I know that L.T. Hobhouse [the English philosopher] blamed WWI on the ideas of Hegel (in his book the Metaphysical Theory of the State) about the State. This did not bother me because I thought it was too far fetched.

But then I noticed that Shirer blamed both Fichte and Hegel for WWII (in his Rise and Fall of the Third Reich). At that point I am thinking maybe Hobhouse was onto something. After all Shirer you can not exactly accuse of  not understanding the German language!

So perhaps it makes more sense to  do what thinkers were doing in the Middle Ages in terms of getting to a comprehensive world view--to combine faith with reason that is the Old Testament with Aristotle and Plato and Plotinus.

This is at least what Saadia Gaon was doing and all the rishonim that wrote of the issues of the overall world view of Torah.


This has a great deal of support from the best of modern thinkers also for example Ed Feser and Kelley Ross (The Kant-Fries School ). Kelley Ross has stated openly that his point of view is from essentially Plato. Feser is basing himself on Aristotle and Aquinas to some degree but is not trying to explain either one but ratter to use their insights to build his own true and comprehensive world view.] [Huemer is related to what is known as the intuitionist school. But in a nutshell he is basically with Aristotle in terms of universals and that universals depend on particulars.] 

Rav Nahman of Breslov comes about as close as I can see into making the Old Testament and the Gemara into a comprehensive system--that is a interconnected system based on a small number of basic principles.

Rav Nahman of Breslov comes about as close as I can see into making the Old Testament and the Gemara into a comprehensive system--that is a interconnected system based on  a small number of basic principles. This kind of task was taken up to a a large degree by the baali HaMusar [sages and authors of works on Athics.] from the Middle Ages  the  Obligations of the Heart by Ibn Pakuda חובות הלבבות and Saadia Gaon. But Rav Nahman brought the task to its completion.

Maimonides was doing something similar--showing that Torah does not contradict Aristotle. But Rav Nahman was trying rather to show that the Torah makes sense. he was not concerned if it agreed with Aristotle.

Still his synthesis seems to leave out a few major principles that were noted by the baali HaMusar and especially the disciples of Rav Israel Salanter. [Midot/good character, learning Torah, trust in God]]

I was reminded about this because on my way to the sea I spoke briefly another secular Jew like myself and he said something along the lines that the main thing is Rav Nahman and that everyone needs the ideas of Rav Nahman. I forget his exact language. But it reminded me of this fact that Rav Nahman has a good advice and ideas about almost any and every human problem.

I think the father in law of Rav Shach [Issar Meltzar] said the Derara dememona is a doubt about where the money ought to go. I forget because I no longer have an Avi Ezri [of Rav Shach] to look up. But if that is what he said it makes sense anyway.
The reason I say this is that the Gemara in Bava Mezia 79 seems to take this as a simple matter.
The basic gemara over there says [in the third case] that if a ship with a cargo of wine sinks the if the ship owner said, "I am renting to you this ship," and the wine owner said "I am hiring you to carry this wine," then wherever the money is that is where it stays. If both said (in forth case) ("stam") "I am renting to you a ship," [not this ship] and "I am hiring you to bring wine," not this wine then they divide.

It looks like a exact copy of the mishna on page 100 and also the mishna on page 97. On page 100 the same issue came up in the Gemara and the Gemara concludes the mishna there is like Sumhos.

No one on page 79 says anything about Sumhos. Not the Tur, the Rosh, the Shulhan Aruch or the Maharsha. But interestingly enough right there the Tosphot says the reason for the case when they are both definite this ship and this wine  is hezkas mamon [prior status of where the money is]. And the reason for the end when they divide is the doubt.

I recall I brought up these issues also on page 100 in my small booklet on Bava Mezia chapters 8 and 9.
[The regular way to understand Derara Demmona is a doubt to the court even without their words. Also the issue seems divided between Bava Metzia page 2b and the Gemara is Bava Batra as to what are the conditions under whcih Sumhos says they divide. Whether you need Derara Demmona or if he hold they divide with D.M. then all the more so without D.M.]

So to make it short, the major issues I see here are these. Why does Rav Papa on page 79 in the forth case not say he is going like Sumhos? And even if he would why is he not saying like Sumhos in the third case? So it looks here that you have to say this Gemara holds Drara Demmona is when there is a doubt. Furthermore why does the Gemara not go straight with the sages that say המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה? One who take money out of a prior status needs proof.

The 15th of the Federalist Papers says that the essence of government is to make laws and by implication to enforce them. This in itself seems to be an argument why not to give power or vote for religious parties in Israel. [Even though the argument in the Federalist papers was arguing for a union of the states  as opposed to staying as they were an confederacy with no unifying centre.]

Even religious people in Israel would not like the religious powers to be to have power over their individual lives.

Learning Torah really ought not be mixed with politics.

Mind can not be a epiphenomenon of Body.

 By analytic means it was shown that the epiphenomenon approach to the Mind Body Problem entails and self contradiction in one of the intermediate steps.
That is to say that Mind can not be a epiphenomenon of Body.
[The epiphenomenon approach is a suggestion of John Searle. But Searle himself says that it is not an adequate solution.

Rav Nahman [from Uman and Breslov].

Rav Nahman had a goodly number of amazing pieces of advice. But I realize also that sometimes his ideas can be taken in ways that do not seem to be so great. For an example I think I was learning Torah a lot better when I was part of the Mir Yeshiva in NY. Getting involved with Breslov seems to have given me some great things, but also seems to have gotten me off track in other ways.

So what you have to say I think is that in terms of learning authentic Torah it is the Litvaks [Lithuanian] Yeshivas that have it down pat--i.e. that have authentic Torah (keeping and learning).

On the other hand, for specific issues, no one is greater that Rav Nahman to get into the core of problems, and find solutions (at least as far as humanly possible).

One bit of advice comes from the last Torah lesson he said in his lifetime in Uman [Le''M vol II chapter 8]--the problem of מפורסמים של שקר famous leaders who are false. [i.e. scam artists]. And it was well known in Breslov that that warning applies even inside of Breslov itself.
The problem nowadays seems to be that a great number of people claim to be presenting authentic Torah who are what Rav Nahman said are "demons." ["תלמידי חכמים שדיים יהודיים"] (Le''M volume I chapter 12 and 28) So how do you tell who is who?
Experience is one way. As Rav Nahman himself brought in the end of sipurei Maasiot that some kinds of knowledge come only with time and experience. They are not known simply by logic.
But if one does not want that kind of experience then there is also the possibility of simply listening to the warnings of the Gra and Rav Shach. That is by אמונת חכמים [faith in the wise]. But that also has a pitfall since often people will assume that Rav Nahman himself was in the category of what the Gra was warning about. I assumed as much myself until I had an opportunity to take a look at a book that printed up the original documents from the court testimony in Vilna and in the actual letter of excommunication that was signed by the Gra.

Kant, Hegel

A certain degree of animosity towards Kant, Hegel seems to have been generated by WWI. So people of the 20th century would go to great lengths to find almost any kind of world view that would by pass Kant and Hegel. Almost to the degree of making them unmentionable.

Though I am no expert in Philosophy at all, but I understood that the English people that were more or less continuing the legacy of Kant and Hegel pretty much denounced the whole thing after WWI. That is what I understood about Bradley anyway. Certainly Hobhouse's critique on the Metaphysical State was in reaction to WWI.

This to me seems unfair--as if Kant and Hegel were responsible for WWI. [See Patrick Buchanan's The Unnecessary War] [That book is not philosophy, but simply showing that WWI was pointless (which is clear) and led inevitably to WWII which already at that point was necessary]

Ayn Rand on the other hand seems to have objected to Kant on the basis of Neo Kantianism which took a psychological turn. as opposed to the objective approach of Schelling, Hegel, and Fichte.
Kant himself seems to have anticipated the problems in his second edition of the Critique of Pure reason when he put in a whole section just to reply to Berkley's lunatic idealism. That seems to settle the issue.

[In terms of the actual critique of Hobhouse I recall that Brand Blanshard had a pretty good answer. It was based as I recall on the consequential theory of political power. [See Danny Frederick on Huemer on that same issue.]

