The Musar Movement of Reb Israel Salanter I think can be divided into different areas of emphasis: Fear of God, Trust in God, good character traits e.g  speaking the truth.
Each disciple came away from Reb Israel with something different.

But I think the track and idea of trying to find a limited numbers of things to emphasize is a better that just "keep Torah" since people have only a limited number of rules they keep in mind on a daily basis. So that set of rules has to be the set that contains the whole Torah in potential.

Cults are the greater danger than  physical means of destroying people's lives. By enslaving a person's mind, you enslave the whole person.
Sadly not enough research has been done in this area. It is hard fir me to believe that there is a single family that has not been touched and ruined by some cult. And yet this problem scarcely gets public mention. I have no idea why something that obviously is very destructive and effects everyone is barely worth public mention? You would think it was just a few odd balls here and there that fall for the shenanigans.

I have from some kind of odd sort of curiosity done much reading on cults. Both their own sets of religious books and also other sources. It is hard to come to any conclusion about any group because they have the power to convince.

Jogging is something that President Kennedy introduced on a large scale in the USA. Very few people engaged in it until he made a very public matter out of it.



He certainly deserves the credit for making jogging popular world wide. I wish I would do more of it.

But I also would like to recommend sit ups. There is something about sit-ups which I find amazing. It is like I get up re- energized in a way I do not see with jogging.

In terms of fat, I recommend putting in a raw egg in your coffee instead of cream. This takes away the desire to eat unhealthy foods the whole day. [This I heard from my learning partner.]

Ideas in Talmud

 אין לי גמרא כדי לבדוק את הכול, אבל  עלתה על דעתי שאלה חשובה על בבא מציעא ושבועות מ''ד. אותה הגמרא נמצאת בבא מציעא פרק האומנים. זאת: מה רבי עקיב מחזיק? הגמרא מסכמת בשבועות שהטיעון של רבי אליעזר ורבי עקיבה תלוי בטענות של רבה ורב יוסף. אז מה אנחנו יודעים עד כה? הוא שרבי עקיבה מחזיק המלווה הוא שומר שכר על המשכון, ורבי אליעזר מחזיק שהוא שומר חינם.
 אבל השאלה שלי היא זו. מה רבי עקיבה מחזיק? האם הוא מתכוון שהמלווה הוא שומר שכר ובכך פטור במקרה של שוד מזוין לחלוטין? והוא מקבל ההלוואה כולה שלו? ובמקרה של אבידה או גניבה, אז הוא מחויב, כלומר הוא מאבד את ההלוואה כולה? אבל זה לא יכול להיות צודק כי אז תהיה לגמרא דרך להרוויח שרבי עקיבה ושמואל מחזיקים באותה שיטה! והגמרא דחפה את זה בהתחלה! אלא אם כן אתה חושב  שהגמרא שינתה את דעתה פה וחושבת שזה בסדר  ששמואל ורבי עקיבה מסכימים. עכשיו בדרך כלל זה יהיה בלתי אפשרי, אבל במקרה שלנו זה יכול להיות, כי אנחנו יודעים שתוספות החליטו כמו שמואל. אז אפשר לומר לתוספות  שלמעשה הגמרא שינתה את דעתה בלי לומר זאת! אז בסדר אולי ככה תוספות לומדים את הסוגיא. אבל מה לגבי הרי''ף והרמב''ם? אני מתכוון שאפשר להסתכל על הצד השני של הדברים. אולי הגמרא מחזיקה שרבי עקיבה מחזיק שהמלווה שומר שכר ובכך פטור במקרה של שוד מזוין, אבל עדיין מאבד את סכום המשכון? בסדר גמור. אז מה לגבי המקרה של גניבה או אובדן? ואז הוא מחויב ומאבד את ההלוואה כולה. זה בהחלט כמו שמואל. וזה בכלל לא טוב כי הרי''ף והרמב''ם לא מחליטים כמו שמואל. דרך אחת שאני חושב הגיונית כאן היא זו: רבי עקיבה מחזיק הוא שומר שכר ולכן הוא לא מאבד שום דבר במקרה של שוד מזוין.  ובכל מקרה של שוד לא חמוש, אלא גניבה או אובדן, הוא מאבד רק את הסכום של שעבוד המשכון. זה יהיה נהדר אם זה היה נכון. כי אז לא יהיה בכל מקרה בו רבי עקיבה ושמואל מסכימים. ואנחנו בהחלט צריכים את זה על פי תחילת הגמרא וגם העובדה היא שהרמב''ם והרי''ף לא מחליטים כמו שמואל. מה אנחנו יכולים למצוא כאן הוא שתי דרכים שונות של למידת גמרא זו. אחת כמו תוספות והשני כמו הרי''ף והרמב''ם

The truth be told I think there is a lot more to think about here but this is just a little bit of what I was thinking while out walking. The things to check if God grants to me a Gemara is to see if perhaps this way of learning is reflected in Tosphot. Also to see how this fits in teh end of the Gemara where the Gemra further modifies its conclusion with a difference of whether he needs the pledge or not. Would this change anything here?

