The Jerusalem Talmud asks about that first stalk.

 If you have the peah [edge of the field.] which is what one must leave to the poor. It is at least 1/60. The first stalk that is cut makes that obligation come into play. [He can not just say, "The whole field is peah." It has to be after something has been reaped.] The Jerusalem Talmud asks about that first stalk. Is is also obligated in peah? [That means we know that it first has to be cut. And then he could make the rest of the field peah. But if he wanted to, could he then say that first stalk is also peah? Answer: No. The reason is it makes everything else obligated, and so it itself is not. And so it is obligated in truma and maasar (gifts to the kohen/priest and Levite). 

Then let's say he goes ahead, and cuts through the whole field. [He was supposed to leave 1/60 standing for the poor.] The first stalk of the 1/60 makes the obligation of peah go to the reaped sheaves. (According to Peah perek II, mishna 5) The question is: Is that first stalk of the 1/60 obligated in peah? Answer: No. It is like the first stalk of the 59/60. [I would like to add here the "hava amina" of he gemara. That is why would this be a question in the first place? Should it not be clear that the case is the same as the first stalk that was reaped? Answer: the first stalk of the 1/60 is now cut. And therefore ought to be obligated in peah. This is different than the first stalk of the 59/60 which caused an obligation on the standing stalks, but it itself is not standing. So then perhaps this ought to be the final answer? No. Because its being cut is simultaneous with the obligation coming on the reaped sheaves. That might be the difference. However you can still argue before it was cut, it was standing and at that time the obligation was on the standing stalks. After it was cut, the obligation is on the reaped sheaves . What makes it not obligated is that it is like the first stalk of the 59/60. It makes obligated and so is not obligated.] 

The question is could he make the 1/60 still to be peah? Or is now that whole part of the field obligated in truma and maasar? 

I realized while coming back from the sea that this is the point of Rav Shach. He asks on the Rambam that writes "If he reaps the whole field [even though he was supposed to leave 1/60], he still gives peah. And if he gives most of what was harvested as peah, that is not obligated in truma and maasar." That means to say that the second he transgressed and reaped the first stalk of the1/60, by transgressing the command to leave a part of the field to the poor that causes the obligation of peah to go on the reaped part (since he can no longer give from the non-reaped part the proper amount). And then, that 1/60 part is obligated in truma and maasar. And even if he gives it to the poor, it is just a present and not considered abandoned (which would be not obligated in truma and maasar), it still is obligated in truma and maasar and can not not become peah. 

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  פאה  is what one must leave to the poor. It is at least אחד ממאה. The first stalk that is cut makes that obligation חל. [He can not say, "the whole field is פאה." It has to be after something has been reaped.] The גמרא ירושלמי asks about that first stalk. Is is also obligated in פאה? [That means we know that it first has to be cut. And then he could make the rest of the field פאה. But if he wanted to could he then say that first stalk is also פאה? Answer של הגמרא: No. The reason is it makes everything else obligated, and so it itself is not חייב. And so it is obligated in תרומה and מעשר  . Then let's say he goes ahead and cuts through the whole field. The first stalk of the חלק אחד מששים makes the obligation of פאה go to the reaped sheaves According to פאה פרק ב' משנה ה') Then  the גמרא ירושלמי asks, "Is that first stalk of the חלק אחד מששים obligated in פאה? Answer: No. It is like the first stalk of the  חמישים ותשעה מששים. I would like to add here the הווא אמינא" of הגמרא. That is why would this be a question in the first place? Should it not be clear that the case is the same as the first stalk that was reaped? Answer: the first stalk of the חלק אחד מששים is now cut. And therefore ought to be obligated in פאה. This is different than the first stalk of the חמישים ותשעה מששים which caused an obligation on הקמה standing stalks, but it itself is not standing. So then perhaps this ought to be the final answer? No. Because its being cut is simultaneous with the obligation coming on the reaped sheaves. That might be the difference. However you can still argue before it was cut it was standing and at that time the obligation was on the standing stalks. After it was cut the obligation in fact is on the reaped sheaves at the time the obligation is on the reaped sheaves. What makes it not obligated בפאה is that it is like the first stalk of the  חמישים ותשעה מששים. It makes obligated and so is not obligated. My question is could he make the אחד מששים still to be פאה? Or is now that whole part of the field obligated in תרומה and מעשר? I realized while coming back from the sea that this is the point of רב שך. He asks on the רמב''ם that writes "If he reaps the whole field,  he still gives פאה. And if he gives most of what was harvested as פאה, that is not obligated in תרומה and מעשר ." That means to say that the second he פשע and reaped the first stalk on the אחד מששים ,  that causes the obligation of פאה to go on the reaped part since he can no longer give from the non-reaped part the proper amount. And then that  אחד מששים part is obligated in תרומה and מעשר . And even if he gives it to the poor, it is just a present and not considered abandoned , it still is obligated in תרומה and מעשר and can not not become פאה. 