In terms of that issue I might mention that Hegel is right that people are defined a lot by their relationships as much and perhaps more so than their inner essence. It is from my standpoint interesting to note a whole branch of math based on that idea arose in the 1940's Category Theory --that the main thing to look at are the maps from elements in a set or group as much as the elements themselves.

[Though I admit that that idea can be misused as Steven Dutch makes a note of.

The idea of saying the name of God as it is written.

The idea of saying the name of God as it is written. Sanhedrin 90 side one and Avoda Zara 17b 18a and the Maharsha in Kidushin at the end of chapter three in the agada section.

Sorry I do not remember the exact page but the Maharsha there is talking about this exact subject and mentions the people in his days who were dabbling in mysticism and speaking publically about it.In particular abiout this very aspect that they were saying different ways of saying the name. He was clearly not very happy about this.

In Segulat Israel there are brought different combinations of the names. And also we find in the Ari this subject. Rav Nahman himself brings such an idea in his Sefer HaMidot.

The basic source of the whole issue is in Sanhedrin 90a that says one who says the name of God as it is written has no portion in teh world to come. In Avoda Zara there is brought the case of one sage who was put into prison and killed and the Gemara there on page 18 attributes his fate to teh fact that he was saying the name as written.

Issues of the best type of government are not the same kinds of issues that come up in the Gemara.

Issues of government were not even relevant during the events of ancient Israel. For  along time there were no kings at all and when Israel asked for a king the prophet Samuel made a point to show that God's anger was kindled against Israel.

During the rule of kings government also was not relevant since the kings rule was directly towards protection from outside enemies, not internal issues. 

During the second Temple period Israel was under Persian rule for the first part. Then later, there was the Syrians [part of the empire of Alexander] and then the  descendents of the Maccabees and later the rule of Rome.
[The kings of the Maccabees were not so great. See Kidushin in chapter 3. Yanai [One king of the Maccabees] came back from a battle and wanted to celebrate. There were there wise men of Israel. One person there [the joker] told him the heart of the wise is not with you. How can I tell he asked? Put on the Urim and Tumim and test them. He did so and decided in fact they were against him. The joker said, "Murder them." The king asked תורה מה תהא עליה? What will happen with Torah? The joker said it is available for anyone who want to learn it. [He forgot about the Oral Law] So the king killed all the wise men of Israel



Gemara does not deal with issue of how to make a just government anywhere.

In the world of the religious it is assumed with no evidence that they ought to be in charge of everyone.--Yet there is no indication that that would be  a just or fair kind of rule.

It simply foes with unfounded assumption that the religious are examples of perfect wisdom and perfect virtue. --All the available evidence seems to indicate the exact opposite.

The reason this is relevant is that there are great paces that learn and try to keep Torah on the highest possible level like the Mir in NY or Ponovitch or Brisk in Israel. (Litvak yeshivas--i.e. Lithuanian types that are based on the Gra and Rav Israel Salanter to some degree) But these kinds of places are in general not interested in political power.

Just to be clear..I feel questions about how to create the most just kind of society are mainly answered in the Federalist papers by Hamilton, John Jay and James Madison.


Another aspect of this issue is that it is natural for people to look for a just group to be a part of. This is why people join the religious world in the first place. That sadly is not that much different than people joining Scientology of some eastern ashram for the same reasons. The trouble is that usually the expectations are not fulfilled and there is a great deal of exploitation --plus the groups are dishonest in terms of representing a false picture of what the essential core beliefs are.

Best type of government is not at all dealt with in the Gemara and this leaves me in doubt why the religious in Israel believe they ought to be in charge of government. From what I can see the Federalist papers are right that certain principles of government have been found over the ages to be effective and workable and bring about as much as possible a fair and decent society.  Republican government [not Democracy], separation of powers, protection of private property etc. None of which the religious care about.
 

I might mention that in UMAN most people regretted the  fall of the USSR because as they told me, things were better then.  i can not explain this but at least as far as uman goes that was the consensus of about 99 %  of the population. 

New Idea. Gemara in Kidushin 64 Bava Batra 134b This is what I believe to be a very good new idea. I have not had a lot of these recently but this one looks good.

I had a chance [thank God] to take a look at the Gemara in Kidushin 64 yesterday and gained a bit of clarity about the issue. In short I would like to suggest an answer to the question of R Akiva Eiger on Bava Batra 134b--but I also want to add that this answer only goes according to one answer of Tosphot on Kidushin 64b.
The Mishna in Bava Batra says one says I have a son is believed. I have a brother is not. [So his wife is permitted to the whole world when he dies and is not obligated to marry his brother--if he dies without children.]

במשנה בבא בתרא קלד: מובא את הדין האומר יש לי בן נאמן יש לי אח אינו נאמן. הגמרא שואלת שיש לנו כבר משנה כזו. היא עונה המשנה כאן היא כשיש חזקה שיש אח. רע''א שואל לא רק חזקה אלא גם אם יש עדות שיש אח היא צריכה להיות מותרת לשוק בגלל הדין כשהוא אומר גירשתי את אשתי נאמן. נראה לי לתרץ שאם הייתה עדות שיש אח היא לא הייתה מותרת לשוק לפי דעת ר' נתן  והגמרא רוצה שהמשנה כאן תהיה גם לפי דעת ר' נתן. אבל התירוץ הזה עובד רק לפי דעת אחת בתוספות קידושין סד:. הגמרא שם מביאה את הדין כמו כאן ושואלת שכנראה  המשנה אינו כמו ר' נתן שמובא עוד לימוד הואמר בשעת קידושין יש לי בן  ובשעת מיתה הוא אומר  אין לו בן או בשעת קידושין אין לי אח ובשעת מיתה הוא אומר יש לו אח ר' יהודה הנשיא אומר הוא נאמן להתיר  ולא לאסור  ור' נתן אומר גם לאסור הוא נאמן. אביי עונה המשנה היא כשאין חזקה של אח או בן  והלימוד האחר הוא כשיש חזקה של אח אבל לא ידוע שום מידע על בן. הסיבה של ר' יהודה הנשיא היא שדבריו בשעת קידושין יש להן דין של עדות שמבטל את החזקה. לכן היא מותרת. לדעת ר' נתן דבריו בשעת קידושין יש להן את הדין של חזקה. לכן החזקה הזאת אינה יותר מועילה  מן חזקת אח.
ונראה שהגמרא בבא בתרא גם מחזיקה שהדין של המשנה שם גם היא לפי דעת ר' נתן ולכן המצב הוא שיש חזקת אח אבל הוא אומר שיש לו בן ולכן היא מותרת. אבל התירוץ הזה הולך רק לפי דעת אחת בתוספות קידושין סד" שבמצב שיש חזקת אח אבל הוא אומר שיש לו בן הוא נאמן. ולפי הדעת האחרת שם בתוספות אין לי תירוץ על הקושיא של רע''א.







The Gemara [Talmud] there asks why do we need this mishna when we learn the same thing in Kidushin? Answer. This mishna is when there is a Hazaka [prior status] that there is a brother.

R Akiva Eiger asks even if there would be witnesses that there is a brother he ought to be believed that he has a son as the very next section of the Gemara makes clear that if he says I divorced my wife he also is believed to make her permitted.[Not require Yibum--to marry his brother.]

The answer I think is that the Gemara in Bava Batra is thinking like the Gemara in Kidushin that the mishna can also go according to R Nathan--who would hold with Hazaka but not if there were witnesses.

The Gemara in Kidushin  brings the same idea of the mishna and then asks that it does not seem to be like R Nathan. For we learn in another teaching: One says I have a son when he gets married and then says he does not before he dies. Or he says I have no brother when he gets married and then says he does not before he dies. R Yehuda HaNasi says he is believed to permit not to forbid. R Nathan says also to forbid he is believed.

