the statement of the Gra that, "To the degree that one lacks any knowledge of the seven wisdoms, to that degree he will lack in understanding of Torah a hundred fold more."

In the path of the Gra it is not clear what education ought to include. In the introduction to Euclid  in Hebrew by Baruch of Sckolev [disciple of the Gra] is brought the statement of the Gra that, "To the degree that one lacks any knowledge of the seven wisdoms, to that degree he will lack in understanding of Torah a hundred fold more." But in the Middle Ages "the seven wisdoms" meant the Quadrivium and Trivium [grammar, logic, and rhetoric, while the quadrivium consists of arithmetic, astronomy, music, and geometry],  Rhetoric is the subject of attack in Plato's Georgias and the Ion. Georgias was a famous sophist that prided himself (like  all the sophists] of being able to convince people of anything even falsehoods. Socrates does not like that. The Gra certainly would not hold by learning that. Rather this seems to refers to the 6 books of Aristotle, the Organon. During the Middle Ages, many Rishonim held one ought to have a secular education  which would mean what today would be known as STEM fields, Science, Tech, Engineering, Mathematics.[But this would not include pseudo science like psychology]

[In the world of Litvak yeshivot, yeshiva was only for seven years==that is to go through the even basic tractates--one per year. [Three bavot: Bava Kama Bava Metzia Bava Batra and 4 Nashim: gitin kidushin yevamot Ketuboth.] 

tendency to add restrictions

 There is a kind of tendency in the religious world to add tons of restrictions that the Torah does not require and to ignore plenty of prohibitions that the Torah forbids. This, of course, is against the verse in Deuteronomy chap. 4 verse 2 that commands us not to add nor subtract from the commandments. And it is also against the approach of the Gra and the general Litvak world. However,  this tendency has seeped in the Litvak world today. And while I was   in the Mir in NY, I barely noticed this tendency because at that time I was interested in following the stricter opinion about any question in halacha--law.  But after some time, I began to notice this. Of course, there is nothing wrong with taking the strict opinion about any particular law. But the problem is that lots of restrictions are made up out ''of whole cloth'' [as the expression goes].

 Philosophers (whether in academia or outside) seem determined to disagree with each other even when their positions are close. Michael Huemer basing himself on the Intuitionalists like Prichard see that reason recognizes universals. Is that  all that far away from the Friesian school of Leonard Nelson and Kelley Ross where first principles are known but not by reason or the senses? They are reasonable (not infallible). Greta Hermann thought that Nelson meant "infallible" and thus went away from the immediate non intuitive approach(-and it might be that in fact that is what Nelson thought). But that its not implied by the Friesian doctrine as Kelley Ross point out.

And while I am at it, is this all that far from Hegel who reaches absolute knowledge by a dialectical process. [This may not be obvious to people unless, you read the Logic of Hegel that was part of his Encyclopedia.]

I mean where would Physics be today if Einstein had decided to attack the concept of the quantum? Or even more striking is that in Quantum Mechanics every incremental step was done by a different person building on the result of some previous person.][not attacking previous results]

[i might mention here that all of this is post Kant and all these people did not ignore Kant but rather tried to deal with the difficulties he raised. Huemer is from  the Analytic tradition starting with Frege. Nelson and Fries is a modification of Kant. Hegel is sort of his own category  but still does try to answer the problem raised by Kant. 

furthermore i must mention that at least a significant number of Rishonim did not ignore philosophy not Plato nor Aristotle or Plotinus nor the later Muslim Philosophers and so I think the great Post Kant Thinkers are important--but not all. After all I do agree that most post Kant philosophy is worthless--but I do know that to see the flaws takes a certain amount of experience and expertise.

Bava Batra page 35a in Tosfot and page 70a. Rambam chapter 4 halacha 14.

An introduction to the subject, A person grabbed a piece of metal from someone and a witness says so. And the person says, "Yes I took it because it is mine". R. Aba said he can not take an oath because he is not disagreeing with the witness, and so he must give back the piece. Tosphot asks why is this different from a case where one is a guard of an object with a  document, and there he  is believed with an oath   because he could have said it was stolen. Here too let him be believed because he could have said ''I did not take it'' and be believed with an oath.  

 In the subject of the bar of metal of R. Aba, Rav Shach suggests the reason the person that grabbed it is not believed because the oath that he would like to take is not the oath of a guard where the Torah believes an a oath. That means to say that there are claims that a person is not believed even with an oath. In certain cases the Torah believes an oath, but this is not one of them. This is different from the case in Bava Batra page 70a where  person is a guard of an object with a document. [The person that gave him the object to guard has a document to that effect.] There the guard is believed that he gave back the object because he has a migo that he could have said the object was stolen and be believed with an oath, Rav Shach explains  that the case of, "I gave it back to you " is a case where the  guard is in fact is saying that the object was stolen because now that the  owner is saying he never got back the object that is a case where the owner is trying to steal the object. Two questions. One is that if so, then the fact that the guard is saying "I gave it back" is a case of it being stolen, and that case in itself is a plea that the Torah believes with an oath. The Torah is not believing him because of a migo, but because that in itself is a plea that the Torah believes with an oath (and yet the gemaras says the guard is believed because of a migo that he could have said it was neenas) The other question is that if Rav Shach is right then the owner is trying to steal the amount of money the object is worth, not the actual object. That would seem to depend if "the the value of money is like money" which we only say in certain cases like kidushin or the amount of money that a Hebrew slave can be redeemed with.

I am being short here because there a a few answers to this question of Tospfot in Bava Batra 35a. Rav Shach is mainly coming to answer this question in the Rambam because other answers do not seem to work so well in the Rambam.   

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 In the subject of the bar of metal נסכא of ר' אבא, Here רב שך suggests the reason the person that grabbed it is not believed because the oath that he would like to take is not the oath of a guard where the תורה believes an a oath. That means to say that there are claims that a person is not believed even with an oath. In certain cases the Torah believes an oath, but this is not one of them. This is different from the case in בבא בתרא ע' ע''א where  person is a guard of an object with a document. [The person that gave him the object to guard has a document to that effect.] There the guard is believed that he gave back the object because he has a מיגו that he could have said the object was נגנב and be believed with an oath,  רב שך explains  that the case of "I gave it back to you " is a case where the  guard  is saying that the object was stolen because now that the  owner is saying he never got back the object that is a case where the owner is trying to steal the object. Two questions. One is that if so, then the fact that the guard is saying "I gave it back" is a case of it being stolen, And that case in itself is a plea that the תורה believes with an oath. The תורה is not believing him because of a מיגו, but because that in itself is a plea that the תורה believes with an oath (and yet the גמרא says the guard is believed because of a מיגו that he could have said it was נאנס). The other question is that if  רב שך is right, then the owner is trying to גונב the amount of money the object is worth, not the actual object. That would seem to depend if "the the value of money is like money" שווה כסף ככסף which we only say in certain cases like קיושין or the amount of money that a עב עברי can be redeemed with.

I am being short here because there a a few answers to this question of תוספות in בבא בתרא ל''ה ע''אa. Here רב שך is mainly coming to answer this question in the רמב''ם because other answers do not seem to work so well in the רמב''ם.   

