za100 B Minor midi file za100 B Minor nwc file [most files that start with a letter go from 1 to 100]some were put on the internet]

za99 C Minor midi file za99 C Minor nwc file

בבא קמא דף כ''ט ע''א. אביי אמר ר' מאיר ור' יהודה חלוקים בשני דברים. בזמן מעידה, ר' מאיר מחזיק נתקל פושע, ור' יהודה מחזיק נתקל לאו פושע. לאחר הנפילה, ר' מאיר מחזיק מפקיר נזקיו אינו פוטר אותו מאחריות, ור' יהודה מחזיק שהוא פטור. אבל מה הוא מייאש החפץ באמצע נפילה? גם אם נתקל פושע, מה אם יש מקרה של נפילה של אונס כמו רוח חזקה לא רגילה. או מה אם יש נפילה על ידי אונס, והוא לא מייאש את החפץ? היה נדמה לי בתחלה שיכול להיות מקרה שהנפילה הייתה על ידי אונס, ובכל זאת הוא לא מפקיר נזקיו, ואולי זו נושא המחלוקת? כמו כן, אולי היה אפשר לחשוב במקרה של נפילה ברשלנות, ולמרות זאת הוא מפקיר את הנזק מיד,ואלי זו נושא המחלוקת? אבל ראיתי את בית יוסף [בשלחן ערוך, חושן משפט תי''ב, דין ד', ובהגהות הגר''א הערה ח'.] שאף אחד מאלה אינו המחלוקת. אז אני חושב שהמחלוקת היא שמכיוון שלר' מאיר ,נתקל פושע, אז אפילו מפקיר נזקיו לאחר הנפילה לא משחרר אותו מחובת תשלום פיצויים. אבל לר' יהודה, מכיוון שהמעידה היא על ידי אונס, אז מפקיר נזקיו לאחר הנפילה לא יהיה חייב. כמו כן הבנתי שלר' מאיר, אפילו במקרה של נפילה שהייתה על ידי אונס, למשל רוח חריגה באה והפילה דברים מן הגג, ואז הוא נטש את הדברים, הוא עדיין יהיה אחראי עד שהוא יסיר את החפצים מרשות הרבים. אני יכול להזכיר כאן שרצף מחשבות זה עלה לי לאחר שראיתי את התפרת שמואל [המודפסת בגמרא] והוא אומר שלר' יהודה לנטוש את החפץ שנופל ברשלנות לא יפטור אותו מאחריות. לאחר מכן ראיתי זאת נאמר בגלוי בשלחן ערוך ובגר"א באותו דין. אז חשבתי שאולי הוויכוח הוא כאשר הנפילה הייתה על ידי אונס והוא לא נטש את החפץ, אבל השלחן ערוך (גם שם) אומר שהוא אחראי. (כלומר, שר' יהודה סבור שהוא אחראי, והחוק הוא כמו שר' יהודה.) אז, חשבתי שאולי המחולקת נמצאת במקרה שבו אפילו ר' מאיר מסכים שזו נפילה על ידי אונס כמו רוח חזקה יוצאת דופן והוא לא נטש את החפץ. ראיתי גם שם שהשלחן ערוך אומר שהוא אחראי. אז, המקום היחיד שבו אפשר שתהיה שם המחלוקת הוא אחרי נפילה על ידי אונס, והוא אכן נטש את החפץ. ר' מאיר אומר שהוא עדיין אחראי להסירו למרות שהוא הפקיר אותו, ור' יהודה אומר שאין אחריות מכיוון שיש גם שהנפילה הייתה על ידי אונס וגם שהוא אכן נטש את החפץ

Bava Kama page 29a. The argument between the Maharsha and almost all other achronim about the approach of Tosphot in Bava Kama page 29