פאה זה מה שצריך להשאיר לעניים. זה לפחות אחד ממאה. הגבעול הראשון שנחתך הופך את המחויבות הזו לחל. [הוא לא יכול לומר "כל השדה פאה". זה חייב להיות אחרי שמשהו נקצר.] הגמרא ירושלמי שואל על הגבעול הראשון. האם חייב גם בפאה? [זה אומר שאנחנו יודעים שקודם כל צריך לחתוך אותו. ואז הוא יכול לעשות את שאר השדה פאה. אבל אם הוא רוצה היה יכול אז לומר שגבעול ראשון הוא גם פאה? תשובה של הגמרא: לא. הסיבה היא שזה הופך את כל השאר לחייב, ולכן זה עצמו לא חייב. ולכן חייב בתרומה ומעשר . ואז נניח שהוא ממשיך וחותך את כל השדה. הגבעול הראשון של חלק אחד מששים גורם לחובת הפאה ללכת לאלומות הנקצרות לפי פאה פרק ב' משנה ה') ואז שואל הגמרא ירושלמי, "האם הגבעול הראשון של חלק אחד מששים חייב בפאה? תשובה: לא. זה כמו הגבעול הראשון של החמישים ותשעה מששים. אני רוצה להוסיף כאן את הווא אמינא" של הגמרא. לכן זו תהיה שאלה מלכתחילה? האם לא צריך להיות ברור שהמקרה זהה לגבעול הראשון שנקטף? תשובה: הגבעול הראשון של חלק אחד מששים נחתך כעת. ולפיכך צריך לחייב בפאה. זה שונה מהגבעול הראשון של החמישים ותשעה מששים שגרם להתחייבות על גבעולים עומדים, אבל הוא עצמו אינו עומד. אז אולי זו צריכה להיות התשובה הסופית? לא, כי גזירתו בד בבד עם החיוב הבא על האלומות הקצורות. יכול להיות שזה ההבדל. עם זאת אתה עדיין יכול להתווכח לפני שנחתך זה היה עומד ובאותו זמן החיוב היה על הגבעולים העומדים. לאחר שנכרת החיוב הוא למעשה על האלומות הנקצרות בזמן שהחיוב הוא על האלומות הנקצרות. מה שהופך את זה לא חייב בפאה זה שזה כמו הגבעול הראשון של החמישים ותשעה מששים. זה עושה מחויב ולכן אינו מחויב. השאלה שלי היא האם הוא יכול לגרום לאחד מששים להיות פאה? או שמא עכשיו כל החלק הזה של השדה חייב בתרומה ומעשר? הבנתי  שזו הנקודה של רב שך. שואל על הרמב''ם שכותב "אם קוטף את כל השדה עדיין נותן פאה. ואם נותן רוב מה שנקטף כפאה, אין חייב בתרומה ומעשר". כלומר לומר שבשני הוא פשע וקצר גבעול ראשון על אחד מששים, שגורם לחובת פאה ללכת על החלק הנקצר כיון שאינו יכול עוד לתת מהחלק הלא נקצר את הכמות הראויה. ואחר כך חלק אחד מששים חייב בתרומה ומעשר . ואפילו אם נותן לעני, זה רק מתנה ואינו נחשב נטוש, עדיין חייב בתרומה ומעשר ואינו יכול להיות פאה.

