In the subject of the third mana [the third hundred] (מנה השלישית). [ note 1] The law is to leave it as long as the middleman was not negligent. [If he was, then he has to pay.] The question that come up in the gemara in Bava Metzia is why is this not divided? They answer division happens only when it could be true. [note 2] Rav Akiva Eigger askes from page 28 what about the case of signs and signs that is left. That is, there is  a lost object. two people give signs to show that it belongs to them. It is left by the finder until some absolute proof can be brought. But it could be of both so why not divide? Answers Rav Shach: division only happens when there is derara demomona [דררא דממונא] a doubt about the money and both have some prior "hazaka" ( "חזקא" holding", that is a reason to say the object is theirs.) But here the finder is not holding the object for both but only for the true owner-even if we do not know who that is.  

[I am being a bit short here because Rav Shach brings up a second question about the last mishna in the first chapter of Bava Metzia where also you leave the document even though the middleman is in fact holding the document for two people.

And I have not worked out how the argument between Sumchos and the sages fits in here--o if it is relevant at all.

[note 1] Two people give three hundred zuz  to a middleman to take care of. When they return each claims 200. If it was given together in one envelope, it stays with the middleman.

[note 2] Two people might pick up an object in the street at the same time. But the third mana belongs to one or the other, Not both. 

Rav Nahman of Breslov and Uman actually has two places in the LeM where he seems to contradict himself. In one place he says to learn "Poskim" [the medieval authorities that wrote on law. This is different than medieval authorities that wrote commentaries.] separates the good from evil--since that is the whole purpose of the poskim --to come to clarification of the law. [However I should add that in the terminology of Rav Nahman, the word "poskim" means basically the actual Shulchan Aruch of Rav Joseph Karo (who was not a Rishon). He was the beginning of the period of the Achronim. However, it is clear throughout his writings that "poskim" to Rav Nahman means especially the actual Shulchan Aruch with its commentaries , the Shach, Taz, Magen Avraham, etc. 

But in Le.M vol. I, chapter 54, he says the "כוח הדמיון שורה על שונה הלכות" ["Delusions rest upon those that learn halacha."] And there is no mistaking his intension there as he goes into great detail explaining this.

But I think that a simple answer is that he uses the word "shone halachot" שונה הלכות not "lomed halachot." לומד הלכות [To be "Shone" is  meant to to say the words and go on. The word "lomed" means to learn in depth.

So the best idea in terms of Halacha according to this would be not to be "shone halachot",  but rather to learn in depth starting from the Gemara and going through the Rosh, Rif, Tur, Shulchan Aruch with the basic commentaries on the Shuclan Aruch. [Later note, actually I think the best of all halacha books, the Tur with the Beit Yoseph is the best.] 

Incidentally, this is how I was taught in my second year in Shar Yashuv (the yeshiva of Rav Friefeld). Only in the third year there did they start with deep "lumdus" [learning] as you can see examples in Rav Shach and Rav Chaim of Brisk.

[There is a way of learning in depth which is to review the paragraph 10 times, and  that helps me to learn Physics and Math.] 

 "Social Justice Warrior"s advocate theft. They call it "redistribution" but changing the words that describe something still does not change the actual act.

This last so called "election" was not an election at all. There was was an astounding amount of open fraud. It was just a test of how much Democrats could get away with cheating. And if the voices that object would make any difference. It takes about two minutes to open any computer that count the votes and program it to count all the votes for Bidden or simply put in as many votes for Bidden as you want. This was already demonstrated in the Conference in Los Vegas at a computer conference.

The Gemara and Tosphot in the beginning of Bava Metzia

When there is a doubt about money the law is in some cases to divide, in other cases to let the money or object remain where it is until Elisha the prophet comes. The Gemara and Tosphot in the beginning of Bava Metzia deal with this.

One issue that come up is the מנה שלישית [the third hundred.] That is when two people come to a someone they trust and give him an envelope with three hundred dollars.  Then they return sometime later and each one says the 200 was mine and the hundred was of the other. Then he gives each 100 and the last hundred he keeps until some proof is brought, one way or the other. But if each comes in and separately give him their own envelope. Then he forgets who gave him the $200 and who gave the $100, then he has to give 200 to each and pay from his own pocket.

The question Rav Shach brings from the last Mishna in the first chapter of Bava Metzia מצא שטר בין שטרותיו ואינו יודע מה טיבו יניח a person finds a document of a loan among his documents and does not remember who gave it to him and the lender and borrower both ask for it. There he leaves it. Is this not the same as the above case where he has to pay from his own pocket since he forgot?

Rav Shach answers the case of the loan reverts to a verbal loan in which case the lender is believed to say "I paid". So we leave the document and give it to neither.