Abyee says our mishna can also be like R Nathan because the mishna here in kidushin is when there is no hazaka of a brother or a son. In the other teaching there is a hazaka that there is a brother but we know nothing about a son. So in case of the other teaching the reason R Yehuda permits is that the words he says at the time he gets married have a category of  witnesses which is stronger that hazaka that he has a brother.] R Nathan hold what he says at the time he gets married has only the category of another hazaka.

So what one can answer to R Akiva Eiger is the case in Bava Batra is there is a hazaka of a brother but he also says he has a son and those words also have the category of a hazaka. But if there were witnesses that he has a brother it would be a hazaka against witnesses and that would not be enough.

But in Kidushin in the end of Tosphot there is a debate about this exact issue. To one opinion there in such a case he would be believed that he has a son and in the other opinion he would not be believed. So to that second opinion my answer here would not work.

problem of Change, Faith and Reason, -the Mind Body problem.

Philosophy started with the problem of Change. (How is change possible? What is, is. What is not, is not. Parmenides) That led up to Plato and Aristotle. Then that puttered down until Plotinus made his synthesis between Plato and Aristotle [Neo Platonism]. Then the Middles Ages were about the possibility and way to combine faith with reason. Then a new thing started with Descartes --the Mind Body problem. That led up until Kant and Hegel. Now we are in a post Kant era. What comes next is any one's guess. [But my feeling is that these questions are all connected. The development is not random]

There were some great thinkers after Kant and Hegel, but great in terms of commentary.

The people after Kant that seems to me to have great value are, Kelley Ross {Friesian School}, McTaggart, Huemer, Steven Dutch, Habermas. and Maverick Philosopher

Sometimes it seems to me the best thing about some thinkers like Kelley Ross or Habermas is when they evaluate other philosophers. Like Habermas' critique on Rawls' Theory of Justice. Or Huemer's Why I am not an Objectivist


I want to add that the issue of faith and reason started early with Philo but really picked up with the debate between Christians and Muslims. The whole issue really reached its climax with Aquinas. Then also puttered out until Descartes.

country of Jewish Law and insane religious fanatics

In Israel at present it looks that the issue of a country of Jewish Law is becoming a big issue in the coming elections. From practical experience I can say confidently that such a state of affairs would be  a disaster. This is in fact in spite of the greatness of personal keeping of the laws of the Torah. But to give power to the insane religious fanatics that control the interpretation of Jewish law would be a horrible nightmare.


[The issue seem to be that the middle and slightly left wing think that Prime Minister Netanyahu is on course to give power to the insane religious parties. That is my impression]

The issue on one hand would be freedom. And that is an issue.But the more important issue is that idea of Rav Nahman of Torah Scholars that are demons in his LeM vol I ch 12 and chapter 28.

[But the issue is brought up many other times in the books of Rav Nahman. For example in the very last Torah lesson of his life in LeM vol II ch. 8 the same issue is brought in terms of religious leaders that are liars. מנהיג של שקר


It is hard to put this into a larger context because you do find in Eastern Religions cults like Adi Da and even secular cults. But the problem in the Jewish world with the religious seems to be a bit different. It is a certain kind of kelipa [evil force] that has some kind of similarity with other kinds of evil forces, but still has it own unique characteristics.

Even more there is great doubt about how much good yeshivas do. After the fact that the Gra's signature on the letter of excommunication is ignored, the Sitra Achra [Realm of Evil] basically has a foothold in every yeshiva. Even the best. [My feeling is that the excommunication did not apply to Rav Nahman and that is why I quote him.This is based on my reading of the original documents that were printed up in a book I saw a few years ago.]

My own experience with even the best of the yeshivas has proved to me that the whole enterprise has limited benefit.

[Of curse the issue of freedom is a big issue. Wanting the means is the same as wanting the goal. If the religious want to impose their world view that would be to murder and enslave everyone that does anything they do not like, And they do not like a lot of stuff. And wanting to give them power means to wanting their goals. Their goals are not innocent]


Torah is important but something went way off in the religious world.

Bava Batra 134b. Kidushin 64b.

You have to say the Gemara in Bava Batra is thinking there is a hazaka for a brother and still she is permitted to marry (without yibum or halitza) because he is also saying he has a son. This is because in Kidushin the whole difference between the Mishna and the Braita over there is when there is a hazaka that there is a brother. The Gemara over in Kidushin clearly say that is the only difference and that is the reason R Nathan forbids her. So then what do you do with the Mishna in Bava Batara that is the exact same law? You have to say in Bava Batra he is also saying he has a son.

[I did not get a chance to do any learning today but it occurs to me that this might be the very reason the Ramban (Nahmanides) is disagreeing with the approach of the Baal Hameor and Rashi.

Besides one other reason he gives that כיוון שהגיד שוב אינו מגיד. [Once he says something and believed he is no longer believed to change his mind. But besides that I can imagine the Ramban (Nahmanides) also is thinking that it makes no sense to  put in an extra condition in the Mishna in Bava Batra--especially when over there it is clearly divided into two case. One when he says he has  a son and the other when he claim to have  a brother.

Rosh on Kidushin page 64b. [

I had a few minutes to look at the Rosh on Kidushin page 64b. [One of the major poskim (people that wrote on the Talmud from the standpoint of determining the law--as different from people that wrote on it with a view to explain the difficulties) of the Middle Ages.] And I see that I need to do a lot more work on that subject there because there seems to be a debate among the rishonim how to understand that subject. You have Rashi and the Baal Hameor [Rav Zarahia HaLevi] on one side. On the other you have the Rosh and the Ramban.

Still from what I could see my answer for R. Akiva Eiger still looks valid -- at least if you look at the subject from the viewpoint of Rashi. [I might mention here that I have heard this before when I was at the Mir in NY--that often the questions of R Akiva Eiger are only to one opinion. Just switching to the other opinions will often  answer the question. So you have to assume he was asking his question according to the viewpoint of the alternative opinion. I actually had that experience once while at the Mir. In those days it was the custom for young married men to give a kind of informal class that was separate from the regular scheduled classes. I was giving such a class there and in fact discovered that a question of R Akiva Eiger in Shabat could be answered based on a Tur in the laws of festivals.]

So just to make this short: The Gemara in Bava Batra [if memory serves me correctly] asks why do you need an extra mishna to tell us if the husband says before he dies "I have a son" he is believed. If he says "I have a brother" he is not. Answer: the Mishna is telling us even when there is a Hazaka  (prior status) that there is a brother. [What this seems to mean (at least the way Rashi and the Baal HaMeor understand it) is that he says also I have a son. So when he says "I have brother" and there is also a Hazaka (prior status) that there is a brother she is still permitted to marry someone without Yibum. [Yibum is when a woman is married and her husband dies without seed, she has to marry his brother. --or do Haliza (taking off the sandal) as mentioned in the Torah.]

R Akiva Eiger asks right there why does the gemara say a hazaka. Even with witnesses she also should be allowed to marry without Yibum.[It seems to me clear in any case that R Akiva Eiger is asking only according to the opinion of the baal Hameor since to the other opinion his question would not make sense.]
My answer is based on Kidushin 64 that wants the Mishna to be like R. Nathan not just R Yehuda Hanasi.
The point is over there in Kidushin R Nathan goes  with Hazaka (prior status) if he says "I have a brother" to believe him to make her forbidden to remarry without yibum. But if he also says I have a son she is permitted. But my point is that if there would be more than a Hazaka but also witnesses, then R Nathan would say no.--and forbid her unless there was some evidence that there is a son.

And just by taking a quick look at Rashi and the Rosh today I saw that this answer is very clear in Rashi since Rashi says that if a brother would come later and say that he is the brother then he would not be believed. But from that Rashi you can see that if there would be witnesses at the time she wants to be permitted to remarry then we would need evidence that there is a son.

I also had another proof for this answer but I forgot it.

Philosophy queen of the sciences? or bankrupt?

Philosophy used to be the queen of the sciences. It has fallen to irrelevance. [As Steven Weinberg (NoblePrize Physics--for combining electromagnetism with the weak force that causes neutron decay) wrote about the unreasonable ineffectiveness of philosophy.] [This as compared to the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics]]  This is similar to large corporations that at one time hold first place and then sink into bankruptcy. [Same with England. Once the prime world power. Now an afterthought.] The situation is not so different when it comes to religion which once was thought to contain all truth. Now is simply a matter of personal preference on where to hang out.

