Many students have a difficult time seeing a distinction between the following two statements: a. It's true. b. It's true for me.

"Well, it's true for me ...."
Many students have a difficult time seeing a distinction between the following two statements:

a. It's true.
b. It's true for me.

But there IS a difference, and it is important to see the difference, and most people see the difference when it comes to things like mathematics, science, accounting, engineering, law, etc.

Here's the question: What does "for me" add to "It's true"? What I mean is, why would anyone say "It's true for me"? Let's say, for example, your favorite physics teacher asks you to tell her what the rate of fall is for a body located approximately at the surface of the Earth. Let's say that you are a student of physics and know with certainty, that bodies fall at 9.4 meters per second per second. If you write on your exam that bodies fall at 9.4 m/sec^2, your instructor would put an annoying red "X" next to your answer. (It should be 9.81)

"But wait a darn minute, there, ma'am: it's true for me that bodies fall at 9.4 m/sec^2!"



Relativism and Tolerance
What is the matter with the following claim:
"Different groups have different moral beliefs.
[One glance would show the absurdity of the logical extension of this argument. Disagreements in questions of history or biology or cosmology do not show that there are no facts about these subjects.]

Do you understand the reasons why such statements as "well it's true for them…" are confused and mistaken (with exceptions)?
Do you understand why such statements as "no one can tell me what to believe (or what to do)" doesn't work as a response to moral criticism? And why it isn't a very respectable or sophisticated response to differences in opinion? [Let's say a cashier in a supermarket who takes money from the cash register is approached by her boss. She defends herself: "No one can tell me what to do."
Let's say a private in the army does not know how to clean and reassemble  a rifle.He is approached by his superior officer who tries to tell him how to do it. He answers: "No one can tell me what to think."]

Do you understand the reasons why such statements as "who needs morality?" are confused and mistaken (with exceptions)?
Do you understand the difference between the law and morality and why the law is an insufficient moral guide?
Do you understand how it is that humans get their views about morality? The various stages of development that many humans experience?


Morality is a social phenomenon. Think about this. If a person is alone on some deserted island would anything that person did be moral or immoral? That person may do things that increase or decrease the chance for survival or rescue but would those acts be moral or immoral? Most of what we are concerned with in Ethics is related to the situation in which humans are living with others. Humans are social animals. Society contributes to making humans what they are. For humans there arises the question of how are humans to behave toward one another. What are the rules to be? How are we to learn of them? Why do we need them?


Consider what the world would be like if there were no traffic rules at all. Would people be able to travel by automobiles, buses and other vehicles on the roadways if there were no traffic regulations? The answer should be obvious to all rational members of the human species. Without basic rules, no matter how much some would like to avoid them or break them, there would be chaos. The fact that some people break the rules is quite clearly and obviously not sufficient to do away with the rules. The rules are needed for transportation to take place.

Why are moral rules needed? For example, why do humans need rules about keeping promises, telling the truth and private property? This answer should be fairly obvious. Without such rules people would not be able to live amongst other humans. People could not make plans, could not leave their belongings behind them wherever they went. We would not know who to trust and what to expect from others. Civilized, social life would not be possible. So, the question is :

Why should humans care about being moral?

John Mackie calls ethical intuitions 'queer' and 'utterly different from our ordinary ways of knowing everything else'. '

Behind Mackie's distaste for intuition there no doubt lies some of the strong empiricist sentiment of twentieth-century philosophy. Empiricism--roughly, the idea that all 'informative' knowledge, or knowledge of the mind-independent, language-independent world, must derive from sense perception--has been fashionable for the last century, though less so, I think, in the past decade.


Here, I will give a  counter-example to empiricism.

First example: Nothing can be both entirely red and entirely green. How do I know that? Note that the question is not how I came upon the concepts 'red' and 'green', nor how I came to understand this proposition. The question is why, having understood it, I am justified in affirming it, rather than denying it or withholding judgment. It seems to be justified intuitively, that is, simply because it seems obvious on reflection. How else might it be justified?

A naive empiricist might appeal to my experiences with colored objects: I have seen many colored objects, and none of them have ever been both red and green. One thing that makes this implausible as an explanation of how I know that nothing can be both red and green is the necessity of the judgment. Contrast the following two statements:

Nothing is both green and red.
Nothing is both green and a million miles long.

We have never observed a counter-example to either statement, so it would seem that the second is at least as well-supported by observation as the first. The second statement is probably true, since we have never observed a green object that is a million miles long, although there seems to be no reason why there couldn't be such a thing. We have a clear conception of what it would be like to observe such a thing, and it would not be senseless to look for one.But the first statement is different: we can see that there simply couldn't be a green object that is red, and it seems that no matter what our experience had been like, we would not have said that there was such an object; consequently, it would be senseless even to look for one.

I conclude with a final epistemological objection to intuitive morality. Even if moral properties are real, it does not seem that they could affect anything. They do not produce physical effects, so they do not affect our brain processes, so they probably do not affect our mental processes either.