An introduction to the subject, A person grabbed a piece of metal from someone and a witness says so. And the person says, "Yes I took it because it is mine". ר' אבא said he can not take an oath because he is not disagreeing with the witness and o he must give back the piece. תוספות asks why is this different from a case where one is a guard of an object with a  document and there he  is believed with an oath   because he could have said it was stolen.

בנושא  נסכא של ר' אבא, כאן רב שך מציע את הסיבה לכך שהאדם שתפס אותו אינו נאמן כי השבועה שהוא רוצה להישבע אינה שבועת שומר במקום שבו התורה מאמין שְׁבוּעָה. כלומר שיש טענות שלא מאמינים לאדם אפילו בשבועה. במקרים מסוימים התורה מאמינה בשבועה, אך זו אינה אחת מהן. זה שונה מהמקרה בבא בתרא ע' ע''א שאדם הוא שומר על חפץ עם מסמך. [לאדם שנתן לו את החפץ לשמירה יש מסמך על כך.] שם השומר נאמן שהוא החזיר את החפץ כי יש לו מיגו שיכול היה לומר שהחפץ נגנב ולהאמין עם שבועה, רב שך מסביר שהמקרה של "החזרתי לך" הוא מקרה שבו השומר אומר שהחפץ נגנב כי עכשיו כשהבעלים אומר שהוא לא החזיר את החפץ זה מקרה שבו הבעלים מנסה לגנוב את החפץ. שתי שאלות. האחת היא שאם כן, אז העובדה שהשומר אומר "החזרתי" היא מקרה של גניבה, והמקרה הזה כשלעצמו הוא טענה שהתורה מאמינה בשבועה. התורה לא מאמינה לו בגלל מיגו, אלא בגלל שזו כשלעצמה זו טענה שהתורה מאמינה בשבועה (ואף על פי כן הגמרא אומרת שהשומר מאמינים בגלל מיגו שיכול היה לומר שזה נאנס). השאלה הנוספת היא שאם רב שך צודק, אז הבעלים מנסה לגנוב את סכום הכסף ששווה החפץ, לא החפץ בפועל. נראה שזה תלוי אם "ערך הכסף הוא כמו כסף", שם שווה כסף ככסף אנו אומרים רק במקרים מסוימים כמו קידושין או כמות הכסף שאיתו ניתן לפדות עבד עברי. אני מקצר כאן כי יש כמה תשובות לשאלה זו של תוספות בבבא בתרא ל''ה ע''א. כאן רב שך בא בעיקר לענות על שאלה זו ברמב''ם כי נראה שתשובות אחרות לא כל כך עובדות ברמב''ם

הקדמה לנושא, אדם תפס חתיכת מתכת ממישהו ועד אומר כך. והאדם אומר, "כן לקחתי את זה כי זה שלי". ר' אבא אמר שאינו יכול להישבע כי אינו חולק על העד ועליו להחזיר את החתיכה. תוספות שואלים למה זה שונה ממקרה שבו שומר על חפץ עם מסמך ושם מאמינים לו בשבועה כי יכול היה לומר שהוא נגנב.

two positions-heresy for Christians

 Christians gravitate towards one of two positions-three gods,- or one God with three different aspects father, son, holy ghost. [The first is not okay.] But both positions are considered heresy for Christians.[Sabellianism, Arianism] With Boethius, they came up with what they think is a middle position: One essence and three persons. But regardless of this being thought to be correct, an individual Christian in his or her thought gravitates towards either of the first two positions, i.e. three different powers, or just One Power with different aspects.

I think a lot depends on which gospel they read first--Mathew or Luke. The first is deeply imbedded in the Old Testament ;, and  Old Testament theology is Monotheism: One God only, and who is totally beyond anything that humans can conceive. Totally :"other". 

Paul is  more along the lines of the later approach which is not very rooted in the Old Testament. And Luke and Acts were written by a disciple of Paul.      

[I am not very happy with the idea of aspects of God, however you do find this in the Ari and Moshe of Cordoba.]

[I should add here that not only the issues mentioned above but also the role of Jesus is an argument between the authors of the \gospels.] 

 There is one major thread of thought that goes through and ties together the existentialists. They would not agree with the label but never the less it applies to all. Kierkegaard,  Husserl, Heidegger, Japers, Sartre,... That thread is the ultimate, absolute  importance of  "ME".  And to claim that this thought did not get accepted throughout the entire West is simply to be blind to the facts. Responsibility towards others, especially family is simply not even a thought that might occur to anyone. "It is all about me". It does not matter what religion anyone is. That is just the window dressing on what really matters to people; the ultimate, absolute "ME.

You might see this in all of them, but it becomes particularly clear in Heidegger-''Being'' instead of God. Responsibility is only to :"My Being" :i,e., to be authentic to  ME.

 

new prohibitions in the religious world

 There is a tendency to make up new prohibitions in the religious world. This leads to a situation where simple people that truly want to keep Torah have no way to discern what is real as opposed to what is added and made up out of thin air. Rav Nahman of Breslov addressed this problem [Le.M II 44]. But that does not seem to hinder people that are Breslov from the same sort of tendency.

The thing about this is that the extra emphasis on rituals has nothing todo with midot tovot [good character traits].  If good character -to be a mensch- a decent human being had nothing todo with Torah then maybe i would have little to complain about. But in fact midot tovot are "deuraita" commandments from the Torah a you can see in Sefer HaChinuch. 

Esther was living with Mordechai

A few questions about Megilat Esther. 

(1)Esther was living with Mordechai. The government officials that took  her could not figure out that he was Jewish? They knew Mordechai was Jewish because he told them so.

(2) The verse says: "When virgins were gathered  a second time." Why was there a second time? For the king had found a queen-i.e., Esther. What was the point of keeping on gathering new virgins?[Unless the king just happened to develop a taste for virgins like Mao Dezong or Beria?] 

(3) The king gave the house of Haman to Esther. What was the point of appointing Mordechai over it.?

(4)The verse says Esther told the king "What Mordechai was to her." What was that? Her uncle or her husband as the Midrash says?

 [I think Mordechai might have been the advisor of  the Persian king [Xerxes] that invaded Greece and the 300 Spartans. See the history in Herodotus]. Xerxes had a recurrent dream warning him that he must invade Greece; and his advisor whose name sounds suspiciously like Mordechi agreed.

 There is a sort of contrast between the fact that religious leaders seem to want power as opposed to what you would think would motivate a religious person. I.e. not lust for power, but rather to sit and learn Torah and privately serve God. While lust for power is assumed for politicians, it is not clear to me why one with supposed religious motivation to serve God would be trying to gain power and control over others. It is interesting to contrast this with the book of Meditation of Marcus Aurelius where he is constantly bemoaning his terrible misfortune of being born to be the emperor of the Roman Empire. This book is his private musings that was never meant to be shared. He ordered his servant to burn it after he would die, but by some odd circumstance of fate, one of his servants took a look at it, and  had compassion on all subsequent generations of mankind, and saved it from the flames. [Incidentally, this is Marcus Aurelius Antonius, the friend of Yehuda the Prince, the author of the Mishna.]

