Gemara Shabat pg 63.One should learn even if he forgets and even though he does not know wat he is saying.לעלם ליגרס אינש אע''ג דמשכח ואע''ג דלא ידע מאי קאמר

In Shar Yashuv [of Rav Friefeld] there was a tremendous emphasis on review and in depth learning. This was in some sense at the Mir also except at the Mir there was the afternoon sessions which was devoted to fast learning. I should admit however that at both places I was out of my depth. The only way I can explain the way they were learning would be if you would learn the Chidushei HaRambam of Rav Chaim of Brisk or the Avi Ezri.

But I felt the need to learn fast--to cover ground. So I developed this sort of style that every paragraph in the Gemara I would learn twice with Rashi and the Maharsha [plus what ever rishonim or achronim that were available.] That way I could satisfy myself that I was doing some review-- but not lingering overly long. [That was the way I went through a lot of the large tractates.]

[Some time after that I was in Uman and David Bronson came there, and we started learning. In his sort of learning I saw the same kind of depth I had seen in Shar Yashuv and the Mir. But after that I left Uman.] 

[Since This balanced approach between in depth learning and fast learning of the Mir seems best to me. I later applied this balanced approach to Physics and it seems to work for me.

[Later,  I began to learn even without understanding based on the Gemara Shabat pg 63.One should learn even if he forgets and even though he does not know wat he is saying.לעלם ליגרס אינש אע''ג דמשכח ואע''ג דלא ידע מאי קאמר The learning gets absorbed into ones subconscious even though he thinks he did not understand. The subconscious processes the raw data as he sleeps at night. The saying of the words is not for understanding but rather for the uptake of the data.

Kant changed from the transcendental deduction in the Critique A to a more inclusive sort in B.

 Kant changed from the transcendental deduction in the Critique A to a more inclusive sort in B. [in order to answer the critique of Schultz]. However, even the second version  suffers from the mind-body problem. The body receives the signals, and then the categories [of Aristotle, how, where, why, when, how much, etc.] unify the information. But what information? There still is no way we know that can combine the signals with the mind. Computer chips in a bathtub are not a computer. And even when you put them together who is the user? So you need immediate non intuitive knowledge to unify the sense perception with the mind. 

That is not new. That is the basic idea of the Kant/Fries/Nelson approach. However I would like to ask if this is so different from Hegel? Hegel wants to collapse the mind body problem all into the mind--the absolute Idea [what you might know more familiarly as the Logos].  But Hegel's concept of reason and the mind is not at all like Kant. [That is the source of the famous critique on his Smaller and Greater Logic.]

His logic does not suffer from the Humean, "Reason can only tell us something is wrong if it is self contradictory," [an unproven postulate, and one that seems wrong on the face of it as G.E. Moore and Prichard and Huemer noticed.]

Hegel's Reason and Fries's are the same thing. Some source of knowledge that is beyond reason and beyond sensory perception.

[I owe Kelley Ross gratitude for explaining the idea of non intuitive immediate knowledge in a way that I began to understand that it means some deeper source of knowledge that branches out into empirical or a priori knowledge or both together.] [The G.E. Moore approach and Huemer is that reason simply recognizes universals. It is not going into the particulars of how. And the how is the question of Kant. How do we know synthetic a priori (universals)?]  So Kelley Ross noted that Huemer could have benefited from the Friesian/Leonard Nelson approach.]

the signature of the Gra

The letter of excommunication  [cherem] that has the signature of the Gra is ignored. I am not sure why no one pays any heed to it. One of the reasons I think it was signed was because of the problem of worshipping dead people which the Gra thought does not represent Torah very well. [That is an understatement. It is plain idolatry and not Torah in the slightest sense. ] Another issue is the "everything is God" which is not what the Torah says or holds. The Torah is monotheism. That is God created the world; he is not the world.   

[I do not think that Rav Nahman came under the herem after I read the actual language and whom it was meant to include. However there is a odd tendency that when people get involved in Rav Nahman (which in itself is a great thing) that they go off into directions that are not good and highly destructive. It seems to open the door to leave the straight path of Torah.]  

 Moral philosophers in the West  hold that adult children have no more moral obligation to support their elderly parents than does any other person in the society, no matter how much sacrifice their parents made for them or what misery their parents are presently suffering. This is because children do not ask to be brought into the world or to be adopted. 

This is similar to  a case I am walking by a lake and there is a child drowning in the lake. So obviously I jump in and save her. Does she owe me any any obligation or gratitude? Why should she? After all she did not ask to be rescued.  It is  the exact same logic as the case of a child towards his or her parents. 

[That is not to say that there are no great philosophers today. On the top of my list is Kelley Ross of the Kant Fries School. A bit lower are Huemer, and Robert Hanna. Though perhaps a bit off the subject but related to the political aspect of philosophy I think the two greatest masterpieces of the 20th century were the Closing of the American Mind by Allan Bloom and The Lucifer Principle by Howard Bloom.] 

z6 music file

 z6 B minor

I would like to mention that Rav Israel Salanter's idea of learning Musar [Ethics] seems to me to be very important. His point was that a lot of the essentials of Torah are forgotten  because of over much religiosity or sometimes the opposite. While we know from Musar that the essential aspect of Torah is to have good character traits, this point is often ignored or forgotten. And what is good character is well defined in the basic set of Musar from the Middle Ages אורחות צדיקים, חובות הלבבות, שערי תשובה, מעלות המידות, ספר היראה המיוחס לרבינו תם. [ Ways of the Righteous, Obligations of the Hearts, Gates of Repentance, Greatness of Good Character.]  

[The books of the disciples of Rav Israel Salanter were for me very helpful in getting the idea since the books of the Middle Ages although great can be hard to get the idea.--since after all they are mediaeval.]  

[I might mention that I was aware of the basic idea of the Torah that the essential thing is "to be a mensch" (a decent human being). From my home and also before I got to the Mir in NY. Still one has to have musar to be able to define what good character is.]

וסוגיא בכורות דף נ''ו/ השאלה שיש לרב שך על הרמב''ם בהלכות שקלים

 

חשבתי על השאלה שיש לרב שך על הרמב''ם בהלכות שקלים. ואף על פי ששאלתי על כך עכשיו הצהיר לי להיות הגיוני. אז מאיפה אני מתחיל? תן לי קודם לומר את הנקודה של רב שך. אם נלמד כמו הרמב''ם את המשנה וסוגיה בכורות דף נ''ו באו לומר לנו יש ברירה. זה יהיה כל העניין של הרעיון שהאחים שמתחלקים ואז מצטרפים שוב אינם חייבים במעשר של בהמה. כלומר, הם נותרו חייבים אפילו כשהם מחולקים בגלל יש ברירה. קשה היה לי להבין למה אם הם יצטרפו שוב הם לא צריכים להיות פטורים אם אנחנו מחזיקים יש ברירה. עכשיו אני רואה את הטעם של רב שך .אנו יודעים שהאחים שמצטרפים מחדש הם פטורים. אבל כל העניין של המשנה הייתה לומר שרק כשהם מצטרפים שוב הם לא חייבים. אז המשנה הייתה צריכה לומר שהם [האחים המתחלקים] ממשיכים להיות חייבים עד שהם יצטרפו שוב. ואנחנו יכולים לראות מדוע אם הם יצטרפו שוב הם אינם מחויבים גם אם אנו מחזיקים יש ברירה. הסיבה לכך היא שהצטרפות חזקה יותר מ”יש ברירה”. יש ברירה רק אומר שכאשר הם מתחלקים זה לא כאילו הם קונים כי הם כבר היו מפוצלים בפוטנציאל. אבל זה לא הולך להצטרפות חדשה כי כל העניין של הפסוק שאומר לנו שאחים או שותפים שהצטרפו אינם חייבים. כלומר שני הפסוקים אומרים לנו חייבים רק בעלי חיים שנולדו לאחר שכבר קיימת שותפות. ועכשיו זו הצטרפות חדש

I might just mention for the sake of clarity that Rashi and the Raavad both hold that brothers that inherit are obligated in maasar behema and business partners are not. It is the Rambam that learns the subject differently because of his version in the gemara. 

