Both learning in depth with lots of review and learning by just saying the words and going on are mentioned in the gemara.''לעולם ליגרס אינש אע''ג דמשכח ואע''ג לא ידע מאי קאמר'' ''Always one should learn fast  by just saying the words even though he forgets and even though he does not even know what he is saying.'' And there is the event where one teacher was teaching each his lesson to his student 400 times until he understood. Then one day the student was not paying attention, so the teacher taught the same lesson another 400 times. Then in that merit, he was granted 400 years of life and that all the people of his generation would merit to the world to come.

So you need both. my suggestion is to do the in-depth learning in math, physics and gemara [talmud] in the morning and the fast type in the afternoon and evening as is the regular order in most Litvak yeshivot. [However, I do not think that Shar Yashuv had any set time for fast learning,-- as all the learning there was in depth.]   [My son, Isaac, told me many times that the main thing is in depth learning, and that fast learning (saying the words in order and going on) should only be after one has completed his in-depth learning sessions.] 

בבא בתרא כ''ב Bava Batra page 22 and In Laws of Neighbors (9:13) in the Rambam.

In laws of neighbors (9:13) in the Rambam, we have the law that one can put the leftovers of the olive press or other forms of garbage next to the border of his neighbor until the neighbor puts up a wall there. Then he must take the garbage away so that it does not damage that wall. But if an upstairs neighbor is planning on making the upper floor a storage place for fruit, then he can object if the downstairs neighbor wants to make an oven downstairs underneath. But if the oven was put there anyway, it can stay. What makes the oven more strict than the leftovers of the olive press before the attic is made into a storage space, and less strict afterwards? The Gra explains  this in the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 155:8) it is because the oven is a doubt, and in case of doubt in prohibitions the law is to be strict, and in money the law is to be lenient. So before the attic is made for storage, the question is that of the prohibition to cause damage, so we are strict. After the attic was made for storage, the question is that of money, and so we are lenient. My question here is that even after the oven was put downstairs and the attic is used for storage, still the question seems to be that of causing damage to the fruit.  [See the Avi Ezri the notebook on laws of damages paragraph 2 and the Avi Ezri on that law in the Rambam.] I would like to suggest a possible answer to this question. It is that the ""chezkat mamon" possession of garbage is weaker than possession of an oven. So while after the  the wall is built the garbage has little right to remain while the oven has more of a right to remain.   

      

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In הלכות שכנים פרק ט' הלכה י''ג in the רמב''ם we have the law that one can put the גפת leftovers of the olive press or  garbage next to the border of his neighbor until the neighbor puts up a wall there. Then he must take the garbage away so that it does not damage that wall. But if  an upstairs neighbor is planning on making the upper floor a storage place for fruit, then he can object if the downstairs neighbor wants to make an oven downstairs right underneath. But if the oven was put there anyway, it can stay. What makes the oven more strict than the leftovers of the olive press before the attic is made into a storage space, and less strict afterwards? The גר''א explains this in the שלחן ערוך חושן משפט קנ''ה ס''ק ח'  it is because the oven is a doubt. In case of doubt in prohibitions, the law is to be strict.  In doubt of  money, the law is to be lenient. So before the upper floor is made for storage, the question is that of the prohibition to cause damage, so we are strict. After the upper floor was made for storage, the question is that of money, and so we are lenient. My question here is that even after the oven was put downstairs and the attic is used for storage, still the question seems to be that of causing damage to the fruit.  [See the רב שך אבי עזרי the notebook on קונטרס הרחקת נזקים paragraph ב and the אבי עזרי on that law in the רמב''ם. ]      

I would like to suggest a possible answer to this question. It is that the חזקת ממון possession of garbage is weaker than possession of an oven. So while after the  the wall is built, the garbage has little right to remain, while the oven has more of a right to remain.   

