My son Izhak held with learning in depth but also fast learning,--- that is fast learning in the sense of Rav Nahman of Breslov --to just say the words and go on. Even though I only heard Izhak state the importance of in depth learning--i.e with lots of review and deep understanding, he also held with the general principles of Rav Nahman which certainly includes fast learning. And I do nor mean this to apply to learning gemara only but also to mathematics and physics. [we know that these are also important a stated openly in the Rambam--in the Yad Hachazah [Mishne Torah] and in his other writings.]  but some will complain that not everyone has the math gene--but so what? We do not say that everyone is talented in understanding the Gemara, and yet everyone is obligated to learn and finish the Oral and Written Torah at least once. Learning Torah is a commandment that applies to everyone as the Rambam  puts it, '' young or old, even until the day of death..'' This mitzvah has nothing to do with how smart one is. So also for math and physics and all the seven wisdoms that the Gra and Rambam and other Rishonim hold are obligatory.

 The ancient Greeks understood that there is a deep connection between truth and beauty.  From that insight one can see that trying towards truth is like a Mozartian symphony where every member of the orchestra plays his or her part. But each one needs to play his part alone --and know his place. The violinist ought not to play the part of the cello or piano. That would be as if in an army, the  person standing watch would desert his post and try to fulfill the part of a general. Even if he might be a good general in other circumstances, but still he has deserted his post [and by that cause the city to fall.]. Even on a religious scale we can see how there should be an awareness of this point. Torah has a good point --monotheism. Christians have a good point about kindness. The Torah is also right about law. Where things go wrong is when the violinist goes over to the French horn section and decides that he can play the French horn better that  those in the wind section. Or things can go wrong when one is not following the score. Or people on the outside imply try to interrupt or play music of the dark side [as most music is nowadays.] 

And in the search for truth enlightenment philosophers also played an important role. While on one hand the middle ages were aware of the need for both reason and faith, still the development of both was needed.  Even though Plato Aristotle and Plotinus had gone far in the realm of reason, still a lot was missed and there needed to be Kant to begin to resolve the mind body problem,

There is a prohibition in the Torah not to add or subtract from the commandments of the Torah. There is a four way argument among the Rishonim [mediaeval authorities ] about what this means.  To the Raavad, it refers only to positive commands. The reason is the courts have permission to add restrictions as a fence around Torah.  However as important this subject is, I wanted to add here the fact that Rav Nahman of Breslov mentions a related issue in the Le.M. II chapter 44 and II chapter 86 and in the Conversations of Rav Nahman 235. There it says that one should not seek extra restrictions.   

Most of what the religious world does is adding extra restrictions. And ''כל המוסיף גורע''. ''Anyone that adds [make believe] restrictions ends up subtracting [transgressing real restrictions].'' [That is a common saying in Israel]. in fact even adding restrictions as a ''fence'' is also problematic as is brought in Avot d'Rav Natan on the first Mishna in Pirkei Avot there it says adding a fence around Torah is exactly what Adam, the first man, did. [And that caused the fall of all mankind.]It say there that was wrong, ''Better ten inches that stands, than 100 yards that falls.''

But for many decrees that are from the scribes, the reason for the decree no longer exists, and thus to the Raavad  they are nullified.  [ But to the Rambam, the decree still stands. that comes from beitza pg 5.  but in the gemara in gitin we see that once the reason for a decree i gone, the decree no longer stands.

The Ramban and Raavad, the Rambam and Tosphot are the main sources to look at. but after all is said and done the point that is most important is Rav Nahman's not to keep on adding restrictions all the time like the insane religious world does. 

I would like to suggest that everything about the prohibition of thou shalt not add revolves around the mishna these are the commandment that have no limit. that is there are commandments that once one has done them they are done and one is not allowed to add. there are other commandments like learning Torah that have no upper limit and so the more one does them the better. But for some reason that is not what תוספות says. They  say one can do again even a mitzvah that one has fulfilled. I do not know why תוספות does not make this simple distinction. Especially after the גמרא itself seems to imply this when they ask in סוכה דף כ''ח why is it that if one sleeps in a סוכה on the eighth day of שמיני עצרת he does not get lashes?

 

 אני רוצה להציע שהכל על איסור "אל תוסיף" סובב סביב המשנה שאלו המצוות שאין להן גבול. יש מצוות שברגע שעשה אותן הן נעשו ואסור להוסיף. יש עוד מצוות כמו לימוד תורה שאין להן גבול עליון ולכן ככל שעושים אותן יותר טוב

 i mean  תוספות ראש השנה ט''ז ע''ב says one can do a commandment more than once, but i think this must refer to commandments that have no upper bound. 