Religious leaders are often simply con men. But also many get their powers from the sitra achra (dark side). 

learning in depth

 I have been considering how to implement the advice of my son, Izhak, about the importance of learning in depth. And besides that, the subject came up in a conversation where I pointed out that Rav Nahman of Breslov himself says learning by "just reading the words and going on" is "judgments"[problems and tribulations] while learning in depth is "sweetening of judgments"(lessening of the problems), [Le.M. vol. I, chapter 74] The way [best] is to make a little progress in the book you are learning, and then go backwards to every previous section, Then when you have gotten back to the beginning, then start again at that place you left off at, and then go on one more section.

[But this depends on the subject. If it is the book like the Avi Ezri, or Reb Chaim of Brisk, then the best thing is to review that one section for about a month. That is to go through it from start to finish every day for a month. If it a book like math [where each section builds on the previous] then the above advice applies. Do one chapter forward, and then go backward to the beginning...

[Rav Shick in fact did not hold solely of fast learning as many assume.  There was one student I recall who went through Shas every month [i.e., about 100 pages [per day] and Rav Shick told him "Enough already. It is time to start doing in depth learning.'' And also he told people after they had been through one tractate to not go on, but to finish it 101 times.]

[I think that I ought to bring up here the idea of "Bitul Torah", the sin of not learning when you can. This you must have noticed is not widely regarded as a sin at all, much less a very severe sin. I  myself  think that I might have sinned in this regard. And I think the industrial-spiritual complex that makes money by using Torah as a means to extract money from  the government does not either consider "bitul Torah" as the sin it actually is, They are just using Torah to make money and get power. ]

[However, I do agree that many  Litvak yeshivot are great--but not all. The best obviously is Ponovitch where Rav Shach was.]

[If I could I would also recommend Tosphot, but I am convinced that no one understands Tophot--especially when they thin they do. That is unless you have that ort of head like Naphtali Yegeer in my first yeshiva SharYahuv or the learning partner I had in Uman David Bronson. Or if you commit to doing one Tosphot every day for about 40 days in a row. Then sometimes one can tart to see the depth of Tosphot]

this confusing modern world

 To gain clarity in this confusing modern world I have no better solution that the medieval idea of synthesis between faith and reason but nowadays it would be a bit different than the Middle Ages. For one thing Reason would not mean just Plato and Aristotle, but would include Kant [and I would dare to add Leonard Nelson.] Also the Rishonim like the Rambam that had Physics being an integral part of learning Torah would include modern Physics. [Hegel might also be considered a powerful sequel to Kant but with the Friesian approach Nelson (and Kelley Ross) I found a lot more answers than i did in Hegel. ] 

As for faith, I realize there is a crisis in faith in itself. Rav Nahman of Breslov pointed out the problem of Torah scholars that are demons [in his book Le.M vol. I, ch. 12 and 28].These teachers make getting to authentic Torah problematic. The best thing I can see is to get through the Tenach and the Two Talmuds and Midrashim by fast learning, and to have at least one in depth session in "Iyun" in Tosphot, Maharsha. and the Avi Ezri of Rav Shach [or Reb Chaim of Brisk.] [This sort of learning in depth along the line of Reb Chaim was the way of the Mir in NY when I was there. But there is also a way of learning Tosphot in depth that is more difficult to decribe. ]  

  

People need more than knowledge. They need wisdom.

 People need more than knowledge. They need wisdom. And by that I mean an understanding of what life is all about. This is the role that the Bible used to play in the lives of people. But when the Bible became disenfranchised, people find other things to fill that gap in their lives. And the new myths are most often teaching lessons that are pernicious. Thus you find in the Bible the fact that sufferings has  a reason--sufferings are an unavoidable part of the  human condition. We all suffer and cause others to suffer. In the Bible, the reason is simple: What goes around, comes around. But when people lack that wisdom, they find other reasons for their  plights and dilemmas. For women, that is men. For the "woke" it is being born in the wrong body. The list goes on.  

professors of gender, race studies, psychology. ...

 STEM [Science, Technology, Engineering, Mathematics ] and labor [working people] make a coalition in liberal capitalistic societies. Who is left out?  The Intellectuals, the pseudo enlightened, the Humanities professors that can't compute, can't do the math, can't make anything that people want. So what do they do? They claim secret knowledge that supposedly everyone needs. That is the university professors of gender, race studies, psychology. philosophy. literature, etc., that no one needs  or wants, and can not make anything that people need. Theirs's is the politics of resentment.  Everyone wants people that can do stuff; can go to the moon, can make computers, that drive trucks. Who needs the pseudo intellectuals? 

 I was walking out side the other day and saw printed on the back of someone's sweater "שומר אחי" ("My brother's keeper").That is in reference to what Cain asked God, "Am I my brother's keeper?"(This was just  after murdering him.)  This reminds me of the attitude that everyone had toward my son, Izhak (also known as Nahman), when he was begging for help and everyone's answer was "Am I my brother's keeper?" Everyone's answer should have been just what was printed on that fellow's sweatshirt:  "שומר אחי" ("My brother's keeper")

 za6 midi file

The subject of string theory

The  subject of string theory came up recently so I thought to write down my thinking on this. Mainly it is appeal to authority. Feynman worked long and hard on gravity and saw that quantum gravity has no chance since it is not renormalizable. So if there is any way to reconcile QM with gravity, it has to be something else. Then there is the remarkable fact that String Theory has a two spin particle which arises  naturally in the equations; and for  along time that was thought to be a strike against it until someone realized that the graviton implied in General Relativity is  a two spin particle.

't Hooft has a synopsis of it, and also Siegel at Stony Brook in NY. 

I am nothing, but a layman, but this I how I see things. Maybe I am not qualified to offer an opinion but neither are most of the enemies of string theory. They are certainly not in the major league like 't Hooft or Siegel or Susskind at Stanford.

Musar approach of the Rishonim

I might have just gone with the Musar approach of the Rishonim except that their framework is faith {sinai} with reason {Aristotle}. That works for me to some degree except for the problem pointed out by Berkley that there is nothing of the heat of the fire or the sharpness of the sword that enters the mind to give an idea of heat or fire. To see that point clearly it helps to read Thomas Reid, the common sense philosopher. [There are also problems  in Aristotle's Metaphysics.] So the purely Aristotelian approach is not possible except with some sort of modification. Thus, the three critiques of Kant are a necessary development. That leaves me however with some problems in Kant which were noticed almost before the ink was dry. From that emanated a few schools. To me the one that makes the most sense is Jacob Fries and Leonard Nelson. ["Why not Hegel?" you might ask. For me, the reason is the dialectic method is a tool of reason, but not the only way reason progress. Empirical evidence is needed. There is the problem of pure reason alone that Kant pointed out.

Roughly the Kant Fries school of Leonard Nelson https://www.friesian.com/nelson.htm"> makes the most sense to me, but not exactly because of an issue in Kant. I,e, Kant accepts Hume's critique of reason to some degree and does escape from it. I however have an issue thus: I think Hume was wrong from the start. Reason is not limited to figuring out contradictions based in definitions like: bachelors are not married. Why did Hume make this mistake? Because in his day, Euclid had authority almost equal to the Bible. And in Euclid, reason is to see when a result of a hypothesis contradicts one of the five starting axioms. Hume says over and over that that is the only function of reason, but with no proof. He assumes it. But that is an arbitrary limitation. Kant did break out of that prison, but limited reason to the realm of possible experience. That is true to some degree, but still assumes that there is no knowledge outside of reason or empirical experience. But that too is too limiting. For even if we start with Euclid, from where do the axioms come from? Why are they reasonable? That is the starting point of Fries and Leonard Nelson: non intuitive immediate knowledge I owe a debt of gratitude in understanding this to Kelley Ross for his web site on the approach of Leonard Nelson and in particular his PhD thesis there. Also To Michael Huemer in his books and essays and Brain Caplan and Steven Dutch whose web it is back after being down for year.

