the statement of the Gra that, "To the degree that one lacks any knowledge of the seven wisdoms, to that degree he will lack in understanding of Torah a hundred fold more."

In the path of the Gra it is not clear what education ought to include. In the introduction to Euclid  in Hebrew by Baruch of Sckolev [disciple of the Gra] is brought the statement of the Gra that, "To the degree that one lacks any knowledge of the seven wisdoms, to that degree he will lack in understanding of Torah a hundred fold more." But in the Middle Ages "the seven wisdoms" meant the Quadrivium and Trivium [grammar, logic, and rhetoric, while the quadrivium consists of arithmetic, astronomy, music, and geometry],  Rhetoric is the subject of attack in Plato's Georgias and the Ion. Georgias was a famous sophist that prided himself (like  all the sophists] of being able to convince people of anything even falsehoods. Socrates does not like that. The Gra certainly would not hold by learning that. Rather this seems to refers to the 6 books of Aristotle, the Organon. During the Middle Ages, many Rishonim held one ought to have a secular education  which would mean what today would be known as STEM fields, Science, Tech, Engineering, Mathematics.[But this would not include pseudo science like psychology]

[In the world of Litvak yeshivot, yeshiva was only for seven years==that is to go through the even basic tractates--one per year. [Three bavot: Bava Kama Bava Metzia Bava Batra and 4 Nashim: gitin kidushin yevamot Ketuboth.] 

tendency to add restrictions

 There is a kind of tendency in the religious world to add tons of restrictions that the Torah does not require and to ignore plenty of prohibitions that the Torah forbids. This, of course, is against the verse in Deuteronomy chap. 4 verse 2 that commands us not to add nor subtract from the commandments. And it is also against the approach of the Gra and the general Litvak world. However,  this tendency has seeped in the Litvak world today. And while I was   in the Mir in NY, I barely noticed this tendency because at that time I was interested in following the stricter opinion about any question in halacha--law.  But after some time, I began to notice this. Of course, there is nothing wrong with taking the strict opinion about any particular law. But the problem is that lots of restrictions are made up out ''of whole cloth'' [as the expression goes].

 Philosophers (whether in academia or outside) seem determined to disagree with each other even when their positions are close. Michael Huemer basing himself on the Intuitionalists like Prichard see that reason recognizes universals. Is that  all that far away from the Friesian school of Leonard Nelson and Kelley Ross where first principles are known but not by reason or the senses? They are reasonable (not infallible). Greta Hermann thought that Nelson meant "infallible" and thus went away from the immediate non intuitive approach(-and it might be that in fact that is what Nelson thought). But that its not implied by the Friesian doctrine as Kelley Ross point out.

And while I am at it, is this all that far from Hegel who reaches absolute knowledge by a dialectical process. [This may not be obvious to people unless, you read the Logic of Hegel that was part of his Encyclopedia.]

I mean where would Physics be today if Einstein had decided to attack the concept of the quantum? Or even more striking is that in Quantum Mechanics every incremental step was done by a different person building on the result of some previous person.][not attacking previous results]

[i might mention here that all of this is post Kant and all these people did not ignore Kant but rather tried to deal with the difficulties he raised. Huemer is from  the Analytic tradition starting with Frege. Nelson and Fries is a modification of Kant. Hegel is sort of his own category  but still does try to answer the problem raised by Kant. 

furthermore i must mention that at least a significant number of Rishonim did not ignore philosophy not Plato nor Aristotle or Plotinus nor the later Muslim Philosophers and so I think the great Post Kant Thinkers are important--but not all. After all I do agree that most post Kant philosophy is worthless--but I do know that to see the flaws takes a certain amount of experience and expertise.

Bava Batra page 35a in Tosfot and page 70a. Rambam chapter 4 halacha 14.

An introduction to the subject, A person grabbed a piece of metal from someone and a witness says so. And the person says, "Yes I took it because it is mine". R. Aba said he can not take an oath because he is not disagreeing with the witness, and so he must give back the piece. Tosphot asks why is this different from a case where one is a guard of an object with a  document, and there he  is believed with an oath   because he could have said it was stolen. Here too let him be believed because he could have said ''I did not take it'' and be believed with an oath.  