Bava Kama page 29a. Abaye said R. Meir and R. Judah disagree about two things. At the time of tripping, R. Meir holds tripping is by negligence, and R. Judah holds it is by accident. After the fall, R. Meir holds abandoning the object does not absolve him from liability, and R. Judah holds it does. But what if he abandons the object in the middle of a fall? Even if tripping is by negligence, what if there is case of a fall by accident like a strong wind (that is unexpected and it blows things off the roof that damaage things on the ground)? Or --what if there is a fall by accident, and he does not abandon the object? It seems to me that one might have thought it could be in a case where the fall was by accident, and yet he did not abandon his property. Also, one might have thought it would be in a case of a fall by negligence, and yet he abandoned the property immediately. But I saw the Beit Yoseph [in Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat chapter 412, law 4, and in the note of the Gra, note 8.] that neither of these are possible. {Not like the Maharsha}. So, I think the argument is that since to R. Meir, tripping is by negligence, then even abandoning the property after the fall does not release him from obligation to pay for damages. But to R. Judah since the tripping is by accident, then abandoning the property after the fall would not be liable. Also, I realized that to R. Meir even a case of a fall that was by accident e.g. a unusual wind came and knocked the things down, and then he abandoned the things, he still would be liable until he removes the objects from the public domain. I might mention here that this train of thought came to me after I looked at the Tiferet Shmuel [printed in the back of the Gemara], and he says that to R. Judah to abandon the object that is falling by negligence would not absolve him from responsibility. After that, I saw this stated openly in the Shulchan Aruch and the Gra on that halacha. I then thought: perhaps the argument is when the fall was by accident, and yet he did not abandon the object? but the Shulchan Aruch (there also) says he is liable. (That means that R. Judah holds he is liable since the law is like R. Judah. So, I though perhaps the disagreement is in a case where even R. Meir agrees it is a fall by accident (like a strong unusual wind), and he did not abandon the object, but then I saw there too the Shulchan Aruch says he is liable. So, the only place an argument is possible is after a fall by accident, and he did abandon the object. R. Meir says he still is liable to remove it even though he abandoned it, and R Judah says there he is not liable since you have both that the fall was by accident and he did abandon the object. ---------------------------------------------------------------------בבא קמא page 29. אביי said ר’ מאיר and ר’ יהודה disagree about two things. At the time of tripping, ר’ מאיר holds נתקל פושע, and ר’ יהודה holds it is by אונס. After the fall, ר’ מאיר holds מפקיר the object does not absolve him from liability, and ר’ יהודה holds it does. But what is he מיאש the object in the middle of a fall? Even if נתקל פושע, what if there is case of a fall by אונס like a strong wind. Or what if there is a fall by אונס and he does not מיאש the object? It seems to me that one might have thought it could be in a case where the fall was by אונס, and yet he did not מפקירhis property. Also, one might have thought it would be in a case of a fall by negligence and yet he הפקיר the property immediately. But I saw the בית יוסף [in שלחן ערוך, חושן משפט תי''ב, law ד', and in the note of the גר''א note ח'.] that neither of these are possible. So, I think the argument is that since to ר’ מאיר ,נתקל פושע then even מפקיר נזקיו after the fall does not release him from obligation to pay for damages. But to ר' יהודה since the tripping is by ,אונס then מפקיר נזקיו after the fall would not be חייב. Also I realized that to ר’ מאיר even a case of a fall that was by אונס e.g. a unusual wind came and knocked things מן הגג down, and then he abandoned the things, he still would be liable until he removes the objects from the רשות הרים I might mention here that this train of thought came to me after I looked at the תפארת שמואל [printed in the back of the גמרא ] and he says that to ר’ יהודה to abandon the object that is falling by negligence would not absolve him from responsibility. After that I saw this stated openly in the שלחן ערוךand the Gra on that דין. I then thought perhaps the argument is when the fall was by אונס and yet he did not abandon the object, but the שלחן ערוך(there also) says he is liable. (That means that R. Judah holds he is liable since the law is like R. Judah. So, I though perhaps the מחלוקת is in a case where even ר’ מאיר agrees it is a fall by אונס like a strong unusual wind and he did not abandon the object by then I saw there too the שלחן ערוךsays he is liable. So, the only place an argument is possible is after a fall by אונס and he did abandon the object. ר’ מאיר says he still is liable to remove it even though he הפקיר it and ר’ יהודה says there is not liable since you have both that the fall was by אונס and he did abandon the object.

Bava Mezia 96.