Bava Metzia page 41 in Rashi and the Baal HaMeor.Rambam laws of stealing and losing chapter 3. law 11.

 שולח יד בפיקדון  In Exodus there is a verse that if one uses a pledge or any object that he is guarding for another, and then that object is lost he is obligated even though normally a unpaid guard{shomer hinam{ is not obligated when an object in his possession has been lost or stolen.

To the Baal Hameor if he steals that object by force then also he  is obligated for the same prohibition of "one uses a pledge". It look like this is also the opinion of the Rambam and Ravad.[In the Rambam this is open. For the Raavad you have to see where the Shita Mekubetzet bring him there.]

But if so then arises a difficulty. In the Rambam it say about one that steals [not by force] a pledge he is obligated in double. The problem is that there is an asymmetry between the two cases. If stealing by force is not considered stealing for a pledge [since it is anyway in his possession by the permission of the owner of the pledge] but rather ''one uses a pledge'' then why is stealing not by force not also considered the same way? Or visa versa why not consider stealing by force just stealing by force.

See the Avi Ezri in Laws of stealing chapter 3. halacha 11 for more details.

[The main reason why the Rishonim hold stealing by force if a pledge is  שולח יד בפיקדון is from that Gemara in Bava Metzia 41.] 

Answer: Using  a pledge is obligated only when the pledge is no longer available. Otherwise he simply give back the pledge. Or if it has been lost or stolen, he pays the amount it was worth. The case of  שולח יד בפיקדון is when he takes an a oath that it was lost or "there never was any such thing" and as an unpaid guard he would not pay back anything. That is the case of stealing by force. The case of stealing not by force where he pay double is when he claims the item was stolen not by force. 

I.e., the case of swearing "it was  stolen not by force" is a special case learned from verses in Bava Kama 105

 

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 שולח יד בפיקדון  In שמות there is a verse that if one uses a pledge or any object that he is guarding for another, and then that object is lost, he is obligated even though normally a unpaid guard is not obligated when an object in his possession has been lost or stolen. To the בעל המאור if he steals that object by force [גוזל] then also he  is obligated for the same prohibition of "one uses a pledge". It look like this is also the opinion of the רמב''ם andהראב''ד. But if so then arises a difficulty. In the רמב''ם it say about one that גונב [not by force] a pledge he is obligated in double. The problem is that there is an asymmetry between the two cases. If stealing by force is not considered stealing for a pledge [since it is anyway in his possession by the permission of the owner of the pledge] but rather שולח יד בפיקדון, then why is גונב not also considered the same way? Or visa versa, why not consider גוזל just גוזל. see the אבי עזרי in הלכות גזלה ואביה ג' הלכה י''א  

Answer: Using  a פיקדון is obligated only when the פיקדון is no longer available. Otherwise he simply give back the פיקדון. Or if it has been lost or stolen, he pays the amount it was worth. The case of  שולח יד בפיקדון is when he takes an a oath that it was lost or "there never was any such thing" and as an unpaid guard he would not pay back anything. That is the case of גזלה. The case of גנבה where he pays double is when he claims the item was stolen not by force. 

I.e., the case of נשבע הפיקדון נגנב חייב כפל is a special case learned from verses in בבא קמא ק''ה 

שולח יד בפיקדון. בשמות יש פסוק שאם אחד  משתמש במשכון או בכל חפץ שהוא שומר עבור אחר, ואז החפץ הזה אבד, הוא חייב למרות שבדרך כלל שומר ללא תשלום[שומר חינם] אינו חייב כאשר חפץ נמצא אצלו אבד או נגנב. לבעל המאור אם הוא גונב את החפץ בכוח [גוזל] אז גם הוא חייב באותו איסור של "משתמש במשכון". נראה שזאת גם דעת הרמב''ם והראב''ד. אבל אם כן אז מתעורר קושי. הרמב''ם אומר על אחד שגונב [שלא בכוח] משכון הוא חייב בכפל. הבעיה היא שיש אסימטריה בין שני המקרים. אם גזלה בכוח אינה נחשבת לגזלה [שהרי היא ממילא ברשותו ברשות בעל המשכון] אלא שולח יד בפיקדון, אז מדוע לא נחשב גם גונב באותה דרך? או להיפך, למה לא לשקול גוזל רק גוזל. ראה אבי עזרי בהלכות גזלה ואבדה ג' הלכה י''א

תשובה: חיוב על השתמשות בפיקדון הוא רק כאשר הפיקדון אינו זמין יותר. אחרת הוא פשוט מחזיר את הפיקדון. או אם הוא אבד או נגנב, הוא משלם את הסכום שהיה שווה. המקרה של שולח יד בפיקדון הוא כשהוא נשבע שהיא אבדה או ש"לא היה דבר כזה מעולם" וכשומר ללא שכר לא היה מחזיר כלום. זה המקרה של גזלה. מקרה הגניבה שבו הוא משלם כפול הוא כאשר הוא טוען שהפריט נגנב שלא בכוח

דהיינו נשבע שהפיקדון נגנב חייב כפל הוא מקרה מיוחד הנלמד מפסוקים בבא קמא ק''ה.

i know this is way too short, but I hope anyone reading this will look at the Baal Hameor over there in Bava Metzia and I think you see what I mean here. I  think he is right. Rather, my question is about גניבה stealing not by force.

the best way to make sure your children turn out alright is by making sure the grow up in a decent wholesome society.

 The ancient Greeks thought the best way to make sure your children turn out alright is by making sure the grow up in a decent, wholesome society. They knew that the influence of parents and family is limited while that of society is unlimited, Thus I can see that even though I have a great deal of respect for Rav Nahman of Breslov, still it would have been better to stick with the wholesome Litvak Yeshiva environment. 

One lesson I learned in Shar Yahuv  was the idea of review ten times everything you learn. Another thing I noticed in the Litvak world is a great respect for Rav Nahman, but no interest to  "become Breslov".

"Do not do good to an evil person, and evil will not reach you."

 There is a point in not doing a favor for someone who will use it against you. In the Midrash i brought a story about some one who came from Israel to Persia and saw a dead bird. Then came another bird with a leaf from a plant, and put it on the dead bird, and that bird came back to life. Then he went to that same plant and picked a leaf from it, and said to himself,
"This will come in handy." On the way, he saw the carcass of a dead lion. He put it on the lion, and it came back to life and ate  him. From this the Midrash learns: "Do not do good to an evil person, and evil will not reach you."

