Yevamot 3b

The ברייתא says how do we know the the sister of one's wife is forbidden in יבום? It answers that it says "עליה" in ויקרא and עליה in דברים concerning יבום. This looks like a גזירה שווה. A גזירה שווה means the same word is used in two different places. So we apply the laws of one place to the other place unless there is some specific reason that undoes the גזירה שווה.




One alternative way to look at this ברייתא is to say that it has nothing to do with a גזירה שווה. It is rather thinking like this. We find that the wife of one's brother is forbidden even after one brother is gone. And yet we find that in the specific case of יבום she is permitted. So we should allow all forbidden relations in the case of יבום. So now we need the extra word "עליה" to tell us that she is forbidden. That is to say that the ברייתא is thinking of a מה מצינו what we find in one place we automatically expand to other places unless we can find specific reason to limit its application , not a גזירה שווה. The problem with this is that this would work even with just the word "עליה" all by itself.. The ברייתא definitely refers to the fact that the same word is used in both places to derive its law. So it definitely means a גזירה שווה.

And if this is גזירה שווה then the result is a קשה. The normal גזירה שווה puts the laws of one place into the other place and visa versa. That would put the "עליה" from יבום into forbidden relations and make them all forbidden only in a case of יבום!

That is we have a question because a  גזירה שווה in general goes both directions.
Answer. Actually if a גזירה שווה goes in both directions is a debate. Here the נרייתא holds  with the opinion the גזירה שווה goes only in one direction.

הברייתא אומרת איך אנחנו יודעים שאחותו של אשתו  אסורה היבום? והיא עונה שהפסוק אומר "עליה" בויקרא ועליה בדברים בנוגע ליבום. זה נראה כמו גזירה שווה. גזירה שווה פירושו  המילה  זהה משמשת בשני מקומות שונים. אז אנחנו מיישמים את החוקים של מקום אחד למקום השני, אלא אם כן קיים טעם ספציפי כי לפחות את כח הגזירה השווה. דרך חלופית אחת להסתכל על ברייתא זו היא לומר שזה לא קשור עם גזירה שווה.  די לחשוב ככה. אנו מוצאים כי אשתו של אחיו (של אחד) אסורה אפילו אחרי שהוא  נפטר. ובכל זאת אנו מוצאים כי במקרה הספציפי של יבום היא מותרת. אז אנחנו צריכים לאפשר לכל היחסים האסורים במקרה של יבום להיות מותרים. אז עכשיו אנחנו צריכים את מילה אחת מיותרת "עליה" לספר לנו שהיא אסורה. כלומר כי ברייתא הוא חושב על מה מצינו מה אנו מוצאים במקום אחד אנו מרחיבים באופן אוטומטי למקומות אחרים, אם לא נצליח למצוא סיבה ספציפית להגביל את תחולתו, לא גזירה שווה. הבעיה עם זה היא כי זה יעבוד גם אם רק הייתה המילה "עליה" לבדה.  את ברייתא בהחלט מתייחס לעובדה כי אותה המילה משמשת בשני המקומות לגזור את  החוק שלה. אז זה בהחלט אומר שזה גזירה שווה. ואם זה גזירה שווה, אז התוצאה היא קשה. הגזירה שווה הרגילה מעמידה את החוקים של מקום אחד למקום השני, ולהיפך. זה היה גורם לשים את "עליה" של יבום לתוך היחסים ולעשות את כולם אסורים רק במקרה של יבום! כלומר יש לנו שאלה משום גזירה שווה  הולך לשני הכיוונים. תשובה. למעשה אם גזירה שווה הולכת בשני הכיוונים הוא ויכוח. כאן נראה שהברייתא  בדעת שהגזירה השווה סובבת רק לכיוון אחד.

r20 6-8 time e minor

There are a good deal of Aristotle's  concepts bantered about in mystic books that at the same time claim metaphysical knowledge of the world. And which tend to knock Aristotle as a know nothing ignoramus. The Ether, the four elements, substance and form. The Ari himself I can excuse for just placing his revelations in the mental structure of his time. He does not claim anything beyond his own formulation of the metaphysical structure of the world. But books that knock Aristotle while at the same time using his concepts seem to be ill informed.
[We can make a good guess from where the concepts come from since there are many possible ways of understanding the metaphysical and physical nature of the world. It does not have to be four elements and ether and substance and form. For example you can have the 1000 systems of totally different metaphysics from China, none of which have any of the above concepts. Or you can have Buddhist philosophies of no substance, or the 6 schools of Hindu thought. Once people are obviously borrowing from Aristotle, you might think they would have the manners not to insult him, and claim that they themselves came up with the ideas on their own. It is like cheating on a test and then claiming the other guy stole it. There is little that is more despicable.


If they would have some deep knowledge of the world you would think they might have noticed things like atoms!

I had some ideas about yeshivas which I thought to share . The idea is that I see the Litvak yeshiva as a great and important ideal but it saddens me that the ideal have been perverted into bureaucracy and cults. My suggestion is to revive the original idea. So here are my thoughts:

The basic idea of a yeshiva is the Oral Law. That is the purpose is to get a decent idea of how to keep the Torah.The way I see it the best approach to this problem was formulated well by the Lithuanian kind of yeshiva. That is I expect there to be flaws and bureaucracy and all the normal human problems that go along with any human institution. But overall I think the idea is sound. And you do not need a large investment for such a thing. You can put tons of money into Jewish institutions and come out with nothing but rot. The reason is the most important thing is missing--the Idea.
Without the idea or with the wrong idea all you get is a cult or tzadik worship,
It is the idea of a yeshiva that makes it what it is.