 I was thinking about the question Rav Shach has on the Rambam in laws of Sheklim. And though i asked on it last week today it stated to make sense to me. So where do I start? Let me first say the point of Rav Shach. If we learn like the Rambam the mishna in bechorot 56 is coming to tell us there is choice. That would be the whole point of the idea that the brothers that divide and then rejoin are not obligated in the tithe of animals. That is that they remained obligated even while divided because of  "there is choice."  But then the simpler thing to do would have simply to say that brothers that divide are still obligated in maasar behema for sheep that were born while they were joined.

Before  it was hard for me to see why if they rejoin they should not be obligated any more if we hold "there is choice." Now I see the point of Rav Shach. In any case we know the brothers that rejoin are not obligated. But the whole point of the mishna was to say that only when they rejoin are they not obligated. So the mishna should have said they [brothers that divide] continue to be obligated until they rejoin. And we can see why if they rejoin they are not obligated  even if we hold there is choice. That is because the rejoining is stronger than there is choice. There is choice only says that when they divide that is not as if they are buyers because\ they were already in potential divided. But that does not go for a new rejoining because the whole point of the  verse that tells us that brothers or partners that joining are not obligated. that is the two verses tell us what comes into the partnership is not obligated. only animals what were born after there is already a partnership are obligated.

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[The Raavad and Rashi learn that subject differently and to them these issues come out fine.]

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 I was thinking about the question רב שך has on the רמב''ם in laws of שקלים. And though I asked on it last week today it stated to make sense to me. So where do I start? Let me first say the point of  רב שך. If we learn like the רמב''ם the משנה וסוגיא in בכורות דף נ''ו is coming to tell us יש ברירה. That would be the whole point of the idea that the brothers that divide and then rejoin are not obligated in the tithe of animals. That is that they remained obligated even while divided because of  יש ברירה."  But then the simpler thing to do would have simply to say that brothers that divide are still obligated in מעשר בהמה for sheep that were born while they were joined. Before it was hard for me to see why if they rejoin they should not be פטורים if we hold יש ברירה." Now I see the point of  רב שך. In any case, we know the brothers that rejoin are פטורים. But the whole point of the משנה was to say that only when they rejoin are they not obligated. So the משנה should have said they [brothers מתחלקים] continue to be obligated until they rejoin. And we can see why if they rejoin they are not obligated  even if we hold יש ברירה. That is because the rejoining is stronger than יש ברירה. There is choice only says that when they divide that is not as if they are buyers because they were already in potential divided. But that does not go for a new rejoining because the whole point of the  verse that tells us that brothers or partners that joining are not obligated. That is the two verses tell us what comes into the partnership is not obligated. Only animals what were born after there is already a partnership are obligated. ועכשיו זו הצטרפות חדש

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חשבתי על השאלה שיש לרב שך על הרמב''ם בהלכות שקלים. ואף על פי ששאלתי על כך עכשיו הצהיר לי להיות הגיוני. אז מאיפה אני מתחיל? תן לי קודם לומר את הנקודה של רב שך. אם נלמד כמו הרמב''ם המשנה וסוגיא בכורות דף נ''ו בא לומר לנו יש ברירה. זה יהיה כל העניין של הרעיון שהאחים שמתחלקים ואז מצטרפים שוב אינם חייבים במעשר של בהמות. כלומר, הם נותרו חייבים אפילו כשהם מפולגים בגלל יש ברירה. קשה היה לי להבין למה אם הם יצטרפו שוב הם לא צריכים להיות פטורים אם אנחנו מחזיקים יש ברירה. עכשיו אני רואה את הטעם של רב שך.אנו יודעים שהאחים שמצטרפים מחדש הם פטורים. אבל כל העניין של המשנה היה לומר שרק כשהם מצטרפים שוב הם לא חייבים. אז המשנה היה צריך לומר שהם [אחים מתחלקים] ממשיכים להיות חייבים עד שהם יצטרפו שוב. ואנחנו יכולים לראות מדוע אם הם יצטרפו שוב הם אינם מחויבים גם אם אנו מחזיקים יש ברירה. הסיבה לכך היא שהצטרפות חזקה יותר מ”יש ברירה”. יש ברירה רק אומר שכאשר הם מתחלקים זה לא כאילו הם קונים כי הם כבר היו מפוצלים בפוטנציאל. אבל זה לא הולך להצטרפות חדשה כי כל העניין של הפסוק שאומר לנו שאחים או שותפים שהצטרפו אינם חייבים. כלומר שני הפסוקים אומרים לנו חייבים רק בעלי חיים שנולדו לאחר שכבר קיימת שותפות. ועכשיו זו הצטרפות חדש

Faster than light travel

 I noted that some have suggest worm holes between black holes in the core of atoms. That was the first time time I had some indication that faster than light might be possible. But now I noticed that someone has noted a similar process https://physicsworld.com/a/spacecraft-in-a-warp-bubble-could-travel-faster-than-light-claims-physicist/

 Copernicus did not predict new effects. Even his calculations were less accurate than that of astronomers working on the Ptolemy model.  But he explained things better. Rather than keeping on adding new rings he was able to make simple sense of the solar system by postulating that the earth goes around the sun.No new rings were needed.

Newton did not predict new effects. He simply explained the same force of gravity we see here on Earth is also in the heavens. It made more sense to explain the Kepler laws rather that leaving them unexplained. But there were no new predictions.

String theory explains things that do not and can not work in quantum gravity. That it has not be developed enough to know what new predictions at present day scales that can be tested  is not a lack. And it is testable.  See this: https://physicsworld.com/a/quantum-gravity-could-soon-be-tested-using-ultracold-atoms/ So string theory or other approaches to gravity can be tested. 

Philosophy has been in a rut for some time. Robert Hanna's approach is to place pretty much everything since Kant into the waste basket.  ["Forward to Kant" is his motto.] And judging by the astounding emptiness of academic philosophy, who can blame him? But I still can see a lot of value in the Kant-Fries School of thought that takes an approach based on Kant, but diverges from him in some ways. And this school is so much ignored that even in lists of philosophers you will not even find Fries or Leonard Nelson mentioned.

But my own interest is in understanding my own experience in the world and making sense of it, [not to understand philosophy]. And for that I found the basis of the Kant-Friesian approach to be helpful.

I should add that the Fries approach and also the Nelson approach also have kinks that need to be worked out. I found that the web site of Kelley Ross does this job the best.  [and this seems to be thanks to the efforts of Greta Hermann.]  [Dr Ross is the best of all philosophers in over view and scope. but there is still plenty to learn from Huemer and Hegel. And I can see how some might say there are deep contradictions between them, but I can not see that. Humer bases himself  on the Intuitionists that reason is a faulty,--which is true. But that does not  contradict the subtleties of Kant. And Hegel does not deal with the Mind Body problem at all-. He sees the Notion as being the synthesis of both. But he  does not explain how and that is the very problem for those that deal with it. Hegel is not interested in that at all. He simply sees empirical and a priori knowledge as two outer sides of some inner coin.]  I still must say that Hegel has some good points that seem to be missed by this school of thought, plus the Intuitionists like Michael Huemer also have some points. They all seem to me to be some aspect of a deeper world view that I can not put my finger on exactly. 

{I truly feel guilty that I can not see the great chasm between Hegel and Fries. To me the whole issue is this: the Friesian school is a post Kant  Platonism. (That is the doctrines of Plato, but taking into account the three critiques). Hegel is a post Kant Plotinus. {That is Neo Platonism taking Kant into account.}  

 One problem I have noticed in religious leaders is that of self deception. That is to say you can not accuse them of being hypocrites  since they sincerely believe that they are super geniuses super wise and in contact with the ultimate wisdom, when in fact they are mostly pretty stupid and obsessed with sex and power. And they very much desire the money of secular Jews-- as you can see by the fact that they are asking for it all the time.

They are people that have never accomplished anything and act and pretend as of the whole world depends on them. And resort to degrading anyone besides them who has accomplished great deeds.

You can see that I am not the first person to notice this. In fact, this theme is mentioned in the books of Rav Nahman of Breslov when he refers to the Torah scholars that are demons in LeM vol I chapters 8, 12, 28. It is  a theme that occurs often in the LeM, but also is brought in the Gemara itself in the end of tractate Shabat. There the Gemara says says that most of the problems in the world come from Torah scholars that are evil.  [The whole quotation is this: "If you see a generation that troubles come upon it, go and check the judges of Israel; for all troubles that come into the world come only because of the judges of Israel.'']

 z2 D major

religious fanaticism and the worship of dead people. Clearly the Gra signed the famous letter of excommunication for this very reason but the fact that he was ignored is what caused the entire religious world to fall and remain deeply imbedded in the worship of dead people.

