I wanted to present a subject in Bava Metzia  page 110 side and then Tosphot ,and then a question.
I have to make a short introduction משכנתא דסורא is a kind of guarantee for a loan that they did in Babylonia in a city called Sura. In Sura there was a custom to make  a loan and as a guarantee the lender מלווה would get a field and be able to work on it and eat its fruits for some number of years and at the end of that time the field would return to the owner the לווה (The borrower) without any more obligation on the borrower.  This is different than נכייתא which is reduction of the loan. In  case of נכייתא the field goes back but some part of the loan still remains.

Let's say we have a lender and borrower in either of the above cases and the lender says the agreement was for five years and the borrower says three years. The document was lost. And the lender has already been there three years. Rav Yehuda said the lender is believed because after three years he could have said לקוחה היא בידי "I bought the field."[After being there three years he would be believed unless contrary evidence is produced.] According to Rabbainu Isaac in Tosphot Ravina disagrees with Rav Yehuda and says the borrower is believed. The way Tosphot understands this is that Ravina is disagreeing all the way. That is even if the מלווה (lender) says he bought it, still the borrower is believed.

Tosphot asks on the Ri (Rabainu Isaac) from a case in  Bava Batra  בבא בתרא כ''ח ע''א. In that case  there is a field that one person has been for three years or more and he says he bought it and the other says it was stolen. We believe the one who has been there three years because we say if it had been stolen the real owner would have said sometime in the meantime and not waited three years.

The question from this to Rabbainu Isaac is this: If the Ri is  right then in the case in Bava Batra the one saying it was stolen should be believed because he could have said it was a guarantee for  a loan. He has a "migo." Since he could have said it was a guarantee and be believed, so we should believe him even when he does not say that, but says a weaker plea, [i.e. a plea that is not believed]. Tosphot answers: it is  מיגו  במקום עדים a case of "he could have said" when there are witnesses against him and מיגו במקום עדים לא אמרינן

In Bava Metzia page 80 we have a case of מיגו במקום עדים לא אמרינן which looks different from this case. That is my question. There we have two roads one with a river that had to be crossed and the other without  and a person that hired an ass to carry him. And he was told don't take it on the road with the river. He took it that way and the ass died and he says when he was there the river had dried up. We say we don't believe him because we don't go with "He could have said..." in a case where there are witnesses. So my question is that on page 80 we don't say "He could have said," because there are witnesses against that migo. That is: we don't know about the river, but we do know he took it the wrong way. This seems very different from our case  in Bava Batra and Bava Metzia  page 110 in Tosphot in which there are no witnesses against the migo. Rather the witnesses are against the plea itself. אנן סהדי that if it had been stolen, he would have said so.

I suggest that this question of mine is the reason that Rabbainu Shimshon ben Abraham disagreed with the Ri in our Tosphot.







========================================================================
This is the same thing as the above paragraphs but with Hebrew additions
I wanted to present a subject in בבא מציעא דף ק''י side and then תוספות ,and then a question.
I have to make a short introduction משכנתא דסורא is a kind of guarantee for a loan that that did in Babylonia in a city called סורא. In סורא there was a custom to make  a loan and as a משכון the  מלווה would get a field and be able to work on it and eat its fruits for some number of years and at the end of that time the field would return to the owner the לווה  without any more obligation on the borrower.  This is different than נכייתא which is reduction of the loan. In  case of נכייתא the field goes back but some part of the loan still remains.

Let's say we have a lender and borrower in either of the above cases and the lender says the agreement was for five years and the borrower says three years. The document was lost. And the מלווה has already been there three years. רב יהודה said the lender is believed because after three years he could have said לקוחה היא בידי "I bought the field." After being there three years he would be believed unless contrary evidence is produced. According to רבינו יצחק הר''י in תוספות רבינא disagrees with רב יהודה and says the borrower is believed. The way תוספות understands this is that רבינא is disagreeing all the way. That is even if the מלווה lender says he bought it still the borrower is believed.

