za8 midi      za8 nwc    [somewhat edited towards the end.]

 za9 midi    za 9 nwc 

za10 =a midi music file and the nwc version with notes

 za10 midi za10 nwc

the reason for the za designation is i started naming music files with a1 to a100 then b1 to b100  to z1 to z100. then stopped until a short time ago when i started again [do not ask where all the files went. i do not know. some were posted on the internet. ] . i did very little writing of music except in high school and only started again in the 1990's

music file za15

 za15 midi  za15 nwc  [The nwc file has the notes.]

2 music files

 za16 midi   za16 nwc  za12 midi za12 nwc

za11 nwc n za11 midi not editedot edited

 An ox that gores a cow [and it is the first time][note 2] is obligated in half damages. To R. Akiva half the ox already belongs to the owner of the cow so if that owner sanctifies 1/2 the ox (note 1), it is sanctified. [Bava Kama 33a]. My question here is the principle that if one has an object that is not in his domain, he can not sanctify it. [The normal such case is one has given over an object to his friend to guard, and the friend denies it, --he can not sanctify it because הוא שלו אינו ברשותו he owns it, but it is not in his domain.] The question here seems strong because Tosphot says the owner of the ox is not actually obligated until he stands in court, even though the 1/2 ox belongs to the damaged person. [Tosphot bases  that on false witnesses that say so and so killed on Sunday. Other witnesses say to them you could not have seen that because you were with us on that day, but on a different day even months  before that time so and so killed. The false witnesses are killed because even though the event already happened, and the murderer had killed, still he was not brought to court. So the false witnesses are killed. Makot pg 5a. Tosphot is difficult to understand here, but the Tosphot Shantz makes the intention clear.] And the question is even stronger according to the approach of Rabainu Chananel and the Rambam that the ox itself is not owned by the owner of the wounded cow until standing in court. You can see this in the Rambam by the fact that he holds that if the ox went up in value by itself, the owner of the cow does not receive any more money than the half damages. Laws of Damages 7:12  

This seems like an obvious question, but I bring it up just in case. I still have to see the great Litvak sages who deal with this subject and I suspect that Rav Shach might very well bring this up. Besides him, I see there are a few other important Litvak sages that have written on Bava Kama [Rav Nachum of the Mir, Rav Shmuel of Ponovitch, and the Even Haazel by R. Isar Meltzer. bli neder, i will try to see what they write on this difficult subject   [Sadly the roshei yeshiva at the Mir in NY did little or no writing. At least they made tapes of Reb Shmuel Berenbaum's last seven years of classes,-- but it would take a massive amount of effort to get them into readable Hebrew.--all classes were in Yiddish.]

Possible answer: Rambam laws of vows 12:10 if a woman says to her husband the work of her hands is sanctified to Him who made them, he still can benefit from the work of her hands because they are under obligation to him. This is so even though freeing a slave, hametz and and sanctification override monetary obligation, but the sages made the obligation to  the husband  to be stronger. so here in our case of an ox that causes damage,  the owner of the cow should be able to sanctify the ox because the ox is at least under obligation to him sanctifying the ox should override the ownership of the owner of the ox. the cases are different, still I think this might be the answer. [the case of the wife is that she owns her hands but they are under obligation to her husband so her sanctifying them should be stronger than in our case where the owner of the cow owns the ox but it is not in his domain.

Another possible answer is that perhaps this Gemara is going like the opinion that half damages is monetary. And this would fit in better with the language of the Gemara that says that R.Akiva holds the owners of the ox and cow are partners, and it is hard to say that something owned together by partners is not in the domain of one of them. (And thus the Gemara would be explained according to the opinion that half damages is a penalty, and thus the owner of the cow does not have any ownership of the ox until standing in court ) I think this last sentence was written wrong and that I meant to say the gemara is like the opinion that 1/2 damages is monetary so to R Akiva the owner of the injured cow can sanctify it. 