 There is a point to what many people say about religious fanaticism. I.e. that it is insane. And that is a true point. And also well justified by observation. But the opposite extreme seems  also somewhat off. The way I think is best to deal with this issue is to find the good and throw out what is wrong. [One good way to see this issue is like Kelley Ross of the Kant Friesian School where religious belief comes under the category of immediate non intuitive knowledge. So where as id one find the path towards holiness that has the most energy and light, the problem is if one misses the target even by the slightest amount he or she falls into the Dark Side where the energy and power of evil is infinite. And even worse is the fact that these two opposite poles are often contained in the same person. (as people often have that characteristic of containing opposite in one body.)

[Another problem in the religious world is the worship of dead people. In Torah we find that there is a prohibition of worship of any other gods besides the One and only First Cause. The religious worship other gods but they get away with this because they pretend that what they are doing is not idolatry. They clothe their worship of dead people in Jewish religious clothing and that is supposed to make it OK.]

Clearly the Gra signed the famous letter of excommunication for this very reason but the fact that he was ignored is what caused the entire religious world to fall and remain deeply imbedded in the worship of dead people.

בכורות דף נ''ו ואבי עזרי של רב שך הלכות שקלים

 I have been puzzling about a certain issue in the אבי עזרי of רב שך in הלכות of שקלים. It is this in the רמב''ם there is this approach to מעשר בהמה. Sheep or cows come into the domain of יורשים it is is not obligated. That is where is disagrees with the ראב''ד. But in the domain, what is born the the domain of the inheritors is obligated.  The question רב שך has on this רמב''ם is based on the משנה that if the inheritors divide and then rejoin, they are not obligated in the tithe. רב שך asks would it not be more of a חידוש to say that the inheritors that   divide are מחויבים if the Mishna is coming to tell us יש ברירה. The lack of understanding on my part is this. The משנה certainly holds just dividing changes nothing. The brothers are still obligated in what was born while they were joined. It is the rejoining that makes them not obligated. Clearly רב שך here is understanding the רמב''ם that that משנה is coming to tell us יש ברירה. But one way or the other does not seem to say anything about if the brothers simply divide. On one hand I can see the point of רב שך. In the way of the רמב''ם, that משנה has to go according to the opinion יש ברירה. For if not [that is if the law would be אין ברירה], then when the brothers divide they would be considered as buyers who would not be obligated in the animal tithe. Still it is hard to say that even according to   אין ברירה that the obligation they already had of giving every tenth animal would disappear. What I mean. The normal way we understand that people that buyers are not obligated in the מעשר for animals is that there is a change in domain, from one person to another. But here animals that were born when the brothers were together are now owned by just one or the other. That is not really a change in domain..

It occurred to me later today to mention that my basic point is that there is not much difference with the brothers going into a new partnership of coming out of one when it comes to the issue of "breira". If אין ברירה [no choosing] then going into one is the same as coming out, and same is there is choosing. While Rav Shach's question revolves on the idea that there is a difference. Going into a new partnership he holds is clearly like they are buyers. But not coming out of one. But if we hold "there is choosing", it ought not to make a difference. Rav Shach is saying since there is choosing the mishna could have simply told us coming out of the partnership does not change anything and they are still obligated in maasar behama. [As the Mishna obviously hold that way anyway.] So why come onto the next case of rejoining? [It is doubtful to me why this should be different] Rav Shach holds that this is where the mishna tells us there is choosing and this new partnership is what makes them obligated.

בכורות נ''ו רמב''ם הלכות שקלים

תמהתי על נושא מסוים באבי עזרי של רב שך בהלכות של שקלים. זה ברמב''ם יש גישה זו למעשר בהמה. כבשים או פרות נכנסים לרשות של יורשים הם לא מחויבים. שם הוא לא מסכים עם הראב''ד. אך מה שנולד ברשות היורשים חייב. השאלה שיש לרב שך על רמב''ם זה מבוססת על הנושא שאם היורשים מתחלקים ואז מצטרפים שוב, הם אינם חייבים במעשר. רב שך שואל האם זה לא יהיה יותר חידוש לומר שיורשים שמתחלקים הם מחויבים אם המשנה באה לומר לנו יש ברירה. חוסר ההבנה מצדי הוא זה. המשנה בהחלט מחזיקה יש ברירה. האחים עדיין חייבים במה שנולד בזמן הצטרפותם. ההצטרפות  השנייה היא זו שגורמת להם לא להיות חייבים. ברור שרב שך כאן מבין את הרמב''ם שאותו משנה בא לומר לנו יש ברירה. אבל נראה שכך או אחרת זה לא אומר כלום אם האחים מתחלקים. מצד אחד אני יכול לראות את הטעם של רב שך. בדרך של הרמב''ם, אותו משנה צריכה ללכת על פי הדעה שיש ברירה. כי אם לא [כלומר אם החוק יהיה אין ברירה], אז כאשר האחים מתחלקים הם ייחשבו כקונים שלא יהיו חייבים במעשר בהמה. ובכל זאת קשה לומר שגם לפי אין ברירה שההתחייבות שכבר הייתה עליהם לתת כל חיה עשירית תיעלם. מה שאני מתכוון. הדרך הרגילה בה אנו מבינים שאנשים שקונים אינם חייבים במעשר בהמה היא שיש שינוי בתחום, מאדם אחד לאחר. אבל כאן בעלי חיים שנולדו כשהאחים היו ביחד הם עכשיו בבעלות זה או אחר בלבד. זה לא ממש שינוי בעלות.

I have been puzzling about a certain issue in the Avi Ezri of Rav Shach [in the only law in Laws of Shekalim that there is a chapter in the Avi Ezri]. It is this in the Rambam there is this approach to tithe of animals [every tenth animal must be given away]. It comes into the domain of inheritors it is is not obligated. [That is where is disagrees with the Raavad.] But in the domain --i.e. what is born the the domain of the inheritors is obligated [That is both to the Raavad and Rambam.] The question Rav Shach has on this Rambam is a different. The question is based on the fact that if the inheritors divide and then rejoin, they are not obligated in the tithe. Rav Shach asks would it not be more of a "chidush" [new idea] to say that the inheritors that   divide are obligated if the Mishna is coming to tell us יש ברירה [what is divided reveals what was already divided in potential in the past.].

The lack of understanding on my part is this. The mishna certainly holds just dividing changes nothing. The brothers are still obligated in what was born while they were joined. It is the rejoining that makes them not obligated. Clearly Rav Shach here is understanding the Rambam that that mishna is coming to tell us something about there is "braira"  יש ברירה or there is not braira [choosing]. But one way or the other does not seem to say anything about if the brothers simply divide. 

On one hand I can see the point of Rav Shach. In the way of the Rambam, that mishna has to go according to the opinion יש ברירה [there is choosing]. For if not [that is if the law would be אין ברירה], then when the brothers divide they would be considered as buyers who would not be obligated in the animal tithe. Still it is hard to say that even according to   אין ברירה that the obligation they already had of giving every tenth animal would disappear.

I think you can see what I mean. The normal way we understand that people that buyers are not obligated in the maasar for animals is that there is a change in domain--from one person to another. But here animals that were born when the brothers were together are now owned by just one or the other. That is not really a change in domain.

 The fact of my accepting way of learning of saying the words and going on [mentioned in the Musar book אורחות צדיקים ורב נחמן the Ways of the Righteous and Rav Nahman Conversations 76  ] does not mean I see no place for intense review and in depth learning. It is just that this sort of in depth type has never been clear to me how to go about it. One of the many ways I have tried is this. Once I get to a place in a book where things simply stop making any sense to me [let's say for example in Algebraic Topology] it is at that point that I figure I need to do review. So I simply start where I am already holding and go back page by page to the very beginning. That seems to work for some subjects. But Tosphot is more self contained. You do not need to know every other Tosphot in Shas in order to understand one. So in terms of that kind of learning I would take just one particular Tosphot or some chapter in the Avi Ezri or Rav Haim of Brisk, and just review that one chapter day after day. So it seems to me that in depth learning depends on the subject.

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Metaphysics

 One finds in some rishonim the importance of Metaphysics. Mainly that would be Ibn Pakuda [author of the Obligations of the Hearts], Binyamin the doctor [author of Maalot HaMidot], Rambam and others. [They do not see this as bitul Torah [waste of time that should be used for learning Torah].] So while clearly they are referring to the discipline, still I would say the main reference is the Book Metaphysics by Aristotle.