 In the subject of the bar of metal of R. Aba, Rav Shach suggests the reason the person that grabbed it is not believed because the oath that he would like to take is not the oath of a guard where the Torah believes an a oath. That means to say that there are claims that a person is not believed even with an oath. In certain cases the Torah believes an oath, but this is not one of them. This is different from the case in Bava Batra page 70a where  person is a guard of an object with a document. [The person that gave him the object to guard has a document to that effect.] There the guard is believed that he gave back the object because he has a migo that he could have said the object was stolen and be believed with an oath, Rav Shach explains  that the case of, "I gave it back to you " is a case where the  guard is in fact is saying that the object was stolen because now that the  owner is saying he never got back the object that is a case where the owner is trying to steal the object. Two questions. One is that if so, then the fact that the guard is saying "I gave it back" is a case of it being stolen, and that case in itself is a plea that the Torah believes with an oath. The Torah is not believing him because of a migo, but because that in itself is a plea that the Torah believes with an oath (and yet the gemaras says the guard is believed because of a migo that he could have said it was neenas) The other question is that if Rav Shach is right then the owner is trying to steal the amount of money the object is worth, not the actual object. That would seem to depend if "the the value of money is like money" which we only say in certain cases like kidushin or the amount of money that a Hebrew slave can be redeemed with.

I am being short here because there a a few answers to this question of Tospfot in Bava Batra 35a. Rav Shach is mainly coming to answer this question in the Rambam because other answers do not seem to work so well in the Rambam.   

__________________________________________________________________________

 In the subject of the bar of metal נסכא of ר' אבא, Here רב שך suggests the reason the person that grabbed it is not believed because the oath that he would like to take is not the oath of a guard where the תורה believes an a oath. That means to say that there are claims that a person is not believed even with an oath. In certain cases the Torah believes an oath, but this is not one of them. This is different from the case in בבא בתרא ע' ע''א where  person is a guard of an object with a document. [The person that gave him the object to guard has a document to that effect.] There the guard is believed that he gave back the object because he has a מיגו that he could have said the object was נגנב and be believed with an oath,  רב שך explains  that the case of "I gave it back to you " is a case where the  guard  is saying that the object was stolen because now that the  owner is saying he never got back the object that is a case where the owner is trying to steal the object. Two questions. One is that if so, then the fact that the guard is saying "I gave it back" is a case of it being stolen, And that case in itself is a plea that the תורה believes with an oath. The תורה is not believing him because of a מיגו, but because that in itself is a plea that the תורה believes with an oath (and yet the גמרא says the guard is believed because of a מיגו that he could have said it was נאנס). The other question is that if  רב שך is right, then the owner is trying to גונב the amount of money the object is worth, not the actual object. That would seem to depend if "the the value of money is like money" שווה כסף ככסף which we only say in certain cases like קיושין or the amount of money that a עב עברי can be redeemed with.

I am being short here because there a a few answers to this question of תוספות in בבא בתרא ל''ה ע''אa. Here רב שך is mainly coming to answer this question in the רמב''ם because other answers do not seem to work so well in the רמב''ם.   

An introduction to the subject, A person grabbed a piece of metal from someone and a witness says so. And the person says, "Yes I took it because it is mine". ר' אבא said he can not take an oath because he is not disagreeing with the witness and o he must give back the piece. תוספות asks why is this different from a case where one is a guard of an object with a  document and there he  is believed with an oath   because he could have said it was stolen.