I noticed in Rav Shach laws of buying and selling 22 law12 that the Rambam and Tosphot hold for holiness of body, the animal does not need to be in the domain of the one who sanctifies it, he only needs to own the animal and so our gemara here might hold that way.--later after writing this blog i noticed the Tosphot Rabbainu Peretz brings up this issue    

     

(note 1) This means that  a person says, "This object is dedicated to the Temple". Sometimes this might  mean he sanctifies an animal as a sacrifice. But it can mean the object is given to the Temple. Then the people in charge of the Temple can use the object or they can sell it and use the money for the upkeep of the Temple/   

note 2 exodus 21; verse 35

later note: I saw today the Rosh brings up this issue in Tosphot HaRosh. He brings from Rav Meir Halevi that the sanctification goes back in time,-  from the time he acquires the animal back to the time he sanctified it. But (as Tosphot points out) that is like Abyee (in Pesachim page 30), not like Rava. and it is hard to say that our whole subject here is coming not like Rava and thus against the halacha (established rule).

Later note the Rambam brings this gemara straight even though in our Gemara the question being asked and answered is according to R Ishmael. [laws of damages chapter 8 law 6 ] So the Rambam understands this is coming according to R. Akiva. Thus when the gemara says the ox is an collateral [apotiki] that would answer my question since the law of an collateral [apotiki] is that it is in the domain of the lender. So in our case the animal is considered to be in the domain of the person that owns the damaged cow.    How do I know the Rambam considers the collateral [apotiki] to be in the domain of the lender? Answer The Rambam writes the law of the collateral [apotiki] to be that the lender has to pay the least amount to the buyer, whether the expenses or the improvement. [laws of lender and borrower 21:10] But to me it seems plain that it comes from the law of one who goes into a field of someone else and plants it. The case came before Rav and Rav said "Go pay the planter, and the planter gets the least amount whether the expense or profit." (Later Rav changed his mind, but this was the first decision).Now the field there was in the domain of its owner, and the Rav said to pay the minimum. So here too, the owner of the damaged cow is the owner of the ox which is an collateral [apotiki] and so he can sanctify the ox  since it is in his domain. /

Now I see that Rav Shach also brings that Gemara Bava Mezia 101 side a as the source for the Rambam but after looking at Rav Shach laws of loans 21 law 10 I think there is some aspect of his answer there that is hard to understand. He says when the expense is more than the improvement, the lender comes with the idea that the field belongs to him, and so he gets all the improvement, and only pays for the expense. But when the expense is more than the improvement, the lender comes with the idea that that the lender wrote, ''What ever I will buy, and a lender collects, I will pay for it, and its expense, and its improvement," the buyer of the field and the lender both have equal claim on the improvement, so they divide it. The problem I see with this is that the law should not depend. on what the lender wants. If the case is that of ''It is my field,'' then that is that; and he pays the expense and gets the improvement. If the case is ''What I will buy," then he and the buyer should divide the improvement. If the case comes from the law in Bava Mezia 101a , then over there it does not depend on what the owner wants.

There is another question that is possible to raise on the answer of Rav Shach here. [I.e. the answer he brings for the decision of the Rambam about an apotiki] That is this: In the case of when the improvement to the field is less than the expense and the lender gets all the improvement but pays back half to the buyer, why does the borrower not have to pay back the expense? After all, he writes "I will pay back their price and improvement and expense if a lender comes to collect the field" The answer to this question is that the Rambam himself holds that the borrower does not have to pay back future fields improvement or expense unless he writes in the document openly that he will do so.[laws of loans 18:1 ] The Rambam holds that even though lack of writing shiabud is a mistake of the scribe, still that only applies to the cost of the field. But for future acquisitions improvement and expense, these have to be written openly. So in our case, if the borrower wrote that he will pay these back, then fine. He will do so. But if not then not,  

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 an ox that gores a cow [and it is the first time] is obligated in half damages. To ר'  עקיבא half the ox already belongs to the owner of the cow so if that owner sanctifies 1/2 the ox, it is sanctified. [בבא קמא ל''ג ע''א]. My question here is the principle that if one has an object that is not in his domain he can not sanctify it. [The normal such case is one has given over an object to his friend to guard, and the friend denies it, he can not sanctify it because הוא שלו אינו ברשותו he owns it but it is not in his domain.] The question here seems strong because Tosphot says the owner of the ox is not actually obligated until he stands in court even though the 1/2 ox belongs to the damaged person. [תוספות bases  that on false witnesses that say so and so killed on Sunday. Other witnesses say to them you could not have seen that because you were with us on that, but on a different day [even months  before that time] so and so killed. the false witnesses are killed. Even though the event already happened, and the murderer had killed, still he was not brought to court. So the false witnesses are killed. מכות ה' ע''א