So what does that mean for today? My impression is that this discipline has developed in three different directions. Kant (along the lines of Leonard Nelson); Hegel; G.E. Moore. That is I would not venture to say which of these is right because each school seems to have very great and important points. But not the whole picture. 

[The Kant Friesian school tends towards reason in areas of physical reality. It is in spiritual reality it tends towards a sort of fifth sense [non intuitive immediate perception. While Hegel agrees totally with these realms of spiritual reality, he holds that reason can penetrate even there.  The G.E. Moore School simply holds that that way that Hume limited the range of reason is just not so. So he is like Hegel.]

[So in philosophy it seems you have the Kant Fries school of Leonard Nelson. Then Hegel and then G.E. Moore. It is hard to know which one is correct, but all have something to add to understanding.

 There is an aspect of Hegel that is similar to the Kantian School of Fries and Leonard Nelson. That is in the self contradictions in every thought and every aspect of being things. 

So it seems to me that these two traditions are not as contrary as one might think at first.

In the Leonard Nelson approach this beyond logic and reason occurs in the dinge an sich, the areas beyond possibilities of experience. In Hegel the contradictions are in every stage of being and are resolved only in the Absolute [God]. So to me, it seems these are not all that different. 

[I mean in terms of metaphysical reality. But as for how we know stuff, there is a difference.]

 I was at the Na Nach place today and there came up an interesting discussion about important it is to marry only a woman who does not listen to religious authorities. The reason being that marriage is a union of minds and when someone else is in your wife's mind, that is not a real marriage.

It occurred to me then that in the LeM of Rav Nahman that this same idea came up in the LeM vol I:61 where it says not to give religious authority to people that are not fit for it since by that is cause that Israel goes into exile. And the language Rav Nahman uses is על ידי זה מגרשים ישראל ממקומם which is the same language used to causing of divorce between couples.

The path of the Torah.

There are things that the Tora is strict about. This can not be derided as "religious fanaticism." And example is idolatry. So what makes the world of the religious problematic is not whether to be strict of not. It is what to be strict about. If only the things that the Torah actually cares about were the top of the list of importance, then everything would be alright. That is why the path of the Gra is so important. Not because of the Gra as much as it accurately defines what Torah is about.  

 Kant actually never shows how mind and body are connected. Rather he shows that they must be connected-but does not show how. [That is not my new idea here. This has been noticed even from the very first review of the Critique by Shultz.] 

So to me it seems that Fries and Leonard Nelson were right in the claim that there is a deeper source of knowledge, non intuitive immediate knowledge, that empirical knowledge and a priori knowledge are just secondary manifestations of. But how do they combine? I think that Hegel was right in this that the way these two origins of knowledge combine together is by a give and take process where each modifies the other --what he terms ''dialectics.'' [Hegel actually also never shows how they are connected. But he does come onto this dialectical process to show how the kind of knowledge that is a part of intuition and the kind of knowledge that is independent of intuition work together.--basing himself on Socrates.]

[And this fact was noticed by Michael Huemer in one of his essays where he shows that there is no such thing as empirical knowledge without some a priori assumptions built into it. [See his list of essays.]

So what you have is the primary source of knowledge that Fries and Nelson call immediate non intuitive. Them the two parts split off into empirical and a priori parts. Then they recombine to create actual knowledge. 

 The importance of learning Torah and the basic message of Musar which is Fear of God and good character traits you really only get with the path of the Gra. The path of Rav Nahman does not really have "hatmada" to be learning Torah constantly as an essential part of it, not the sort of basis of Musar. You get other great things in the advice of Rav Nahman but not those few points which really relate to the Gra. 

And I see these points of the Gra as being the essence of Torah. Diligence in learning Torah, Musar and fear of God in the way described in the books of Musar and not to speak lashon hara [slander]. To me it seems that without these points that nothing else can even begin. Sine que non. But if you have the Gra, then there is tremendous benefit in the advice and ideas of Rav Nahman.

[And I admit that my idea of expanding the idea of learning Torah to include Physics is not really part of the path of the Gra though it is hinted at in other rishonim. Still it seems to me that everything has to start with the Gra. The Gra is sine que non.

 The idea of the natives that Columbus encountered were peace loving is somewhat inconsistent with the facts. Columbus encountered the Caribs when he returned on the second trip. The Caribs controlled three islands. They used to make raids on other islands to eat the men and enslave the women. The other islanders were terrified of the Caribs. They had nothing of the noble savage myth. [On the first trip, the other  natives had begged Columbus to protect them from the Caribs]

balance between iyun and bekiut [in depth learning and fast learning.]

 One of the really great things I learned in Shar Yashuv of Rav Freifeld was the idea of review. I had learned the Musar book Ways of the Righteous and also had see the a book bringing the path of learning of Rav Nahman which was to say the words and go on. So the fact that Motti Freifeld [Rav Freifeld's son] kept on telling me about the importance of Iyun [in depth learning] and review gave me a sort of balance. [In fact, it was the conflict between these two extremes that gave me the idea of doing every paragraph of the Gemara with Rashi twice in Hebrew and once in English, and then going on.] So nowadays, I still try to find a sort of balance between these two approaches-- whether in the Gemara, Tosphot and/or the Avi Ezri of Rav Shach or in Mathematics and Physics.   

I once mentioned to my learning partner in Uman, David Bronson that it seems to me that without the emphasis on learning in depth that I got in Shar Yashuv in my beginning of learning, that I never would have gotten the idea at all.  For I noticed that unless one gets the idea of learning in depth at the very start of one's learning, then no matter how much "bekiut" fast learning he does later, he never gets the idea of the in depth sort. [They just tend to skip over Tosphot as if the details are irrelevant. Therefore even with much learning, they never get the essence of Torah.] 

הגמרא בעבודה זרה כ''ג ע''ב

נראה לי שקשה להבין את הגמרא בעבודה זרה כ''ג ע''ב. היא שואלת איך זה שבני ישראל נצטוו לשרוף את כל העצים האלילים כשנכנסו לארץ כנען? אחרי כל הארץ ניתנה לאברהם ושום אדם לא יכול לגרום לאסור את מה שלא שייך לו. האם גמרא זו יכולה להיות על פי הדעה אין כוח ביד עכו''ם להפקיע מידי תרומה ומעשרות שזו שיטת ר' אלעזר, או לפי השיטה יש כוח ביד עכו''ם להפקיע מידי תרומה ומעשרות שזו שיטת רבה ישראל? פירוש הדבר שכאשר ישראלי קונה את התבואה מהעכו''ם, הוא עצמו יצטרך לקחת את תרומה ומעשרות ולתת אותם לכהן ולוי. נראה כי הגמרא בעבודה זרה לא יכולה להיות לפי אחת הדעות, שכן שניהם מדברים רק על תרומה ומעשר, אך שניהם מסכימים כי עכו''ם יכול להחזיק אדמה בישראל כשמדובר בחוקים על כסף והוא יכול לבנות לחפור וכו'. אז איך בכלל מתחילה שאלת הגמרא? הכנעניים היו בעלי אדמות מבחינת החזקה כספית. אז הם יכלו לשתול עצים ולגרום להם להיות אסורים! אולי אתה יכול לענות שהכנענים לפני כניסת ישראל לארץ לא ממש נקלעו לקטגוריה של "קניית האדמה". זו היתה שייכת לצאצאיו של אברהם, אבל הם גם לא היו גנבים. אם הם היו קונים את האדמה, היינו אומרים שלמעשה הם יכולים לאסור על העצים ששתלו וסגדו. אך למעשה הם לא קנו את האדמה.

I should add that after I thought of this I saw that Rav Shach intended the same question and answer in the Avi Ezri. But he did write this openly. Only after I thought of this question and answer I saw that Rav Shach really intended to to say the same thing.

Anyway there is a lot more to go into this sugia but I was not prepared to write all my thoughts so I just wrote this short piece. In the meantime for those interested the best thing is to look at Rav Shach in Law of Idolatry. 

It seems to me that the Gemara in עבודה זרה כ''ג ע''ב is hard to understand. It asks how is it that the Israelites were commanded to burn all the idolatrous trees when they entered the land of Canaan? After all the land was given to Abraham and no on can cause to be forbidden that which does not belong to him.