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It also occurred to me that there seems to be a question on the Rif. He does say the lender is a paid guard and also that then it is  a case of armed robbery that he loses the mount of the pledge. We can conclude that in the case of theft or loss he would be obligated more that just the amount of the pledge but rather the whole loan. And on this there is the question that if so then the Gemara would have a way of making Rabbi Akiva and Shmuel coincide in the case of theft or loss. And this contradicts the previous Gemara/

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It also occurred to me that there seems to be a question on the רי''ף. He does say the lender is a שומר שכר and also that then it is  a case of armed robbery that he loses the mount of the משכון. We can conclude that in the case of theft or loss he would be obligated more that just the amount of the pledge but rather the whole loan. And on this there is the question that if so then the גמרא would have a way of making רבי עקיבה and שמואל coincide in the case of theft or loss. And this contradicts the previous גמרא

I don't have a  Gemara to look this up, but it occurred to me an important question about Bava Metzia and Shavuot 44. [The same Gemara is in Bava Metzia perek האומנים]That is what does Rabbi Akiva hold? The Gemara concludes in Shavuot that the argument of Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva depends on the argument of Raba and Rav Joseph. So what we do know so far is RA holds the lender is a paid guard and RE hold he is an unpaid guard.
Now I admit that if one had the Gemara in front of him this might seem like a silly question. But my question is this. What does Rabbi Akiva hold? Does he mean he is a paid guard and thus patur in the case of armed robbery completely? And this get his entire loan? And in the case of loss or not armed robbery [theft] then he is obligated meaning he lose the entire loan? But this can not be right because the the Gemara would have a way of making Rabbi Akiva and Shmuel coincide! And the Gemara pushed that off right at the beginning! [Unless you would want to say the Gemara is changing its mind here and is thinking it is OK for Shmuel and Rabbi Akiva to agree. Now normally this would be impossible but in our case it might be try because we know Tosphot does Poskin like Shmuel. So you might say Tosphot is in fact thinking the Gemara changed its mind without saying so!]
So Fine maybe this is how Tosphot learns the sugia. I just do not know and have no way to look it up.

But what about the Rif and Rambam? I mean lets look at the other side of things. Maybe the Gemara means Rabbi Akiva hold he is a paid guard and thus patur in a case of armed robbery but still loses the amount of the משכון? Fine. Then what about the case of theft or loss? Then he is obligated  and loses the whole loan. This is definite like Shmuel. and that is not good at all because the Rif and Rambam do not poskin like Shmuel.

One way I think makes sense here is this: Rabbi Akiva holds he is a paid guard and so he loses nothing in the case of armed robbery. And in a case of not armed robbery but rather theft or loss he loses just the amount of the pledge משכון. This would be great if this were true. Because then there would not be any case in which Rabbi Akiva and Shmuel are agreeing. And we certainly need this according to the beginning of the Gemera and also the fact is the Rambam and Rif do not poskin like Shmuel.

In summery: What we might have here is two different ways of learning this Gemara. One like Tosphot and the other like the Rif and Rambam.

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I don't have a  גמרא to look this up, but it occurred to me an important question about בבא מציעא and שבועות מ''ד. The same גמרא is in בבא מציעא פרק האומנים.That is what does רבי עקיבה hold? The גמרא concludes in שבועות that the argument of רבי אליעזר and רבי עקיבה depends on the argument of רבה and רב יוסף. So what we do know so far is רבי עקיבה holds the מלווה is a שומר שכר and רבי אליעזר hold he is an unpaid guard.
Now I admit that if one had the גמרא in front of him this might seem like a silly question. But my question is this. What does רבי עקיבה hold? Does he mean he is a שומר שכר and thus פטור in the case of armed robbery completely? And this get his entire loan? And in the case of אבידה or גניבה then he is obligated meaning he loses the entire loan? Or just the amount of the משכון? But this can not be right because the the גמרא would have a way of making רבי עקיבה and שמואל coincide! And the גמרא pushed that off right at the beginning! Unless you would want to say the גמרא is changing its mind here and is thinking it is OK for שמואל and רבי עקיבה to agree. Now normally this would be impossible but in our case it might be try because we know תוספות does decide like שמואל. So you might say תוספות is in fact thinking the גמרא changed its mind without saying so!
So Fine maybe this is how תוספות learns the סוגיא. I just do not know and have no way to look it up.

But what about the רי''ף and רמב''ם? I mean lets look at the other side of things. Maybe the גמרא means רבי עקיבה hold he is a paid guard and thus פטור in a case of armed robbery but still loses the amount of the משכון? Fine. Then what about the case of theft or loss? Then he is obligated  and loses the whole loan. This is definitely like שמואל. and that is not good at all because the רי''ף and רמב''ם do not decide like שמואל.

One way I think makes sense here is this: רבי עקיבה holds he is a paid guard and so he loses nothing in the case of armed robbery. And in a case of not armed robbery but rather theft or loss he loses just the amount of the pledge משכון. This would be great if this were true. Because then there would not be any case in which רבי עקיבה and שמואל are agreeing. And we certainly need this according to the beginning of the גמרא and also the fact is the רמב''ם and רי''ף do not decide like שמואל.

