I can not think of a worse nightmare than imagining the religious to be in charge.

I was in the Breslov Beit Midrash today [the Na Nach group] and listened a few minutes to a book written by Rav Natan [a disciple of Rav Nahman]. [I mean to say that the general approach is to read of books of Rav Nahman and Rav Natan aloud--and I listened a few minutes.
The statement of Rav Natan was basically about "חכמות חיצוניות" [secular wisdom].
 This seems to be an argument between rishonim. There are those that go along the lines of Saadia Gaon and the Rambam that see certain secular subjects as important. There are others that say no.

I am not really sure how to deal with this issue. To me the whole emphasis on not learning secular wisdom seems to be with intention to create a kind of alternative society. --The idea is to create a kind of insulation from the outside world.
 The same thing seems to be the emphasis on dress and the skull cap and women's dress. It all seems to be geared towards creating a separate society where the religious are in charge.

I can not think of a worse nightmare than imagining the religious to be in charge. Enough said for the wise.

On the other hand I can how a great deal of secular subjects are rotten--like anything that has the word "studies".

My own approach is more or less based on the Rambam in Mishne Torah in the part that deal with learning Torah and the part in particular that says to divide one's time into three parts. There the Ramabm says one part goes for the written law. Another third for the Oral Law. And the third for Gemara. Then the Rambam adds, "The subjects discussed in the first four chapter of Mishna Torah which are called Pardes are in the category of the Gemara."
Those subjects are what the ancient Greeks called Physics and Meta-physics. [The Ramabm repeats this in the Guide.] You can see this in the Hovot Levavot also[Obligations of the Heart by Ibn Pakuda].

I can see how the world changed from when I was growing up. The world I grew up in was optimistic and open. Southern California. Things were a little different in the two yeshivas I went to  in NY Shar Yashuv and the Mir but the same atmosphere or classic American optimism was there. Then I kind of wne into a period of hibernation. I was in the Vishniz community in Meor Haim in Safed for a few years and totally lost contact with the outside world. I spent most of my time in the basic path path of Rav Nahman from Breslov of Hitbodadut.[[Talking with God in the forest]. And there was a kind of Divine light that filled the atmosphere in those days. Then it all fell through. So when I awoke the world had changed drastically. I think a lot had to do with crimes that had changed people's perspective. The world was filled with suspicion one for the other. Maybe it is justified suspicion. But it seems to me it is usually misplaced. There are lots of deviants and sadistic monstors. But they are never the people that are usually suspected.

As Rav Nahman himself made a point of this in his critique of Torah Scholars that are demons.

Today I would probably have taken Rav Nahman's teachings in a more balanced way. My center of gravity would be along the lines of the Gra and Rav Shach, while at the same time I would try to follow what is valuable and important in Rav Nahman's teachings.

Rambam in laws of Nedarim chapter 1 law 19.

I have a question in the Rambam in laws of Nedarim chapter 1 law 19.
The question that I have is one that it looks like Rav Joseph Karo and the Radvaz answer but their answers look to me to be hard to understand.


The basic issue is this. There is a teaching in the Gemara that says hulin the hulin like hulin whether \I will eat of yours or will not is permitted. "'Hulin I will not eat of yours' is forbidden. 'Not hulin I will not eat of yours' is permitted."

The Rambam says, "'Not hulin I will not eat of yours' is forbidden." [Nedarim 1:19]

Now with the Radvaz, the Rambam holds like R Yehuda that from a negative we can understand what would result in a positive. So it makes sense why the Rambam would disagree with the end of that teaching. However the question I have is that, "How does it make sense?" Should not two negatives result in a positive?

Rav Joseph Karo holds the Rambam holds like R Meir that from a negative one can not derive a positive. So I am not sure how to deal with this issue. I saw a few days ago that Rav Shach has some ideas on this subject but I still have not gotten a chance to get over to the Litvak Beit Midrash where the Avi Ezri of Rav Shach is located to study carefully what he says.

I just wanted to give a short idea of who I am for those that are wondering. I was born into an amazing family. My parents loved each other and us [their children very much]. I went to public school until it became time to choose a university and instead i decided to go to Shar Yashuv [a Litvak Yeshiva in NY] and then the Mir in NY. And then to Israel.
The experience I had in the Mir was formative of my attitudes about the importance of learning Torah and trust in God.
I have not been able to continue on that path very well and so I also went to Polytechnic Institute of NYU for Physics.

the existence of time

McTaggart argues against the existence of time. I forget the argument. I was not like Kant's. But locality is well established. as in Special Relativity. Which means cause and effect have to be close to each other and in sequence. The only way I can see Kant's point is if time is circular like Godel wanted to show.