כלומר תוספות ראש השנה ט''ז ע''ב אומר שאפשר לעשות מצוות יותר מפעם אחת, אבל אני חושב שזה חייב להתייחס למצוות שאין להן גבול עליון

אבל משום מה זה לא מה שהתוספות אומרים. הם אומרים שאפשר לעשות שוב אפילו מצווה שקיימה. אני לא יודע למה תוספות לא עושות את ההבחנה הפשוטה הזו. בפרט לאחר שהגמרא עצמו נראה רומז לכך כששואלים בסוכה דף כ''ח למה זה שאם ישן בסוכה ביום של שמיני אצרת אינו מקבל מלקות?

My feeling about philosophy is that there were some wrong turns. Mainly I think people ought to get back to Kant, and in particular the Kantian approach of Fries and Leonard Nelson- because in that approach there is room for faith. Now while on one hand, Hegel was trying to reconcile faith and reason, but i think there he tried to make everything about reason [no limit to reason] but I do not think that works very well.

i would like to thank all the people that take the time and efforts to look at my blog. As for the subject in this entry i would like to add that it makes sense to look at the issue here in a bit more detail in the blog of Kelley Ross on the approach of Kant -Fries and Nelson. Also it is very good to look at Robert Hanna who goes into great detail where British American philosophy went wrong. As for Hegel, the political writings leave a lot to be desired but the Logic in the Encyclopedia is outstanding,--a true tour de force. In the Analytic School it is still important to look at Michael Huemer because he ties together the best of the Intuitionists like Prichard and G.E. Moore.

There are good reasons to look at Fries and Leonard Nelson because of some issues in Kant that were noticed even before the ink was dry. That led to Fichte and Schelling and then to the radical approach of Hegel. But as a sensible modification of Kant that remains in the Kantian orbit, I think Fries is the best,

And as for Huemer, my feeling is that he is not really getting into the problem that Kant faced. I think that is not my own criticism but I might have heard it before about the Intuitionist School. [ I admit I have not looked at any of this for a long time--but I am not excusing my ignorance.]

Gemara in Bava Batra 127. Rav Shach brings a question on the Ramban.

Rav Shach [Rambam Laws of Acquisition 22:1] brings a question on the Ramban. However there is some aspect of this question that I find hard to understand. The issue revolves on the opinion of R. Meir and Rav that one can acquire something that has not yet come into the world. The Gemara in Bava Batra 127 askes on this from the law ''yakir' a father can say so and so is my son in order to have the inheritance go to that son. The Gemara askes, "Why do we need that law, if we already have R Meir that holds the father could say, 'All property that I will own will go to my son.''' The gemara answers, "That law is needed for property that comes to him when he is dying." Now the Ramban holds that if he had said, "All property that I will own is acquired to him from now" then he can not retract. The question of Rav Shach is if he can not retract, then the acquisition is complete and he does not need to have ''daat'' (conscious awareness) at the time he is dying. However I would like to ask that if he has no daat at the time he is dying, then how can he acquire anything? Just like Rav Shach holds that he can not cause something to be acquired, so he should not be able to acquire. The point of Rav Shach is that a person dying has no conscious awareness and so he is can not cause something to be acquired as is the case with one who is under age or deaf or insane. But if so how can he be able to acquire property as he is dying?  I know that underage person can acquire and not cause something to be acquired , but my question is based on the fact that Rav Shach is saying a person dying has no daat at all like and insane or deaf person  

Rav Shach says a underage person or insane or deaf can not own anything nor cause anything to be owned because they are eliminated by a verse ''man'' not underage person. not because they have no conscious awareness. but if so then why would a person that is dying not be able to acquire or cause to be acquired in the first place? For  the Gemara says we need yakir for a person dying that would not be able to cause something to be acquired.