Could this Gemara be according to the opinion אין כוח ביד עכו''ם להפקיע מידי תרומה ומעשרות שזו שיטת ר' אלעזר או לפי השיטה יש כוח ביד עכו''ם להפקיע מידי תרומה ומעשרות שזו שיטת רבה [the opinion when a gentile owns land in Israel that means the grain grown on it is not obligated in the presents truma, tithes etc. Or that it is obligated? (That would mean that when a Israeli buys the grain from the gentile, he would himself have to take the truma and tithes and give them to a priest and a Levi.) 

It seems that Gemara in Avoda Zara can not be according to either opinion since both are talking only about truma and maasar but both agree that a gentile can own land in Israel when it come to laws about money and he can build and dig etc. So how does the question of the Gemara even start? The Canaanites owned land in terms of monetary possession. So they could plant trees and cause them to be forbidden!

Perhaps you can answer that the Canaanites before Israel entered the land did not actually come under the category of "buying the land". It was owed by the descendants of Abraham but neither were they thieves. If they had bought the land then we would say that in fact they could forbid the trees they planted and worshipped. But in fact they did not buy the land.

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It seems to me that the גמרא in עבודה זרה כ''ג ע''ב is hard to understand. It asks how is it that the Israelites were commanded to burn all the idolatrous trees when they entered the land of Canaan? After all the land was given to Abraham and no on can cause to be forbidden that which does not belong to him. Could this גמרא be according to the opinion אין כוח ביד עכו''ם להפקיע מידי תרומה ומעשרות שזו שיטת ר' אלעזר או לפי השיטה יש כוח ביד עכו''ם להפקיע מידי תרומה ומעשרות שזו שיטת רבה [the opinion when a gentile owns land in Israel that means the grain grown on it is not obligated in the תרומה ומעשרות. Or that it is obligated? That would mean that when a Israeli buys the grain from the עכו''ם, he would himself have to take the תרומה and tithes and give them to a כהן and a Levi. It seems that גמרא in עבודה זרה can not be according to either opinion since both are talking only about תרומה and מעשר, but both agree that a עכו''ם can own land in Israel when it come to laws about money and he can build and dig etc. So how does the question of the גמרא even start? The Canaanites owned land in terms of monetary possession. So they could plant trees and cause them to be forbidden! Perhaps you can answer that the Canaanites before Israel entered the land did not actually come under the category of "buying the land". It was owed by the descendants of Abraham, but neither were they thieves. If they had bought the land, then we would say that in fact they could forbid the trees they planted and worshipped. But in fact they did not buy the land.

נראה לי שקשה להבין את הגמרא בעבודה זרה כ''ג ענראה לי שקשה להבין את הגמרא בעבודה זרה כ''ג ע''ב. היא שואלת איך זה שבני ישראל נצטוו לשרוף את כל העצים האלילים כשנכנסו לארץ כנען? אחרי כל הארץ ניתנה לאברהם ושום אדם לא יכול לגרום לאסור את מה שלא שייך לו. האם גמרא זו יכולה להיות על פי הדעה אין כוח ביד עכו''ם להפקיע מידי תרומה ומעשרות שזו שיטת ר' אלעזר, או לפי השיטה יש כוח ביד עכו''ם להפקיע מידי תרומה ומעשרות שזו שיטת רבה ישראל? פירוש הדבר שכאשר ישראלי קונה את התבואה מהעכו''ם, הוא עצמו יצטרך לקחת את תרומה ומעשרות ולתת אותם לכהן ולוי. נראה כי הגמרא בעבודה זרה לא יכולה להיות לפי אחת הדעות, שכן שניהם מדברים רק על תרומה ומעשר, אך שניהם מסכימים כי עכו''ם יכול להחזיק אדמה בישראל כשמדובר בחוקים על כסף והוא יכול לבנות לחפור וכו'. אז איך בכלל מתחילה שאלת הגמרא? הכנעניים היו בעלי אדמות מבחינת החזקה כספית. אז הם יכלו לשתול עצים ולגרום להם להיות אסורים! אולי אתה יכול לענות שהכנענים לפני כניסת ישראל לארץ לא ממש נקלעו לקטגוריה של "קניית האדמה". זו היתה שייכת לצאצאיו של אברהם, אבל הם גם לא היו גנבים. אם הם היו קונים את האדמה, היינו אומרים שלמעשה הם יכולים לאסור על העצים ששתלו וסגדו. אך למעשה הם לא קנו את האדמה.

 Some of the major points of Rav Nahman are the Tikun Chazot, Hitbodadut, Seder HaLimud, Not to be stubborn about anything, to be joyful always. Tikun haKlali.

(1) The Tikun Chazot thing he saw as the main job of every Israeli. That is the midnight prayer for the rebuilding of the Temple. [That does not have to include the "piyutim" [added songs]. It just is a short Tikun Rachel and a somewhat longer Tikun Leah. []I actually have not been able to fulfill this for  long time but I still see the hours after midnight as a very important time to learn and pray.

(2) Hitbodadut is thought to be his major point. It is talking with God as one talks with your parents or a close friend in your own language. This was so important to him that he would spend whole days on this and he said that if one really wants to serve God properly he ought to spend the whole day on this every day. [I actually did try to do that fr  awhile when I first got to Safed in the forests surrounding that city.]

[3] Seder HaLimud is also fairly well known but not as much as the Hitbodadut idea. It is to learn by saying the words and going on. It is how he advice one disciple Rav Nathan to go through the entire Shulchan Aruch with all the commentaries [Shach, Taz, Magen Avraham, etc.] in one year. As I have mentioned before I found this very helpful for me when I majored in Physics at the Polytechnic Institute of NYU. [And in  fact that is how I think Physics ought to be learnt. You do not have to be  a genius to learn Physics. If a block of wood would learn in this way, it would also become a physicist in time.] 

[4] To not be stubborn about anything is something that I have also found helpful. Not to force any issues. When the waves of life come along, to lower my head and let the wave pass over me.

[5] To be joyful Rav Nahman saw as the very essence of Torah. Joy he said is the very essence of holiness.

[6] Tikun haKlali. To say ten psalms the day one has sinned any kind of sexual sin. [16, 32, 41, 42, 59, 77, 90,105, 137, 150.]

Rav Nahman that see the Will [Ratzon] as the great and highest of all things.

 One thing David Bronson pointed out to me in the LeM of Rav Nahman. That one word religious authorities love is "No." They see one's "Ratzon" [Desire, Will.] as an evil thing.  It is only Rav Nahman that see the Ratzon  [Will] as the great and highest of all things. Just that one needs to raise his desires towards God. That is what you see in the LeM chap.13 about how the tzadik helps to raise the desires of people towards God. 

[This reminds me of Schopenhauer who also saw the root of everything as being the Will. Logos to him is a secondary derivative.] 

"Not to be stubborn about anything."

There is a whole section of the Hayee Moharan about the idea "לא להתעקש על שום דבר" ("not to be stubborn about anything.") I noticed that one of the examples he brings there is about sleep. That is by trying to force oneself to go to sleep, that is exactly what causes sleep to evade him. And there are other examples there. 

But that is not to say that there are not some things that one needs to be ("makpid") stubborn about. But that one ought to choose one's battles wisely.

[You could apply this to learning also. By being overly stubborn about getting the details perfectly, one can lose the big picture. I mean to refer here to the Conversations of Rav Nahman Conversation 76 where he discusses the importance of learning fast--saying the word and going on until the end of the book and only then to review. It is implicit in this that he is suggesting not to insist on understanding all the details. And in fact I found this method helpful in my Physics courses at NYU.] 

Chaiye Moharan [the life of Rav Nahman]

 The book Chaiye Moharan [the life of Rav Nahman] was not edited. You can see this in a few places. One that come to mind is the statement that Columbus died in chains. This is brought as a proof that who so ever brings some great thing into the world suffers for it. While there are plenty of proofs plus the verse "one who increases knowledge increases pain], still Columbus did not die in chains. He was put into chain in the New World by a favorite of the court, and sent back to Spain in chains. They were removed by Isabella and Ferdinand immediately when he arrived. As far as we know they were buried with him when he died as  he cherished them as a symbol of his loyalty to his monarchs. 

But it also should be noted that he was extremely dishonored and died poor. [But he still had credit he could draw on to pay his rent at an inn.]