בנושא  נסכא של ר' אבא, כאן רב שך מציע את הסיבה לכך שהאדם שתפס אותו אינו נאמן כי השבועה שהוא רוצה להישבע אינה שבועת שומר במקום שבו התורה מאמין שְׁבוּעָה. כלומר שיש טענות שלא מאמינים לאדם אפילו בשבועה. במקרים מסוימים התורה מאמינה בשבועה, אך זו אינה אחת מהן. זה שונה מהמקרה בבא בתרא ע' ע''א שאדם הוא שומר על חפץ עם מסמך. [לאדם שנתן לו את החפץ לשמירה יש מסמך על כך.] שם השומר נאמן שהוא החזיר את החפץ כי יש לו מיגו שיכול היה לומר שהחפץ נגנב ולהאמין עם שבועה, רב שך מסביר שהמקרה של "החזרתי לך" הוא מקרה שבו השומר אומר שהחפץ נגנב כי עכשיו כשהבעלים אומר שהוא לא החזיר את החפץ זה מקרה שבו הבעלים מנסה לגנוב את החפץ. שתי שאלות. האחת היא שאם כן, אז העובדה שהשומר אומר "החזרתי" היא מקרה של גניבה, והמקרה הזה כשלעצמו הוא טענה שהתורה מאמינה בשבועה. התורה לא מאמינה לו בגלל מיגו, אלא בגלל שזו כשלעצמה זו טענה שהתורה מאמינה בשבועה (ואף על פי כן הגמרא אומרת שהשומר מאמינים בגלל מיגו שיכול היה לומר שזה נאנס). השאלה הנוספת היא שאם רב שך צודק, אז הבעלים מנסה לגנוב את סכום הכסף ששווה החפץ, לא החפץ בפועל. נראה שזה תלוי אם "ערך הכסף הוא כמו כסף", שם שווה כסף ככסף אנו אומרים רק במקרים מסוימים כמו קידושין או כמות הכסף שאיתו ניתן לפדות עבד עברי. אני מקצר כאן כי יש כמה תשובות לשאלה זו של תוספות בבבא בתרא ל''ה ע''א. כאן רב שך בא בעיקר לענות על שאלה זו ברמב''ם כי נראה שתשובות אחרות לא כל כך עובדות ברמב''ם

הקדמה לנושא, אדם תפס חתיכת מתכת ממישהו ועד אומר כך. והאדם אומר, "כן לקחתי את זה כי זה שלי". ר' אבא אמר שאינו יכול להישבע כי אינו חולק על העד ועליו להחזיר את החתיכה. תוספות שואלים למה זה שונה ממקרה שבו שומר על חפץ עם מסמך ושם מאמינים לו בשבועה כי יכול היה לומר שהוא נגנב.

two positions-heresy for Christians

 Christians gravitate towards one of two positions-three gods,- or one God with three different aspects father, son, holy ghost. [The first is not okay.] But both positions are considered heresy for Christians.[Sabellianism, Arianism] With Boethius, they came up with what they think is a middle position: One essence and three persons. But regardless of this being thought to be correct, an individual Christian in his or her thought gravitates towards either of the first two positions, i.e. three different powers, or just One Power with different aspects.

I think a lot depends on which gospel they read first--Mathew or Luke. The first is deeply imbedded in the Old Testament ;, and  Old Testament theology is Monotheism: One God only, and who is totally beyond anything that humans can conceive. Totally :"other". 

Paul is  more along the lines of the later approach which is not very rooted in the Old Testament. And Luke and Acts were written by a disciple of Paul.      

[I am not very happy with the idea of aspects of God, however you do find this in the Ari and Moshe of Cordoba.]

[I should add here that not only the issues mentioned above but also the role of Jesus is an argument between the authors of the \gospels.] 

 There is one major thread of thought that goes through and ties together the existentialists. They would not agree with the label but never the less it applies to all. Kierkegaard,  Husserl, Heidegger, Japers, Sartre,... That thread is the ultimate, absolute  importance of  "ME".  And to claim that this thought did not get accepted throughout the entire West is simply to be blind to the facts. Responsibility towards others, especially family is simply not even a thought that might occur to anyone. "It is all about me". It does not matter what religion anyone is. That is just the window dressing on what really matters to people; the ultimate, absolute "ME.

You might see this in all of them, but it becomes particularly clear in Heidegger-''Being'' instead of God. Responsibility is only to :"My Being" :i,e., to be authentic to  ME.

 

new prohibitions in the religious world

 There is a tendency to make up new prohibitions in the religious world. This leads to a situation where simple people that truly want to keep Torah have no way to discern what is real as opposed to what is added and made up out of thin air. Rav Nahman of Breslov addressed this problem [Le.M II 44]. But that does not seem to hinder people that are Breslov from the same sort of tendency.

The thing about this is that the extra emphasis on rituals has nothing todo with midot tovot [good character traits].  If good character -to be a mensch- a decent human being had nothing todo with Torah then maybe i would have little to complain about. But in fact midot tovot are "deuraita" commandments from the Torah a you can see in Sefer HaChinuch.