And this is the reason the religious people commonly refer to secular Jews as "crazy." כל הפוסל במומו פוסל

 A lot of religious motivation is from schizoid personality defects, not from strong faith in God. [video lecture by Sapolsky (start at minutes 8:00 and onward. And in particular minute 1:15:16 [i.e. one hour and fifteen min.]) and https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nEnklxGAmak] [See : Alfred Kroeber] Thus it is easy to see why the religious world seems so unhealthy. Clearly, this was noticed by Rav Israel Salanter who saw that the essence of Torah is Monotheism with good Midot [good character traits], not religions fanaticism. But that did not help after the first few generations of Musar. Eventually, it became  another sort of religious fanaticism. [See: Geschwind Syndrome]

And this is the reason the religious people commonly refer to secular Jews as "crazy." כל הפוסל במומו פוסל." ''All who calls names calls with his own name." [ Gemara and brought in many Musar books.]

learning in depth. that is with lot's of review

 The major lesson that I learned from my son Izhak is that of learning in depth, that is with lot's of review until I understand, and even then to keep on reviewing. I had of course been introduced to this at Shar Yashuv and the Mir yeshivot, but the lesson did not really sink in until Izhak explained this to me. But it still seem to me to be unclear how much review to do. I have been thinking of the idea of focusing on one subject and kind of expanding out from there. 

Even though Rav Nahman is known for advocating the fast kind of learning, see his book Le.M vol I chap. 74 where learning with iyun [review and depth] is considered to be a higher level.

to rav nahman there are two kinds of judgment: (1) from the realm of holiness, (2) from the realm of uncleaniness. The last is understood: sickness, tragedy, etc. The first i when one tries to come into the realm of holiness and just then troubles begin. These come as tests of faith, or because one was not fit in the first place. And learning without understanding is the same essence as judgment of the realm  of holiness. But when one learns with understanding that mitigates and weakens that all the judgments. 

 There was on Friday afternoon an Arab with a blue id card [i.e. Israeli Citizenship] plowed into a bus stop and wiped out a whole family. Aristotle wrote that two people's that are not getting along, there is no solution but separation. the idea of Israeli Arabs maybe was an ok idea at first, but after 70 years of experience that is clearly unreasonable already. 

The evil inclination uses false mitzvot to bring people into the paths of darkness.

 I was in a local sort of Litvak kind of Beit Midrash and worked on some sugia there for a while. Then I noted that they had there a book of a collection of ideas if the Gra on the Five Books of Moses [Chumash]. There I noted a comment by the Gra that reminded me of the very first lesson of Rav Nahman (in his book the Le.M vol. I, chapter 1). That is that the evil inclination uses false mitzvot to bring people into the paths of darkness,

This is why the straight path of Torah of the Gra is important--, it is that it is too easy to be distracted and fall by pseudo mitzvot, and they lead from one thing to another until one's whole life is ruined. [Breslov itself, while based on the teaching of Rav Nahman, tends to have that same sort of aspect [being a half way house] between holiness [kedusha] and anti-holiness.  It is like a door by which people leave the straight and narrow path of the Torah [the Litvak Yeshiva world],  and by which some people come into Torah after being outside.. Rav Nahman has great and powerful advice, but also there is there things that can be (and are)  misunderstood from how he intended them.

People in Ukraine are afraid to say their true feelings

I can imagine that people in Ukraine are afraid to say their true feelings, but when I was there in Middle Ukraine [not the East] people told me openly that they were upset that the USSR was gone. The vast majority of people in Uman went to the Russian Orthodox Church [near the local bazar]. Now you might counter that that was because it was in the city center, while the large Ukrainian Orthodox church was out a bit from the main city. But even so, that does not answer it, because there was also a small  Ukrainian Orthodox church on Sadova  Drive [also city centre], and that was open just a few hours on Sunday. But the Russian Orthodox Church was open all the time--from morning to evening every day, and always had plenty of people in it. And on Sunday, it was packed--hardly room to move.

Of course, now the government has closed it, and made it illegal. Even the Communists never did that during the entire 70 years they were in power. [I admit that there was talk among the Communist officials during the 1980's to close it, but they never did.]

superiority attitude in the religious world

The Litvak Yeshiva world really was a great place for me for some period, but I did not have the appreciation for it and the straight path of the Gra as I should have had. Even so I find it important to show respect of it's tremendous value, even though I did not manage to stick with it. And I think that is an important lesson--that Rav Nahman pointed out: "Even if I can't be "איש כשר" kosher person, I should at least want my friend to be one." 

[However, there is a kind of  superiority attitude in the religious world. Gentiles are not considered human and baali teshuva [newly religious] are thought to be sub human. This attitude displays itself in subtle ways at first when they are love bombing teen agers with rich parents. Only later when they have no more use for you, does this attitude become apparent. 

The State of Israel, Reb Moshe Feinstein and Rav Aaron Kotler

 Even though there is a certain amount of criticism from the religious world on the State of Israel, I think it is mistaken from a few different angles, --mainly by the fact that both Reb Moshe Feinstein and Rav Aaron Kotler held ''the law of the country is the law'' in regards to Israel. [That means it has the legitimate category of a state with all the implication of that in halacha.] So I would say it is  great mitzvah to serve in the IDF. If you look into history yoas in their area in the old city.

The book of the Rav of Satmer is meant to show that the State of Israel is not legitimate is based on a midrash about not to go up to  Israel "as a wall" against the nations. This ignores the League of Nations and the Balfour Declaration. 

 I have been thinking about the importance of learning Torah and the straight path of the Gra. But I also see that one aspect of the Gra is ignored what was known as the "seven wisdoms".[note 1]That was the name that several secular subjects were known by during the Middle Ages,- but not all secular subjects.

There is at any rate some difference between rishonim what would be permitted to learn and not count a bitul Torah. To find some middle ground I recommend the authentic sciences, but would leave out the pseudo sciences like psychology.

[note 1] the translation of Euclid by a disciple of the Gra quotes him saying, "To the degree that one lacks any knowledge of the seven wisdoms, to that degree he will lack in understanding Torah a hundred fold."

American education

 The whole  problem with American education is that it starts too late. For the real root of the USA is England. If one does not know the origin of the Parliamentary system, the Magna Carta. and trials and tribulations that led to the English system of government, then his understanding of the Constitution of the  USA itself has to be superficial. It can not start either with John Locke who was encoding facts that were already history. He found the justification for the Glorious Revolution.     

 Parents think they can go to the schools, and find out what their children are learning? No such luck. Because of the Ferrari method of education, your children ae being taught gender and woke poison propaganda in the disguise of reading, writing, and arithmetic.

In terms of what would be better than the poisonous public schools, I think that self learning is the best idea. And in order to advance this, I would like to suggest learning with ten times review of every chapter or section. This idea of leaning with lot of review I understood from my son, Izak. (I had suggested to him to "just say the words and go on," but he did not accept that. So I finally decided to accept his advice.)

Furthermore I would like to suggest that most of what is learnt in schools is really not very positive. [See  Allan Bloom's Closing of the American Mind,] 

Rav Nahman emphasized living in the land of Israel as [I noted in the Le,M vol I chap. 55 when I went into the local Na Nach place to study that book of Rav Nahman today] and in fact it was the encouragement that I saw in a different chapter in the Le.M that convinced me to come to Israel for the first time some years ago. I also saw this emphasis in the letter of the Gra  that he wrote to his wife on his journey to Israel.

The original motivation was from the general approach of Musar that I had been reading. But when I actually began to take steps, I found my way blocked. Then i noted that Rav Nahman had said that the land of Israel is acquired by hardships,,, and the major hardships and obstacles are the slanderers of the land ,

Avi Ezri Laws of Inheritance, chapter 1 halacha 3. Ketuboth pg 69 in the Gemara and Rashi.