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רב שך brings a question on the רמב''ן. However there is some aspect of this question that I find hard to understand. The issue revolves on the opinion of ר' מאיר and רב that one can acquire something that has not yet come into the world. The גמרא in בבא בתרא קכ''ז  askes on this from the law ''יכיר' a father can say פלוני is my son in order to have the inheritance go to that son. The גמרא askes, "Why do we need that law, if we already have R Meir that holds the father could say, 'All property that I will own will go to my son.''' The גמרא answers, "That law is needed for property that comes to him when he is גוסס." Now the רמב''ן holds that if he had said, "All property that I will own is acquired to him from now" then he can not retract. The question of רב שך is if he can not retract, then the acquisition is complete and he doe not need to have דעת  (conscious awareness) at the time he is dying. However I wרould like to ask that if he has no דעת at the time he is גוסס, then how can he acquire anything? Just like רב שך holds that he can not cause something to be acquired, so he should not be able to acquire. 

The point of רב שך is that a person dying has no conscious awareness and so he is can not cause something to be acquired as is the case with one who is under age or deaf or insane. But if so how can he be able to acquire property as he is dying?

רב שך says a קטין or insane person or deaf person can not own anything nor cause anything to be owned because they are eliminated by a verse ''איש'' not קטין person. not because they have no conscious awareness. But if so then why would a person that is dying not be able to acquire or cause to be acquired in the first place? For  the גמרא says we need יכיר for a person dying that would not be able to cause something to be acquired.

רב שך מביא שאלה על הרמב''ן. עם זאת, יש היבט מסוים של השאלה הזו שקשה לי להבין. הסוגיה נסובה על דעת ר' מאיר ורב שאפשר לרכוש דבר שעדיין לא בא לעולם. הגמרא בבא בתרא קכ''ז שואל על זה מדין "יכיר" אב יכול לומר פלוני הוא בני כדי שהירושה תלך לאותו בן. שואלת הגמרא, "למה אנחנו צריכים את הדין הזה, אם כבר יש לנו את ר' מאיר שמחזיק האב יכול לומר, 'כל הרכוש שיהיה בבעלותי ילך לבני.''' עונה הגמרא, "צריך את החוק הזה. על רכוש שבא לו כשהוא גוסס". עתה גורס הרמב"ן שאם היה אומר "כל הרכוש שיהיה בבעלותי נרכש לו מעתה" אזי אינו יכול לחזור בו. שאלת רב שך היא אם הוא לא יכול לחזור בו, אז הרכישה הושלמה והוא לא צריך דעת (מודעות) בזמן שהוא גוסס. עם זאת אני רוצה לשאול שאם אין לו דעה בזמן שהוא גוסס, אז איך הוא יכול לרכוש משהו? כמו שרב שך סובר שהוא לא יכול לגרום למשהו להירכש, כך הוא לא אמור להיות מסוגל לרכוש

​​רב שך מחזיק שלאדם הגוסס אין מודעות ולכן הוא לא יכול לגרום למשהו להירכש כפי שקורה אצל קטן או חירש או לא שפוי. אבל אם כן איך הוא יכול להיות מסוגל לרכוש כשהוא גוסס?

אני יודע ש קטן יכול לרכוש ולא לגרום למשהו להירכש, אבל השאלה שלי מבוססת על העובדה שרב שך אומר שלאדם גוסס אין שום דעת כמו אדם משוגע או חירש.

רב שך אומר שקטין (או לא שפוי או חירש) אינו יכול להחזיק בשום דבר ולא לגרום לשום דבר להיות בבעלות כי הם מתבטלים על ידי פסוק ''איש'' לא אדם קטין. לא בגלל שאין להם מודעות.. אבל אם כן אז למה שאדם הגוסס לא יוכל לרכוש או לגרום לרכישה מלכתחילה? שהרי הגמרא אומר שצריך יכיר לאדם גוסס שלא יוכל לגרום לרכישת משהו.

I think there is a lack of serious understanding of Torah when one is not proficient in the school of Rav Haim of Brisk.[i.e., the sort of deep learning that Reb Haim was known for.] That had a beginning with the Mishna laMelech but was laid aside for a few hundred years as the later authorities concentrated on Tosphot. But now I think that to really have any kind of decent idea one needs to be proficient in the Chidushei Reb Haim, Reb Shimon Shkopf, the Birchat Shmuel [the two students of Reb Haim], and the Avi Ezri. 

     The major reason that all secular Israeli Jews go to into Far East religions [mainly Tao, the Bhagavad Gita and Buddhism  ]is that the rabanim have given Torah a terrible name. Regular Jews just take one look at the religious teachers and say to themselves, ''I want nothing to do with them''.

i think that many people are unaware of this problem-- if you look at it as a problem. Rav Nahman i think was the only one who pointed out the source of the problem in the few Torah lessons where he referred to rabanim a  Torah scholars who are demons.