Being silent to one's insult

 In the LeM of Rav Nahman in vol I:6 is brought: Being silent to one's insult is the main repentance on one's sins.[This is simple to understand if you know the principle of repentance which is to accept not to repeat the sin. But a sin can be an isur asey איסור עשה (a prohibition that comes from a positive command), a lav לאו (prohibition), a lav that has karet לאו שיש בו כרת (prohibition that has the penalty of being cut off from one's people), a lav that has hilul hashem לאו שיש בו חילול השם (a prohibition that has the desecration of the Divine Name). For the last two simple repentance and Yom Kippur are not enough, one must receive afflictions in order for the repentance to b accepted. So Rav Nahman is saying here that being silent in the face of being insult is in place of other sorts of afflictions.

Later in vol II Rav Nahman says that this Torah lesson contains in it the intensions of Elul and that the intensions of Elul are a segulah סגולה [help] to find one's match.

I actually had a lot of trouble finding my match for a long time. I had tried every possible idea that I or anyone else could suggest.... Until one day I decided I was going to say that Torah lesson LeM vol I perek 6 every day and never stop until I would find my match. And that is what I did.  Every day for about a year until I fact I found my match.

And other thing I gained from that was the idea of silence. In that Torah lesson, silence in itself is praised, not just silence in the face of one's insult. 

music files from years ago (when I was a teenager) and some recent.

 z47 D Minor

orchestra [written a long time ago in my parent's home. In high school orchestra in in Idywild Music Camp we were playing Beethoven and Brahms so that obviously effected my style.]

piano [also written at my parents home. It is called piano because on that it was written but scored for organ.]

CHS 

mathematics  

This is a great title

i 69

b101

b98

b99

r3

s82

e15

Kant

 Kant wants to show that our intuitions [things that we see or hear] can only have unity if the categories (where, how, when) unite them. But the doubt is how does this work? If I go into a field and collect flowers and put them into a basket, the basket puts them together, but does not make them a unity.

Kant answers this question by showing that intuitions have to have the capability to be able to be united by the categories. [The forms of intuitions are in them, but the unity is contributed by the categories.] [Reason is in the things themselves. Otherwise they could not be interpreted as fitting into the categories. [note 1]] And he shows that the categories can only unite concepts and intuitions, but not make them out of scratch. So he shows that both require the other. The categories and the intuitions are dependent one on the other.

The question is this still seems to leave the flowers in the basket. So I am thinking that this must be one of reasons for the principle that there is a deeper source of knowledge, non intuitive immediate knowledge that unites the categories with the intuitions. [That is the idea of the Kant-Friesian School]

I might mention that there is plenty of debate about the B Deduction  of how the mind and body work together [intuitions and categories.] [It seems the B Deduction shows that space and time have to have structure that is able to be thought by the mind.] The other debate is whether intuitions have themselves some sort of knowledge in them besides the categories. In any case no scholars of Kant seem to take the Kant Fries approach. [Kant obviously did not. Rather this immediate non intuitive knowledge seems to answer the question.. And besides that Kant's own explanation seems to be "It must be true", that still leaves me wondering "How is it true?" I think the Friesian idea helps for that.

[It so happens that, even as Nelson tried to revive this idea,.]

I ought to mention that immediate non intuitive knowledge was conjectured for the sake of the dinge an sich. But it seems to help also for Kant's dilemma how categories of thought and sense perception relate. 

