I have been thinking about the importance of learning Torah and the straight path of the Gra. But I also see that one aspect of the Gra is ignored what was known as the "seven wisdoms".[note 1]That was the name that several secular subjects were known by during the Middle Ages,- but not all secular subjects.

There is at any rate some difference between rishonim what would be permitted to learn and not count a bitul Torah. To find some middle ground I recommend the authentic sciences, but would leave out the pseudo sciences like psychology.

[note 1] the translation of Euclid by a disciple of the Gra quotes him saying, "To the degree that one lacks any knowledge of the seven wisdoms, to that degree he will lack in understanding Torah a hundred fold."

American education

 The whole  problem with American education is that it starts too late. For the real root of the USA is England. If one does not know the origin of the Parliamentary system, the Magna Carta. and trials and tribulations that led to the English system of government, then his understanding of the Constitution of the  USA itself has to be superficial. It can not start either with John Locke who was encoding facts that were already history. He found the justification for the Glorious Revolution.     

 Parents think they can go to the schools, and find out what their children are learning? No such luck. Because of the Ferrari method of education, your children ae being taught gender and woke poison propaganda in the disguise of reading, writing, and arithmetic.

In terms of what would be better than the poisonous public schools, I think that self learning is the best idea. And in order to advance this, I would like to suggest learning with ten times review of every chapter or section. This idea of leaning with lot of review I understood from my son, Izak. (I had suggested to him to "just say the words and go on," but he did not accept that. So I finally decided to accept his advice.)

Furthermore I would like to suggest that most of what is learnt in schools is really not very positive. [See  Allan Bloom's Closing of the American Mind,] 

Rav Nahman emphasized living in the land of Israel as [I noted in the Le,M vol I chap. 55 when I went into the local Na Nach place to study that book of Rav Nahman today] and in fact it was the encouragement that I saw in a different chapter in the Le.M that convinced me to come to Israel for the first time some years ago. I also saw this emphasis in the letter of the Gra  that he wrote to his wife on his journey to Israel.

The original motivation was from the general approach of Musar that I had been reading. But when I actually began to take steps, I found my way blocked. Then i noted that Rav Nahman had said that the land of Israel is acquired by hardships,,, and the major hardships and obstacles are the slanderers of the land ,

Avi Ezri Laws of Inheritance, chapter 1 halacha 3. Ketuboth pg 69 in the Gemara and Rashi.

 There is an argument between the Beit Yoseph and the Darkei Moshe concerning the law about one who is dying and he gives instructions about his will that are valid, but would not be valid if he gave these instructions while he was healthy. R. Akiva Eiger [Responsa 138] explains this argument in one way, and Rav Shach explains this in a different way, and I can see a way to agree with R Akiva Eiger and another way to agree with Rav Shach. This refers to one who is dying and he gives instruction that one of his children should inherit, and then after him the inheritance should go to a stranger. The Beit Joseph holds this is valid only if the son that is inheriting has no children nor brothers. However the one that is dying might have brothers and this is still valid.  The Darchei Moshe holds even if that son that is inheriting has brothers this law is still valid. To R. Akiva Eiger the argument is about indirect inheritance. The son and brothers inherit directly, and so the father can not disinherit them. The Darchei Moshe holds that the brothers inherit indirectly, and so the father can say that one of his children should inherit and then after him the inheritance should go to a stranger.  Rav Shach  writes that the  Beit Yoseph  holds the reason the father can not disinherit the brothers is then it would be as though there was no inheritance at all [after that brother has died] and the whole inheritance would be a present to a stranger--and that can not be valid. But Rav Akiva Eiger could say this reason can not be so because the Beit Joseph agrees that if the father has a brother, then it would be valid to give to the brother and then the stranger.  But Rav Shach points out that then even though there is someone that could inherit, still he does not inherit and it is as if there was no inheritance at all but simply a present to a stranger which can not be valid.