בהלכות שכנים פרק ט' הלכה י''ג ברמב''ם יש את הדין שאפשר לשים את שאריות הגפת של בית בד או אשפה ליד גבול שכנו עד שהשכן ישים חומה שם. אז הוא חייב לקחת את האשפה כדי שלא יפגע בקיר הזה. אבל אם השכן מלמעלה מתכנן להפוך את הקומה העליונה למקום אחסון לפירות, אז הוא יכול להתנגד אם השכן מלמטה רוצה להכין תנור למטה ממש מתחת. אבל אם התנור הונח שם בכל זאת, הוא יכול להישאר. מה מחמיר את התנור משאריות בית הבד לפני הפיכת עליית הגג לחלל אחסון, ופחות מחמיר לאחר מכן? הגר''א מסביר זאת בשלחן ערוך חושן משפט קנ''ה ס''ק ח' זה משום שהתנור ספק. במקרה של ספק באיסורים, יש להחמיר את הדין. בספק כסף, החוק צריך להיות מקל. אז לפני שהקומה העליונה נעשית לאחסון, השאלה היא של איסור גרימת נזק, ולכן אנחנו מחמירים. לאחר שהקומה העליונה נעשתה לאחסון, השאלה היא של כסף, ולכן אנו מקלים. השאלה שלי כאן היא שגם לאחר שהוכנס התנור למטה ועליית הגג משמשת לאחסון, עדיין נראה שהשאלה היא של גרימת נזק לפרי. [ראה רב שך אבי עזרי קונטרס הרחקת נזקים פסקה ב', ובאבי עזרי על הדין ההוא ברמב''ם. ]

אני רוצה להציע תשובה אפשרית לשאלה זו. זה שהחזקת ממון של אשפה חלשה יותר מהחזקה של תנור. אז בעוד שלאחר בניית הקיר, לאשפה אין זכות להישאר, בעוד שלתנור יש יותר זכות להישאר

wisdom of the Greeks

 Even though the wisdom of the Greeks is frowned upon in the Gemara, many Rishonim (note 1) did not think that applied to Plato or Aristotle but to the other schools of Greek philosophy. [There were four such schools altogether including Epicurus ]. It seems likely that the Rishonim understood the objection of the sages was directed against  Epicurus. otherwise it is hard to understand why the Rambam would have written that מעשה מרכבה ומעשה בראשית the Divine Chariot and the Work of Creation mentioned in the Mishna and Gemara refer to what the ancient Greeks called Physics and Metaphysics   

(note 1)   [FIRST AUTHORITIES from the  Rif [Isaac ALFASSI ] up until the Beit Joseph [JOSEPH KARO-author of the SHULCHAN ARUCH]--not including the Beit Joseph]

My opinion is that the prohibition of idolatry was the basic point of the herem [excommunication] that was signed by the Gra [Gaon of Vilna].

 The major point of the Book of Maccabees is against worship of idols. The miracle of the oil and the menorah are not even mentioned. The only thing that comes up is that the king of Syria put up an idol and demanded that people worship it and when someone went over to bow down to that idol, Matisyahu killed him, and started the rebellion against Syrian rule.   [My opinion is that this prohibition of idolatry was the basic point of the herem [excommunication] that was signed by the Gra [Gaon of Vilna].]

[And I believe that herem is still valid and in force, but I do not think it applies to Rav Nahman of Breslov for reason that looking at the actual language of the herem, I noticed it did not seem applicable to him. ]

THE king of Syria, Antiochus is referred to as Greek because he was king of of of the four areas conquered by Alexander of Macedonia which after conquering Greece adopted much of Greek culture. AS a result, ''Greek wisdom'' got a negative review until Rav Saadia Gaon, ibn Pakuda, the Rambam. and the Gra. I myself would have been happy to it a learn Gemara, and ignore all ''outside learning'' until I discovered the opinion of these above mentioned  sages that wrote about the importance of certain aspects of secular learning--but not all. learning.  Physics and Metaphysics, in fact, the Rambam writes are included in the commandments to love and fear God. But most of what today is considered science is pseudo science [e.g., psychology], and would  not be included in these commandments 

'' Male and female HE created them.'' [Genesis chapter one]

 The synthesis faith and reason was the major idea of the Middle Ages. Each by itself can get seriously out of kilter. This is a case where faith in the Bible can correct flaws in reason. '' Male and female HE created them.'' [Genesis chapter one].