The question here is that most of the time in Bava Metzia when issues about money that we do not know to whom it belongs, the Mishnas goes like Sumchos [ממון המוטל בספק חולקים] , not the sages ( המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה) [like on page 100 side a]. But sometimes the mishna is a case where even the Sages agree. Sometimes the Gemara deals with this issue, and sometimes leaves it. So that last mishna might be like the sages that you leave the document where it is because it is המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה

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One issue that come up is the מנה שלישית . That is when two people come to a someone they trust and give him an envelope with three hundred שקלים.  Then they return sometime later and each one says the 200 was mine and the hundred was of the other. Then he gives each 100 and the last hundred he keeps until some proof is brought, one way or the other. But if each comes in and separately give him their own envelope. Then he forgets who gave him the 200 and who gave the 100, then he has to give 200 to each and משלם from his own pocket.

The question רב שך brings from the last משנה in the first chapter of בבא מציעא מצא שטר בין שטרותיו ואינו יודע מה טיבו יניח a person finds a document of a loan among his documents and does not remember who gave it to him and the lender and borrower both ask for it. There he leaves it. Is this not the same as the above case where he has to pay from his own pocket since he forgot?

רב שך answers the case of the loan reverts to a verbal loan in which case the lender is believed to say: "I paid". So we leave the document and give it to neither.

The question here is that most of the time in בבא מציעא when issues about money that we do not know to whom it belongs, the משנה goes like סומכוס ממון המוטל בספק חולקים, not the sages  המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה) like on page 100 side a. But sometimes the משנה is a case where even the Sages agree. Sometimes the גמרא deals with this issue, and sometimes leaves it. So that last משנה might be like the sages that you leave the document where it is because it is המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה

נושא אחד שעולה הוא מנה שלישית. זה כאשר שני אנשים מגיעים למישהו שהם סומכים עליו ונותנים לו מעטפה עם שלוש מאות שקלים. ואז הם חוזרים זמן מה אחר כך וכל אחד אומר שה -200 היו שלי והמאה היו של השני. ואז הוא נותן לכל אחד את 100 ואת המאה האחרונה שהוא שומר עד שמביאים הוכחה כלשהי, כך או אחרת. אבל אם כל אחד נכנס ונפרד נותנים לו מעטפה משלהם. ואז הוא שוכח מי נתן לו את ה200 ומי נתן את ה100, ואז הוא צריך לתת 200 לכל אחד ומשלם מכיסו.

השאלה שרב שך מביא מהמשנה האחרון בפרק הראשון בבא מציעא מצא שטר בין שטרותיו ואינו יודע מה טיבו יניח (אדם מוצא מסמך של הלוואה בין מסמכיו ואינו זוכר מי נתן לו המלווה או הלווה. שניהם מבקשים את המסמך. שם הוא משאיר את זה. האם זה אינו זהה למקרה דלעיל בו עליו לשלם מכיסו מאז ששכח?

רב שך עונה על המקרה של ההלוואה חוזר להלוואה מילולית ובמקרה זה מאמינים שהמלווה שאומר: "שילמתי". אז אנחנו עוזבים את המסמך ונותנים אותו לאף אחד מהם.

השאלה כאן היא שרוב הזמן בבבא מציעא כשנושאים על כסף שאיננו יודעים למי הוא שייך, המשנה הולכת כמו סומכוס (ממון המוטל בספק חולקים), ולא החכמים (המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה) כמו בעמוד 100 בצד א. אבל לפעמים זה מקרה שבו אפילו החכמים מסכימים. לפעמים הגמרא עוסקת בנושא זה ולעיתים עוזבת אותה. כך שבמקרה האחרון של שיכחת השטר יכול להיות כמו החכמים שאתה משאיר את המסמך במקום שהוא נמצא בגלל שהוא המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה

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I suggest getting up in the morning and saying right away the Shema [first paragraph], then a bit of Musar/ Ethics. [That is from some few paragraphs of what one feels he needs strength and encouragement in.] Then the Oral Law [in such a way as to get through the oral law, i.e. two Talmuds and Midrashim]. Then what the Rishonim essential Physics and Metaphysics. That approach you can see in Chovot Levavot and More Nevuchim/ the Guide for the Perplexed.  

As for halacha -my approach is that any opinion in the Gemara counts as Halacha unless openly dismissed. רב שלמה לוריא מחבר של החכמת שלמה  Shelomo  Luria writes [in his commentary on the Gemara which is printed with every Gemara at the bottom of the page of the Mahrasha] that it is better to decide the halacha straight from the Gemara even if one is wrong, rather than to decide from the Shulchan Aruch even if that is right. He thought the whole idea of taking away the authority form the Gemara into later on books was a terrible idea.

the problem with USA universities.

 Allan Bloom in The Closing of the American Mind pointed out the problem with USA universities. Maybe it all starts from philosophy as Ayn Rand suggested. If Ayn Rand is right the place to begin would be a different kind of Philosophy program. My suggestion would be the steps leading to the Kant Fries School of thought. That is Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Kant, Hegel, Leonard Nelson.

But to ignore philosophy does not seem like a good idea. The Mediaeval approach to combine faith and reason seems like to the best idea to me.