תוספות בבא מציעא צט ע''א וקידושין נ''ה ע''א

The משנה says מועל with בדק הבית goes out to חולין. That is אין מועל אחר מועל אלא בבהמה וכלי שרת. The תוספתא פרק ב says יש cases when בדק הבית also stays הקדש. This is the question of תוספות in קידושין נ''ה ע''א. The answer  looks to me to be straightforward. The first answer is to ר' מאיר  that מזיד it goes out to חולין. This seems to be open and plain in the words of תוספות even though he does not mention ר' מאיר. The second answer looks to be straight like ר' יהודה that only if he שוגג that it goes out to חולין. The actual division that תוספות says there is whether he thinks it is his or not. And besides that I think this is possible to be what תוספות means in Bava Mezia page 99a also. However the משנה למלך on רמב''ם laws of 'מעילה פרק ו' הלכות ד' וה says the difference is whether he gives the ax to another person or not. It looks like the מהרש''א understands Tosphot like the Mishna Lamelek. However the Maharshal divides the answers of Tosphot into two parts. So to me it looks like the marshal understands Tosphot as I said.


במשנה כתוב אין מעול אחר מועל אלא בבהמה וכלי שרת. היינו שמעילה בבדק הבית יוצאת לחולין. אבל בתוספתא כתוב מצבים שיש מועל אחר מועל בבדק הבית. זו שאלת התוספות בקידושין נ''ה ע''א. נראה לי שתירוץ התוספות הוא שזה תלוי רק באם הוא חושב שכלי שלו. אם הוא חושב שהוא שלו אז לר' מאיר הוא יוצא לחולון  ולר' יהודה רק אם הוא יושב שהכלי של אחר.
אבל לפי המשנה למלך התירוץ של תוספות הוא שהכל תלוי באם הוא נתן את הכלי למי שהוא אחר או אם הוא משתמש בו בעצמו. הדבר שקשה להבין במשנה למלך הוא שאם הוא נותן את החפצא שמי שהוא אחר הוא יוצא לחולין בהכרח אז מה אפשר לעשות עם המחלוקת בין ר' מאיר לר' יהודה

the question of Tosphot in Kidushin 55

If you have some object that you want to give to the Temple in Jerusalem and you say something that indicates this, then the object becomes sanctified. If it is one of those things that can be offered on the altar that is one kind of holiness. If not then it is just given to the Temple for its money value. In the meantime if someone uses it before it gets to the Temple and is redeemed then that person has to pay the amount he causes the vessel to lose value. If he just gives the object to someone then this is an argument between R Meir and R Yehuda. To R Meir if he knew it is holy then it became unconsecrated when it changed hands.But if he did not know then not.  To R Yehuda it is just the opposite.



The Mishna says moel [one who uses] with bedek habait [something consecrated for the Temple] goes out to hulin [to be not any more consecrated]. The Tosefta says There are cases when bedek habait [consecrated ]also stays holy [kodesh]. This is the question of Tosphot in Kidushin 55. The answer there looks to me to be straightforward. The first answer is to R. Meier that on purpose it goes out to hulin [secular]. [That is: R M says if one uses a sanctified object to marry a woman if he knew it is consecrated then she is married. If he did not know then she is not. The idea here is that one usually marries a woman by means of giving her some object that is worth some amount of money. But here the object does not belong to him. But still when he gives it to her it becomes not consecrated and she can use it].This seems to be open and plain in the words of Tosphot even though he does not mention R Meier. The second answer looks to be straight like R Yehuda that only if he thinks it is his that it goes out to hulin [secular].  The actual division that Tosfot says there is whether he thinks it is his or not.
And besides that I think this is possible to be what Tosphot means in Bava Mezia page 99a also.
However the Mishna Lamelek on Rambam laws of Meila perek 6 halachas 4 to 5 says the difference is whether he gives the ax [which was consecrated towards use in the Temple] to another person or not.
I learned this subject in Uman with David Bronson and for some reason I do not recall that we discussed this problem.
I have been troubled by the Mishna LaMelek for over a week and am also upset that I do not have my old learning partner to straighten out this issue for me. I mean the basic issues look clear--even if I do not understand the Mishna Lamelek. But where David Bronson excels is in deciphering the actual words of Tosphot when Tosphot is unclear and to me the words of Tospfot in Kidushin do look unclear.

And in partcular I have to admit that it looks like the Maharsha understands Tosphot like the Mishna Lamelek


The problem that has bothered me with the Mishna laMelek is if you say that when he gives the object to his friend it goes out to hulin then what do you do with the argument between R Mei and R yehuda [in kidushin page 52b]?

Gender wage gap

Thousands of cases were brought and the number keeps rising. But less than one percent of the cases are won. [Actually less than one percent but I forget the exact number.] Just because you can accuse someone of something does not mean they did anything wrong. The wag gap is like that. I am sitting in a library where girls are writing a paper that assumes the wag gap is true and suggest solutions. But why bring solutions to a problem before you know there is a problem.

I was in Netivot with the same problem. They assumed in the public schools that global warming is a fact without verifying the facts.





Thomas Sowell makes this point :

If the 77 percent statistic was for real, employers would be paying 30 percent more than they had to, every time they hired a man to do a job that a woman could do just as well. Would employers be such fools with their own money? If you think employers don't care about paying 30 percent more than they have to, just go ask your boss for a 30 percent raise!