תוספות asks on the ר''י from a case in  בבא בתרא כ''ח ע''א. In that case  there is a field that one person has been for three years or more and he says he bought it and the other says it was stolen. We believe the one who has been there three years because we say if it had been stolen the real owner would have said sometime in the meantime and not waited three years.

The question from this to הר''י is this: If the הר''י is  right then in the case in בבא בתרא the one saying it was stolen should be believed because he could have said it was a guarantee for  a loan. He has a מיגו. Since he could have said it was a guarantee and be believed, so we should believe him even when he does not say that but says a weaker plea.  תוספות answers it is  מיגו  במקום עדים a case of "he could have said" when there are witnesses against him and מיגו במקום עדים לא אמרינן

In בבא מציעא דף פ we have a case of מיגו במקום עדים לא אמרינן which looks different from this case. That is my question. There we have two roads one with a river that had to be crossed and the other without  and a person that hired an חמור to carry him. And he was told don't take it on the road with the river. He took it that way and the חמור died and he says when he was there the river had dried up. We say we don't believe him because we don't go with he could have said in a case where there are witnesses. So my question is that on page 80 we don't say "he could have said" because there are witnesses against that מיגו. That is we don't know about the river but we do know he took it the wrong way. This seems very different from our case  in בבא בתרא and בבא מציעא דף ק''י in תוספות in which there are no witnesses against the מיגו. rather the witnesses are against the plea itself. אנן סהדי that if it had been stolen he would have said so. ______________________________________________________________________


רציתי להציג נושא בבא דף ק''י  מציעא דף ק''י ולאחר מכן תוספות, ואז שאלה. אני חייב לעשות הקדמה קצרה משכנתא דסורא הוא סוג של ערבות להלוואה שנעשתה בבבל בעיר הנקראת סורא. בסורא היה מנהג לעשות הלוואה וכמשכון המלווה יקבל שדה ולהיות  ולעבוד על זה ולאכול את פירותיו למספר שנים ובסופו של אותו זמן   השדה יחזור לבעלים (לווה) ללא כל התחייבות נוספת על הלווה. זה שונה מאשר נכייתא שהוא הפחתה של ההלוואה. במקרה של נכייתא השדה חוזר אבל חלק של ההלוואה עדיין נשאר. נניח שיש לנו מלווה ולווה באחד מהמקרים לעיל והמלווה אומר ההסכם היה במשך חמש שנים והלווה אומר שלוש שנים. המסמך אבד. ומלווה כבר היה שם שלוש שנים. רב יהודה אמר המלווה הוא נאמן כי אחרי שלוש שנים הוא היה יכול לומר "לקוחה היא בידי"  היינו "קניתי את השטח". להיות שהיה שם שלוש שנים הוא יהיה נאמן, אלא אם כן ראיות בניגוד מיוצרת. לדברי רבינו יצחק (הר''י) בתוספות רבינא לא מסכים עם רב יהודה ואומר הלווה נאמן. הדרך שתוספות מבין את זה היא שרבינא חולק כל הדרך. כלומר גם אם המלווה אמר שהוא קנה אותו עדיין הלווה נאמן. תוספות שואל על ר''י ממקרה בבבא בתרא כ''ח ע''א, במקרה שיש שדה שאדם אחד היה שם לשלוש שנים או יותר והוא אומר שהוא קנה אותו ובעל דין אומר שזה נגנב. אנו מאמינים מי שהיה שם שלוש שנים, כי אנחנו אומרים שאם זה נגנב הבעלים האמיתיים היו אומרים משהו בינתיים ולא לחכות שלוש שנים. השאלה מזה להר''י היא זו: אם ההר''י נכון, אז במקרה בבבא בתרא שאחד אומר שזה נגנב הוא צריך להיות נאמן כי הוא יכול לומר שזה היה ערובה להלוואה. יש לו מיגו. מאז שהוא היה יכול לומר שזה היה ערובה ולהאמין, ולכן אנחנו צריכים להאמין לו גם כשהוא לא אומר את זה, אבל אומר טיעון חלש. תוספות עונה זה מיגו במקום עדים. המקרה הוא  "הוא יכול היה לומר" כאשר יש עדים נגדו ומיגו במקום עדים לא אמרינן. יש שאלה. בבבא מציעא דף פ' יש לנו המקרה של מיגו במקום עדים לא אמרינן שנראה שונה ממקרה זה.  יש  שתי דרכים אחת עם נהר שהיה צריך להיות חצוי ואחר בלי ואדם ששכר חמור לשאת אותו. ואמרו לו לא לקחת את זה על הכביש עם הנהר. הוא לקח את זה ככה וחמור מת והוא אומר כשהוא היה שם לא היה שם הנהר כיוון שהתייבש. אנחנו לא מאמינים לו, כי אנחנו לא הולכים עם "הוא יכול היה לומר" במקרה שבו יש עדים. אז השאלה שלי היא, שעל דף 80 אנחנו לא אומרים ", הוא יכול היה לומר" כי יש עדים נגד המיגו. זה שאנחנו לא יודעים על הנהר, אבל אנחנו יודעים שהוא לקח את  הכביש הלא נכונה. זה נראה שונה מהמקרה שלנו בבא בתרא ובבא מציעא דף ק''י בתוספות שבו אין עדים נגד המיגו. אלא שהעדים נגד הטיעון עצמו. אנן סהדי שאם זה נגנב הוא היה אומר כך.