There are five major books from Rav Nahman. The most well edited are LeM, Midot, and Stories. The Conversations and Life of Rav Nahman were put together from the writings of Rav Natan. But the publishing took on a series of sad events. It was not edited by Rav Natan, and tons were left out. Later, Rav Shmuel Horwitz's "Left out Parts" helped make up some of the lack.

[But of all the books of Rav Nahman, the Conversations and the Life are the most instructive for me. I mean the path of learning in Conversation 76 you see only in the Conversations and only slight hints of that in the LeM itself.

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The idea of idolatry is the worship of anything that is not just simply the First Cause who has no form nor image. So worship of pictures of tzadikim or their graves ought to be considered idolatry as much as worship of stars. So the term עובד כוכבים עכו''ם a worshiper of stars [or worshippers of stars and constellations] does not refer to ethnic group or nationality. It is not a synonym of "gentile".

[And since this kind of worship pervades the religious world from top to bottom, I tend to avoid all of them. If there was a Litvak yeshiva in my area, I might go into that, but even then I would be uncomfortable because of the pervasiveness of idolatry anywhere and everywhere in the religious world. Certainly the Gra and Rav Shach were "מוחה" [objected], but their objections went largely unheeded.

[I ought to add that there is an obligation to be  "מוחה" [object], even if you know your objection will not be heeded as we see in the event of the concubine of Givat Binyamin in the book of Judges and the event of Kamtza and Bar Kamtza in tractate Gitin. ] 

[In fact I was hoping to study the connection between hametz and idolatry in terms of the ashes after they are burnt. But so far I have not gotten to that.]  

One way of learning I think helped me a lot was that every paragraph I would repeat twice and then go on forward.

 One way of learning I think helped me a lot was that every paragraph  I would repeat twice and then go on forward. To my mind this combined what I saw in the books of Rav Nahman about learning fast (that is to say the words in order and then to go on) and the way of learning in Litvak yeshivas which was to stress in depth learning with review. In this way of repeating each paragraph twice I felt I was making progress and also doing review. This seemed to help a lot when it came to learning Gemara and later I used this same method for Mathematics and Physics.

[The thing is that in Shar Yashuv there was an emphasis on in depth learning that almost seemed to negate the value of "bekius" fast learning. And in the book of Rav Nahman [Conversations of Rav Nahman 76] the emphasis is the exact opposite. So this sort of compromise was the only way I could make sense of this. And this method definitely helped  me.]

[That was for Gemara and Tosphot. But when it came to the Pnei Yehoshua I used to repeat very paragraph more than 10 times--or at least that much. That was based on Rav Freifel's emphasis on repeating every chapter of Gemara 10 times.]](Rav Freifeld was the rosh yeshiva of Shar Yashuv)

גמרא פסחים דף צ''ה

 

רב שך מסביר שהרמב''ם מחזיק כמו החכמים נגד ר' יהודה בכך שהוא מחזיק שאפשר להיפטר מחמץ  בכל אופן, לא רק על ידי שריפה. והוא מחזיק שמי שקונה חמץ בפסח מקבל מלקות. אז הוא חייב לקבוע שגמרא פסחים דף צ''ה לא מתנהל לפי הדרך בה החוק הוחלט כחכמים אלא לר' יהודה. שגמרא שם אומרת שהבעלות על חמץ בפסח היא איסור לאו הניתק לעשה שניתן לתקן באמצעות פקודה חיובית. זה אומר שהוא חייב לחשוב שלר' יהודה האיסור והפקודה החיובית מגיעים בו זמנית. אם הפקודה החיובית תבוא לפני הפקודה הנגדית, זה לא יכול להיות לאו הניתק לעשה. כך שהסיבה שמישהו יקבל מלקות על קניית חמץ תהיה משום שלפי החכמים, הפקודה החיובית להיפטר מהחמץ באה לפני האיסור להחזיק בה. רמב''ם זה שונה אם כן מרש''י או תוספות. לרש''י שגמרא בעמוד צ''ה יהיה כמו החכמים שהאיסור והפקודה החיובית מגיעים בו זמנית ורק לר' יהודה מצווה התשביתו (לבטל את החמץ באמצעות שריפה) מחויב לקרות לפני הזמן של האיסור. לתוספות שניהם מגיעים בו זמנית. מה אני תוהה לגבי זה: יכול להיות הבדל בין להחזיק חמץ לרכוש חמץ? אם היה הבדל כזה, אולי הרמב''ם יכול לומר שגמרא בדף צ''ה יכול להיות גם לחכמים. הדרך בה זה יכול לעבוד תהיה שמקרה  של איסור שניתן לתקן באמצעות פקודה חיובית (לאו הניתק לעשה) הוא כאשר שניהם פעולות. לפיכך, הגמרא בדף צ''ה פירושה שהמצב הפסיבי של בעלות על חמץ הוא איסור לאו הניתק לעשה שניתן לתקן באמצעות פקודה חיובית מכיוון שביטול  של חמץ אינו מעשה. זה יכול להיות על ידי הפיכתו לרכוש נטוש "הפקר". אך לא ניתן לבטל פעולה חיובית של קניית חמץ על ידי מצב פסיבי של אמירתו שהיא הפקר בלבד. רב חיים מבריסק מסביר את הרמב''ם הזה אחרת. לדבריו, חובתו של חמץ היא גם פקודה שלילית וגם חיובית, אבל אז זה לא יהיה כמו הגמרא בדף צ''ה ולכן הוא גם יצטרך לומר כי הגמרא הולכת כמו ר' יהודה ולגמרא שהבעלות על חמץ תהיה רק איסור

Here is a link to the small booklet I wrote on different areas in Shas where I included this idea 

חידושי הש''ס

Also I should mention that I should run this idea by David Bronson  to get some feedback or criticism.  But since that does not seem possible right now, I will have to think about this a little more. I am mean, after all what is the category of "spread to the winds" of the sages? Probably not the same as bitul as the Ran [in the beginning of Pesachim goes into]. Still it seems worthwhile at least writing this idea down for future reference and to see if this is perhaps what the Rambam was getting at. [That is besides the obvious question that there ought to be some proof of this hiluk. ]

Gemara on page 95 [Pesachim] Rambam [laws of hametz 3:11]

Rav Shach explains that the Rambam [laws of hametz 3:11] holds like the sages against R. Yehuda [tractate Pesachim 23] in that he holds getting rid of hametz [leavened bread] is by any means, not just by burning.  And he holds that one who buys hametz on Passover gets lashes. So he must hold that the Gemara on page 95 [Pesachim]is not going according to the way the law was decided as the sages but rather to R Yehuda. That Gemara says owning hametz on Pesach is a לאו הניתק לעשה prohibition that can be corrected by a positive command.

 That must mean that he must be thinking that to R. Yehuda the prohibition and the positive command come simultaneously.[If the positive command would come before the negative command it could not be a לאו הניתק לעשה].

So the reason one would get lashes for buying hametz would be because to the sages, the positive command to get rid of hametz comes before the prohibition of owning it.

[This Rambam is thus different than Rashi or Tosphot. To Rashi that Gemara on pg 95 would be like the sages that the prohibition and positive command come simultaneously  and only to R. Yehuda does the command תשביתו [to make the hametz rest by means of burning happen before the time of the prohibition..

To Tosphot both come simultaneously.

What I am wondering about i this: could there be a difference between owning hametz and buying hametz? If there was such a difference, perhaps the Rambam could say that Gemara on page 95 could be to the sages also.

The way this could work would be  that a regular case of a prohibition that can be corrected by a positive command is when both are actions. Thus the gemara on pg 95 would mean the passive state of owning hametz is a לאו הניתק לעשה prohibition that can be corrected by a positive command  because the "bitul" nullification of the hametz is not any act. It could be just by making it "hefker" abandoned property. But a positive act of buying hametz could not be nullified by a passive state of just saying that it is hefker. [But if I was in Uman, I would have to run this by my learning partner David Bronson to see if there are counter examples. ]

[Rav Haim of Brisk explains this Rambam differently. He says owing hametz is both a negative and positive command but then that would not be like the gemara on page 95 so he also would have to say that that gemara is going like R. Yehuda. and to that gemara owning hametz would only be a prohibition.]