What does this mean in a practical sense?

I mean this question also in terms of the discredited ideologies that swept through Europe and Russia in the later 1800's.


Faith and Reason was the formula that worked for the Middle Ages. And still is a working combination. Not just one or the other. But the very meaning of faith and reason can not be the same as in the Middle Ages.
[Like the Renaissance that looked towards ancient Attica [Greece] for inspiration, but went beyond that.]

Not that philosophy itself is irrelevant. It is still necessary to get an accurate idea of what is everything all about. Just philosophy as a study has undergone a systematic decay.


[Perhaps if we could all go back to basics would be best. Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Kant, Fries, Leonard Nelson. If we could just get through that material maybe we would be doing a lot better.]- See robert hanna about the vacuous twentieth century analytic philosophy. 

Gemara in Bava Batra page 134b and seeing the question of Rav Akiva Eiger בבא בתרא דף קלד ע''א ע''ב

But on last Friday after looking at the Gemara in Bava Batra page 134b and seeing the question of Rav Akiva Eiger there, I had an idea of how to answer his question.

גמרא בבא בתרא דף קלד ע''א ע''ב. המשנה האומר יש לי בן נאמן. יש לי אח אינו נאמן. זה אומר יש לו בן ולכן אשתו אינה חייבת ביבום. יש לי אח ולכן אשתו חייבת ביבום. הגמרא שואלת שיש לנו כבר משנה בזה בקידושין  דף ס''ד ע''א. הגמרא .עונה פה יש חזקה על שיש אח. רע''א שואל אפילו אם יש עדים שיש לו אחים הוא צריך להיות נאמן כשהוא אומר שאין לו
בגלל הדין המובא להלן כשהוא אומר גירשתי את אשתי נאמן וזה אפילו כנגד עדים. התירוץ נראה בא מן הגמרא בקידושין סד ע''ב. שם מובא את הדין שיש לי בן נאמן יש לי אח אינו נאמן. הגמרא שאול שכנראה שזה אינו כר' נתן. שכך מובא  האומר בשעת קידושין יש לי בן ובשעת מיתה אין לי בן או האומר בשעת קידושין אין לי אח ובשעת מיתה יש לי אח. ר' יהודה הנשיא אומר נאמן להתיר ואינו נאמן לאסור. ר' נתו אומר גם נאמן לאסור. אביי אומר לא קושיא. המשנה היא כשאין חזקה והברייתא היא כשיש חשזה שיש אח ואין חזקה על בן. ולכן שם ר' נתן אומר שהיא אסורה וחייבת ביבום בגלל החזקה.
לי נראה שהגמרא בבבא בתרא גם מחזיקה בשיטת הגמרא בקידושין שהמשנה שם גם כמו ר' נתן. ור'נתן מאמין בו בגלל החזקה אבל לא היה מאמין לו אם הייתה עדות בגלל שהנאמנות של הבעל בשעת מיתה הוא רק בגלל שהוא מפספס ומשנה את הטיעון שלו אבל עדות ר' נתן היה מאמין


From what I recall the Gemara there goes like this. The Mishna says one who says he has a son is believed but one who says he has a brother is not. The Gemara asks that this seems to be extra since we already learn this same rule in Kidushin 64 side A. It answers, here in Bava Batra there is a prior status that he has a brother [Hazaka.]  Rav Akiva Eiger asks that even more that a Hazaka but even with witnesses that he has a brother and he says he does not he should be believed like the case when he is married and he says he gave a get [divorce ] to his wife.
The answer I think is this. The Gemara in Kidushin brings the same rule [He says he has a son he is believed. he says he has brother he is not believed.] and asks that it seems to not be like R. Nathan.]
For we have a teaching: He says at the time of marriage I have a son and later before he dies he says I do not have a son. Or at the time of marriage he says I have no brother and later before he dies he says I have brother. R Yehuda the Prince says he is believed to permit not to forbid. R Nathan says also he is believed to forbid. [That is R Natan is going by what he says at the end. R Yehuda goes by what he says at the beginning.]






Abyee answers the mishna [is where] there is no hazaka (prior status). The teaching is where there is a hazaka that he has a brother but no hazaka (prior status) about a son.

The answer to the question of R.A. Eiger is that the Gemara in Bava Batra is also thinking like the Gemara in Kidushin that wants the Mishna to be like R Nathan, not just like R Yehuda. And R Nathan in the teaching is going with Hazaka.  But that is because the husband himself flip flops.But in a case where there would be witnesses R Nathan would disagree with the Mishna.

The problem I see in the religious world is that of con. Getting people to believe that what is not authentic Torah really is. This I see is the ultimate reason for the fact that the Gra signed on the letter o excommunication. But it also explains why so many people ignore it. Because we are all more liable to being fooled that we believe. For this reason it is a good idea to have an idea of what authentic Torah is. And also to read a few books about the widespread practice of con and scam--to show how easy it is to be fooled.

The great thing about Shar Yashuv and the Mir in NY [two very great Litvak yeshivas] is authenticity.

This is very much different from the majority of what goes on in the religious world where deception and scamming secular Jews is the rule--not the exception.

And this I think one of the major reasons for the signature of the Gra on the letter of excommunication.

The problem he saw was not just falsifying what the Torah says but scamming and conning people about it.

"Authentic" means that certain places are into learning Torah--nothing more or less. They are not claiming anything else. This is the major characteristic of Litvak yeshivas in Israel also. There is no aspect of scam that is so common place in the rest of the religious world. 

R Yohanan had a disciple R. Zeiri. R Yohanan wanted R Zeiri to marry his daughter. [The daughter of R Yohanan.] R Zeiri did not want her. One day they were crossing a river. R Zeiri carried R Yohanan over teh river on his shoulders. [All this is in the last chapter of Kidushin.] R Yohana asked him, "My Torah is good enough for you but my daughter is not?" [R yohanan was born in Israel. R. Zeiri came to Israel from Babylon]

[The point was that the people in Babylon were considered to be more myuhas [pure lineage] than people born in Israel.

I have trouble understanding this story because if I would have had a chance to marry the daughter of a true Torah scholar [not the modern phonies] I would have jumped at the opportunity.[If I would have I probably would still be learning Torah until this very day]

In Shar Yashuv and the Mir there was a clear distinction between learning "bekiut" and learning "beiyun" (in depth)

While in high school --I was there during a vacation time. The assistant of the physics teacher told me an interesting idea about learning Physics [that is any Physics text]. He said you need to start at the beginning and go to the end. And go from the end to the beginning and to go from the middle outwards.

This I think is helpful when it comes to review. For example  lets say you learn in the way of Girsa גירסא [just saying the words and going on.] And lets say you have done that a few times with the same text book. But at some point you feel you need more review directly after learning some part of it. You do not want to wait until the second time around --by which time you have probably forgotten what you learnt. So you do review from the place you leave off and start towards the beginning.

[After all the sages did emphasize review  also besides the way of "Girsa"]


[In Shar Yashuv and the Mir there was a clear distinction between learning "bekiut" and learning "beiyun"  (in depth). The morning was for "beiyun" (in depth) and the afternoon for bekiut (fast).
In the Mir itself [in NY] the meaning of this was clear. The morning was to prepare for the class of the teachers. And the classes themselves were basically along the lines of Rav Haim of Brisk.

Bekiut just meant what it sounds like. Going through as much Gemara and Tosphot in order as possible. [So it was not exactly "Girsa"].

But for me I found myself somewhat lost in terms of the classes. So my morning hours were spent instead of preparing for the classes I learnt the Maharasha, Maharam and Pnei Yehoshua. [And what other commentaries I could find]]

But when I came to Physics I found the straight way of Girsa to be more effective. So what I think for people like me, it is best to do straight Girsa for a long time until you basically absorb the concepts by osmosis. And then to straight to concentrate on review.