Rambam nedarim has one law that comes from the Mishna: "'Not Hulin I will eat of yours,' is forbidden."The reason is that it means, "a karban I will eat of yours."  That is like R. Yehuda that from a "no" we can understand a "yes." Then in two laws later he says, "'hulin I will not eat of yours' is permitted."  That is like R Meir that we do not know a "yes" from a "no." Because if we would learn from the implication of "no" to "yes" it would mean, "Hulin I will not eat of yours, but a karban |I will eat of yours."

The Raavad asks this question. The Raavad asks this question on the Rambam. The Radvaz says the Rambam in  fact holds like R Yehuda and so the only question is the later law. The Radvaz points out that Rav Ashi makes a difference between To hulin and to not Hulin. How does that answer the question? For in the later law we also have a no. Hulin I will not eat of yours. Clearly what the Radvaz means in that in the later law the no comes in front of the verb, not the noun. But why would that makes the difference? The answer is that from a no you can learn a yes can only be the case if there is a one to one correspondence between the cause and effect. But if that is not the case then we do not know a yes from a no. For example. We know if it is raining then it is wet outside. But if it wet outside we do not know that it is raining. Someone might have turned on the sprinkler.
So in the first law of the Ramabm we know that there is only one thing that is not hulin. It is  a karban. But in the second law the fact that I will not eat any hulin of yours does not mean I will eat a pkarban of yours. I might not eat not hulin nor a karban.

________________________________________________________________________________


רמב''ם נדרים has one law that comes from the משנה. This is it. "Not חולין I will eat of yours is forbidden." The reason is that it means a קרבן I will eat of yours.  That is like ר' יהודה that from a no we can understand a yes. Then in two laws later he says חולין i will not eat of yours is מותר.  That is like ר' מאיר that we do not know a yes from a no. Because if we would learn from the implication of no to yes it would mean חולין I will not eat of yours but a קרבן |I will eat of yours.

The ראב''ד asks this question.  The רדב''ז says the רמב''ם in  fact holds like ר' יהודה and so the only question is the later law. The רדב''ז points out that רב אשי makes a difference between  לחולין and to  לא חולין. How does that answer the question? For in the later law we also have a no. היינו שלא אוכל לך חולין I will not eat of yours. Clearly what the רדב''ז means in that in the later law. The no comes in front of the verb, not the noun. But why would that makes the difference? The answer is that from a no you can learn a yes can only be the case if there is a one to one correspondence between the cause and effect. But if that is not the case then we do not know a yes from a no. For example. We know if it is raining then it is wet outside. But if it wet outside we do not know that it is raining. Someone might have turned on the sprinkler. So in the first law of the רמב''ם we know that there is only one thing that is not חולין. It is  a קרבן. But in the second law the fact that I will not eat any חולין of yours does not mean I will eat a קרבן of yours. I might not eat not חולין nor a קרבן.

ברמב''ם הלכות נדרים יש הלכה. האומר לא חולין שאני אוכל לך אסור. כלומר שזה דומה שמי שאומר קרבן שאני אוכל לך. זו דעת ר' יהודה שמכלל לאו אתה יכול להבין כן. אבל אחר כך הרמב''ם פסק  חולין שלא אוכל לך מותר. זו שאלת הראב''ד. הרדב''ז עונה ממה שהגמרא מביא רב אשי שיש חילוק בין לחולין ללא חולין. אבל בחוק השני יש גם לא. היינו חולין שלא אוכל לך. תירוץ. אם יש התכתבות אחת לאחת בין סיבה למסובב אז מכלל לאו אתה יודע כן. אבל אם אין התכתבות כזה אז לא. למשל אם יש גשם אנחנו יודעים שבחוץ הוא רטוב. אבל אם הוא רטוב בחוץ אין אנו יודעים שהוא יבש בחוץ בגלל שיכול להיות שמי שהוא פתח את הממטרה שלו. לכל בעניין שלנו לא חולין יש לו רק פירוד אחד היינו קרבן. לכן לא חולין שאוכל לך פירודו קרבן שאוכל לך. אבל זה שלא אוכל לך חולין אין מזה מובן שכן אוכל לך קרבן אלא שיכול שלהיות שלא אוכל לך לא חולין ולא קרבן.

The religious in general give me the creeps.

I think the best approach to passover is to stay home and do as much as one can do without going to any religious people. I think people make too much of a problem out of Passover in such a way that people get the idea the can not stay home and do it themselves. I think in general is the best to not go to any religious place except if you have a Reform or Conservative place nearby. The religious in general give me the creeps. [However I do like the Breslov Na Nach Groups and also I like the Litvaks [i.e., Lithuanian yeshiva type people.]  
I should add that not just Breslov but some other groups I think are OK like Vishnitz and Ger.] 

It occurs to me that you only find strong old trees where the wind and rain blow hard. In the sunny valleys where a tree encounters little resistance, it does not grow strong.
So it is in life that the problems are often opportunities for growth and to learn from one's mistakes.

When sailing also it is a rule that you do not want the wind right behind you. That causes one to lose control of the boat. You want to go to the side of the wind where it is coming at an angle--for the same reason as ditto. You need a bit of resistance.

Musar movement of R. Salanter

It is possible that the Musar movement of R. Salanter and his ideas do not work as well as one would hope. But when I was in the Yeshiva world I found that combination of intense learning of Gemara and Musar [Ethics] [the ethical works of the rishonim [medieval authors]] to be a potent combination that works for self improvement. And from what I can see -it does work to a high degree.. [The only thing is that I felt I needed the imput of idea from Rav Nahman also.]

I mean to say that the way of the Litvak yeshivot is good in which the morning is devoted to in depth Gemara learning and fast in the afternoon, while Musar is only given a short amount of time. Still the Musar periods I think should be expanded.