Belief in God is rational. Everything has a cause. So unless there is a first cause, then you would have an infinite regress. And then nothing could exist. Therefore there must be a first cause. Therefore God, the first cause, exists. QED.
21.11.21
Rittenhouse
Rittenhouse was acquitted on all accounts. He had gone to protect store owners and stores from being looted and destroyed as when happening all over the USA. Then he was attacked and he defended himself. I can not see why this even went to trial. One glance at the video should have been enough. He was knocked down an a guy was pulling out a gun to shoot him, and so he shot before he was killed. How much more obvious could this be?
Well the answer seems to be that too much of the judicial system in the USA has gotten politized. Instead of justice, what is pursued is what is politically correct.
So while on one hand I am happy that justice was served, still I am thinking that this whole trial shows that the justice system in the USA needs to get back on track.[One suggestion is this people making false accusations should be punished by the law. They should at least be liable. That should even apply to prosecutors.]
20.11.21
infrared telescopes and Philip Rosenblum-Rosten
Two infrared telescopes. Spitzer and James Web. The Spitzer was the first in space. Now the James Webb is about to be deployed. Why should not Philip Rosenblum get some credit for being the inventor of the first infrared telescope?
Spitzer was operated by NASA, JPL/Cal Tech. named after the person who suggested the idea of a space telescope and a very good scientist. James Webb has not yet gone into operation yet.[James Webb was the administrator of NASA.] I am just wondering why the name Philip Rosenblum is never mentioned with his own invention. Something he did not just suggest but actually made. Should that not count for something? Would it not be like crediting someone who thought about an electric light bulb instead of the person who actually made it-- Edison? Do you not usually give credit to the person that made the first thing, not those who thought how nice it would be to have it. The two brothers (Wright) that made an airplane get the credit, not people who thought about how nice it would be to fly?
Even though Isabella promoted Columbus, she is not given credit for the discovery of America, rather the person who actually did it, Columbus. Who gets the credit for Mozart symphonies, the musical director of the orchestra in Vienna or Mozart?
I realize credit does not always go to who deserves it. Some theorems in Mathematics get named for those who used them or introduced them to the public rather than the inventor. Not that the second person was trying to steal credit. Rather it was just the way things worked out. Still I think that some effort ought to be made to give credit to whom credit is due.
[Maybe I could suggest that the next generation of Infrared telescopes be called on the name of Philip Rosenblum? This way one dos not detract from the credit due to others, but still gives credit to the actual inventor.]
19.11.21
The Jerusalem Talmud asks about that first stalk.
If you have the peah [edge of the field.] which is what one must leave to the poor. It is at least 1/60. The first stalk that is cut makes that obligation come into play. [He can not just say, "The whole field is peah." It has to be after something has been reaped.] The Jerusalem Talmud asks about that first stalk. Is is also obligated in peah? [That means we know that it first has to be cut. And then he could make the rest of the field peah. But if he wanted to, could he then say that first stalk is also peah? Answer: No. The reason is it makes everything else obligated, and so it itself is not. And so it is obligated in truma and maasar (gifts to the kohen/priest and Levite).
Then let's say he goes ahead, and cuts through the whole field. [He was supposed to leave 1/60 standing for the poor.] The first stalk of the 1/60 makes the obligation of peah go to the reaped sheaves. (According to Peah perek II, mishna 5) The question is: Is that first stalk of the 1/60 obligated in peah? Answer: No. It is like the first stalk of the 59/60. [I would like to add here the "hava amina" of he gemara. That is why would this be a question in the first place? Should it not be clear that the case is the same as the first stalk that was reaped? Answer: the first stalk of the 1/60 is now cut. And therefore ought to be obligated in peah. This is different than the first stalk of the 59/60 which caused an obligation on the standing stalks, but it itself is not standing. So then perhaps this ought to be the final answer? No. Because its being cut is simultaneous with the obligation coming on the reaped sheaves. That might be the difference. However you can still argue before it was cut, it was standing and at that time the obligation was on the standing stalks. After it was cut, the obligation is on the reaped sheaves . What makes it not obligated is that it is like the first stalk of the 59/60. It makes obligated and so is not obligated.]
The question is could he make the 1/60 still to be peah? Or is now that whole part of the field obligated in truma and maasar?
I realized while coming back from the sea that this is the point of Rav Shach. He asks on the Rambam that writes "If he reaps the whole field [even though he was supposed to leave 1/60], he still gives peah. And if he gives most of what was harvested as peah, that is not obligated in truma and maasar." That means to say that the second he transgressed and reaped the first stalk of the1/60, by transgressing the command to leave a part of the field to the poor that causes the obligation of peah to go on the reaped part (since he can no longer give from the non-reaped part the proper amount). And then, that 1/60 part is obligated in truma and maasar. And even if he gives it to the poor, it is just a present and not considered abandoned (which would be not obligated in truma and maasar), it still is obligated in truma and maasar and can not not become peah.