Reason by itself does not tell us much. To Hume it is confined to analytic propositions. Kant struggled mightily for ten years to answer this approach of Hume, and came up with his justification of synthetic a priori knowledge-which is that it is justified within the realm of possibility of experience. But this approach in itself has been subject to debate until rejected totally by both continental and Anglo American so called ''Analytic philosophy.'' The approach favored by me is the Kant-Friesian School [Leonard Nelson] which rightly shows that reason itself has to have starting principles-otherwise it can not get off the ground. This is by immediate non-intuitive knowledge.

But this problem has been rejected by Michael Huemer who says reason itself recognizes universals, i.e., a priori knowledge. While what he says is quite true, however it leaves the problem of how does reason recognize what principles are more ''reasonable''. What criteria does one have to judge. He depends on probability [of Bayes], but even there one needs criteria to decide what is more reasonable.  

The main contenders of the Kant Friesian School of Leonard Nelson were the neo- Kantian and Husserl. The Neo-Kantians have gone into oblivion, and Husserl is incoherent. What does he think?--to boil down a person to discover his essence? That is like boiling down a whale into its constituent atoms to find out what is the essence of a  whale.   And  his method of phenomenology  he never got around to defining what exactly it is. No wonder David Hilbert sided with Nelson. And there is a bit of poetic justice in that Husserl was paid back in kind in his efforts to block Nelson from a professorship. [That was when his own student, Heidegger, got Husserl removed from his professorship. Payback is a bitch.   

The Mishna [Bava Batra page 2a]

The Mishna [Bava Batra page 2a] says if a wall falls down between two neighbors, they divide the stones or bricks evenly. The Rashba [[Bava Batra page 4]] asks what if one says, ''I built all of the wall',' and the other says, ''I built half and my neighbor built half.'' The Rashba answers [according to Rav Shach] since it is derara demomona [relevance of money] still both divide evenly. But what about Tosphot [Bava Metzia page 2a ]? To Tosphot when there is derara demomona that is when the court says one takes three fourths and the other one fourth. I would like to answer this question thus. Perhaps the Mishna is Sumchos [money in doubt is divided]. And this is not far fetched, since the stam mishnas [anonymous mishnas  ] in the three bavot hold like Sumchos. However, we see the Rambam still decided the halacha like this mishna even though it is like Sumchos. The reason might be that if  the sages would disagree with it, why did they not say so? So it must be that they agree. This leads me to a different answer. Perhaps if the one neighbor would say, ''I built all'' and the other would say, ''I built half'', then we would divide three fourths to one and one fourth to the other. It just so happens that the Mishna does not deal with that case. Perhaps they are saying nothing and the case is that the bricks fell into one yard only.

I am aware of the fact that in Bava Metzia pg 100 there is some modification of Sumchos, but I forget what was said there, and it could be it might disprove my suggestion here. If so, I am willing to retract.  All this is just a suggestion that this first mishna in Bava Batra might be Sumchos, and if so, that would help Tosphot.

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The משנה בבא בתרא ב' ע''א  says if a wall fall down between two neighbors, they divide the stones or bricks evenly. The רשב''א בבא בתרא דף ד   asks What if one says, ''I built all of the wall',' and the other says, 'I built half and my neighbor built half. The רשב''א answers [according to רב שך] since it is דררא  דממונא still both divide evenly. But what about תוספות בבא מציעא ב' ע''א? To תוספות when there is דררא דממונא that is when the court says one takes three fourths and the other one fourth. I would like to answer this question thus. Perhaps the משנה is סומכוס ממון המוטל בספק חולקים . And this is not far fetched, since the סתם משנה in the three בבות hold like סומכוס. However, we see the רמב''ם still decided the הלכה like this משנה even though it is מסתבר like סומכוס. The reason might be that if  the חכמים would disagree with it, why did they not say so? So it must be that they agree. This leads me to a different answer. Perhaps if the one neighbor would say, ''I built all'' and the other would say, ''I built half'', then we would divide three fourths to one and one fourth to the other. It just so happens that the משנה does not deal with that case. Perhaps they are saying nothing and the case is that the bricks fell into one yard only.