A borrower of an object or animal is liable more than a paid guard because all the benefit goes to him. The Gemara in Bava Mezia 96 side a has a case where there are two borrowers of an animal, and yet the owner was with only one of the borrowers. [When the owner of the animal is with a borrower at the time the deal was agreed upon, and the animal dies, the borrower is not liable.] So, if the animal dies, then the only borrower who could be liable for his half is the one that was alone without the owner. To the Ramban and the Ran this might be a source for the law of the Rambam that when there are two borrowers of money on one document each one is liable only for half. The question is perhaps each should be liable for the whole loan just like in the case of guarantors] thus the Ramban comes to tell us the Rambam learned this from the case of the borrowers on page 96. Rav Shach (lender and borrower chapter 25, halacha 10) asks that this does not seem to be a good proof since the borrowers of the animal must be liable only for one part. The reason is that the other part of the animal was loaned to the other borrowers and so the first borrowers can not be liable for the other half because the benefit of that half did not go to him, but rather went to the other borrower. My tentative answer for this is that the in the case of the borrowers of the animal, the animal is one whole piece thus is not divided, and yet we still say each borrower is responsible only for his own half. But with borrowing money, there is no reason not to consider the whole amount as dividable. So, we have a “all the more so”. If the one borrower of the animal is liable only for his half, all the more so a borrower money is responsible only for his half even f both are signed on the loan.-------------------------------------------A שואל of an object is liable more than a שומר שכר because all theכל הנאה שלו . The גמרא in בבא מציעא צ''ו ע''א has a case where there are two שואלים of an animalת and yet the owner was with only one of the שואלים. So, if the animal dies, then the only שואל who could be חייב for his half is the one that was alone without the owner. To the רמב''ן and the ר''ן this might be a source for the law of the רמב''ם that when there are two לווים of money on one שטר, each one is liable only for half. The question is perhaps each should be liable for the whole הלוואה just like in the case of guarantors]. Thus, the רמב''ן comes to tell us the רמב''ם learned this from the case of the borrowers on page צ''ו. ON THIS רב שך asks that this does not seem to be a good proof since the שואלים of the animal must be liable only for one part. The reason is that the other part of the animal was loaned to the other שואל and so the first שואל can not be liable for the other half because the benefit of that half did not go to him, but rather went to the other שואל. While לווים of כסף might be liable for the whole amount. Why should we learn from שואלים of an animal to לווים of money? There is a specific reason the שואל of the animal can only be חייב for his half. My tentative answer for this is that the in the case of the שואלים of the animal, the animal is one whole piece thus is not divided, and yet we still say each שואל is responsible only for his own half. But with borrowing money, there is no reason not to consider the whole amount as dividable. So, we have a “קו וחומר”. If the one שואל of the animal is חייב only for his half, all the more so a לווה OF money is responsible only for his half even If both are signed on the loan.--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- עיין ברב שך מלוה ולווה כ''ה ה''י. שואל של חפץ אחראי יותר משומר שכר כי כל ההנאה שלו. לגמרא בבא מציעא צ''ו ע''א יש מקרה שיש שני שואלים של בהמה, ובכל זאת הבעלים היה רק עם אחד מהשואלים. (כאשר בעל הבהמה נמצא עם שואל בזמן סיום העסקה, והבהמה מתה, השואל אינו חייב.) אז אם בהמה מתה, אז השואל היחיד שיכול להיות חייב על החצי שלו הוא זה שהיה לבד בלי הבעלים. לרמב''ן ולר''ן זה יכול להיות מקור לדין הרמב''ם שכאשר יש שני לווים של כסף על שטר אחד, כל אחד חייב רק בחצי. השאלה היא שאולי כל אחד צריך להיות אחראי לכל הלוואה בדיוק כמו במקרה של ערבים]. לפיכך, הרמב"ן בא לומר לנו שהרמב"ם למד זאת ממקרה השואלים בעמוד צ"ו. על כך שואל רב שך שזו לא נראית כהוכחה טובה מכיוון שהשואלים של הבהמה חייבים להיות אחראים רק לחלק אחד (כל אחד רק חצי). הסיבה לכך היא שהחלק השני של הבהמה הושאל לשואל השני, ולכן השואל הראשון אינו יכול להיות אחראי למחצית השנייה מכיוון שההנאה של מחצית זו לא הלכה אליו, אלא הלכה לשואל השני. בעוד שלווים של כסף יכולים להיות אחראים לכל הסכום. מדוע עלינו ללמוד משואלים של בהמה ללווים של כסף? יש סיבה ספציפית לכך שהשואל של הבהמה יכול להיות חייב רק למחציתו. התשובה הזמנית שלי לכך היא שבמקרה של השואלים של הבהמה, הבהמה היא חלק אחד שלם, ולכן אינה מחולקת, ובכל זאת אנו עדיין אומרים שכל שואל אחראי רק על מחציתו. אבל כשמדובר בהלוואת כסף, אין סיבה לא להתייחס לכל הסכום כמתחלק. לכן, יש לנו "קו וחומר". אם השואל האחד של הבהמה חייב רק על מחציתו, קל וחומר שלווה של כסף אחראית רק על מחציתו גם אם שניהם חתומים על ההלוואה