I had a period in Yeshiva in which I read every paragraph twice. This I think helped me a lot

That is I would take one paragraph of the Talmud and read it once straight through and then the Rashi and understand nothing. Then I would read the Soncino English translation and also understand nothing. Then I would read the paragraph in the Talmud once again and gain understand nothing. But then I would read the Rashi once again and then the whole thing became clear.

This reading the words twice approach helped me for all the years I was in Yeshiva from 18 until about 25.  The idea of review I saw in the Gra and I think it is good for certain kinds of learning, but not all. There were things that even saying them over  a few time s were simply way beyond my league and I found it better just to say the words and go on. Then I would hope the ideas would get into me by osmosis--which in fact often did happen.

The idea of a crisis of the Enlightenment is not the sole product of Allen Bloom. [I think the original person that noticed it was Max Weber.]
The problem of this crisis was the main subject of Allen Bloom's book The Closing of the American Mind.

I think that book is  a major masterpiece and recommend it for everyone. In any case the basic idea was there were two opposing currents of the Enlightenment. And these two opposing currents came to collide in the USA in the lifetime of Allen Bloom. That is the idea of this book in a nutshell.
This same problem was faced by Max Weber.


One part of the Enlightenment was give everyone education (i.e. enlightenment). Teach them reason, and then Utopia will result. And make governments do this. The Enlightenment  was an attempt to take power from Kings and the Priest and give it to the intellectuals.
The other part of the Enlightenment was the intellectual revolt against  reason, a celebration of subjective will and intuition, and a neo-Romantic longing for spiritual wholesomeness.
So far I have said nothing new. Just read Allen Bloom and Max Weber.


The Middle Ages were in spirit was very different from everything that came before or after. It is a time that is almost impossible to understand. And yet one thing stands out from that time--the attempt to combine reason with spiritual wholeness.  This same attempts still continues today in Lithuanian yeshivas. We know learning Rishonim [Mediaeval authorities] has always been the bedrock of Lithuanian yeshivas. Recently this idea has gained in force by the example of some yeshivas that expressly commit to this approach and on purpose avoid Achronim (anyone after the Middle Ages). In some places you can see a similar approach  when then spend their efforts on Thomas Aquinas.  In any case Allen Bloom certainly noticed this because he mentioned in his book that some of his relatives who were observant Jews had as much and better understanding of life and the world just based on their reading the Old Testament and Talmud as others who read the New York Times. But Allen Bloom's answer was to tell people to learn the Republic of Plato and other great books. This seems to me to  lack the numinous, and holy aspect that makes something compelling as opposed to mere intellectual exercise.