Communism

You can see in Michael Huemer [Intuition-ists] and Dr Kelley Ross [the Kant-Fries School] that  they are not at all thrilled with Communism. Huemer even has a link to a whole web site of Communist crimes. Kelley Ross has a good intellectual defence of capitalism based on Kant's idea of individual autonomy. [That is a good defence and tightly woven into the structure of Kant's philosophy.]

Michael Humer has a particularly devastating critique on Communism.

[One of several essays of his that are masterpieces.]

On a separate note you can see the efforts of the USSR to change America into a communist socialist system in books that were based on the opened archives of the KGB and the GRU in the USSR. [See also the video of Bezmenov.]

And even though the communists made use of Hegel, they turned him upside down in order to do so. Hegel was the exact opposite of a Marxist.

To get a bigger picture of the penetration of communism into Western Civilization see Fire in the Minds of Men by Billington.

To see however the reasons for the rise of Lenin and Stalin it is useful to get a picture of Europe from 1876 until 1905. And then WWI.  They were confronting situations like the massacre of the goldmine workers in Russia. And also plenty of stuff that would not have been easy to answer with simple capitalism.
See Hobhouse who in spite of his critique of Socialism and in particular the Metaphysical State--agreed that straight laissez-faire capitalism had been tried in England and did not work.
Simply put if you look at the French Revolution and the history of Europe up until 1876 all you see is a big mess --all which started from the ideas of socialism of the French Revolution. But look after 1876 until 1918 you get an opposite picture.

Also Howard Bloom's the Lucifer Principle which is more or less a simple form of Hegel's super organism. Or as Blanshard puts it: No human good is possible without the state.

The religious world thinks of secular Jews as a problem

The religious world thinks of secular Jews as a problem.  A problem that needs to be solved delicately. [The religious need the money of secular Jews so they have to pretend to be "we are all one group". Along with the love bombing.]
The religious need that secular Jews  accept the leadership of the religious lunatics. But not to be equal to the frum [religious] but rather subservient.

To me it seems this is an unjustified attitude. I do not see the religious as being the super geniuses or moral giants they think they are.


The religious world seems to be sunk in a world of delusion of superiority. And that they attribute to the fact that they keep a few made up rituals that are not from the Torah at all.

[This is not meant as a critique on the authentic Litvak yeshivas [Brisk, Mir, Ponovitch, Shar Yashuv] where Torah is learned for its own sake.]

Bava Kama page 70 B

In Bava Kama page 70 B there is brought down that one who steals and then sells on Shabat does not have to pay the 4 and 5. [4 sheep in place of one sheep. 5 oxen in place of 1 ox.] Rav Papa said the sell and shabat came at once in case the buyer said throw your theft into my yard. The question the Gemara asks then is that that seems to be like R. Akiva who said קלוטה כמונחה דמיא an object that is thrown is like it is sitting. The Gemara answers it could be like the Sages [who disagree with R Akiva] also in the case the buyer said my yard will only acquire when the object lands.

In Gitin 78 a husband throws a divorce document at his wife from a roof top into her courtyard and it burns up before it hits the ground. She is divorced. The Gemara asks but the document was not in a guarded place? Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel that is  a case where it got inside the walls of the yard. R. Aba asked Ula this seems to be like R. Yehuda Hanasi who said an object that is thrown is like it is sitting. Ula answered the sages who disagree with R Yehuda can agree with this since they can hold Shabat and acquiring are different to the sages.

Tosphot in Bava Kama asks on the statement there "It seems to be like R Akiva". He asks that even to R Akiva there is a problem since he also would said the object is not acquired until it gets inside the walls, but in terms of Shabat he would be liable right away as the object is above the walls. He answers the thief threw the object in through a window or side door. He then asks on the Gemara in Gitin why does it not ask "It seems to be like R Akiva?" [So what would the sages say?] Tosphot answers the case there is with walls while R Akiva hold the object is acquired even without walls.

The Maharsha, Maharam and Maharshal ask on this Tosphot that the start of Tosphot holds R Akiva would require walls and then says he would not.


I have not had a chance to take  a close look at these three comentaries,. But off hand it seems the end of Tosphot is dealing with the question why ask from R Yehuda. That is they are asking about the הווא אמינא. [What the Gemar is thinking at that point]. So to ask from R Yehuda the Gemara has tobe thinking R Akiva is different. While the beginning of Tosphot is going according to the idea there that the sages would make a difference between shabat and acquiring and that would presumably go for R Akiva also.

There is also a side question I thought of as I was looking at this subject. Lets say in fact that R Akiva does not require walls for acquiring as the Gemara thinks there at first. Then would not it make sense to drop the need for walls?

Next day: I did get a chance to glance at the Maharsha today and saw that he and the Maharam both answer the question on Tosphot in basically the same way as I did up above. And as for the second question. I was going to answer it that R. Akiva would not think that walls are sufficient since the divorce document needs to be in a guarded place before it can be valid. So even if walls would help for acquisition they would not help for the divorce. And today i saw that that is in fact what the Maharasha says right there.

Rav Nahman said not to be strict about anything.

Rav Nahman said not to be strict about anything. That is in terms of Jewish Law but also in terms of every day matters.

So for years I was not at all careful about carrying things in a public domain on Shabat. Sadly I can not learn Torah but I did get a chance to glance at a few pages in tractate Shabat and noticed that carrying is a big issue over there.

Even though you see the idea that a public domain in only where 600,000 people walk through  in Rashi and Tosphot and the Shulhan Aruch of Rav Joseph Karo itself brings it. Still it does not seem to be in the Gemara itself. I even noticed in the Yerushalmi some incident where a sage accidental carried on Shabat said he would bring a sin offering when the Temple would be rebuilt.

How would that have been possible in Babylon? the Jewish cites there were minuscule. Just think about Rome at the peak of its power. It had about a million people.  How could small Jewish towns have had comparable numbers?

Creation ex nihilo [from nothing] comes up in the book of Rav Nahman of Breslov in in LeM vol 1 chapter 4.

The idea of Creation ex nihilo [from nothing] comes up in the book of Rav Nahman of Breslov in in LeM vol 1 chapter 4. So it is hard for me to figure out why some people think that the Torah and or Rav Nahman held by pantheism.

Torah that comes from the halls of delusion

In the LeM of Rav Nahman [Collections of Rav nahman] you find the idea of Torah that comes from the halls of delusion. That is in volume I. Chapter 245.

In the השמטות [left out parts] you also find this idea of Torah of the Sitra Achra [the Realm of Evil]

The basic idea there is that  there are Torah lessons which come from the kelipot [forces of evil].

That is to say --in order to merit to true and authentic Torah takes a great deal of self sacrifice in the service of God.

Not just people that cl;aim to be giving over Torah lessons, Rav Nahman finds highly suspect;-but also doing things which you think are good deeds ma very well not be good deeds. As the LeM starts out Vol I chapter 1 "the evil inclination is dressed in mitzvot" היצר הרע מתלבש במצוות

The magnum opus of Rav Nahman from Breslov [Collections of Rav Nahman, the LeM] has a great deal of great ideas

The magnum opus of Rav Nahman from Breslov [Collections of Rav Nahman, the LeM] has a great deal of great ideas but does not seem to have a systematic world view except "be frum."
It is not like Hegel, Spinoza, or Leibniz [or the Nefesh HaHaim by Rav Haim from Voloshin]]

When you find a particular Torah lesson that deals with your particular issue, you learn it forty days in a row and that helps to solve the problem.

His idea of avoiding philosophy on one hand makes a lot of sense. Like Descartes said . that no opinion, however absurd and incredible, can be imagined, which has not been defended by a philosopher.


However the blanket attack on the Guide for the Perplexed of Maimonides and all medieval Jewish thinkers seems a bit over the top. Plus the attack on scientists also seems kind of overboard. [Okay then stop using your I phones and Jet airplanes to get to Uman.]