[I have mentioned that this is tremendously significant to my learning partner in Uman David Bronson and others but apparently no one has paid attention. See the site of Kelley Ross

[note 1]This is close to what Hegel says. Both Kant and Hegel are looking for something inside sensory perception that makes it amenable to being processed by the human mind. To Hegel the reason is that Logos Reason is in everything. See Plotinus. Kant's answer is different and still subject to debate.

Robert E Lee.

 I have been thinking about Robert E Lee. And it occurred to me to mention a few ideas. One is a retraction. I think that when Stonewall Jackson died, Lee did not think the South was lost. 

Next as to secession, even though the tenth ammendment looks to some degree as allowing it, still there is some doubt because the idea that all rights not granted by the Constitution to the Federal government are reserved for the states or to the people of the USA would mean any individual person could also secede from the Union.  So no one could be guilty of any crime because all he would need to say would be  "I secede from the Union." [Or you could argue that individuals are different than states for individuals are liable to punishment by the courts as brought in the Constitution. But there is no such mechanism for punishing states. Besides that, Virginia openly made the possibility of secession as a key condition for joining the Union in the first place.] 

Another point on the side of Lee is that the Constitution mentions citizens of the states and of the union itself. It seems one can be both! So Lee was right that he was a citizen of Virginia and thus bound by its laws--and its secession.

"It is possible to find God in everything." [LeM II: 44 and also I think II:87].

 I was at the nearby Breslov Na Nach place yesterday and some mentioned an idea  that kind of makes sense to me. At first I suggested the idea that is well known, "תלמוד תורה כנגד כולם" ("Learning Torah is equal to all the other mitzvot put together.") And this person is a working guy who as you can imagine finds it hard to be sitting and learning all day because of his responsibilities. He mentioned this idea of Rav Nahman of finding the good point in others and in oneself. And that situations with people often change so that sitting and learning is not always possible.

[He did not mention another idea of Rav Nahman but which I think is relevant here that, "It is possible to find God in everything." [LeM II: 44 and also I think II:87]. And this applies to me since I also have found that my goal of sitting and learning Torah just did not work out as well as I thought. 

The idea is brought at greater length in the LeM [of Rav Nahman] in a few other places that is based on the mishna in Pirkei Avot בעשרה מאמרות נברא העולם with ten statements the world was created. Nine of them are open and plain to see "God said..." [and in everything created by these nine statements the glory of God is revealed. ] But the tenth statement is hidden. It does not say "God said.." , rather just "In the beginning God created...". That is called the "Hidden Statement." Now even though it says "the whole world is full of his glory" still there are places where the glory of God does not reach as it says וכבודי לאחר לא אתן "I will not give of my glory to another".[The speaker in that verse is God]. But nothing can exist without the will of God to make it exist. So how do evil things and places have existence? That is by the hidden statement. So even when one has fallen into evil and evil places and from there one seeks God and tries to return to Him, then the glory of the hidden statement is revealed upon him.

[There is more to be discussed here, but I just got back from the sea and I would like to spend my time learning. So it is best for anyone reading this just to see in the LeM of Rav Nahman some of the places that are relevant to this like the LeM II:4.]

Capitalism lifts everyone out of poverty.

 It is a proven fact that democracy and prosperity go together. And it has been proven that socialism and repression, and poverty go together hand in hand.

 \Why is this? The question of "Why?"" never bothered me much since I assumed that no matter how brilliant a system may be conceived --if its end result is million of dead and an equality of poverty, then that system can not be right. [I mean what should it matter to a poor person in the USA the lives better than medieval kings? Capitalism lifts everyone out of poverty. The poorest of the poor in the USA have I phones and Nikes shoes and electricity and sanitation that medial kings could not have dreamed of.]

Even China never got out of poverty until it embraced a market economy, but with the control of the party that retains political control.--not market control.

[And I admit I can not see the attraction of Communism today. All one has to do is the compare a picture of any ordinary grocery store in the USA, with a picture of street block long lines in the USSR just to get a loaf of bread.]