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פאה is what one must leave to the poor. It is at least אחד ממאה. The first stalk that is cut makes that obligation חל. [He can not say, "the whole field is פאה." It has to be after something has been reaped.] The גמרא ירושלמי asks about that first stalk. Is is also obligated in פאה? [That means we know that it first has to be cut. And then he could make the rest of the field פאה. But if he wanted to could he then say that first stalk is also פאה? Answer של הגמרא: No. The reason is it makes everything else obligated, and so it itself is not חייב. And so it is obligated in תרומה and מעשר . Then let's say he goes ahead and cuts through the whole field. The first stalk of the חלק אחד מששים makes the obligation of פאה go to the reaped sheaves According to פאה פרק ב' משנה ה') Then the גמרא ירושלמי asks, "Is that first stalk of the חלק אחד מששים obligated in פאה? Answer: No. It is like the first stalk of the חמישים ותשעה מששים. I would like to add here the הווא אמינא" of הגמרא. That is why would this be a question in the first place? Should it not be clear that the case is the same as the first stalk that was reaped? Answer: the first stalk of the חלק אחד מששים is now cut. And therefore ought to be obligated in פאה. This is different than the first stalk of the חמישים ותשעה מששים which caused an obligation on הקמה standing stalks, but it itself is not standing. So then perhaps this ought to be the final answer? No. Because its being cut is simultaneous with the obligation coming on the reaped sheaves. That might be the difference. However you can still argue before it was cut it was standing and at that time the obligation was on the standing stalks. After it was cut the obligation in fact is on the reaped sheaves at the time the obligation is on the reaped sheaves. What makes it not obligated בפאה is that it is like the first stalk of the חמישים ותשעה מששים. It makes obligated and so is not obligated. My question is could he make the אחד מששים still to be פאה? Or is now that whole part of the field obligated in תרומה and מעשר? I realized while coming back from the sea that this is the point of רב שך. He asks on the רמב''ם that writes "If he reaps the whole field, he still gives פאה. And if he gives most of what was harvested as פאה, that is not obligated in תרומה and מעשר ." That means to say that the second he פשע and reaped the first stalk on the אחד מששים , that causes the obligation of פאה to go on the reaped part since he can no longer give from the non-reaped part the proper amount. And then that אחד מששים part is obligated in תרומה and מעשר . And even if he gives it to the poor, it is just a present and not considered abandoned , it still is obligated in תרומה and מעשר and can not not become פאה.
פאה זה מה שצריך להשאיר לעניים. זה לפחות אחד ממאה. הגבעול הראשון שנחתך הופך את המחויבות הזו לחל. [הוא לא יכול לומר "כל השדה פאה". זה חייב להיות אחרי שמשהו נקצר.] הגמרא ירושלמי שואל על הגבעול הראשון. האם חייב גם בפאה? [זה אומר שאנחנו יודעים שקודם כל צריך לחתוך אותו. ואז הוא יכול לעשות את שאר השדה פאה. אבל אם הוא רוצה היה יכול אז לומר שגבעול ראשון הוא גם פאה? תשובה של הגמרא: לא. הסיבה היא שזה הופך את כל השאר לחייב, ולכן זה עצמו לא חייב. ולכן חייב בתרומה ומעשר . ואז נניח שהוא ממשיך וחותך את כל השדה. הגבעול הראשון של חלק אחד מששים גורם לחובת הפאה ללכת לאלומות הנקצרות לפי פאה פרק ב' משנה ה') ואז שואל הגמרא ירושלמי, "האם הגבעול הראשון של חלק אחד מששים חייב בפאה? תשובה: לא. זה כמו הגבעול הראשון של החמישים ותשעה מששים. אני רוצה להוסיף כאן את הווא אמינא" של הגמרא. לכן זו תהיה שאלה מלכתחילה? האם לא צריך להיות ברור שהמקרה זהה לגבעול הראשון שנקטף? תשובה: הגבעול הראשון של חלק אחד מששים נחתך כעת. ולפיכך צריך לחייב בפאה. זה שונה מהגבעול הראשון של החמישים ותשעה מששים שגרם להתחייבות על גבעולים עומדים, אבל הוא עצמו אינו עומד. אז אולי זו צריכה להיות התשובה הסופית? לא, כי גזירתו בד בבד עם החיוב הבא על האלומות הקצורות. יכול להיות שזה ההבדל. עם זאת אתה עדיין יכול להתווכח לפני שנחתך זה היה עומד ובאותו זמן החיוב היה על הגבעולים העומדים. לאחר שנכרת החיוב הוא למעשה על האלומות הנקצרות בזמן שהחיוב הוא על האלומות הנקצרות. מה שהופך את זה לא חייב בפאה זה שזה כמו הגבעול הראשון של החמישים ותשעה מששים. זה עושה מחויב ולכן אינו מחויב. השאלה שלי היא האם הוא יכול לגרום לאחד מששים להיות פאה? או שמא עכשיו כל החלק הזה של השדה חייב בתרומה ומעשר? הבנתי שזו הנקודה של רב שך. שואל על הרמב''ם שכותב "אם קוטף את כל השדה עדיין נותן פאה. ואם נותן רוב מה שנקטף כפאה, אין חייב בתרומה ומעשר". כלומר לומר שבשני הוא פשע וקצר גבעול ראשון על אחד מששים, שגורם לחובת פאה ללכת על החלק הנקצר כיון שאינו יכול עוד לתת מהחלק הלא נקצר את הכמות הראויה. ואחר כך חלק אחד מששים חייב בתרומה ומעשר . ואפילו אם נותן לעני, זה רק מתנה ואינו נחשב נטוש, עדיין חייב בתרומה ומעשר ואינו יכול להיות פאה.