The reason Allen Bloom did not think going back to the Middle Ages was a good idea was because of the very problems themselves that had produced the conditions  and problems which made the Enlightenment necessary.  What happens in practice is ad hoc justice, ad hoc adjudication. and widespread injustice. If laws are not equal for all, then they become very unequal. 

The model I have thought best is a kind of continuation of the Rambam approach. The Rambam thought learning Torah was a necessary prerequisite for learning Physics and Metaphysics. That is he saw learning (not knowing) Physics and Metaphysics as the fulfillment of the commandments to love and fear God. But that they don't accomplish this with the proper background of the Oral and Written Law. That is the approach that I take myself even though I have never seen anyone take Rambam approach  seriously. I simply decided not to wait until others wake up. [I am not claiming expertise in any of these fields. Rather it is just my claim that it is proper and important to spend time each day in each of these three areas.]

This longing for spiritual wholeness I think explains the Baal Teshuva movement, and the widespread revolt against reason in those circles and in fact the general seeking of spirituality we see since the 1960's. I certainly have seen my share of this in different cults.

cults and cult leaders

 I am certainly not the only one who has noticed the profusion of cults and cult leaders that are positively insane that are at least in name following him. Certainly everyone can see when anyone gets involved in Brelsov, they stop learning Torah for its own sake, and start following any one of the lunatic leaders. self proclaimed imitators of the real thing.

There is no good answer for this. There are areas of Torah that are important: that is, "What is it all about?" What is the meaning of it all?



Some people think that because someone was in fact a very great tzadik that therefore it is a great mitzvah to spread the word about him. But I feel it is not  praiseworthy to ignore the side effects.  It seems to me to display an enormous amount of irresponsibility to not care about the possible effects of such advice. Unconcern about the human consequences of a theory is not an attractive trait.  

My own approach I should mention. I think there are two aspects of Torah that are important--the "between man and his fellow man" (בין אדם לחבירו) part, and then the "between man and God" (בין אדם למקום) part.  The best example of the first that I know of is my parents. The later part is hard to say. I think there were a few tzadikim that represented different aspects of Torah best. The Gra for learning Torah  and general strictness in keeping the mizvot as they were given. 

. But all these aspects I think are important in order to narrow the gap between what I do and what I ought to do. That is to reach objective morality. 

q63  [q63 in midi format] [q63 in nwc format]
l8 A song for the God of Israel  l8 in midi [l8 nwc format ]


n1  [n1 in midi]  n1 in nwc format

orchestra [ orchestra in midi]    [orchestra in nwc format]

mathematics   [mathematics in midi format] mathematics nwc format

Exodus 4  [Exodus 4 in midi]   [exodus4 in nwc format]

Bohr's concept of Quantum Mechanics and Kant

I wrote to  Dr Ross 

Dear Dr. Ross, your ideas about the connection between Kant and the Bohr concept of  Quantum Mechanics were finally noticed by the academic world. The article in the Stanford Encyclopedia states this connection explicitly.

Sincerely, Avraham Rosenblum

Dear Mr. Rosenblum,

A number of people and sources see similarities between Kant and Bohr.  However, that depends.  The Stanford page seems to assert that Bohr is a metaphysical realist, but that isn't always what he sounds like.  If he is actually a non-realist, which is often what he does sound like, then that would not be Positivism, which makes no metaphysical judgments, but it also would not be Kant, who posits "empirical realism."  Also, the Stanford page says that Bohr somehow agrees with Kant that things-in-themselves "can't be conceived of in causal terms."  This is quite false.  Kant would say that causality applies both to phenomena and things-in-themselves, but we don't know how it applies to things-in-themselves -- although it may allow for freedom.  Also, the idea that quantum mechanics violates causality at all is questionable.  With populations, quantum mechanics is as deterministic as anything.  Schrodinger's Equation is deterministic.  So the only issue is whether the random factor that enters when we consider individuals violates causality.  Or perhaps in quantum events, like the decay of nuclei, we don't detect an efficient cause.  But a lot of this depends on what we mean by causality.  Aristotle meant a lot more than what we do now.  I discuss some confusions about causality in relation to the movie Knowing -- http://www.friesian.com/why.htm#note-2a.