 There is an argument between the Beit Yoseph and the Darkei Moshe concerning the law about one who is dying and he gives instructions about his will that are valid, but would not be valid if he gave these instructions while he was healthy. R. Akiva Eiger [Responsa 138] explains this argument in one way, and Rav Shach explains this in a different way, and I can see a way to agree with R Akiva Eiger and another way to agree with Rav Shach. This refers to one who is dying and he gives instruction that one of his children should inherit, and then after him the inheritance should go to a stranger. The Beit Joseph holds this is valid only if the son that is inheriting has no children nor brothers. However the one that is dying might have brothers and this is still valid.  The Darchei Moshe holds even if that son that is inheriting has brothers this law is still valid. To R. Akiva Eiger the argument is about indirect inheritance. The son and brothers inherit directly, and so the father can not disinherit them. The Darchei Moshe holds that the brothers inherit indirectly, and so the father can say that one of his children should inherit and then after him the inheritance should go to a stranger.  Rav Shach  writes that the  Beit Yoseph  holds the reason the father can not disinherit the brothers is then it would be as though there was no inheritance at all [after that brother has died] and the whole inheritance would be a present to a stranger--and that can not be valid. But Rav Akiva Eiger could say this reason can not be so because the Beit Joseph agrees that if the father has a brother, then it would be valid to give to the brother and then the stranger.  But Rav Shach points out that then even though there is someone that could inherit, still he does not inherit and it is as if there was no inheritance at all but simply a present to a stranger which can not be valid.

I would like to add here  that the proof that Rav Shach bringc against R Akiva Eiger is from the law that one can choose to give inheritance to only one of the others that can inherit him. And that includes those that could inherit from him indirectly {Mishmush}. However the question is if this applies also to the halacha that one can give the inheritance to one son and from him to a stranger. And the whole point of the Beit Yoseph is that you can not combine both halachot. So even though the explanation of Rav Shach in the Beit Yoseph makes sense, but  also the explanation of R Akiva Eiger. i.e., that the Darchei Moshe might hold true that brothers inherit only indirectly. However Rav Shach could answer that the point of his objection is not about  just one of the two laws that are being combined here by the Darchei Moshe, but about the very essence of the inheritance of the brothers. If we have established that they inherit directly then that is established in all cases.

I am being short here but just look in the Avi Ezri and you will see that  Rav Shach is bringing his proof only from the law of R Yochanan ben Broka as it is brought in the Rambam. That establishes that brothers inherit directly.

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 There is an argument between the בית יוסף and the  דרכי משה concerning the law about one who is dying (שכיב מרע) and he gives instruction about his צוואה that are valid, but would not be valid if he gave these instructions while he was healthy. ר' עקיבא איגר תשובות קל''ח  explains this argument in one way and רב שך explains this in a different way, and I can see a way to agree with ר' עקיבא איגר and another way to agree with רב שך. This refers to one who is dying and he gives instruction that one of his children should inherit, and then after him the inheritance should go to a stranger. The בית יוסף holds this is valid only if the son that is inheriting has no children nor brothers. However the one that is dying might have brothers, and this is still valid.  The  דרכי משה holds even if that son that is inheriting has brothers, this law is still valid. To ר' עקיבא איגר the argument is about indirect inheritance (מישמוש). The son and brothers inherit directly and so the father can not disinherit them. The  דרכי משה holds that the brothers inherit indirectly (מישמוש) and so the father can say that one of his children should inherit and then after him the inheritance should go to a stranger.   רב שך writes that the  בית יוסף  holds the reason the father can not disinherit the brothers is then it would be as though there was no inheritance at all [after that brother has died] and the whole inheritance would be a present to a stranger, and that can not be valid. But ר' עקיבא איגר could say this reason can not be so because the בית יוסף agrees that if the father has a brother then it would be valid to give to the brother and then the stranger.  But רב שך points out that then even though there is someone that could inherit, still he does not inherit and it is as if there was no inheritance at all but simply a present to a stranger which can not be valid.

I would like to add here  that the proof that רב שך bring against ר' עקיבא איגר is from the law that one can choose to give inheritance to only one of the other that can inherit him. And that includes those that could inherit from him indirectly {מישמוש}. However the question is if this applies also to the law that one can give the inheritance to one son and from him to a stranger. And the whole point of the  בית יוסף is that you can not combine both laws. So even though the explanation of  רב שך in the בית יוסף makes sense, but  also the explanation of ר' עקיבא איגר, i.e., that the דרכי משה  might hold true that brothers inherit only indirectly. However  רב שך could answer that the point of his objection is not about  just one of the two laws that are being combined here by the דרכי משה , but about the very essence of the inheritance of the brothers. If we have established that they inherit directly, then that is established in all cases

I am being short here, but just look in the אבי עזרי and you will see that רב שך is bringing his proof only from the law of ר' יוחנן בן ברוקא as it is brought in the רמב''ם. That establishes that brothers inherit directly.

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יש ויכוח בין הבית יוסף לדרכי משה בנוגע להלכה על גוסס (שכיב מרע) והוא נותן הוראה על צוואה שלו שהיא תקפה, אבל לא תקפה אם היה נותן אותה הוראה בעודו בריא. ר' עקיבא איגר תשובות קל''ח מסביר את הטיעון הזה בצורה אחת, ורב שך מסביר זאת בצורה אחרת, ואני יכול לראות דרך להסכים עם ר' עקיבא איגר ודרך אחרת להסכים עם רב שך. הכוונה היא למי שגוסס והוא נותן הוראה שאחד מבניו צריך לרשת, ואחריו הירושה תעבור לזר. הבית יוסף קובע שזה תקף רק אם לבן שיורש אין בנים ואחים. אולם למי שגוסס אולי יהיו אחים, וזה עדיין תקף. הדרכי משה קובע גם אם לבן שיורש יש אחים, דין זה עדיין תקף. לר' עקיבא איגר הוויכוח הוא על ירושה עקיפה (מישמוש). הבן והאחים יורשים ישירות, ולכן האב לא יכול לנשל אותם. הדרכי משה גורס שהאחים יורשים בעקיפין (מישמוש) ולכן האב יכול לומר שאחד מבניו צריך לרשת ואחריו הירושה צריכה לעבור לזר. רב שך כותב שהבית יוסף מחזיק שהסיבה שהאב לא יכול לבטל את האחים היא שאז זה יהיה כאילו לא הייתה ירושה כלל [אחרי שאח זה נפטר] וכל הירושה תהיה מתנה לזר, ו זה לא יכול להיות תקף. אבל ר' עקיבא איגר יכול לומר שסיבה זו לא יכולה להיות כך, כי בית יוסף מסכים שאם לאב יש אח, אז יהיה תקף לתת לאח ולאחר מכן לזר. אבל רב שך מציין שאז למרות שיש מי שיכול לרשת, בכל זאת הוא לא יורש וזה כאילו לא הייתה ירושה בכלל אלא פשוט מתנה לזר שאינה יכולה להיות תקפה.