Kant redefined reason to be a system of rules. But to my opinion, it is a bridge between Mind and Objective Reality

Because of Hume, Kant redefined reason to be a system of rules. This came the fact that Hume was teaching Euclid. There reason is to build on axioms, and only when a contradiction between a deduction and an axiom comes about then reason says one rejects the deduction. So, to Hume reason has one function alone-to perceive contradictions. Not to bridge between the mind and reality. The problem with this is that Hume states his point as a given fact without ever proving it or even giving any arguments for it. Kant disagreed with this a and said reason has another function that through its software to perceive reality, i.e., through the principles of logic to perceive reality. That is reason is a system of rules by which reality can be perceived. the problem is that this still builds of Hume’s fallacy. Reason in my opinion goes beyond that. To Michael Huemer it perceives universals. But to my opinion it goes beyond that. It is a bridge between Mind and Objective Reality.[However, there is a difference between the function of reason recognizing contradictions and universals and objective reality. This is still not to deny the importance of Kant and Leonard Nelson who recognize these differences.]][You do not need to prove that there is reality, or that reason sees reality directly. If you do not belive in reality, then you need to bring proof, and there is no proof that could satisfy the conditions needed for such a proof.]See this from Dr. Bryan Caplan (Economics) and similar ideas from Dr. Michael Huemer (Philosophy--University of Colorado). I would like to add a further note: I have noticed that there is a close similarity between H.A. Prichard and Jacob Fries, in one respect, but quite different in others. The similarity is what Fries calls immediate non intuitive knowledge. Prichard also has something similar; --he says moral knowledge is inherent, not derived from anything, and not known by reason, nor by empirical evidence. In fact, that was his disagreement with G.E. Moore who held moral knowledge can be known by reason. But the differences are in the nature of reason. To Prichard, knowledge has to be of entities independent of the mind. [I.e., to Prichard, knowledge is of things in themselves. To Kant, knowledge is only of phenomena.] There is away to defend Kant concerning the nature of knowledge based on an idea from the intuitionists. Seeing empirical reality is not knowledge. Seeing anything is not knowledge. So no matter what you see, you have to process it and synthesise it into knowledge. A Possible objection to the Kantian approach to knowledge is that the mind must know something that is not the mind itself. The arrow goes from the mind to outside the mind. Only then can the mind reverse direction and go back to know its own properties. To self knowledge is not direct, rather it comes only as a second step. Therefore, knowledge must be of things independent of the mind.

With learning Physics, I found for me going forwards and backwards on every page was an amazing help. but eventually it got me bogged down. I try nowadays to combine several methods of learning. One way is to listen to lectures by experts that are now accessible on the internet. In years past, there was no access to anything like this unless one was enrolled in a university. I also hold strongly with the path of learning of Rav Nachman of saying the words and going on with no review until I have finished the whole book, and then review the whole book at least four times. {This comes from the Conversations of Rav Nachman of Breslov number 76. It is also hinted at in the LeM of Rav Nachman vol. I, chapter 11. } [The forwards and backwards approach helped me get started, and also to get through my subjects at Polytechnic Institute of N.Y.U.] [The source in the Gemara in Tractate Shabat page 63 and Tractate Avoda Zara page 19a]