My view is more along the lines of Rav Israel Salanter while at the same time accepting the important ideas from other places.

faith with reason

In the Middle Ages there was an approach that combined faith with reason.
In Ibn Pakuda חובות הלבבות Obligations of the Heart you see this right on the first page of the introduction in terms of the important of what Muslims called "theology"["Wisdom of God" literally] . So he is not referring juts to Plato, Aristotle and Plotinus but also to how Muslim scholars developed those ideas. [I imagine he must have been thinking about Al  Farabi and Al Kindi.]

Later in Obligations of the Heart in chapter 3 of Shar NaBehina you see the emphasis on Physics [not just the spiritual aspects of Creation like angels.]

This seems to go with the general nature of the approach of Saadia Gaon and later the Rambam.

With the Rambam, the subject becomes a little more clear when he says specifically Physics and Metaphysics as they were understood by the ancient Greeks. [So he is not talking about mysticism.]

Even though learning Torah mainly refers to the Gemara with the Rishonim [Tosphot, Ritva, Rashba, Tosphot HaRosh.] still you see in the medieval sages [mainly from Spain] that also included Physics and Metaphysics in the category of the mitzvah itself.

Physics I think is clear if you look at the subject matter  extends to modern Physics. But what about metaphysics?
I think that after the Middle Ages some important advances have been made. On one hand you have Berkeley and general critiques of Aristotle. But what do you do with that? Thomas Reid [the philosopher of common sense] pointed out how absurd Berkley's idealism is and yet admitted that his arguments are close to irrefutable. To deal with this it seems to me it is unavoidable to have to learn Kant and Hegel.

faith in the wise. You need some kind of common sense to tell when it is best to listen to the experts and when to develop your own approach.

Rav Nahman makes a good point about אמונת חכמים--faith in the wise. But I think one needs to develop a certain kind of common sense to know in what exact points the sage was correct and to be able to filter out the areas where he might have been wrong.

In universities it is common to give advice to students to think for themselves. Read the material and come to their own conclusions. However how would this work if you are in a hospital? What would be the best approach? Listen to the doctor? Or think for yourself and come to your own conclusions?

Sometimes however even experts can be wrong.
You need some kind of common sense to tell when it is best to listen to the experts and when to develop your own approach.

the main benefit of Musar is the formation of ones consciousness plus world view issues.

To merit to fear of God and to good character traits was a major point of Rav Israel Salanter. [I mean that was the major point of the Musar Movement.]

I think the main benefit of Musar is the formation of ones consciousness plus world view issues.
That is to say that without Musar it is easy to adopt false sets of values all the while thinking sanctimonious thought about how one is keeping Torah.

Musar has the advantage of having its background world view being Platonic as outlined by Ibn Pakuda in the beginning of his Obligations of the Heart. [And that world view permeates most of Musar of the Middle Ages.]

Evolution

Evolution seems to be indicated in the Talmud in Bava Kama and in the Jerusalem Talmud in Shabat chapter 1 the third mishna [page 8].

The rate of change of species there is indicated to be every seven years. [The bava kama Gemara I did not see recently but the Yerushalmi goes through a whole list of examples of species that change into other species.]

Recently my learning partner brought my attention to a discussion of the mathematical improbability of evolution. However my feeling about this is that let us say you take a pencil and you hit a point on a line. Now you can prove that you never could have hit that point since the probability of hitting that point is 1/infinity. [Since there are an infinite number of points on a line.]

[From another point of view I ought to mention the Or HaHayim of the Tiferet Israel on the Mishna that brings that there were different periods before this period of time.] [That essay of the Tiferet Israel is fairly well known. It was mentioned to me several times when I was in the Mir Yeshiva and I think it was also brought up when I was in Shar Yashuv in Far Rockaway.] [I might add Rav Isaac of Aco who is the source of that opinion.]

In the story of Rav Nahman about the wise son and the simple one there is a warning about being smart.

In the story of Rav Nahman about the wise son and the simple one there is a warning about being smart. However you also see him in the L''eM vol I bring that acquired intellect is a determining factor for one's portion in the next world. [Sekel hanikne. It is Socrates who brings the connection between virtue and wisdom. Also Aristotle brings the idea in his Metaphysics.]

[Napoleon]

 Love is the obsession of the idle, a distraction for the warrior, a stumbling block for kings. [Napoleon]

Western Civilization depends on a kind of synthesis between Faith and Reason.

Part of the reason I do not comment on a lot of stuff  is that I feel that I have a right to an opinion only about subjects that I am somewhat familiar with.

Furthermore current events, politics economics though important issues do not seem to me to be at the core of what is going on in the world. Rather I see faith and reason to be the major things that are important. But since both faith and or reason can go astray it is important to get the synthesis between them right.

A lot of what people do right and what they do wrong depends on their world view.
And Western Civilization depends on a kind of synthesis between Faith and Reason.
And I have a lot of thoughts about that. For one thing I want to mention that this seems to me to be the reason for the differences between the American Revolution and the French Revolution.

Mainly as Allan Bloom pointed out --that England had a kind of synthesis between these two poles for a long time. I want to point out that not just the revolutions were different but the background was different. France before its revolution had no Parliament, no freedom of speech, no rights to the England. Nothing in terms of freedoms that were in England. So the American Revolution was not at all a  rebellion against the good and great values of England. It just wanted Parliament to mind their own business. The French Revolution on the other hand had a stated purpose. To overthrow everything. All religion all authority all traditions.
So what is reason with faith? My own approach is more or less like that of my parents. Balance. To be a Mensch. To be self sufficient. [More or less values that were American values in the old days when "America" meant something.]

Even though Jews have contributed a tremendous amount to Western Civilization, no religious Jew has contributed anything.

Even though Jews have contributed a tremendous amount to Western Civilization, no religious Jew has contributed anything. (Lenin)

This is true for the time of Lenin but all the more so nowadays that the state of Israel was built entirely by the efforts of secular Jews. The contribution of the religious is just to constantly try to bring it down.

Not because the religious are keeping Torah, but  rather because they keep the Torah of the Sitra Achra. [the realm of Evil]. Not the authentic Torah.

However there are a few moments of light as in the authentic Litvak yeshivas like Ponovitch, Brisk, Mir. But that is just a  drop.  How did this situation arise? Because the warnings and signature of the Gra on the letter of excommunication were ignored.

Bringing in from a public domain on Shabat is one kind of work. Bringing out to a public domain is another. Are these two separate things or or they both just one kind of work?

Mishna in Shabat. יציאות השבת שתיים שהן ארבע בפנים ושתיים שהן ארבע בחוץ



Bringing in from a public domain on Shabat is one kind of work. Bringing out to a public domain is another. Are these two separate things or or they both just one kind of work?

To Tosphot they are both just one kind of "av melacha" [principle kind of work. lit. father of work.]
To the Baal Hameor (Rav Zarahia Halevi) taking out is an "av" (father, principle). Taking in is a tolada [offspring].

The Ball HaMeor goes into this in the beginning of Shabat and Rav Moshe Margolit (the author of the Pnei Moshe and Mareh Panim on the Jerusalem Talmud) goes into more detail.

The way he see it is that this is an argument between Rav Ashi and Rava. The Gemara asks on the Mishna. It says taking out and then talks about bringing in? Rav Ashi says the author of the Mishna is calling bringing in also taking out. Rava said it means domains of Shabat.
To Moshe Margolit, Rava holds bringing in is a tolada and there are two verses. To Rav Ashi they are both the same av and there is only one verse.
To me the question here seems to be the beginning of the Gemara in Bava Kama which says that something that is in the Mishkan and also important is a av. [It says nothing about whether there is a verse or not. ] That seems to be the main question here. But there are others that I forgot about. [I recall that when I was learning Shabat that that particular Tosphot in the beginning of Shabat had other questions.

Trust in God without effort brings up the sparks of holiness that come from the empty space.

A disciple of Rav Nahman, that is Rav Natan brings in Hoshen Mishpat, laws of guards [that is the part of Shulchan Aruch that deals with monetary laws and deposited object] the idea of trust in God that you see also in Rav Israel Salanter, and his disciple Rav Joseph Horvitz of Navardok. 

To Rav Natan, trust with effort brings up the sparks of holiness that fell because of the breaking of the vessels. Trust in God without effort brings up the sparks of holiness that come from the empty space.