  אני רוצה להוסיף כאן שההוכחה שרב שך מביא נגד ר' עקיבא איגר היא מההלכה שאפשר לבחור לתת ירושה רק לאחד מהאחרים שיכולים לרשת אותו. וזה כולל את אלו שיכולים לרשת ממנו בעקיפין {מישמוש}. אולם השאלה היא האם זה חל גם על הדין שניתן לתת את הירושה לבנו וממנו לזר. וכל העניין של בית יוסף הוא שאי אפשר לשלב את שני הדינים. אז למרות שההסבר של רב שך בבית יוסף הגיוני, אבל גם ההסבר של ר' עקיבא איגר, דהיינו, שהדרכי משה עשוי לקבוע שאחים יורשים רק בעקיפין. אולם רב שך יכול היה להשיב שטעם התנגדותו אינו רק באחד משני ההלכות המשולבות כאן על ידי הדרכי משה, אלא על עצם הירושה של האחים. אם קבענו שהם יורשים ישירות, אז זה נקבע בכל המקרים

אני מקצר כאן, אבל רק עיין באבי עזרי ותראה שרב שך מביא את הוכחתו רק מדין ר' יוחנן בן ברוקא כפי שמובא ברמב''ם. זה קובע שאחים יורשים ישירות

The West is decaying

 The West is decaying from within the reason is''reason'' alone. Reason alone can not arrive at the true nature of reality. This was noted by Hume. Pure reason can only tell us knowledge without sensory input. [''Pure'' mean with no empirical input.]. But for areas where the ''is'' can not tell us about ''ought'', there one needs faith,  Faith with reason. For faith without reason believes nonsense. And reason without faith tells us nothing.  

One important lesson  I learned from my son  Izhak [aka Nahman] is specifically not to add nor subtract from the commandment of the Torah. \This in particular is relevant to sexual sin where it is common for people to add restrictions which then leads them to transgress real ones.  The secular world demises all the prohibition of the Torah, and so in place of them, they make up new ones. On the other hand, the religious world makes up new restrictions, and by that transgress actual prohibitions.

Examples are fairly well known, concubines [or mistress] [''girl friend''] is permitted to most rishonim [mediaeval authorities.] But the Rosh bring the problem that she might be embarrassed to go to the mikve. But I do not think  mikves are okay anyway since they are made from concrete which can be lifted out of the ground in one piece--so they are vessels. And one who dips in a vessel is not made clean. הטובל בכלים לא עולה לו טבילה Instead one might go to the sea, or river, or have the concrete thin enough that it would nor be a vessel. But nowadays, often when making a pool or mikve, there is put some layer of plastic under the concrete. That, in any case, makes the mikve invalid.   

[I might add that clothing is not a separation חציצה from water since the water can and doe get through the clothing.]

questions about faith and reason.

 I am surprized that Leonard Nelson' New Friesian School is ignored. For me it answers basic questions about faith and reason. And these question have bothered plenty of people way before me, I can not imagine that no one besides me cares. Christians during the Roman Empire were the first to try to find the synthesis between faith and reason. Boethius. Later Muslims began to search for the right approach. They did not conquer Constantinople but requested Greek scholars from there to teach them about Aristotle and Plato. Then Saadia Gaon, Solomon Ibn Gabirol, and Rambam.

What I figure is that some are satisfied with the ancients and mediaeval authors. But I found the answers were somehow not satisfying --not just because of David Hume, but just because the questions seemed different that needed answers. 

Ramchal (Rav Moshe Haim Luzato) author of one of the four classical Musar [ethics] books, the Mesilat Yesharim

 I have been thinking about the Ramchal (Rav Moshe Haim Luzato). He was one of the greats before the time of the Gra, and the Gra said that if he would have been alive during his lifetime, he would have walked all the way to Italy just to see him. As is well known, he wrote one of the four classical Musar [ethics] books, the Mesilat Yesharim, and lots of other books. [Some more along mystic lines, and others philosophical. All this is well known. But one thing I thought to bring out is that he had a disciple who also wrote what amounts to almost a whole encyclopedia [along the lines of the Ramchal]. I only saw it once in Netivot in the Yemani beit midrash. Apparently it was only printed once in a limited edition. I think that along with all the writings of the Ramchal would make an important addition to the learning of Musar nowadays. 

[I admit to not being able to get through the Ramchal's books except two. While at the Mir Yeshiva most of my time was in Gemara, with the basic commentaries of the  Maharsha and Pnei Yehoshua. There was only a very limited time for Musar.]

halacha/[Jewish law].Thus when religious leaders are in charge, the society they create is a nightmare

Even though halacha/[Jewish law] is important, there is the flaw that Rav Nachman [Breslov] point out. That flaw is Torah scholars that are demons. [Le.M I;12 I:28] [He bring this from the Talmud]. Thus when religious leaders are in charge, the society they create is a nightmare. But that is not a flaw in halacha but in people. For there is no system that can not be subverted. The reason is that no matter what the system is, people will find a way to mess it up.

[The English-American form of government  maximizes freedom, but is being destroyed from with-in. ]

The Importance of Land of Israel and the State of Israel

 Being in the Land of Israel is important because of the verse Deuteronomy chapter 11 verse 9 which says to do all the commandments of God in order to come to the land and when you are in the land to stay --;''...so that you shall have length of days in the land...'

And the anti Israel religious world does not have a legal leg to stand on.  Both Reb Moshe (Feinstein) and Rav Aaron Kotler said: "דינא דמלכותא דינא" the law of the land is the law which means that the State of Israel has the legal (halachic) category of a legitimate state. And the Rav of Satmer (his entire book) is based on one midrash. and midrash  has no halachic validity.

And besides that, Rav Joel of Satmer ignored the League of Nations. 

The midrash  is- "If you go up to the Land as a wall, I will allow your blood to be spilled like the deer of the field''

People did not come to Israel against the will of the nations as the Rav of Satmer had claimed, they came with the will of the nations. Herzel negotiated with the sultan as long as he was in power. The Rothchild's legitimately bought land in Israel from the Ottoman Empire at extremely inflated prices. --In today's currency, that was hundreds of million of dollars. When the empire of the Sultan fell, the League of Nations declared the land of Israel to be for the Jews.

That, at the time, meant all the land of Israel and Jordan. Then they cut it in half. They said in the later "White Paper" that only half would go to the Jews. But there was no time at which they decided that none of Israel would be for the Jews. So the thesis  of Rav Joel simply has no halachic validity. 

  

It is important to know this because the importance of Israel is not well known 

 I  see the world sleep walk into WWIII. and i can not see how anyone can win. but no one listens to me. so i think the best I or anyone can do to help save mankind from disaster is to learn Torah in depth.  But sadly, while I see that some people  learn Torah, it is mixed with the cyanide of the sitra achra [dark side] that the Gra saw is Torah of the kelipot [Torah scholars that are demons]and therefore put into herem [excommunication].

Argument between Jacob Fries and Hegel

 The main argument between Jacob Fries and Hegel is about how to get beyond Kant's iron wall between ''what's out there'' and what is ''in here''. To Fries this is by immediate knowledge which does not come through reasoning through any principles nor any senses. [This includes space and time which to Kant are synthetic a priori. ] To Hegel this is by the dialectic process of what is commonly known from Kant's phrase thesis anti thesis synthesis.

To a large degree, Kant was taken in by Hume who limited pure reason to detecting contradictions in concepts. He repeats this limitation often enough but strangely just assumes it from his experience from teaching Euclid. but that is not to say that there i no difference in types of reasoning from unpacking definitions to reasonable assumptions. 