Answer. רמב''ם הלכות נדרים י''ב הלכה י' if a woman says to her husband the work of her hands is sanctified to Him who made them, he still can benefit from the work of her hands because they are under obligation to him. This is so even though freeing a slave, חמץ and and sanctification override monetary obligation, but the חכמים made the obligation to  the husband  to be stronger. So here in A case of an ox that causes damage,  the owner of the cow should be able to sanctify the ox because the ox is at least under obligation to him sanctifying the ox should override the ownership of the owner of the ox. Even though this is a stretch, i think i might answer my question 

the cases are different, still i think this might be the answer. [the case of the wife is that she owns her hands but they are under obligation to her husband so her sanctifying them should be stronger than in our case where the owner of the cow owns the ox but it is not in his domain.      

Another possible answer is that perhaps this גמרא is going like the opinion that half damages is monetary. And this would fit in better with the language of the גמרא that says that ר' עקיבא holds the owners of the ox and cow are partners, and it is hard to say that something owned together by partners is not in the domain of one of them. (And thus the גמרא would be explained according to the opinion that half damages is a penalty (קנס) and thus the owner of the cow does not have any ownership of the ox until standing in court) .I think this last sentence was written wrong and that I meant to say the גמרא is like the opinion that חצי נזק  is monetary so to ר' עקיבא the owner of the injured cow can sanctify it.     

I noticed in רב שך הלכות מכירה כ''ב הלכה י''ב  that the רמב''ם and תוספות hold for holiness of body, the animal does not need to be in the domain of the one who sanctifies it. He only needs to own the animal.  Our גמרא here might hold that way.

Later note: I saw today the רא''ש brings up this issue in תוספות הרא''ש. He brings from רב מאיר הלוי that the sanctification goes back in time,  from the time he acquires the animal back to the time he sanctified it. But (as תוספות points out) that is like אביי (in פסחים ל'), not like רבא. and it is hard to say that our whole subject here is coming not like רבא and thus against the הלכה (established rule).

     

Later note. The רמב''ם brings this גמרא straight even though in our גמרא the question being asked and answered is according to ר' ישמעאל שאינו ההלכה. So the רמב''ם understands this is coming according to ר' עקיבא. Thus when the גמרא says the ox is an collateral אפותיקי that would answer my question, since the law of an collateral [אפותיקי] is that it is in the רשות of the מלווה. So in our case, the animal is considered to be in the רשות of the person that owns the damaged cow.    How do I know the  רמב''ם  considers the collateral אפותיקי to be in the רשות of the lender? Answer: The רמב''ם writes the law of collateral [אפותיקי] to be that the lender has to pay the least amount to the buyer, whether the expenses or the improvement. The מגיד משנה on the רמב''ם did not find a source for this. But to me it seems plain that it comes from the law of one who goes into a field of someone else and plants it (bava mezia 101a ). The case came before רב and רב said "Go pay the planter and the planter gets the least amount," (whether the expense or profit). (Later רב changed him mind, but this was the first decision). Now the field there was in the domain of its owner and  רב said to pay the minimum. So here too, the owner of the damaged cow is the owner of the ox which is an collateral [אפותיקי] and so he can sanctify the ox  since it is in his רשות. [It might be that רב changed his mind because the case there was that the field was owned and set aside for planting , so רב decided the owner had more of an obligation than  regular collateralץ   ]

Now I see that רב שך also brings that Gemara Bava Mezia 101 side a as the source for the Rambam but after looking at רב שך מלווה ולווה פרק כ''א הלכה י. I think there is some aspect of his answer there that is hard to understand. He says when the הוצאה is more than the שבח, the lender comes with the idea that the field belongs to him, and so he gets all the שבח, and only pays for the הוצאה. But when the הוצאה is more than the שבח, the lender comes with the idea that that the lender wrote, ''What ever I will buy, and a lender collects, I will pay for it, and its הוצאות, and its שבח," the buyer of the field and the lender both have equal claim on the שבח, so they divide it. The problem I see with this is that the law should not depend on what the lender wants. If the case is that of  ''It is my field,'' then that is that; and he pays the הוצאות and gets the שבח. If the case is ''What I will buy," then he and the buyer should divide the שבח. If the case comes from the law in Bava Mezia 101a , then over there it does not depend on what the owner wants.-