The way you can see that causality [or locality is correct is by GPS [Global Positioning System]. Both Special Relativity and General Relativity have to be right for the system to work at all.
However there is a  set up that Einstein Podolsky Rosen thought up that Bell showed that Quantum Mechanics is  right. So you can  show from the inequality of Bell that either locality is not right or that particles do not have classical values until measured. So since we know locality is right therefore we have to take the second choice. Particles do not have classical values until measured.

I one time wrote to Dr Kelley Ross asking about this result which looks a  lot like Kant. I asked him that de-coherence is well known phenomenon. That means the wave function of particles collapses even just because a particle interacts with another particle. That is what makes Quantum computing hard to set up. He answered that some people argue that if your look at the big picture in which the lab itself is a part of the system we still have the result that things do not have classical values until measured.

Just to be a little more clear about the issues I raised in my blog from yesterday I want to explain a little as best I can.

The idea of R.   Meier is this. You can not derive a plus from a minus, a yes from a no. That means let us says you have a sentence, "If it is raining it must be wet outside." To R. Meier you can not derive "If it is not raining it is dry outside." And this came up in one of my little books on Shas. But I had forgotten this whole issue about R Meir.

This comes up in the Talumd tractate "Nedarim" page 11 side A. and in the book of Rav Shach on the Rambam laws of nedarim vows chapter 1 law 18 [actually 18 through 20].

The problem in the Rambam is in law 18 he says, '"That which I will eat of yours is not secular" and then he is forbidden to eat of anything that belongs to the other person.' That is like the Sages against R Meir.. Then in law 20 he says, "That which I will eat of yours is secular or that which I will not eat of yours is secular and that is allowed to eat from the other fellow,' and that is like R Meir. So everyone wants to answer how can the Rambam decide the law in two contradictory ways? The Radvaz [Rav David ben Zimrah], the Migdal Oz [Rav Shem Tov from Spain], and Rav Elazar Shach  and Rav Yoseph Karo each try to answer this question.


I have nothing new to add here except that I can see that I really must have been a real ignoramus (am haaretz) when I was at the Mir, because this exact chapter in Nedarim is what the whole yeshiva was learning in my first six months there and I can see now that I was completely unaware of the issues that ought to be obvious to anyone learning Nedarim--but I missed all these issues.

daughter of an"am Haaretz" -ignoramus

I was surprised to see in the commentary of the Rambam on the Mishna  that one is not allowed to marry the daughter of an"am haaretz"[that is a ignoramus]. That is it is not just good advice but actual a law. Then I noticed the same thing in Mishne Torah of the Rambam. This goes to show what they used to say in the Mir Yeshiva [during the short period I was there] concerning the choice of whom to marry: "If your wife wants you to learn Torah,- you will. If she does not want it,- then you won't."

This is an important point to consider when thinking about marriage.
 When at the Mir, I was hoping for this kind of shiduch. In the meantime, the girl [whom I knew from high school] who had been writing and calling me for years to get me, just seemed to not want to give up. I tried to explain to her nicely, and not nicely, that I was not interested in her. Yet, she just did not  give up. So one day, on the phone trying to find a place for her for the Sabbath meals, I was on the phone with Arye Kaplan. He asked why I did not marry her? I said, I wished for a daughter of a person that was into learning Torah{as in the path of the Mir}. His reaction to that was that it was not possible that I would be offered anyone else in the religious world except for a baalat mum [a person with a hidden defect]. [That is to say, I should marry her since she is a good girl that I know very well. That is preferable to someone I do not know, and would find later problems with.] So I talked afterwards to Rav Getz, a good Torah scholar who learned at the Mir. He also suggested that I marry her.[I did. Soon after we went on the normal 6 dates--every motzai Shabat. And for a while I stayed at the Mir [I forget how long. Maybe two years I think. Then Israel. So for a good long time se stuck with me as I was learning Torah and she deserves credit for that,]  


I ought to add that these issues are not all that clear, since it is possible to have a girl that wants you to learn Torah even though her background might be not religious at all. And on the opposite side of things you might have  a girl from a religious background that wants one to work. But in any case, I suggest that if one is into learning Torah in the way of the Gra and the Litvak Yeshiva World. I suggest  that this issue ought to be  a first priority. For it is hard for most people to realize what the issue is all about. It is not that it is "good idea" to learn Torah. It is more or less that learning Torah is the purpose of life and of the creation of the universe. It is the first priority beyond anything else imaginable. It is hard to see this. For I myself having fallen from this ideal find it hard to describe. But in fact there is a profound truth in this that is more or less impossible to communicate to anyone who does not already feel it deep inside of him or her.
[In later times I got involved in Physics and Mathematics, yet I feel that even though these are also important, still I wish I had been able to contunue in Torah.] The thing is --it is hard to find the right balance.