Best wishes,
Kelley Ross



My note: empirical means  things that are immanent in experience (not transcendent). Realism is these things don't depend on us for their existence. 

What Dr Ross is saying here is QM does not violate locality. And that Bell's Theorem has nothing to do with locality at all. It does say the world is dependent on how we observe it just like Kant says. That is there is a subjective and objective element in the representation. The world is not solely objective. [A good way of understanding this is how Schopenhauer puts it- the representation is  half from the subject and half from the object.]


What we call non-locality is you have  an atom that disappears  here it has to appear somewhere else but it could appear far away. Locality means it cant just disappear. Causes an effects are local.

Dr Ross is in between the lines answering the objections of some people on Kant. 

I am bringing here a question on the Rambam. But before I can I have to go through the subject.



Introduction. There are 43 kinds of sin that one must bring a sin offering for. [i.e. a female goat or sheep.] A sin offering can only be brought for accidental sin. So here we have a case where there was a piece of forbidden fat cooking the stove. John walks in and eats it. The Peter walks in a minute later and asks where is the piece of forbidden fat I left on the stove? John has to bring a sin offering.
[For the general public let me mention of the 43 a lot concern sexual relationships between family members and the Temple. Besides that there are few others likely idolatry, and Shabat.]


If one eats a piece of forbidden fat חלב, he brings a sin offering [a female goat or sheep]. If he ate a piece and then knew that it was forbidden, and then ate another piece and then knew that was forbidden, he has to bring a one sin offering on each piece.
Not only that but if there was two knowings. That he ate a כזית חלב and then ate another כזית חלב and then he knew about the first piece and then he knew about the second piece he brings two sacrifices.
That is you don't need the knowledge to be in between the two acts of eating.


From Tractate Shabat page 71Rambam 6:9. Laws of Accidental Sins.
That is to say the Rambam decided like Rabbi Yochanan that ידיעות מחלקות not like reish lakish that only bringing the sacrifice is מחלק
If he ate two pieces  in one span of forgetfulness and then knew about the first piece. Then in the same span of forgetting he ate a third piece, when he brings a sin offering for the first piece, he is absolved for the sin for the second piece. Rambam שגגות 6:11.

The Beit Joseph brings in the name of the Ri bei Rav an answer that is flimsy. And the Kiryat Sefer says another answer which is worse. Both answer are contradicted directly in the Rambam himself chapter 8:8

In 8:8 the Rambam brings the exact same law of Rabbi Yochanan that he says in 6:9 except that it is in terms of the guilt offering. And there he says אכל חמשה זיתי חלב. This directly contradicts what the Beit Yoseph said that the difference between 6:9 and 6:11 is in the first it   אכל כזית חלב וכזית חלב בהעלם אחת. There was this attempt to say ate and ate is two different acts so they count separately while in 6:11 it says he ate שני זיתי חלב בהעלם אחת he ate two pieces in one span and that means in one act of eating and so they count together. This is  contradicted in 8:8 where he ate five pieces together and still they count separately.




Rav Shach offers a third answer that makes lot of sense to me even though there still seems to be some question that remains about it.



What Elazar Menachem Shach suggests is based on two premises. 1. knowledge causes a sin offering. 2. one span of forgetfulness is one sin. Thus he ate the first two pieces in one state of forgetfulness. And he knew about the first piece. So he brings a sin offering for the first piece. but since the second piece was eaten in the same span of forgetfulness the sin offering takes care of both pieces.  But what about if he only remembered that the second piece was forbidden? It certainly makes sense according to Rav Shach to say that everything would be forgiven and in fact that is exactly what the Rambam says.