Being silent to one's insult
In the LeM of Rav Nahman in vol I:6 is brought: Being silent to one's insult is the main repentance on one's sins.[This is simple to understand if you know the principle of repentance which is to accept not to repeat the sin. But a sin can be an isur asey איסור עשה (a prohibition that comes from a positive command), a lav לאו (prohibition), a lav that has karet לאו שיש בו כרת (prohibition that has the penalty of being cut off from one's people), a lav that has hilul hashem לאו שיש בו חילול השם (a prohibition that has the desecration of the Divine Name). For the last two simple repentance and Yom Kippur are not enough, one must receive afflictions in order for the repentance to b accepted. So Rav Nahman is saying here that being silent in the face of being insult is in place of other sorts of afflictions.
Later in vol II Rav Nahman says that this Torah lesson contains in it the intensions of Elul and that the intensions of Elul are a segulah סגולה [help] to find one's match.
I actually had a lot of trouble finding my match for a long time. I had tried every possible idea that I or anyone else could suggest.... Until one day I decided I was going to say that Torah lesson LeM vol I perek 6 every day and never stop until I would find my match. And that is what I did. Every day for about a year until I fact I found my match.
And other thing I gained from that was the idea of silence. In that Torah lesson, silence in itself is praised, not just silence in the face of one's insult.
18.11.21
music files from years ago (when I was a teenager) and some recent.
Kant
Kant wants to show that our intuitions [things that we see or hear] can only have unity if the categories (where, how, when) unite them. But the doubt is how does this work? If I go into a field and collect flowers and put them into a basket, the basket puts them together, but does not make them a unity.
Kant answers this question by showing that intuitions have to have the capability to be able to be united by the categories. [The forms of intuitions are in them, but the unity is contributed by the categories.] [Reason is in the things themselves. Otherwise they could not be interpreted as fitting into the categories. [note 1]] And he shows that the categories can only unite concepts and intuitions, but not make them out of scratch. So he shows that both require the other. The categories and the intuitions are dependent one on the other.
The question is this still seems to leave the flowers in the basket. So I am thinking that this must be one of reasons for the principle that there is a deeper source of knowledge, non intuitive immediate knowledge that unites the categories with the intuitions. [That is the idea of the Kant-Friesian School]
I might mention that there is plenty of debate about the B Deduction of how the mind and body work together [intuitions and categories.] [It seems the B Deduction shows that space and time have to have structure that is able to be thought by the mind.] The other debate is whether intuitions have themselves some sort of knowledge in them besides the categories. In any case no scholars of Kant seem to take the Kant Fries approach. [Kant obviously did not. Rather this immediate non intuitive knowledge seems to answer the question.. And besides that Kant's own explanation seems to be "It must be true", that still leaves me wondering "How is it true?" I think the Friesian idea helps for that.
[It so happens that, even as Nelson tried to revive this idea,.]
I ought to mention that immediate non intuitive knowledge was conjectured for the sake of the dinge an sich. But it seems to help also for Kant's dilemma how categories of thought and sense perception relate.
[I have mentioned that this is tremendously significant to my learning partner in Uman David Bronson and others but apparently no one has paid attention. See the site of Kelley Ross
[note 1]This is close to what Hegel says. Both Kant and Hegel are looking for something inside sensory perception that makes it amenable to being processed by the human mind. To Hegel the reason is that Logos Reason is in everything. See Plotinus. Kant's answer is different and still subject to debate.