המשנה בבא בתרא ב' ע''א אומרת שאם נפל קיר בין שני שכנים, מחלקים את האבנים או הלבנים באופן שווה. הרשב''א בבא בתרא דף ד' שואל מה אם אחד אומר ''בניתי את כל החומה'', והשני אומר ''בניתי חצי ושכני בנה חצי''. עונה הרשב''א [לפי רב שך] כיון שזה דררא דממונא עדיין שניהם מחלקים שווה בשווה. אבל מה לגבי תוספות בבא מציעא ב' ע''א? לתוספות כשיש דררא דממונא שבית הדין אומר אחד נוטל שלש רביעיות והשני רביעית. אני רוצה לענות על השאלה הזו כך. אולי המשנה היא סומכוס, ממון המוטל בספק חולים. וזה לא מופרך, מכיוון שהסתם משנה בשלושת הבבות מחזיקה כמו סומכוס. עם זאת, אנו רואים שהרמב''ם עדיין החליט על ההלכה כמו המשנה הזו למרות שזה מסתבר כמו סומכוס. הסיבה עשויה להיות שאם החכמים יחלקו על כך, מדוע לא אמרו זאת? אז כנראה שהם מסכימים. זה מוביל אותי לתשובה אחרת. אולי אם השכן האחד היה אומר ''בניתי הכל'' והשני היה אומר ''בניתי חצי'', אז נחלק שלוש רביעיות לאחד ורביעית לשנייה. המשנה לא מטפלת במקרה הזה. אולי הם לא אומרים כלום והמקרה הוא שהלבנים נפלו לחצר אחת בלבד

I was thinking about the idea of Rav Shach in the Rambam [laws of neighbors chapter 2 halacha 18.] off and on for a few weeks. I felt there was some sort of question that I should ask, but I could not see it exactly until today on my way to the sea. So here it is: 

 I have a question on the way Rav Shach explains the Rashba in Bava Batra page 4 side a , brought in Rambam laws of neighbors chapter 2 halacha 18. . My question is that derara demomona [a relevance of money] goes like this. If there is an argument between two people about who owns a ship or boat and there is no proof one way or the other, we say who ever grabs it first gets it. But for two people holding a garment, we say they divide equally. Or if one says, ''It is all mine'' and the other says, ''It is half mine,'' then 1/4 goes to the last one, and 1/2 to the first. The difference is that with the garment, there is derara demomona. Tosfot Bava Metzia page 2a based on the mishna there and the case of the boat in Bava Batra page 35.  

But in Bava Batra, the first mishna says  two neighbors must build a wall between their properties. Therefor if it falls the stones or bricks are divided equally between them. The gemara on page 4 asks, "Is that not obvious?" The Rashba there asks, "Why is it obvious? What if one says, 'I built all of the wall.' and the other claims each one built half of the wall? Rav Shach explains there that the intension of the Rashba is because each has derara demomona which means there is a doubt to the court even without their claims, and therefore the court ignores their claims and divides the wall equally.

The question on this is that derara demomona in the beginning of Bava Metzia means that the court pays attention to their claims,--as opposed to ignoring their claims, and letting them settle the matter by themselves. But here Rav Shach is saying derara demomona is a reason to ignore their claims, and simply divide the wall equally.     