Some philosophers maintain that knowledge of a thing requires some kind of interaction with it.
Now, this problem is not specific to moral knowledge. It is a general problem about a priori knowledge. Paul Benacerraf originally raised it as a problem about mathematics: since we have no interaction with the number 2--we do not bump into it on the street, and so on--how can we have knowledge of it?

Answer: Reason perceives universals

Universals exist necessarily. 'Universals' are abstract things (features, relationships, types) that two or more particular things or groups can have in common. For instance, yellow is a universal. It is something that lemons, the sun, and school buses, among other things, all have in common. Yellow is 'abstract' in the sense that it is not a particular object with a particular location; you will not bump into yellow, just sitting there by itself, on the street. Nevertheless, yellow certainly exists. Here is an argument for that:
1.
The following statement is true:
(Y) Yellow is a color.
2.
The truth of (Y) requires that yellow exist.
3.
Therefore, yellow exists.

Comment: Suppose I say, 'The King of Colorado is fluffy'. Since there is no king of Colorado, some would say the sentence is false; others would say it is neither true nor false. But no one thinks it would be true.

Some philosophers (the 'nominalists') say that the only thing multiple particulars have in common is that we apply the same word or idea to them. Here is an argument against that:

4.	Yellow is a color, and lemons have it.
5.	No word or idea is a color, nor do lemons 'have' words or ideas.
6.	Therefore, yellow is not a word or an idea.

Yellowness is something lemons, the sun, and so on have in common; so what they have in common is not (merely) a word or idea. Some philosophers will say I have oversimplified this issue. I say I have simplified but not oversimplified; the existence of universals is a trivial truth.

[The latter part of this essay is taken from Dr Michael Huemer.]]

The Torah's world view is Monotheism. That is: that God created the world something from nothing, and He is not the world, nor is the world Him.

The basic idea of the verse אתה הראתה לדעת כי השם הוא האלהים אין עוד מלבדו (You were shown to know that the Lord is God, there is no other besides Him.) is actually explained simply in the beginning of the Mishne Torah (of Maimonides). [הלכות יסודי התורה פרק א' הלכה א-ד] That is that God's existence is independent of anything else. The existence of everything else depends on the existence of God. It does not mean the way people commonly take it to mean nowadays as a support for the Bhagavad Gita.

I mean to say that the Torah's world view is that of what is called Monotheism.That is that God created the world something from nothing, and He is not the world, nor is the world Him.

This all goes to show how right Reb Israel Salanter was about Musar. For in Musar one gets the basic orientation of the Torah. 

[In Israel, in Rav Montag's yeshiva I had an opportunity to demonstrate this. I was talking with some of the "kollel-lite" guys that were learning in kollel, and this subject came up. I had two stones in my pockets. I asked them about one of them, "Is this stone godliness?" "האם האבן הזאת אלקות?" They remained uncommitted. They must have thought I had something up my sleeve. I then took out the other stone and put the first one on the floor and smashed it with the second one. It made such a noise that the entire beit midrash looked up-including Rav Montag.
I asked them, "Did it just break godliness?"האם עכשיו שיברתי אלקות? 
[I do not recommend this demonstration because part of the first stone flew out and it could have hurt someone. That would have then brought up the question: "Is godliness is dangerous?"]

Most supposed Torah scholars are demons as Reb Nachman pointed out. Once they decide to use Torah for money they lose their holy soul and become possessed by forces from the dark side.]

Not enough credit is given to Kant when it come to his insight that when pure reason goes into an area of  "the thing in itself" (dinge an sich (plural)) it comes up with self contradictions. Kant intended this insight to be expanded. Not just to be understood in the limited philosophical form he put it in.
 Thus Kant himself applied it further. He said when a person looks into his own soul and psychology that creates in him mental illness because the "self" is in the realm of the dinge an sich. [That in itself was an important insight. It was by this awareness that one is only conscious of the surface of the self--not what is inside it that gave Kant the ability to overcome solipsism.

Thus it seems clear to me why learning Torah presents the kinds of problems that one generally encounters. The reason now seems simple. It is in the realm of the dinge an sich.
The only way to come to Torah is to be able to jump over the questions. To come to appreciate Torah is much more important than the amount of time spent learning it.
The question typically are sometimes contradictions in the issue of "parnasa" how much time to spend on a livelihood as opposed to how much time spent of learning Torah. There are also questions that arise from phony people that pretend to learn Torah and yet are not at all moral or decent.[Most supposed Torah scholars are demons as Reb Nachman pointed out. Once they decide to sue Torah for money they lose their holy soul and become possessed by forces from the dark side.]
The way you can see this in the Ari [Isaac Luria] and Rav Shalom Sharabi is  the צימצום applied to all the midot (sepherot). Thus when the צימצום occurred it happened even in wisdom. So there are areas where wisdom can not venture into. [That is how the Reshash explains  the צמצום at the beginning of the נהר שלום  based on a reading of the Ari.]