There is another question that is possible to raise on the answer of רב שך here. [I.e. the answer he brings for the decision of the רמב''ם about an אפותיקי] That is this: In the case of when the improvement to the field is less than the expense and the lender gets all the improvement but pays back half to the buyer, why doe the borrower not have to pay back the expense? After all, he writes "I will pay back their price and improvement and expense if a מלווה comes to collect the field" The answer to this question is that the רמב''ם himself holds that the לווה does not have to pay back these future acquisition unless he writes in the document openly that he will do so. The רמב''ם holds that even though lack of writing שיעבוד is a mistake of the scribe, still that only applies to the fields that he owns at the time of the loan. But for future fields, these have to be written openly. So in our case, if the לווה wrote that he will pay these back, then fine. He will do so. But if not then not,  

שור שנגח פרה [וזו פעם ראשונה] חייב בחצי נזק. לר' עקיבא חצי השור כבר שייך לבעל הפרה אז אם הבעלים הזה מקדש 1/2 מהשור, הוא מקודש. [בבא קמא ל''ג ע''א]. השאלה שלי כאן היא העיקרון שאם יש לאדם חפץ שאינו בתחום שלו הוא לא יכול לקדש אותו. [המקרה הרגיל כזה הוא שאדם נתן חפץ לחברו כדי לשמור, והחבר מכחיש אותו, הוא לא יכול לקדשו כי הוא אינו ברשותו. הוא הבעלים שלו, אבל זה לא בתחום שלו.] השאלה כאן נראית חזקה כי תוספות אומר שבעל השור אינו חייב בפועל עד שיעמוד בבית דין אף על פי שחצי השור שייך לניזוק. [תוספות מבססים את זה על עדי שקר האומרים כך וכך הרגו ביום ראשון. עדים אחרים אומרים להם שלא יכולתם לראות את זה כי הייתם איתנו ביום זה, אלא ביום אחר [אפילו חודשים לפני הזמן הזה] כך וכך הרגו. עדי השקר נהרגים. למרות שהאירוע כבר קרה, והרוצח הרג, עדיין הוא לא הובא לבית המשפט. אז עדי השקר נהרגים. מכות ה' ע''א

והשאלה עוד יותר חזקה לפי גישת ר' חננאל והרמב''ם שהשור עצמו אינו בבעלותו של בעל הפרה עד שעומד בבית דין. אתה יכול לראות זאת ברמב''ם בכך שהוא קובע שאם השור עלה בשווי ממילא, אין בעל הפרה מקבל יותר כסף מחצי הנזק. בהלכות נזקי ממון ז' הלכה י''ב

תשובה. רמב''ם הלכות נדרים י''ב הלכה י' אם אשה אומרת לבעלה מקודשת מעשה ידיה למי שעשה אותן, עדיין יוכל להפיק תועלת מעבודת ידיה כי הן חייבות לו. כך אף על פי ששחרור עבד, חמץ והקדש גוברים על חיוב ממון, אבל החכמים עשו את החיוב לבעל להיות חזק יותר. אז כאן במקרה של שור הגורם נזק, בעל הפרה צריך להיות מסוגל לקדש את השור כי השור לפחות מחויב עליו ולכן קידוש השור צריך לעקוף את בעלות בעל השור.

המקרים שונים, אבל עדיין אני חושב שזו יכולה להיות התשובה. [ענין האישה הוא שהיא בעלת ידיה אבל הן מחויבות לבעלה ולכן הקדש שלהן צריך להיות חזק יותר מאשר במקרה שלנו שבעל הפרה הוא בעל השור אבל זה לא ברשותו

תשובה אפשרית נוספת היא שאולי הגמרא הזו הולכת כמו הדעה שחצי נזק הוא כספי. וזה ישתלב טוב יותר עם לשון הגמרא האומר שר' עקיבא מחזיק בעלי השור והפרה שותפים, וקשה לומר שדבר שבבעלות שותפים יחד אינו ברשות אחד מהם. . הגמרא כפי הדעה שחצי נזק הוא כספי ולכן לר' עקיבא יכול בעל הפרה הפצועה לקדש את השור.