What is hard to understand here is this in the last part of this halacha the Rambam says if  he knows about the middle piece and then brings a sacrifice then both the first and last are taken care of and when he knows about the first or the last he does not need to bring any further sin offering.
Here is the question I wanted to bring in the name of my learning partner. "What is dividing the pieces?" That is in the last case he ate a piece and another piece in one span. then he ate a third piece and still does not know. Then he knows about the second. Therefore it is all one span. There is nothing to divide them so obviously there is only one sacrifice.

Now I think Rav Shach does answer this in some way. I think he is saying that the Rambam intends the simple case but also if there was some kind of knowledge in between. But if so then it would be two separate acts and two separate sin offerings. Just think about it. He ate the first and second piece and if someone would tell him abut either then we would have knowledge that would separate completely. So it cant be that he knows anything. Then he ate a third piece. So it was all one span!.
I would like to suggest what kind of answer might help us. It is the fact that is it does not matter if the knowledge was in between the eating. It only matters what he knows. If he eats one piece and then another and then knows about the first is this one span or not? In 6:9 it seems not. Only the knowledge would divide.  I still don't know how this would help us but I suggest that we think along these lines.
If anyone has an idea here I would welcome it.

________________________________________________________________________________

I am bringing here a question on the רמב''ם. But before I can I have to go through the subject.



Introduction. There are 43 kinds of sin that one must bring a חטאת for. i.e. a female goat or sheep. A חטאת can only be brought for שוגג. So here we have a case where there was a כזית חלב cooking the stove. ראובן walks in and eats it. Then שמעון walks in a minute later and asks where is the כזית חלב   I left on the stove? ראובן has to bring a sin offering.


If one eats a piece of  חלב, he brings a חטאת a female goat or sheep. If he ate a כזית and then knew that it was forbidden, and then ate another כזית and then knew that was forbidden, he has to bring  one חטאת on each piece.
Not only that but if there was two ידיעות. I mean he ate a כזית חלב and then ate another כזית חלב and then he knew about the first כזית and then he knew about the second כזית, he brings two חטאות.
That is you don't need the ידיעות to be in between the two acts of eating.


From שבת דף ע''א Also  'רמב''ם הלכות שגגות פרק  ו': הלכה ט .
That is to say the רמב''ם decided like רבי יוחנן that ידיעות מחלקות not like ריש לקיש that only bringing the sacrifice is מחלק
If he ate two כזיתים  in one העלמה and then knew about the first כזית. Then in the same span of forgetting he ate a third כזית, when he brings a חטאת for the first piece, he is absolved for the sin for the second כזית. This is from  רמב''ם שגגות 6:11.

The בית יוסף brings in the name of the ר''י בי רב an answer that is flimsy. And the קרית ספר says another answer which is worse. Both answer are contradicted directly in the רמב''ם himself chapter 8:8

In 8:8 the רמב''ם brings the exact same law of רבי יוחנן that he says in 6:9 except that it is in terms of the guilt offering. And there he says אכל חמשה זיתי חלב. This directly contradicts what the בית יוסף בשם הר''י בי רב  said that the difference between 6:9 and 6:11 is in the first it   אכל כזית חלב וכזית חלב בהעלם אחת. There was this attempt to say אכל כזית חלב וכזית חלב is two different acts so they count separately while in 6:11 it says he ate שני זיתי חלב בהעלם אחת he ate two pieces in one העלמה and that means in one act of eating and so they count together. This is  contradicted in 8:8 where he ate five pieces together and still they count separately. אכל חמישה כזיתים בהעלם אחת. According to the Beit Joseph that language would have to mean they are counted as one and yet there in 8:8 the law is they are counted separately.




רב שך offers a third answer that makes lot of sense to me.