One trouble is also the very common problem of people being thrown out of yeshivas. There are many causes of this-sometimes justified and sometimes not. One thing that makes this disturbing is the fact that many yeshivas present themselves as "open door" places to the public. That is the face they present when trying to collect charity. But the big picture is more simple. It is hard to merit to Torah and to do so one has to overcomes the mental blocks, questions about, "Why should one learn Torah?" So if it would not be one kind of question or problem it would be another, because there is not way to merit to Torah without jumping over the questions and ignoring them and simply saying "people are people are primates" and simply decreeing on oneself to sit and learn Torah as much and even more than what is possible.

[What I meant to say here about Rav Shalom Sharabi is that he mentions the doubt of Reb Chaim Vital about if the צמצום  was only in כלליות or also in פרטיות. And the Reshash says there that this doubt of Rav Chaim Vital was only at the beginning of his learning from the Ari, but later it was clear to him that it also applied in פרטיות. Reb Nachman brings this same point also. He says like the Reshash that the צמצום contraction happened in all the traits -for example wisdom. So there is a limit to how far reason--even pure reason can extend.]

noble savage myth

I wanted to mention that I think the problem in England is the noble savage myth that was popularized by Rousseau. They think they have found the noble savage in Muslims. They hate their Christian past but can not shake it off, so instead they cater to Muslims and by they get the feeling of spiritual release from the constraints of the Bible. I know I am not stating this properly but they main idea is I think England and France's infatuation with Muslims is highly psychological and not at all based on reason but rather the deep "Id"--more or less discovered by Nietzsche.

rebellion against religious authority

The problem of religious and secular authority and abuse of authority has been around for as long as there has been any kind of human or even primate groups. [Jane Goodall noticed this in primates.]
In history the first time this problem is recorded is in Herodotus. There the question of Democracy versus Monarchy is always just under the surface. Democracy is not a modern option. It is been around for a while. Maybe not has long as monarchy but it has been around. Athens suffered under kings and thus choose democracy. Persia had suffered under Cambyses and the Magi and thus was almost about to choose democracy at the advice of Otanes. The modern approach to democracy began with Calvin. In him and in Luther the problem of abuse of religious authority and abuse of secular authority always looms on the horizon. Calvin is the beginning of the modern day version of representative government --but with a major difference. To him there is not a separation of church an state except in functions-- not as some hypothetical legal dividing line. All are under God's Law and God's Law encompasses all facets of life. But to Calvin the option of rebellion a against  authority when it abuses God's Law always exists. [This really began with Luther in terms of rebellion against religious authority when it is abusive. To Calvin the problem is more in the area of abuse of secular authority.



The ramifications of all this took a long time to get into the Jewish world. But in time also in the Jewish world the problem of authority became an issue. And it still is.
The major reaction of abuse of religious authority is Reform Judaism. The reaction of abuse of secular authority resulted in the State of Israel. Both are results of legitimate complaints about intolerable abuses of authority by religious leader and the anti Semitic government of the Czar and Europe's monarchs.

The result today of reaction to abuse of religious authority tends to be what is called חוזר בשאלה return to question.

But the big picture is not the problem in the Jewish world of abuse of authority but rather the larger question of abuse of authority in all human history--and what is possible to do about it?

My impression is that Luther was right about what to do concerning abuse of religious authority. Though for sure he was the polar opposite of a saint, still his basic idea is valid--get back to Torah.
In other words to learn and keep Torah is an individual responsibility. How better can I put it? Though Luther was including the New Testament in his approach I still feel there is a great message in what he says. But from my point of view the main thing would be instead of the NT one should learn the  Law of Moses [Written and Oral] and keep  it. That is this depends on the individual.
That is to learn the Old Testament and the two Talmuds in depth and with rigorous painstaking work on every page.
This in fact became the approach of the Litvak yeshivas--to simply learn Torah and do what it says. This was the Litvak solution to the problem of abuse of authority. To throw out the phonies and charlatans and get back to what the Torah in fact says.

[The trouble that I see is that it takes some kind of merit to learn Torah. Without some kind of specific merit, obstacles arise that are not surmountable. The evil inclination always comes into the mind telling one how much better it is to do other things. One always finds other things preferable. So what to do? To pray to learn and appreciate Torah. Even one word of Torah is in my eyes a great merit..]

music file T 65

T65 A flat major mp3    t65 in midi   t65 nwc  t60 mp3  t60 midi   t60 nwc

T 66 music file

t66 in mp3    [t66 in midi]  [t66 in nwc]As I said before I spent a lot of time trying to learn from the greats. like Mozart. One idea I borrow here is to go to the 6th instead of the expected 5th towards the end.
Another important idea of Mozart is to leave the tonic in the bass, while the higher goes to the dominant.  I have wanted to use this idea often but was never able to until this piece  right towards the end.