Clearly he is holding that trust with effort is a good thing, but not as great as trust without effort.

In fact the idea is that only by trust with no effort can one bring up the sparks that come from the deepest kelipot [forces of evil.]

Top some degree you see this in Napoleon. He was in prison in Elba. Then broke out to retake France. A army of the new king came out to fight him. As these two armies stood face to face with their arms and weapons raised ready to fire the general of the kings troops called out to Napoleon to surrender. Napoleon told his men to lower their weapons and walked out in front of all his troops and called to the other army. "Here I am, your emperor. If any of you want to kill me here is your chance!" There came a voice from one of the captains of the kings army "Fire!" But no one fired. Instead they all lowered their weapons and shouted long live the Emperor!

So you have to say that the Mishna that says all Torah without work is useless and brings to sin and in the end he merits only to hell has to be talking about Torah without trust. That is: these are independent variables. Torah and work are different variables than trust with or without effort.

To American women you are just a disposable plaything.

Why not to marry American women.

To read that article is a good idea, but to put it simply. To American women you are just a disposable plaything.

truth is divided up

The Litvak Yeshiva world has noticed the importance of the Middle Ages. [That is the people that follow the Torah path like the Gra and Rav Shach.]

That is: the Lithuanian Yeshiva World [i.e. straight Torah]  holds highly of Rishonim (mediaeval authorities like the Tosphot, Rif,  Rosh etc.) [more than achronim (later authorities after the 1500's) ] and of the Musar (Ethics) of the Middle Ages. [Learning teh Ethics of the Middle Ages was the whole point of Rav Israel Salanter and the Musar movement. Later on, the books of his disciples got added in. But the original idea was the Middle Ages.]

So what do do with Metaphysics? [Emphasized by Maimonides and Ibn Pakuda [the author of  the Obligations of the Hearts] right in the beginning of  חובות לבבות, [Obligations of the Heart by Behayee Ibn Pakuda].

Medieval metaphysics can not be taken simply simply because some of the axioms do not seem all that correct, even though the logic is correct.

You need to some degree Kant and Hegel. But in the same way that the Litvak world takes achronim--as modifications of Rishonim, not as standing on their own.


[My own opinion is that true Torah is only found in yeshivas that go by the Gra like Brisk or Ponovitch. However, as the sages said-- in the future the truth will be divided. האמת יהיה נעדרת --עדרים עדרים. Since the truth is divided up and you can not find it in just one place. so you need to do a process of "birur" taking the good and discarding what is wrong. But you can not do that until the lies and delusions have fallen. Truth can only come together after lies have been destroyed.]

Rav Avraham Abulafia

Professor Moshe Ideal brings a doubt  as to the development of Rav Avraham Abulafia. That is what was the trigger for the new revelations of 1270? Was it his method of Divine Names or was it grace?

This rings a bell with me because I think that it is a combination of factors. That is to say in my view there are certain stages to come to "Devekut" [literally "attachment"] (or prophecy in the language of the Middle Ages) and there are also certain stages to leaving that and coming back down to Earth as we find in Plato's cave where those who left it were forced to come back and instruct those that remained inside.

In my view coming to Devekut is simply a matter of following the straight, simple path of Torah as defined by the Gra and Rav Shach.  That is Devekut comes by grace. But then to contain the light and focus it one needs the Divine names. And then one is forced to leave in order to help thoese that are left inside the cave.

[But what to do with the problem of ego inflation and religious delusions? To me it seems that one needs to be rid of evil before one can come to truth. To be rid of evil I think depends a lot on the art of discernment. To take literally the advice of the Gra in his letter of excommunication.  But not to use that to dismiss Rav Nahman who I think would not be included as can easily be seen from the language used there.]

See Moshe Idel on this subject

Jerusalem Talmud Tractate Shabat on Bitachon [trust in God]

In the Jerusalem Talmud Tractate Shabat [end of perek 6] there is a story about a person that became "ger" [convert].
Before that he had been an astrologer. He was about to go on a trip but he then saw in the star charts that it was dangerous. Then he rethought the matter. "Why did I join this nation in the first place if not to desist from such things. He went and was in danger of being eaten by a lion. He gave it his ass and he was saved. The Talmud asks why did he fall into danger? Because he checked the star charts. why was he saved because in the end he trusted.

Rav Joseph Yozel Horvitz [the disciple of Rav Israel] brings this event in his book the Level of Man.

So what is the thing about trust in God? When I was in the Mir in NY I assumed it to mean to sit and learn Torah and assume that one's needs will be taken care of. Now I am thinking that that is basically correct except that I would not limit the learning Torah thing to be confined to the basic cannon but to include Physics and Metaphysics as Ibn Pakuda and other rishonim hold. [You can see this mainly in rishonim based in Spain like Benjamin the doctor or Maimonides who was born in Spain.]

[I am not sure what to say about the Metaphysics aspect however. What would that include? Chesterson noted that almost all philosophy after the 1600's is nuts. [Exact quotation: :Since the modern world began in the sixteenth century, nobody’s system of philosophy has really corresponded to everybody’s sense of reality; it what, if left to themselves, common men would call common sense."] Now normally that would not be a complaint except that to go against common sense prima facie evidence you need to have some reason. You can not just make some nice statement that seems reasonable at first and then draw conclusion that are clearly off.  That is not how science works. The way science goes is you try to explain what it "out there". You do not postulate at the start what is allowed to be "out there."

When evidence comes in that goes against the original common sense, then you change your assumptions. Modern philosophy works in the exact opposite way. It starts with some profound sounding platitude and then derives some nutty result from it. Then it assumes the nutty result has been proven.

So when it comes to philosophy and metaphysics it might make the most sense to stick with the classics: Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus and the scholastics from the Middle Ages.

Tosphot in Sanhedrin page 10

Rosh Hashanah = the actual new moon. This of course is going according the Tosphot in Sanhedrin page 10 that you go according to the time of the "molad"--the conjunction. 

Prince Philip [husband of the Queen of England]: pearls of wisdom.

"British women can't cook"

"Everybody was saying we must have more leisure. Now they are complaining they are unemployed" (during the 1981 recession).

"You are a woman, aren't you?" (in Kenya after accepting a small gift from a local woman).

"If you stay here much longer you'll all be slitty-eyed" (to a group of British students during a royal visit to China).

"You can't have been here that long, you haven't got pot belly" (to a Briton he met in Hungary).

"Aren't most of you descended from pirates?" (to a wealthy islander in the Cayman Islands).

"How do you keep the natives off the booze long enough to pass the test" (to a Scottish driving instructor).

"It looks as if it was put in by an Indian" (referring to an old-fashioned fuse box in a factory near Edinburgh).

"Still throwing spears?" (question put to an Aboriginal Australian during a visit).

"There's a lot of your family in tonight" (after looking at the name badge of businessman Atul Patel at a Palace reception for British Indians).

"The Philippines must be half-empty as you're all here running the NHS" [National Health Service] (on meeting a Filipino nurse at Luton and Dunstable Hospital). 

People respond to incentives. If you give to the religious world lots of money they gain power and control. And yet no one that is actually subject to religious rule is very happy.

People respond to incentives. If you give to the religious world lots of money they gain power and control. And yet no one that is actually subject to religious rule is very happy. It is a conspiracy to keep the corrupt and evil leaders in control. Thus it seems to me that the Prime Minister of Israel, Netanyayu ought not to have religious people in his cabinet.  Though I can not figure out why or how the religious world got to be such a nightmare still the facts on the ground indicate that the more power they gain the worse it is for everyone.

[My own approach to Torah is more along the lines of balance. and דרך ארץ קדמה לתורה and not to seek out new restrictions. To some degree This approach is based on the book of Rav Nahman the LeM vol II. 42. Where he defines the service of God as not to be seeking out new restrictions. but rather learning and keeping Torah simply.