What רב אלעזר מנחם שך suggests is based on two premises. 1. ידיעה גורמת חיוב חטאת. 2. Also העלם אחת היא חטא אחד. Thus he ate the first כזיתי חלב in one state of העלמה. And he knew about the first כזית. So he brings a חטאת for the first כזית. But since the second כזית was eaten in the same span of forgetfulness the חטאת takes care of both כזיתים.  But what about if he only remembered that the second כזית was forbidden? It certainly makes sense according to רב שך to say that everything would be forgiven and in fact that is exactly what the רמב''ם says.

What is hard to understand here is this in the last part of this הלכה the רמב''ם says if  he knows about the middle piece and then brings a חטאת then both the first and last are taken care of and when he knows about the first or the last he does not need to bring any further חטאת.
Here is the question I wanted to bring in the name of my learning partner. "What is dividing the pieces?" I mean in the last case he ate a piece and another piece in one span. then he ate a third piece and still does not know. Then he knows about the second. Therefore it is all one span. There is nothing to divide them so obviously there is only one חטאת.

Now I think רב שך does answer this in some way. I think he is saying that the רמב''ם intends the simple case but also if there was some kind of knowledge in between. But if so then it would be two separate acts and two separate חטאות. Just think about it. He ate the first and second כזית and if someone would tell him abut either then we would have knowledge that would separate completely. So it can't be that he knows anything. Then he ate a third כזית. So it was all one span!.
I would like to suggest what kind of answer might help us. It is the fact that is it does not matter if the knowledge was in between the eating. It only matters what he knows. If he eats one כזית and then another and then knows about the first is this one span or not? In 6:9 it seems not. Only the knowledge would divide.  I still don't know how this would help us but I suggest that we think along these lines.
If anyone has an idea here I would welcome it.


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אני מביא כאן שאלה על רמב''ם. אבל לפני כן אני חייב לעבור את הנושא. מבוא. יש ארבעים ושלשה סוגים של חטא שצריך להביא עליהם חטאת . כלומר  עז נקבה או כבשה. חטאת ניתן להביא רק לשוגג. אז הנה יש לנו מקרה שבו הייתה כזית חלב על  התנור. ראובן נכנס ואוכל אותו. אז שמעון נכנס לאחר מכן ושואל איפה הוא כזית החלב ששמתי בתנור? ראובן צריך להביא חטאת. אם אוכל חתיכת החלב, הוא מביא חטאת. אם הוא אכל כזית ולאחר מכן ידע שאסור, ואז אכל כזית נוספת ולאחר מכן ידע שהיה אסור, שיש לו להביא אחד חטאת על כל חתיכה. לא רק זה, אלא אם היו שתי ידיעות, שהוא אכל כזית חלב, ולאחר מכן אכל עוד כזית חלב, ואז הוא ידע על כזית הראשונה ואז הוא ידע על כזית השנייה, הוא מביא שתי חטאות.  אתה לא צריך שיהיו הידיעות בין שני מעשים של אכילה. שבת דף ע''א וכן ברמב''ם הלכות שגגות פרק ו': הלכה ט'. כלומר הרמב''ם החליט כמו רבי יוחנן שידיעות מחלקות, לא כמו ריש לקיש  שהקרבת הקורבן הוא מחלקת.