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רב שך explains that the רמב''ם  holds like the חכמים against ר' יהודה  in that he holds getting rid of חמץ  is by any means, not just by burning.  And he holds that one who buys חמץ on פסח gets מלקות. So he must hold that the גמרא פסחים דף צ''ה is not going according to the way the law was decided as the sages but rather to ר' יהודה. That גמרא says owning חמץ on פסח is a לאו הניתק לעשה prohibition that can be corrected by a positive command. That must mean that he must be thinking that to ר' יהודה the prohibition and the positive command come simultaneously. If the positive command would come before the ne  gative command it could not be a לאו הניתק לעשה. So the reason one would get מלקות for buying חמץ would be because to the חכמים, the positive command to get rid of חמץ comes before the prohibition of owning it. This רמב''ם is thus different than רש''י or תוספות. To  רש''י that גמרא on דף צ''ה would be like the sages that the prohibition and positive command come simultaneously  and only to ר' יהודה does the command תשביתו to make the חמץ rest by means of burning happen before the time of the prohibition. To תוספות both come simultaneously. What I am wondering about this: could there be a difference between owning חמץ and buying חמץ? If there was such a difference, perhaps the רמב''ם could say that גמרא on דף צ''ה could be to the חכמים also. The way this could work would be  that a regular case of a prohibition that can be corrected by a positive command לאו הניתק לעשה is when both are actions. Thus the גמרא on דף צ''ה would mean the passive state of owning חמץ is a לאו הניתק לעשה prohibition that can be corrected by a positive command because the ביטול nullification of the חמץ is not an act. It could be just by making it "הפקר" abandoned property. But a positive act of buying חמץ could not be nullified by a passive state of just saying that it is הפקר.  רב חיים מבריסק explains this  רמב''ם differently. He says owing חמץ is both a negative and positive command but then that would not be like the גמרא בדף צ''ה so he also would have to say that that גמרא is going like ר' יהודה and to that גמרא owning חמץ would only be a prohibition.]

רב שך מסביר שהרמב''ם מחזיק כמו החכמים נגד ר' יהודה בכך שהוא מחזיק שאפשר להיפטר מחמץ  בכל אופן, לא רק על ידי שריפה. והוא מחזיק שמי שקונה חמץ בפסח מקבל מלקות. אז הוא חייב לקבוע שגמרא פסחים דף צ''ה לא מתנהל לפי הדרך בה החוק הוחלט כחכמים אלא לר' יהודה. שגמרא שם אומרת שהבעלות על חמץ בפסח היא איסור לאו הניתק לעשה שניתן לתקן באמצעות פקודה חיובית. זה אומר שהוא חייב לחשוב שלר' יהודה האיסור והפקודה החיובית מגיעים בו זמנית. אם הפקודה החיובית תבוא לפני הפקודה הנגדית, זה לא יכול להיות לאו הניתק לעשה. כך שהסיבה שמישהו יקבל מלקות על קניית חמץ תהיה משום שלפי החכמים, הפקודה החיובית להיפטר מהחמץ באה לפני האיסור להחזיק בה. רמב''ם זה שונה אם כן מרש''י או תוספות. לרש''י שגמרא בעמוד צ''ה יהיה כמו החכמים שהאיסור והפקודה החיובית מגיעים בו זמנית ורק לר 'יהודה מצווה התשביתו להניח את החמץ באמצעות שריפה מחויב לקרות לפני הזמן של האיסור. לתוספות שניהם מגיעים בו זמנית. מה אני תוהה לגבי זה: יכול להיות הבדל בין להחזיק חמץ לרכוש חמץ? אם היה הבדל כזה, אולי הרמב''ם יכול לומר שגמרא בדף צ''ה יכול להיות גם לחכמים. הדרך בה זה יכול לעבוד תהיה שמקרה  של איסור שניתן לתקן באמצעות פקודה חיובית לאו הניתק לעשה הוא כאשר שניהם פעולות. לפיכך, הגמרא בדף צ''ה פירושה שהמצב הפסיבי של בעלות על חמץ הוא איסור לאו הניתק לעשה שניתן לתקן באמצעות פקודה חיובית מכיוון שביטול  של חמץ אינו מעשה. זה יכול להיות על ידי הפיכתו לרכוש נטוש "הפקר". אך לא ניתן לבטל פעולה חיובית של קניית חמץ על ידי מצב פסיבי של אמירתו שהיא הפקר בלבד. רב חיים מבריסק מסביר את הרמב''ם הזה אחרת. לדבריו, חובתו של חמץ היא גם פקודה שלילית וגם חיובית, אבל אז זה לא יהיה כמו הגמרא בדף צ''ה ולכן הוא גם יצטרך לומר כי הגמרא הולכת כמו ר' יהודה ולגמרא שהבעלות על חמץ תהיה רק איסור

Here is a link to the small booklet I wrote on different areas in Shas where I included this idea 

חידושי הש''ס

I should add that I do not think I am worthy in any sense to write ideas in Torah. Rather what happened was I was in Uman and a fellow I had met in Israel showed up one day and we started learning Torah at his suggestion. Then I began to see he would casually say over amazing insights in the Gemara without even trying-- just obvious points to him. But I realized that these were points on the level of the greatest e.g. like Rav Shmuel Berenbaum the rosh yeshiva of the Mir who I had leaned under. So I started writing down  ideas that came up in our learning sessions.

Jesus is a sore topic

 The subject of Jesus is a sore topic. Especially when combined with the history of the church.  The opinions vary. On one hand, you have the Rambam who thought that Christianity is idolatry. And Rav Abulafia does not seem to disagree with that at all. But the opinion of Rav Avraham Abulafia is that Jesus was the messiah son of Joseph,  --even though his opinion about the church was highly negative.

[The issue of  Christianity however is approached differently in Tosphot in tractate Avoda Zara. By sitting and trying to learn that Tosphot with my learning partner, helped me see that Tosphot seems to have several different approaches.] My own opinion is that I go with Rav Abulafia.

Messiah son of Joseph is brought in the end of tractate Suka and in the Zohar and the Kol HaTor of the Gra and the Tikunim Hadashim of the Ramchal. What it means is simple. It refers to a preliminary stage before messiah son of David. [Rav Nahman also refers to this . Just today I was in the Na Nach place and opened up the LeM of Rav Nahman and saw that sometimes the same tzadik can contain both aspects in himself.]

I should add that there are souls of the world of Emanation in the Ari [The Arizal, Rav Isaac Luria]. These are souls that are Divine, in that they receive the light of God without any division in between God and them. Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Moses, Aaron Joseph, David. So when it comes to the subject of the messiah son of Joseph or son of David, we are talking about a spark of the soul of David or Joseph.

[I might add here that I think the idea of Emanation is the approach that Hegel took to this same issue--that is how I tend to read Hegel. [See the debates about Hegel between McTaggart and Cunningham (Logos is everything or penetrates everything?). At any rate, this idea of over flowing or Emanation seems to me to be what Hegel was saying concerning Logos and Jesus. And we know that Hegel was aware of the Ari and borrows from him concerning Adam Kadmon. So it is not to far to imagine that Hegel was thinking along these lines concerning more central issues in his system. So I am not claiming that this answers all the issues in Hegel. Certainly McTaggart and Cunningham would argue that the idea of overflow along with condensation might not answer the issues they were raising. Still this seems to me to be what Hegel was saying.]

[So what would McTaggart say? He would answer that my arguing that condensation of the light or flow of Logos does not answer the issues --because of the same problem--it is the same or it is not.[The law of the excluded middle.] So I am not saying I could answer this question. But rather that I think that this is what Hegel was saying.

So the question would be can incremental change cause a complete change in essence or some other variable.\This is answered in Chaos Theory and in fact is a suggestion of Kelley Ross on how evolution happens.

[Just to make myself clear I want to mention that I can see important points in Kant, Leonard Nelson Kelley Ross, Huemer and Hegel.  ]

it is better to sit in one's room and twiddle your thumbs that go around looking for "mizvot"

 Rav Nahman wrote in the LeM that when one needs compassion from Heaven the way thing to do is to have compassion on others. the difficulty of course is that it is not always so clear how to have compassion on others. But it is clear that when someone asks for help, it ought to be offered as the law is on Purim, "One must give to whom so ever asks."

My approach to having compassion is to try to give to whom so ever asks, but not to seek things to do. The disciple of the Gra, Rav Chaim of Voloshin said it is better to sit in one's room and twiddle your thumbs that go around looking for "mizvot". As Rav Nahman said "the evil inclination is dressed in mizvot."

A certain amount of the extra added restrictions that often one finds people doing for Passover seem to me to be not all that necessary. After all what is matza? Just flour and water. Heat it up and eat it within 18 minutes and it can not be leavened, bread. The only way something an be leavened bread is by sitting. In any case, the restrictions I think are a power grab by religious authorities to make people think that we need their great wisdom.