In summery. What we might have here is two different ways of learning this גמרא. One like תוספות and the other like the רי''ף and רמב''ם.
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Something to consider in light of the above. Does any of this help us when it comes to the argument between Rashi and Rabbainu Chananel? I mean: the Gemara's original question was is there an argument between Shmuel and Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Eliezer? The Gemara answers no. One is when the lender explained and the other case is when he did not. Rashi says the case of Shmuel is when he did not.
Tome it makes sense to say Rabbainu Hananal must have meant that the Gemara did not use the word "lender," because it would make no sense for the lender to explain the pledge is for the whole loan if that would weaken his position! 
Now I wonder if going back to the original position of the Gemara as I mentioned in the above essay is related to this?  For I have been suggesting that the Gemara did go back to its original position according to Tosphot and the Rif. So now understanding this original position makes sense.

And the fact of the matter is according to this idea of mine that Rabbainu chanel is when the borrowers spoke and Rashi is when the lender spoke we come out with the outstanding and amazing conclusion that there is no argument.
If the borrower spoke he increased his power and so if the lender lost the pledge it goes for the whole loan. If the lender spoke then it was he who increased his power and the pledge is only according to it monetary value.

Furthermore according to what I wrote before that the cases in Bava Metzia 104 and Shavuot 44 are different this also might make  a difference. That is: I wrote Shavuot is when the pledge was lost and the Gemara in Bava Metzia is when the loan was not paid back and so the lender can go after the whole pledge. Going after the whole pledge might be when it was the lender who spoke. The case in Shavuot is when the borrower spoke. And so these two are not disagreeing at all!
And this idea that the different gemaras in different places do not disagree is certainly a starting prima facie assumption of Tosphot.
This might help u in terms of Rosh Hodesh also.
 I wrote in my little booklet Iyunai Bava Metzia that the two gemaras in rosh hashana and Sanhedrin seem to disagree. The Gemara in Sanhedrin the day of rosh hodesh does not depend on the Sanhedrin and to one opinion in Tosphot that means the molad even though you can never see the actual molad
The gemara in Rosh Hashana makes clear everything depends on the ability to see the new moon. To resolve this it is possible to say the difference is when there is a sitting Sanhedrin or not.

Shabatai Tzvi and the cult that the Gra signed the excommunication on.

I think the whole business of the cult that the Gra signed the  excommunication on is a waste of time and even damaging mentally and spiritually.  

 The Shatz  left lots of cookies. That is like Hansel and Gretel left crumbs to be able to find their way back to the town. Cookies mostly seem innocent. They are also left by software writers in order to preserve their copyright. That is: when they write some code, they sometimes writes meaningless code that does nothing, and has no use. But if someone copies their software and claims that they (the second person) thought it up all by himself, it can be shown in a court of law that the second copied from the first if there are the same lines of meaningless code. [Since there is zero chance the second thought up also the same meaningless code by himself]

These cookies you can find all over all books of the cult that the Gra signed the  excommunication on. So you know from where they get their ideas from. The Shatz has copyrights.

But even more so--actual basic innovative ideas of the Shatz and his false prophet, Nathan, were accepted by the cult that the Gra signed the  excommunication on and became part of parcel of their unique teachings.
This is not news to anyone with the slightest familiarity with the books of the cult that the Gra signed the  excommunication on and knows a bit of history.
What was a surprise to me was the first chapter in the Lekutai Moharan. I had thought that seeing the Divine wisdom in everything and tying oneself to that wisdom was a unique idea of Reb Nachman. Little did I know. It is straight from Natan Haazati [Natan from Gaza] whose has a long and involved presentation of this idea in one of his major works. [In some universities you can find his three books on microfilm]

But Reb Nachman is the very best of the bunch. The most insightful and sincere. The rest of it really ought be be thrown out with the rest of the trash as the Gra already said 200 years ago and still is not listened to.

It is undoubted the original the cult that the Gra signed the  excommunication on had spiritual powers, but certainly not any more than the Shatz himself. The miracles people did in name of the Shatz dwarfed anything anyone heard or saw with the Baal Shem Tov. People as far away as Frankfurt  could revive the dead just by saying the name of the Shatz. I never heard anyone do such a thing by saying the name of the Baal Shem Tov.
Spiritual powers are taken to be  a proof of holiness by the cult that the Gra signed the  excommunication on. The opposite is the truth. Spiritual powers are a proof of unholiness and powers from the Dark Side.

At any rate, it takes a certain amount of the interest out of  learning the Lekutai Moharan when you realize from where a lot of the ideas come from.

Reb Nachman was sincere, but so was Shabatai Tzvi. That does not make one right.


The trouble here is that this kind of person that makes a living by being meta-magical is not that rare in human societies. Every society has it's shamans, witch doctors, speaking in tongues --but all at the right time. So they are not full blown schizophrenics, but a gray area called schizo-typal personality