בירושלמי בפאה פרק ב' משנה ה. רב שך על הרמב''ם מתנות עניים פרק ב' הלכה י''א Yerushalmi in Peah chap 2 Mishna 5

ideas in shas

ideas in Bava Metzia

 I was at the sea again, and it occurred to me on the way back that there is something hard to figure in the Yerushalmi in Peah chapter 2, Mishna 5. My question is this. Let us say one cuts down the whole field up until the one part of sixty (that he is supposed to leave  as peah ("corner of the field"). Then he cuts one more stalk. Then the Yerushalmi says the obligation of peah goes on the fifty nine of sixty. Why could he not still give peah from the one part of sixty (1/60 part) anyway? The reason  is supposed to be that now it is obligated in truma and maassar. But it was anyway obligated in truma and maasar!?

Could it be then that the Yerushalmi considers the measure of one part in sixty to be from the Torah?

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  There is something hard to figure out in the ירושלמי in פאה פרק ב  משנה ה. My question is this. Let us say one cuts down the whole field up until the one part of sixty (that he is supposed to leave  as פאה). Then he cuts one more stalk. Then the ירושלמי says the obligation of פאה goes on the fifty nine of sixty. Why could he not still give פאה from the one part of sixty  anyway? The reason  is supposed to be that now it is obligated in תרומה and מעשר. But it was anyway obligated in תרומה and  מעשר!? Could it be then that the ירושלמי considers the measure of one part in sixty to be דאורייתא?

בירושלמי בפאה פרק ב' משנה ה.

רב שך על הרמב''ם מתנות עניים פרק ב' הלכה י''א

יש משהו שקשה להבין בירושלמי בפאה פרק ב' משנה ה'. השאלה שלי היא כזו. נגיד אחד כורת את כל השדה עד החלק האחד משישים (שהוא אמור לעזוב כפאה). ואז הוא חותך עוד גבעול אחד. ואז הירושלמי אומר שחובת פאה הולכת על החמישים ותשע מתוך שישים. למה בכל זאת הוא לא יכול לתת פאה מהחלק האחד משישים? הסיבה אמורה להיות שעכשיו זה חייב בתרומה ובמעשר. אבל ממילא היה חייב בתרומה ובמעשר.האם יכול להיות אם כן שהירושלמי מחשיב את המידה של חלק אחד משישים דאורייתא

 One girl said to me at the beach that everything depends on from whom you learn. This was prompted by another girl saying she was majoring in criminology and gender studies where upon I explained about the Frankfurt School and the roots of woke and gender ideology. The students listening had never heard  any of that. They had thought gender stuff  had emerged full grown like Athena from the forehead of Zeus. To locate the flaws in any system, it helps to  identify the underlying and hidden assumptions. [For example one major [unstated] assumption in Marx is the labor theory of value. Take that away and the whole structure falls. You can not extract "excess value" is there is no "excess value", only market value.

I do not recommend learning the left-Hegelians and Marxists but it just happened that I picked up some knowledge of this just by reading Hegel and his defenders and retractors  

  My son Izhak held with the idea of learning in depth [also with fast learning--saying the words in order and going on but the to go back over that chapter many times.] ], and this message was conveyed to me by the Litvak world over the years, but it was not until recently I have taken this advice seriously [But there were some periods when I did more than ''just saying the words and going on.''] 

However, whether in learning Gemara Tosphot or the Achronim like Rav Chaim of Brisk, Rav Shach or in Math and Physics, I am hoping to in fact concentrate on לימוד בעיון learning in depth. [But I ought to add that this is not meant to diminish the importance of  ''bekiut'' fast learning--i.e. saying the words in order and going on.  This complements the learning in depth. In the Litvak world this is understood in such a way that the morning hours are set for in depth learning and the afternoon hours are set for fast learning. ]

    

I also hope to print a few copies of my little booklet on Shas that my son helped me to write.

The West thinks they can attack Moscow with no response,

 It is astonishing that the West thinks they can attack Moscow with no response, Is not that exactly what Japan thought in its attack on Peal Harbor. They also were unaware that a response would come. Do not people know that Russia will respond?--The flaw comes from the fact that people do not understand why Russia took parts of Ukraine, and the strategy of not attacking to destroy, but to convince. But if the West attacks Russia, the response will not be to convince, but to really attack.

[I would hope that there would be a bit more understanding  about the situation. few people in  the West have actually lived in Ukraine or have talked with average people on the street. the lack of understanding is shocking. So on one hand they do not know what the average babushka selling vegetables in the market think. but they do not know why Russia is taking back what is their's in their opinion and the opinion of many in Ukraine that are now fearful of expressing this.  nor do they understand that the approach of Russia towards people that consider themselves to be Russian and Russia consider to be Russian will be different if they are attacked and Moscow decide to retaliate with nuclear submarines off the coast of California and New York.    

 in philosophy and politics it  helps to trace the genealogy of ideas [and systems]. "Woke" and "gender"? studies stems directly from the Neo Marxist Frankfurt group [the 1960's One Dimensional Man] which comes from the Left Hegelians and the Labor Theory of Value. Without the background the ideas of woke gender seem new and dazzling.  

midot tovot good character would not be known to be an essential part of Torah except for Rav Israel Salanter. Religious feeling would be directed toward ritual. but the importance of musar goes far beyond  the awareness of the importance of good character but also in defining it. sfor pne thing the rishonim were particularly good at was painstaking rigorous  thinking and that kind of thinking i needed in order to understand what the Torah in fact considers good character and not to decide it baed on whim or personal bias.

Fat

 Fat. At one point, a few years ago, I was over weight, and this was cured by פת שחרית morning bread, raw beets and eggs right away in the morning [right after doing a few sessions of learning]. Then a jog. The beets thing does not seem practical right now, but I am thinking of starting again that פת שחרית morning bread, [morning bread is brought in the gemara as being very helpful for a whole array of problems.]

 There is something that is odd about the religious world, but it is hard to know what. Maybe the problem what Rav Nahman [Breslov]  noted about Torah scholars from the Dark Side [sitra achra]. But I am unsure if that is all. While on one hand, the express belief in Torah is good, But when the actions show that belief is hollow and a façade, --that tends to cause '' hilul hashem'' i.e. questions on Torah that they supposedly represent. [I avoid the religious world mainly because of personal experience. I think that if they already did as much harm to me and my family as they could then why trust them again?   Lie Charlie Brown thinking every time that Lucie  could be trusted not to remove the football at the last second when he wa no longer in a position to back out.                   ]

 Few one but a few fanatics want to fight Russia.  I know this from years of asking Ukrainians [IN UMAN central ukraine] if they preferred Russian rule or rule of Kiev. The answer was almost always that things were better under Russia. But I admit there  were a few exceptions. but in a city of 60,000 people, a couple of exceptions were not significant. But clearly Ukrainians in the USA or other countries are ultra nationalists-- they have nothing to lose.

But besides the few Ukrainian fanatics I can see no point in starting WWIII with Russia which in the already started stages of WWIII will be joined by China, Saudi Arabia, Brazil and to add to that the fact is a vast percent of people in the USA itself hate America and can not wait for a bit of chaos to start rioting, burning, looting and raping --as soon as things get unstable.