Personally, I think the whole religious world has an aspect of being a cult. I would not go anywhere near them --with two exceptions. One would be  straight Litvak yeshiva. There the Torah is learned for its own sake. Another exception would be a Na Nach group of Breslov. Though these are very different kinds of groups, still they both seem fine to me. 

The best way to keep Passover is to do the seder at home.to make ones' own maza by making a thick batter of dough and to either put it into an oven or in a frying pan [or empty can of fish. if one does not have a frying pan.] with just enough oil so as to not stick. [a thin batter would be mezonot--cake and not considered as bread. even though one can eat it, it still is not maza.]

See the LeM of Rav Nahman volume II, chapter 44   not to add extra restrictions to the commandments of the Torah. Just to keep it plain and simple.

[I got the idea of not adding extra restrictions from the LeM of Rav Nahman. Since then I have tried to stick to what the Torah says: "Do not add nor subtract from the mizvot that I have commanded." However the religious thrive on adding restrictions. So I recommend staying away from them.]

 I think human affairs often go as a pendulum. You see the situation in Russia under the czars and it was quite natural that people would be upset and see the monarchy as a problem. [Especially you can imagine that when the monarch got a little too out of touch with the people, that would have exasperated the situation. Like going into WWI.] So then you get the Bolsheviks going in the opposite direction. And that that turns out to be not all that better.

I was thinking about this argument of Rav Shach

Hametz of a gentile who uses force that a Israeli has to guard or pay for. To the Rambam one is required to get rid of it. To the Raavad he does not. \

Rav Shach ties this with a different argument. That is the issue of Haametz of a regular gentile that a Israeli has accepted to guard. There he certainly does need to get rid of it. But the question is how much responsibility does he accept for the Hametz? Like a paid guard or a guard that guards for nothing.

I was thinking about this argument of Rav Shach before I went to sleep last night. And it occurred to me that you could argue one way of the other. On one hand the Raavad is only saying that a case where the Israeli accepts no responsibility at all that he does not trespass the prohibition of "בל יראה ובל ימצא"  ["Hametz (leaven bread or yeast) should not be found in your home nor your boundary."] That is unlike an unpaid guard. However what in fact is the unpaid guard obligated in? Only willful neglect. That would be as if one was walking alone the street in Yerushalaim and saw Arabs selling leaven bread on Passover and overturned their stand. Certainly he has to pay for the damage, but would not transgress the prohibition of "Hametz (leaven bread or yeast) should not be found in your home nor your boundary,"--even though he is incurring a financial obligation to pay for hametz on Passover.  

So you can see this argument of Rav Shach as possibly holding.

Bitul Torah means the very severe sin of not learning Torah when one is able.

What is considered a part of "learning Torah" is extremely important because of the sin of "bitul Torah".[Bitul Torah means the very severe sin of not learning Torah when one is able. ]

So when some rishonim [mediaeval authorities]like Ibn Pakuda and the Rambam include Physics and Metaphysics in the category of learning Torah, the significance is great. What I mean is that one is obligated to learn Torah all the time. And if Physics was not a part of Torah, then it would be possibly bitul Torah. [Unless one was doing it for the sake of making a living.] 

The significance of the concept of bitul Torah is not just to make one guilty if e is not learning when he could. Rather it is to point out the awesome sweetness of Torah that one would not give up after having tasted it even once. The only thing is thatt I am saying that to some rishonim, math and physics come under the heading of "Learning Torah"

To so degree you can see this in Psalms 77, 105 and other places where it says to speak of God's wisdom in his creations.

picture of my Dad with the U-2 camera.

 

That was after he invented the Infra Red telescope. Then he was offered a job at to make a camera to put on the U-2 airplane to see if the Soviets were about to launch a military strike against the USA. [That is, to see if there was any indication anywhere inside the USSR if they were planning on a strike of any sort against the USA. No one in the USA had any info, and President Eisenhauer had been advised to launch a preemptive strike against the USSR. Instead, he exercised caution, and decided to create the U-2 project. 

[In fact, the U-2 camera showed that the USSR was not planning any sort of attack on the USA. So the U-2 had the great merit of avoiding WWIII.]

 One is not allowed to mention the name of an idol and certainly not to swear an oath by an idol. Now for a regular prohibition of the Torah one gets lashes. [That is the punishment unless something else is stated openly.] But here things are a little different. One who swears by an idol has not done an act. The Gemara in Sanhedrin 63 side A says the opinion that one gets lashes for swearing by an idol is coming like R Yehuda who holds one can get lashes even for a prohibition that does not have an act. 

The Rambam brings that one does get lashes for this and the Raavad asks that that is only like R. Yehuda. But the law is not like R. Yehuda but rather R Yose who held one does not get lashes for a prohibition that does not have an act. 

Rav Shach answers that Rabin who stated the original version of the law before the Gemara made its corrections to his statement said simply one does not get lashes for a prohibition that does not have an act except swearing and vowing. [And that original statement was said according to the law which is like R Yose. And the way that original statement was said involved not just swearing a false oath but also swearing in the name of an idol.]

I am trying to figure out what possible reason the Rambam would have had to ignore the correction of the Gemara.

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 "The evil inclination is dressed in mitzvot". [This is from the LeM of R.Nahman of Breslov. vol I. perek 1. ] The Satan never comes to  a person and says come and do a sin. Rather it is always "come and do a mitzvah." But hidden in the mitzvah is some poison that is unseen. You you this same idea in the commentary of the Gra on Mishlei in the beginning where the evil inclination comes and says: "Come and bring peace offerings."

So my approach is to avoid anything and everything that has any connection with the religious world unless it is straight from the Gra  according to the approach of Rav Shach and Rav Kinyesvsky. [The trouble is the aspect of the trojan horse that has seeped and infiltrated everything in the religious world] 

Without the Litvak approach based on the Gra, one lacks the backbone

 I see sometimes in the books of Rav Nahman statements that need to be taken with a grain of salt. His approach is basically to get to the core essence of Torah. But that is not to say that his approach is the whole shebang. Without the Litvak approach based on the Gra, one lacks the backbone [the structure]. It would be like a a person with no bones. 

the emphasis of the Litvak world was to learn in depth along the lines of Rav Haim of Brisk and Rav Shach.

 Rav Nahman has in one Torah lesson the idea that when one finds that he learns but does not understand the advice is to shout  the words. On occasion I have tried that myself and it works, but it seems to be advice for occasions that present the opportunity to do so. Because in general, I find it simpler to take the basic path of learning of Rav Nahman of just saying the words and going on more practical.

Also Rav Nahman did bring the idea of review both in the LeM and Sefer HaMidot. But clearly according to the Conversations of Rav Nahman 76, that is only a part time affair. Still I want to bring one way of review that I have tried and seems to work for me. As I progress through a book, I go one page forward and then keep my place and then review all the way back to the beginning. Then I go one more page forward and then from that new place also review back to the beginning. 

[But I should add that there were different ideas of how to learn in depth in Shar Yashuv in NY and the Mir in NY. But in any case, the emphasis of the Litvak world was to learn in depth along the lines of Rav Haim of Brisk and Rav Shach. [That is a more global approach than the previous achronim later authorities [like the Pnei Yehoshua and Maharsha] that concentrate more on local issues.]

Slander [lashon hara]

Slander [lashon hara] is causing damage. That is the main issue. This fact can get obscured within all the details you find in the Hafez Haim. In lesser degrees of severity comes the points of the Hafez Haim that speaking even truth  that results in damage that would not happen if judged in court is lashon hara pliss all the other conditions. [There are 7 condition altogether to be able to say something negative about someone else. In issues of between man and his fellow man. In issues of between man and God the conditions are not the same but seem to be related.]

Rehilut is different. That is causing hatred between people. That is not the same thing as lashon hara.

In any case, the point of the Hafez Haim that lashon hara is dived into between man and fellow man and man and God does not come out of this principle-of causing damage. [Causing damage to one's reputation is also causing damage.]

[There however is a sort of balance in that to warn others of to stay away from evil people is a positive command. And the prohibition of lashon hara does not forbid that. Thus the letter of excommunication of the Gra is important to abide with since it in fact warns us of danger that we would not know otherwise. In fact it would be hard to know without the warning of the Gra and Rav Shach.]