I would like to add here  that the proof that Rav Shach bringc against R Akiva Eiger is from the law that one can choose to give inheritance to only one of the others that can inherit him. And that includes those that could inherit from him indirectly {Mishmush}. However the question is if this applies also to the halacha that one can give the inheritance to one son and from him to a stranger. And the whole point of the Beit Yoseph is that you can not combine both halachot. So even though the explanation of Rav Shach in the Beit Yoseph makes sense, but  also the explanation of R Akiva Eiger. i.e., that the Darchei Moshe might hold true that brothers inherit only indirectly. However Rav Shach could answer that the point of his objection is not about  just one of the two laws that are being combined here by the Darchei Moshe, but about the very essence of the inheritance of the brothers. If we have established that they inherit directly then that is established in all cases.

I am being short here but just look in the Avi Ezri and you will see that  Rav Shach is bringing his proof only from the law of R Yochanan ben Broka as it is brought in the Rambam. That establishes that brothers inherit directly.

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 There is an argument between the בית יוסף and the  דרכי משה concerning the law about one who is dying (שכיב מרע) and he gives instruction about his צוואה that are valid, but would not be valid if he gave these instructions while he was healthy. ר' עקיבא איגר תשובות קל''ח  explains this argument in one way and רב שך explains this in a different way, and I can see a way to agree with ר' עקיבא איגר and another way to agree with רב שך. This refers to one who is dying and he gives instruction that one of his children should inherit, and then after him the inheritance should go to a stranger. The בית יוסף holds this is valid only if the son that is inheriting has no children nor brothers. However the one that is dying might have brothers, and this is still valid.  The  דרכי משה holds even if that son that is inheriting has brothers, this law is still valid. To ר' עקיבא איגר the argument is about indirect inheritance (מישמוש). The son and brothers inherit directly and so the father can not disinherit them. The  דרכי משה holds that the brothers inherit indirectly (מישמוש) and so the father can say that one of his children should inherit and then after him the inheritance should go to a stranger.   רב שך writes that the  בית יוסף  holds the reason the father can not disinherit the brothers is then it would be as though there was no inheritance at all [after that brother has died] and the whole inheritance would be a present to a stranger, and that can not be valid. But ר' עקיבא איגר could say this reason can not be so because the בית יוסף agrees that if the father has a brother then it would be valid to give to the brother and then the stranger.  But רב שך points out that then even though there is someone that could inherit, still he does not inherit and it is as if there was no inheritance at all but simply a present to a stranger which can not be valid.

I would like to add here  that the proof that רב שך bring against ר' עקיבא איגר is from the law that one can choose to give inheritance to only one of the other that can inherit him. And that includes those that could inherit from him indirectly {מישמוש}. However the question is if this applies also to the law that one can give the inheritance to one son and from him to a stranger. And the whole point of the  בית יוסף is that you can not combine both laws. So even though the explanation of  רב שך in the בית יוסף makes sense, but  also the explanation of ר' עקיבא איגר, i.e., that the דרכי משה  might hold true that brothers inherit only indirectly. However  רב שך could answer that the point of his objection is not about  just one of the two laws that are being combined here by the דרכי משה , but about the very essence of the inheritance of the brothers. If we have established that they inherit directly, then that is established in all cases

I am being short here, but just look in the אבי עזרי and you will see that רב שך is bringing his proof only from the law of ר' יוחנן בן ברוקא as it is brought in the רמב''ם. That establishes that brothers inherit directly.