שמתי לב ברב שך הלכות מכירה כ''ב הלכה י''ב שהרמב''ם והתוספות מחזיקים לקדושת הגוף, אין הבהמה צריכה להיות ברשות המקדש אותה, הוא רק צריך בעלות. הגמרא שלנו כאן עשויה להחזיק כך..

היינו שהגמרא מכוונת לקדושת הגוף וזה לפי רב אשי בכתובות נ''ט שמסיק רב אשי שם קונמות קא אמרת שאני קונמות שקדושת הגוף נינהוא וכן משמע בתוספות קידושין ס''ג ד''ה וידיים וכן פסק הרמב''ם בנדרים פרק י''ב הלכה י' לפי פירוש הכסף משנה

הערה בהמשך: ראיתי היום שהרא"ש מעלה את הנושא הזה בתוספות הרא"ש. הוא מביא מהרב מאיר הלוי שהקדשה חוזרת אחורה בזמן,- מרגע שהוא רוכש את הבהמה חזרה להקדשה. אבל (כפי שמציינים תוספות) שזה כמו אביי (בפסחים דף ל'), לא כמו רבא. וקשה לומר שכל הנושא שלנו כאן בא לא כמו רבא ובכך נגד ההלכה (הלכה קבע)

הערה מאוחרת יותר. הרמב''ם מביא את הגמרא הזה ישר למרות שבגמרא שלנו השאלה הנשאלת והתשובה היא לפי ר' ישמעאל שאינו ההלכה. אז הרמב''ם מבין שזה בא לפי ר' עקיבא. לפיכך כשהגמרא אומר שהשור הוא אפותיקי זה יענה על שאלתי, כיון שדין בטחונות הוא שהוא ברשות המלווה. אז במקרה שלנו, השור תם נחשב ברשותו של האדם שבבעלותו הפרה החבולה. איך אני יודע שהרמב''ם רואה את (הבטחונות) אפותיקי ברשות המלווה? תשובה: הרמב''ם כותב את דין ה אפותיקי שהמלווה צריך לשלם לקונה את הסכום הנמוך ביותר, בין ההוצאות ובין ההשבחה. (הלכות מלווה ולווה כ''א הלכה י') המגיד משנה ברמב''ם לא מצא מקור לכך. אבל לי זה נראה פשוט שזה בא מהחוק של מי שנכנס לשדה של מישהו אחר ונוטע אותו בבא מציעא ק''א ע''א. הגיע המקרה לפני רב ורב אמר לו "לך תשלם את הנוטע, והנוטע יקבל את הסכום הכי פחות", (בין אם ההוצאה או הרווח). (מאוחר יותר שינה אותו רב, אבל זו הייתה ההחלטה הראשונה). עתה השדה שם היה ברשות בעליו ואמר רב לשלם את המינימום. אז גם כאן, בעל הפרה החבולה הוא בעל השור שהוא משכון [אפותיקי] ולכן הוא יכול לקדש את השור כיון שהוא ברשותו. [יכול להיות שרב שינה את דעתו כי המקרה שם היה שהשדה בבעלותו ומופרש לנטיעה, ולכן החליט רב שלבעלים יש יותר חובה מאשר בטחונות רגילים]

עכשיו אני רואה שרב שך מביא גם את אותה גמרא בבא מציעא ק''א ע''א כמקור לרמב"ם אבל לאחר עיון ברב שך מלווה ולווה פרק כ''א הלכה י', אני חושב שיש איזשהו היבט בתשובה שלו שם שקשה להבין. הוא אומר כשההוצאה היא יותר מהשבח, המלווה בא עם הרעיון שהשדה שייך לו, ולכן הוא מקבל את כל השבח, ומשלם רק עבור הוצאה. אבל כשההוצאה היא יותר מהשבח, המלווה בא עם הרעיון שהמלווה כתב, ''מה שאקנה, ומלווה יגבה, אני אשלם על זה, ועל הסכום שלו, והשבח שלו", ולרוכש השדה ולמלווה יש תביעה שווה על השבח. אז הבעיה שאני רואה בזה היא שהחוק לא צריך להיות תלוי במה שהמלווה רוצה. אם השדה שלו, אז זה הוא זה, והוא משלם את ההוצאות ומקבל את השבח. אם המקרה מגיע מהחוק בבבא מציעא ק''א ע''א , אז שם זה לא תלוי במה שהבעלים רוצה.