So what is the idea? It is Gemara, Rashi, and Tosphot. Period.
In a practical vein this means a morning session from 10:00 to 2:00 and and afternoon session from 3:30 to 8:00.  About a hundred years ago the question of adding a little bit of learning Ethics came up. And also at some point someone decided to add a small Halacah session. But these were additions onto the main idea.

Kollel is a perversion of this idea and something that all gedolai Israel would have opposed if it had been brought up during a time when there were still people around that knew better. [That is you never pay people to learn. The whole concept is as absurd as paying someone to pray.]

What people did in NY was to go to Brooklyn Collage in the afternoon. This was sanctioned by Rav Hutner. This was in order to learn a vocation. Torah with Derech Eretz.

So in any case what you need is a straight forward Litvak yeshiva in every town and hamlet. Where there is Torah then there is everything of value.

On the other hand the lack of authentic Torah opens the door to cults which mimic true Torah but whose inner essence is satanic. These cults are sadly the main body of religious world today.
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I should mention that the ideas here took me a long time to come to. I admit I was part of the kollel at the Mir Yeshiva in NY. But on the other hand there really was nothing wrong with that. They were simply accepting government grants. No one was claiming that learning Torah could be used making money. It was clearly charity. If the yeshivas in Israel would be run the same way I would have no objection.

Unconditioned realities. The trouble with understanding morality is that of knowing any unconditioned realities. This is the source of moral contradictions. Just as Kant said that when pure reason ventures into the real of unconditioned realities contradictions automatically pop up.


The objects of experience are individual, particular, and concrete, while, on the other hand, the objects of thought, or most of the kinds of things that we know even about individuals, are general and abstract, i.e. universals.

So he shifted from the regular Neo Platonic approach which had been begun by Saadia Gaon and went to Aristotle. That gives knowledge of individual things since universals are in the individual. From there there will be higher levels of pure reason that can conceive of higher things.


Appendix. Aristotle by putting the forms inside of things helped bridge between objects of experience and universals. And other levels of knowledge that are concepts alone. It goes from the Oral Law, to Maase Breshit מעשה בראשית and from that to Maase Merchava מעשה מרכבה

Letter to a friend

Dear ...: That is a long letter with lots of points. As for the first point. Dale Martin is getting all of his material from other sources. He just puts it together very well. Better than I could ever do. But the actual sources are difficult. At Polytechnic I saw a few books in the library about the hypothetical documents.  But this is a long and involved study.

The Rambam [Maimonides] concerning Maase Breishit is also a difficult subject. I think looking into the Ramban [Nachmanides] is a good area of investigation. All the Rishonim are worthy of study. I do not think there will be any great kashe about the Rambam however because he seems to be uniform in his opinion from the beginning of his life until the end and hinted at it in many places. You are right that without the Ramban (Nachmanides) the Rambam (Maimonides) would have been forgotten and marginalized to the point of vanishing.

Besides that I think that it is helpful to get a general idea of all the rishonim in order to understand any particular one. Context makes a difference.

[I should add that Yaakov Abuchatzeira and the Gra clearly held from the Ari.]

the belief system of Torah is Monotheism

The Sages asked why was Mordechai called a "Yehudi". Today we understand the word to mean a Jew (or Jewish). But it means from the tribe of Yehuda [Judah].
He was from the tribe of Benjamin. So what could it mean?

They answer because he denied idolatry -- because anyone who denies idolatry is  as if he confess to the whole Torah.  Anyone who admits idolatry is as if he denied the whole Torah. [Yehuda comes from the word admit.]

Thus I decided to stay away from idolatrous cults that seem to infest Orthodx Judaism like lice.  Even if they are the only show in town. To me it is more important to stay away from idolatry.

This clarity only came to me after learning Sanhedrin 63 fairly well. Before I learned that page in Sanhedrin the whole concept of idolatry was fairly ambiguous to me. I wrote some of my ideas about that Gemara in my little booklet on the Talmud. Mainly I was concentrating on the Tosphot there. But learning it in depth helped me understand the subject better.

An example of idolatry a person says any created thing besides God, "You are my god, save me" that makes the thing itself into an idol. The person himself gets the normal penalty for idolatry.

I should mention in this context that the belief system of Torah is Monotheism.  That is that God made the world something from nothing. That is Torah belief excludes pantheism. And it excludes worship of tzadikim.

God also is a simple One. He is not a composite of substance and form. He has no form nor substance nor anything that we can conceive of. There is a limit to human reason and even to pure reason in this regard. We can know he exists and that is all.

Also in the Torah there is no sense that God is imminent in nature or tied to natural substances or phenomena.  Nature also is not divine. It's  de-divinized; the created world is not divine, it is not the physical manifestation of God. The line of demarcation therefore between the divine and the natural and human worlds is clear. 


Nature isn't God himself. He's not identified with it. He's wholly other. He isn't kin to humans in any way either. So there is no blurring, no soft boundary between humans and the divine. 

So, to summarize, the view of God is that there is one supreme God, who is creator and sovereign of the world, who simply exists, who is  incorporeal, and for whom the realm of nature is separate and subservient. 

Indeed, creation takes place through the simple expression of his will. "When God began to create heaven and earth," and there's a parenthetical clause: "God said, 'Let there be light' and there was light." He expressed his will that there be light, and there was light and that's very different from many Ancient Near Eastern cosmogonies in which there's always a sexual principal at work in creation.