אם הוא אכל שני כזיתים כאחד בהעלמה ולאחר מכן ידע על כזית הראשונה. לאחר מכן, באותו פרק הזמן של שיכחת השניה אכל כזית שלישית, כשהוא מביא חטאת לחתיכה הראשונה, הוא פוטר את החטא  שלכזית השנייה. זה משגגות ברמב''ם פרק ו' הלכה י''א. הבית יוסף מביא בשם הר''י בי רב תשובה. והקרית ספר, אומר תשובה אחרת. שתי התשובות נסתרות בפרק ח' הלכה ח'  ברמב''ם.  הרמב''ם מביא בדיוק את אותו החוק של רבי יוחנן שהוא אומר ב פרק ו' הלכה ט' חוץ מזה שזה במונחים של קרבן אשם. ושם הוא אומר אכל חמשת זיתי חלב. זה ישירות סותר את מה שהבית יוסף מביא בשם הר''י בי רב שאמר שההבדל בין  פרק ו' הלכה ט' ופרק ו' הלכה י''א שבהתחלה זה אכל כזית חלב וכזית חלב בהעלם אחת. היה הניסיון הזה לומר ''אכל כזית חלב וכזית חלב הוא שני מעשים שונים ולכן הם נחשבים בנפרד ואילו בפרק ו' הלכה י''א הוא אומר שהוא אכל שתי זיתי חלב בהעלם אחת (היינו שהוא אכל שתי חתיכות כאחד בהעלמה אחת) ור''י בי רב  אמר שהכוונה בפעולת אכילה אחת וכך הן ספורות יחד. זה נסתר בפרק ח' הלכה ח' שבו הוא אכל חמש חתיכות יחד ועדיין הן ספורות בנפרד. "אכל חמש כזיתים בהעלם אחת." לדברי הבית יוסף השפה מכוון שהן נספרות כאחד, ובכל זאת יש בפרק ח' הלכה ח' החוק שהן נספרות בנפרד. רב אלעזר מנחם שך מציע תשובה שלישית. מה שרב שך מציע מבוסס על שתי הנחות. 1. הידיעה גורמת חיוב חטאת. 2. כמו כן העלמה אחת היא חטא אחד. כך הוא אכל כשתי זיתי חלב  בהעלמה אחת. והוא ידע על כזית הראשונה. אז הדין שהוא מביא חטאת על כזית הראשונה. אבל מאחר שכזית השנייה נאכלה באותו פרק זמן של שיכחה החטאת מכפרת  על שתי הכזיתים.
בחלק האחרון של זו ההלכה הרמב''ם אומר אם הוא יודע על חתיכה האמצעי ולאחר מכן מביא חטאת, אז שתיהם, החתיכה הראשונה והחתיכה האחרונה מתכפרות וכאשר הוא יודע על הראשונה או האחרונה הוא לא צריך להביא עוד חטאת. הנה השאלה שאני רוצה להביא בשמו של השותף הלמידה שלי. "מה היא חלוקת החתיכות?" אני מתכוון במקרה האחרון שהוא אכל חתיכה וחתיכה בהעלמה אחת . ואז הוא אכל חתיכה שלישית ועדיין לא יודע. ואז הוא יודע על השנייה. לכן זה כל העלמה אחת. אין שום דבר לחלק אותן ולכן  ברור שיש רק חטאת אחת. עכשיו אני חושב רב שך  ענה על זה בדרך כלשהי. אני חושב שהוא אומר שרמב''ם מתכוון מקרה הפשוט, אבל גם אם היה איזשהו ידע שביניהם. אבל אם כן אז זה יהיה שני מעשים נפרדים ושתי חטאות נפרדות. רק תחשוב על זה. הוא אכל כזית הראשונה ושנייה, ואם מישהו היה אומר לו שהשנייה הייתה חלב,  גם אז יהיה לו ידע שיפריד לחלוטין. אז זה לא יכול להיות שהוא לא יודע שום דבר. ואז הוא אכל כזית שלישית. אז זה היתה שיכחה אחת ! אני רוצה להציע איזה סוג של תשובה שעשוי לעזור לנו. זה הוא העובדה שזה לא משנה אם הידע היה בין האכילה. זה רק משנה מה שהוא יודע. אם הוא אוכל כזית אחד, ואז עוד אחד, ואז יודע על הראשון היא העלמה אחת  או לא? בפרק ו' הלכה ט'  נראה שלא. רק הידע יחלק. אני עדיין לא יודע איך זה יעזור לנו, אבל אני מציע שאנחנו חושבים לאורך קווים אלה. אם למישהו יש רעיון כאן הייתי מברך אותו.