There is an obvious answer, the Rashba is not Tosphot. But my question is based on the idea that the Rashba had a reason for his approach and the Tosphot also. Thus the question is based on the issues, not on who said what 

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 I have a question on the way רב שך explains the רשב''א in בבא בתרא דף ד' ע''א. (This is brought in the רמב''ם הלכות שכנים פרק ב' הלכה י''ח.) My question is that דררא דממונא [a שייכות of money] goes like this. If there is an argument between two people about who owns a ship or boat and there is no proof one way or the other, we say who ever grabs it first gets it. But for two people holding a garment we say they divide equally. Or if one says it is all mine and the other says it is half mine, then a fourth goes to the last one and חצי to the first. The difference is that with the garment, there is דררא דממונא. And תוספות בבא מציעא דף ב' ע''א based on the משנה there and the case of the boat in בבא בתרא דף ל''ה. But in בבא בתרא, the first משנה says  two neighbors must build a wall between their properties. Therefor if it falls the stones or bricks are divided equally between them. The גמרא בבא בתרא דף ד' ע''א asks, "Is that not obvious?" The רשב''א there asks, "Why is it obvious? What if one says, 'I built all of the wall.' and the other claims each one built half of the wall? רב שך explains there that the intension of the רשב''א is because each has דררא דממונא which means there is a doubt to the בית דין even without their claims, and therefore the בית דין ignores their claims and divides the wall equally. The question on this is that דררא דממונא  in the beginning of בבא מציעא means that the בית דין pays attention to their claims, as opposed to ignoring their claims, and letting them settle the matter by themselves. But here רב שך is saying דררא דממונא is a reason to ignore their claims, and simply divide the wall equally.   

There is an obvious answer, the רשב''א is not תוספות. But my question is based on the idea that the רשב''א had a reason for his approach and the תוספות also. Thus the question is based on the issues, not on who said what 

יש לי שאלה בדרך רב שך מבאר את הרשב''א בבבא בתרא דף ד' ע''א. (זה מובא בהלכות שכנים פרק ב' הלכה י''ח) השאלה שלי היא שדררא דממונא הולך ככה. אם יש ויכוח בין שני אנשים לגבי מי הבעלים של ספינה או סירה ואין הוכחה לכאן או לכאן, אנו אומרים שמי שחוטף אותה קודם מקבל אותה. אבל לשני אנשים שמחזיקים בגד אנחנו אומרים שהם מחלקים שווה בשווה. או אם אחד אומר שהכל שלי והשני אומר  חצי שלי, אז רביעי הולך לאחרון וחצי לראשון. ההבדל הוא שעם הבגד יש דררא דממונא. (תוספות בבא מציעא דף בע''א לפי המשנה שם ומקרה הסירה בבבא בתרא דף ל''ה.) אבל בבבא בתרא, המשנה הראשונה אומרת ששני שכנים חייבים לבנות חומה בין הנכסים שלהם. לכן אם היא נופלת, האבנים או הלבנים מחולקות ביניהם שווה בשווה. שואל הגמרא בבא בתרא דף ד' ע''א "האם זה לא מובן מאליו?" הרשב''א שם שואל: "למה זה ברור? מה אם הראשון יגיד: בניתי את כל החומה", והשני טוען שכל אחד בנה חצי חומה? רב ש"ך מבאר שם שכוונת הרשב"א היא משום שיש לכל אחד דררא דממונא, כלומר יש ספק לבית דין גם בלי טענותיהם, ולכן בית הדין דין מתעלם מטענותיהם ומחלק את החומה שווה בשווה. השאלה על כך היא שדררא דממונא בראשית בבא מציעא משמע שבית דין שם לב לטענותיהם, לעומת התעלמות מטענותיהם, ולתת להם להסדיר את העניין בעצמם. אבל כאן רב שך אומר דררא דממונא סיבה להתעלם מטענותיהם, ופשוט לחלק את הכותל שווה בשווה   

יש תשובה ברורה, הרשב''א אינו תוספות. אבל שאלתי מבוססת על הרעיון שלרשב''א הייתה סיבה לגישתו וגם התוספות. לכן השאלה מבוססת על הנושאים, לא על מי אמר מה