[The trouble with parliamentary systems as noted by the founding fathers of the USA. At the time even King George assumed the English Parliament had absolute power over the colonies. [Besides that the Parliament in fact needed to pay the war debt that they had incurred because of the war with France which in fact was a benefit for Americans. But Americans though willing to contribute money and arms and people to the war effort did not think Parliament had power over them.. The king yes, but Parliament no. This same kind of system still plagues Europe. The founding fathers on the other hand did not think to give to even their own parliament [Congress and Senate] such power. This is the reason for three branches of government in the USA. In Israel this problem is such that the religious have power to bring down the government any time they feel they are not getting enough money.

Profesor Moshe Idel (Hebrew University)

Profesor Moshe Idel (Hebrew University) has a new book on the issue of the Sonship which looks at the issue from the standpoint of mystics from the Middle Ages.

I have noticed this subject come up in various places in the Gemara. [One place I noticed this was in Bava Batra. God calls a tzadik by his name.]

But the major thing seems to be a kind of take on Emanation that is common enough in the Ari [Isaac Luria] and Moshe Cordovaro.

The idea of Jesus being a tzadik that partakes of this  aspect of things seems to me to be more or less clear after I saw this in Avraham Abulafia and also in Moshe Idel's PhD thesis.

[Son in the Remak always refers to Tiferet. In the Ari himself I saw the idea of the vessel of yesod containing the light of kindness which I figured was in reference to Jesus.]

With Kant I go with the idea that certain areas of value are not accessible to human reason, so to speculate about them makes little sense. And you see this also with Fries and Leonard Nelson who hold from a kind of knowledge that is not by reason nor by sense perception. So besides basic faith I have that Rav Avraham Abulafia knew what he was talking about, I do not like to make any further speculations.



Another thing is this: The Christian "take" on Jesus to me seems wrong. He did not advocate the nullification of the commandments--as explained in the Theonomic Position on the web site of Anthony Flood. He said one must keep all the Torah. The Oral and Written Law. [Everything the prushim say to do you must do...] [He said anyone who teaches you to not keep the Torah shall be called the least in the kingdom of heaven for verily I say unto you heaven and earth shall pass away but not one jot or tittle of the law shall pass away] So it does not sound like he is saying not to keep the Law.]

American War of Independence as opposed to the Revolution in France.

The reasons for the American War of Independence do not seem to be based on the idea of John Locke. There was a soldier who fought at bunker hill who was interviewed many years later and he was asked about it. He never had heard of John Locke. As for the Stamp act --also he had never seen one. There was a whole list of the usual reasons given  that he was asked about and he never heard of any of them. So when finally he was asked then why did you fight? He said because we had been taking care of our own business  by ourselves and the British wanted to interfere.

What you see is that the colonies were not beholden to England for more than a hundred years--since 1620. They had been taking care of themselves They just wanted to continue their traditions and organizations with no interference from Britain. It was not a revolution to change the order of things.--Completely opposite of the Revolution in France that aimed at overturning the old order.

[I want to add here that the American system even after the War of Independence was based 99% on the English system. The Colonies had no reason to rebel except for the tyranny of Parliament. But that alone would not have caused the break from England until they appealed to the king, King George, and he refused to hear their complaints.]

Species can change

Species can change from one into another. [It is also brought in the Babylonian Talmud in Bava Kama around page 16--I forget exactly].[It is in the Jerusalem Talmud also. I saw it as I was flipping through the pages. I forget where I saw it. It was I think in Shabat or Eruvin.]
You see there that even bones can become living things. And many different examples are given on one species changing into another every seven years.
So I do not see why this seems to be an issue of contention. [That is in terms of evolution. As for the math probability of evolution I think that is not the best way of looking at it. After all if you take any point on a line and ask before you hit it with your pencil what is the probability of hitting it you get zero. 1/infinity. --Since there are an infinite number of points on a line. So after you have hit any random point you can prove mathematical that you could never have hit it. ]

argument between the Rambam and the Rashba and Tosphot

The argument between the Rambam and the Rashba and Tosphot concerning an alley with three walls.
To the Rambam it has a category of a carmlit [a middle state that is not a private domain nor a public domain] To Tosphot and the Rashba it is a private domain.


One of the commentators of the Yerushlmi brings this subject and the opinion of the magid mishna on the Rambam.
What is hard to understand about the Rambam here is the gemara in Suka page 7: an alley that is open on two sides--if equipped with a lehi is a private domain and if with overhead board is a carmlit.

If the Rambam would be right why should the Gemara deal with an alley with two walls?

In this area there is an argument between the Magid Mishna on the Rambam and Rav Moshe Margolit [the author of the Pnei Moshe on the Yerushalmi].

To Rav Moshe the three wall alley that is open to a carmlit and has a lehi is a reshut Hayakid. And to me it looks like he is using this idea to answer for the Rambam. I do not see how this helps the Rambam. If a simple lehi helps an open alley [open on two sides] then why should an alley closed on three sides be worse.

I guess he must be saying the open alley also is just open to a carmlit. Still I admit it is hard for me to see how the Ramabm could fit into the Gemara over here.

[Sorry if I do not have any more ability to concentrate on things in order to make my remarks clearer--after my experience with getting arrested because of false accusations I have little ability to concentrate on anything.]]

Ben: Sonship and Jewish Mysticism. Moshe Idel conserning his approach to the idea of "the Son" and the start of his interest in Rav Avraham Abulfia.

Ben: Sonship and Jewish Mysticism

https://shi-webfiles.s3.amazonaws.com/Havruta_2009_Issue3_MosheIdelInterview.pdf

" In my Ph.D. dissertation, I wrote a section dealing with the son of God in Avraham Abulafia."
[Abraham ben Shmuel Abulafia (1240-C.1291), the founder of the ecstatic brand of Kabbalah]


In that thesis, you can see the Rav Abulafia held that Jesus was a tzadik.[משיח בן יוסף, החותם של יום ששי] I had seen that beforehand in Rav Abulafia, but seeing this idea also brought in Moshe Idel made it more clear. [I asked him later about this issue on the phone.]

Sonship

https://www.amazon.com/Ben-Sonship-Mysticism-Library-Studies/product-reviews/0826496660/ref=cm_cr_dp_d_show_all_btm?ie=UTF8&reviewerType=all_reviews


See also Kabalah and Elites

[Myself I never got into Rav Abulafia but I see him as a very important aspect of Torah. However I did see some of this subject in the Ari [Rav Isaac Luria]. The most obvious place for me is after the breaking of the vessels the vessel of Foundation was brought up into Emanation and filled with the light of Kindness. כלי של יסוד נעלה לאצילות ובו ירד האור של חסד. The Ari also brings this up concerning Joseph in Egypt.
Hegel has his own take on this which is known to be hard to understand. However it seems to me that Hegel is thinking more about Adam Kadmon more than Joseph. [While Hegel brings both subjects he does not tie them specifically together.]]

the Rambam and Tosphot about a private domain on Shabat.

There is an argument between the Rambam [Shabat chapter 14] and Tosphot about what constitutes a private domain.
Tosphot and the Rashba both hold three walls constitutes a private domain on Shabat. But the Rambam makes a difference. If the alley is open to a public domain then it is just a Carmalit. [A place that is not a private domain nor a public domain.] But if open to a carmalit then it is a private domain. That is the three walls reduce it one level down.
There is a lot to go into here because of a few gemaras in Eruvin which seem to be clearly like Tosphot. [And I wanted to add that the Karban Eda in the Yerushalmi holds that the Rambam holds a Lehi is considered a wall from the Torah but an overhead board is just derabanan.]


But the thing I wanted to point out here is something I mentioned a few years ago--that you really do not see the Gemara making the distinction about a public domain having 600,000 people walking through it. So on Shabat my approach is to carry only in a pocket. This you can see in Ketubot chapter 3 and also in Bava Batra that the thief taking out a purse on Shabat is obligated for Shabat when the purse has changed domain, not when the object in the purse has changed domains.[You can see this more clearly in Bava Batra but I have forgotten the sugia over there.]


But unless it is really absolutely necessary I think it is best to stay home on Shabat and avoid all the problems. Besides that usually people need to recover from Shabat ion Sunday. So it really is not much of a day of rest for most people.