יש עוד שאלה שאפשר להעלות על תשובת רב שך כאן. [כְּלוֹמַר. התשובה שהוא מביא להכרעת הרמב''ם על אפותיקי] כלומר: במקרה שהשבחת השדה קטנה מההוצאה והמלוה מקבל את כל ההשבחה אבל מחזיר חצי לקונה, מדוע הלווה לא צריך להחזיר את ההוצאה? הרי הוא כותב "אחזיר להם את מחירם והשבחתם והוצאה אם ​​יבוא מלווה לגבות את השדה." התשובה לשאלה זו יכולה להיות  שהרמב''ם בעצמו גורס שהלווה אינו חייב להחזיר את קניינים עתידים אלא אם כן כתב כן. הרמב''ם גורס שלמרות שחוסר כתיבה שיעבוד הוא טעות של הסופר, עדיין זה מתייחס רק  לשדה שכבר יש לו. לכן יכול להיות  שלמען שיפור והוצאות על אפותיקי, אלה צריכים להיכתב בגלוי. אז לענייננו, אם הלווה כתב שיחזיר את אלו, אז בסדר. הוא יעשה זאת. אבל אם לא, אז לא

Paying people to learn Torah, or to teach Torah, or to judge according to the law of the Torah is all against the Torah

 I have not been able to see why the State of Israel should give money to yeshivot, nor to religious judges. I think the main reason for this fact is that one of the first tractates I ever learned was Ketuboth. So when I got to the last chapter [page 105B], I got the idea that paying people to learn Torah, or to teach Torah, or to judge according to the law of the Torah was all against the Torah. [Even though that Gemara deals with judges, I was aware of other places where the prohibition of learning or teaching for pay is forbidden. bava batra chap. 1] If you look at that Gemara in ketuboth ,you will see that even taking money from public funds is forbidden. The only two cases of permission are payment for taking time off one' regular work. The first kind of permission is when it is payment for work that is not obvious,-  and the second is payment for work that is obvious. But in both cases, it has to be a case where one has some other kind of work, and then people come and want him to judge a case. [It can not be for hypothetical work.]The obvious type is when one has a fixed salary. The non obvious type is for example one its in a store, and the amount he would get per hour is not clear.

There is a Rambam [Shekalim] which brings that there can be judges that receive money from the temple funds [לישכת הגזית] to judge cases of robbery, but that has to be understood in accord with the other place where the Rambam says a person that receives money to judge--all his judgements  are null and void. There [in laws of shekalim] the Rambam is only dealing with the question from where their payment would come from -in a case where paying them would be permitted--ie שכר בטלה הניכר. 

    I admit I was part of the kollel system until I got to Israel and then the contradiction between what the Torah says and the kollel system became too much for me so I dropped out and depended on trust in God. Then my trust in God ran out,  and I decided to work, and then things went south. But getting back to trust in God never worked again, so that is when I decided that I already needed to find a decent wholesome way of making a living and that is when I went to the Polytechnic Institute of NYU.  so i feel at this point that it makes sense to dispose of a system that claims to be learning and teaching Torah in direct contradiction to what the torah says

Thus I think if people need charity because of being poor, that is fine. But not if they say, ''It is because of learning Torah.'' That just makes Torah into a mode of making money  If people lie about Torah, can they really have any respect for Torah? Or rather perhaps they have found it a convenient way to get money?  

00ךשאקר later note, someone showed to me a beit yoseph that does bring a wider sense of שכר בטלה for people learning torah--that is if you look inside the tur and beit yoseph it does look that payment for not doing one's regular work, might have a wider sense for people sitting a learning torah than for a judge. i mean for a judge it i clear that any kind of a salary is totally forbidden. he has to have a different occupation. but for learning torah it could be that restrictin might be lessened.