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יש ויכוח בין הבית יוסף לדרכי משה בנוגע להלכה על גוסס (שכיב מרע) והוא נותן הוראה על צוואה שלו שהיא תקפה, אבל לא תקפה אם היה נותן אותה הוראה בעודו בריא. ר' עקיבא איגר תשובות קל''ח מסביר את הטיעון הזה בצורה אחת, ורב שך מסביר זאת בצורה אחרת, ואני יכול לראות דרך להסכים עם ר' עקיבא איגר ודרך אחרת להסכים עם רב שך. הכוונה היא למי שגוסס והוא נותן הוראה שאחד מבניו צריך לרשת, ואחריו הירושה תעבור לזר. הבית יוסף קובע שזה תקף רק אם לבן שיורש אין בנים ואחים. אולם למי שגוסס אולי יהיו אחים, וזה עדיין תקף. הדרכי משה קובע גם אם לבן שיורש יש אחים, דין זה עדיין תקף. לר' עקיבא איגר הוויכוח הוא על ירושה עקיפה (מישמוש). הבן והאחים יורשים ישירות, ולכן האב לא יכול לנשל אותם. הדרכי משה גורס שהאחים יורשים בעקיפין (מישמוש) ולכן האב יכול לומר שאחד מבניו צריך לרשת ואחריו הירושה צריכה לעבור לזר. רב שך כותב שהבית יוסף מחזיק שהסיבה שהאב לא יכול לבטל את האחים היא שאז זה יהיה כאילו לא הייתה ירושה כלל [אחרי שאח זה נפטר] וכל הירושה תהיה מתנה לזר, ו זה לא יכול להיות תקף. אבל ר' עקיבא איגר יכול לומר שסיבה זו לא יכולה להיות כך, כי בית יוסף מסכים שאם לאב יש אח, אז יהיה תקף לתת לאח ולאחר מכן לזר. אבל רב שך מציין שאז למרות שיש מי שיכול לרשת, בכל זאת הוא לא יורש וזה כאילו לא הייתה ירושה בכלל אלא פשוט מתנה לזר שאינה יכולה להיות תקפה.

  אני רוצה להוסיף כאן שההוכחה שרב שך מביא נגד ר' עקיבא איגר היא מההלכה שאפשר לבחור לתת ירושה רק לאחד מהאחרים שיכולים לרשת אותו. וזה כולל את אלו שיכולים לרשת ממנו בעקיפין {מישמוש}. אולם השאלה היא האם זה חל גם על הדין שניתן לתת את הירושה לבנו וממנו לזר. וכל העניין של בית יוסף הוא שאי אפשר לשלב את שני הדינים. אז למרות שההסבר של רב שך בבית יוסף הגיוני, אבל גם ההסבר של ר' עקיבא איגר, דהיינו, שהדרכי משה עשוי לקבוע שאחים יורשים רק בעקיפין. אולם רב שך יכול היה להשיב שטעם התנגדותו אינו רק באחד משני ההלכות המשולבות כאן על ידי הדרכי משה, אלא על עצם הירושה של האחים. אם קבענו שהם יורשים ישירות, אז זה נקבע בכל המקרים

אני מקצר כאן, אבל רק עיין באבי עזרי ותראה שרב שך מביא את הוכחתו רק מדין ר' יוחנן בן ברוקא כפי שמובא ברמב''ם. זה קובע שאחים יורשים ישירות

The West is decaying

 The West is decaying from within the reason is''reason'' alone. Reason alone can not arrive at the true nature of reality. This was noted by Hume. Pure reason can only tell us knowledge without sensory input. [''Pure'' mean with no empirical input.]. But for areas where the ''is'' can not tell us about ''ought'', there one needs faith,  Faith with reason. For faith without reason believes nonsense. And reason without faith tells us nothing.  

One important lesson  I learned from my son  Izhak [aka Nahman] is specifically not to add nor subtract from the commandment of the Torah. \This in particular is relevant to sexual sin where it is common for people to add restrictions which then leads them to transgress real ones.  The secular world demises all the prohibition of the Torah, and so in place of them, they make up new ones. On the other hand, the religious world makes up new restrictions, and by that transgress actual prohibitions.

Examples are fairly well known, concubines [or mistress] [''girl friend''] is permitted to most rishonim [mediaeval authorities.] But the Rosh bring the problem that she might be embarrassed to go to the mikve. But I do not think  mikves are okay anyway since they are made from concrete which can be lifted out of the ground in one piece--so they are vessels. And one who dips in a vessel is not made clean. הטובל בכלים לא עולה לו טבילה Instead one might go to the sea, or river, or have the concrete thin enough that it would nor be a vessel. But nowadays, often when making a pool or mikve, there is put some layer of plastic under the concrete. That, in any case, makes the mikve invalid.   

[I might add that clothing is not a separation חציצה from water since the water can and doe get through the clothing.]