Talmud Nedarim page 11

From "no" you hear "yes". That is the sages. However R. Meier hold not. This comes up in the Talmud Nedarim page 11 and in Rav Shach's Avi Ezriin laws of Nedarim chapter 1 law 18.

I had forgotten this whole issue and because of this I would like to add a comment on my little books on Bava Mezia and Shas. But I can not because the police have my computer.
There are probably tons of things going on in this chapter in the Avi Ezri -- but the first thing that occurs to me is how this relates to a comment made my my learning partner David Bronson a few years ago.

The basic idea is this.Rashi in Bava Mezia had some comment If A then B therefore if not A then not B. I objected to this because of Aristotelian logic Even if it is true that it is raining it is wet outside but there might be other reasons for it to be wet. Therefore if it is wet that does not mean it is raining. Someone might have turned on their sprinklers.
Then David noticed in laws of sacrifices this same argument came up between Rava and the gemara.

This I wrote down in my notes. But at the time I was not aware of this disagreement between the sages and R Meier. So now it looks like Rava was going like the sages and the Gemara was going like R. Meier.
And from what I can tell that is how Rav Joseph Karo answers the problem in the Rambam himself who on the surface looks like he contradicts himself between law 18 and law 20 in laws of Nedarim chapter 1.
But I was in a Lithuanian Beit Midrash today where they have a copy of Rav Shach's Avi Ezri and from my brief glance I could see that he has a different way of answering for the Rambam.
He makes a distinction beween "hatfasa" התפסה and prohibition. But I still have not had a chance to learn what Rav Shach says thoroughly.

In any case the basic idea is this לא חולין שאוכל לך אסור כחכמים. הלכה י''ח. חולין שאוכל לך מותר כר' מאיר. הלכה כ

There is something in laws of Truma of the Rambam [chapter  1] that I have a hard time with. It comes from a well known statement of Reish Lakish that if one takes the first tithe before he takes truma from sheaves of wheat that have not yet been separated and grounded then the Levi does not have to take truma but only maasar. In that the Rambam is going like the Babylonian Talmud [Abyee], not like the Jerusalem Talmud. The Jerusalem Talmud holds that the Levi gives truma only if the tithe was taken after the crops became obligated. The thing that I find confusing is that in the first case the crops are tevel [obligated after the grinding] and the maasar is not even maasar. So why would the maasar be anything but a present/gift? The tithe was given before the crops even became obligated, so the maasar is not even maasar. In the case of the Jerusalem Talmud, the crops are actual tevel and still there is no obligation to give truma.

These are not really hard questions once you have verses which state that that is just the way it is. But what is odd is the Rambam says the reason in the first case is that the crops have not yet been obligated in truma. How is that a reason? In both cases you have real tevel that is not going to have truma taken from it. So on either Gemara I really have no question. It is rather the reason the Rambam gives that I find hard to understand.

The new idolatry is worship of religious leaders. Israel is so full of this that it is almost impossible to go anywhere without encountering it. This was one of the major reasons I did not want to return to Israel. As you can see in tractate Avoda Zara to go anywhere where there is avoda zara [idolatry] is a problem.
I knew there might be  probvlem but I was not aware of how extensive it is. If only Rav Shach and the Gra had been listened to, this would nopt be an issue. But for some reason even in the Litvak wolrd they are ignored for the most part.

The lowest I.Q. among all university majors

The lowest I.Q. among all university majors is the people that go into social work. And they are the people that decide whether you can keep your children? And interview children to see if they have been hurt by an adult? As in "did so and so hurt you".[That is they ask leading questions to get the children to say what they want to hear.] You must be kidding. social workers ought to be put away in some insane asylum so they can stop hurting people themselves. Asking a social worker to interview kids is like asking a monkey to do the same.
Psychologists are almost as stupid as social workers--but not quite. But they certainly think they are superior beings.

The Hegelian State is not so absurd in my eyes. I think Communism is in its very core based on serious mistake like the Labor Theory of Value--even thought that was accepted as fact in the time of Marx--still it is not true that they value of any thing depends on how much labor went into making it. Rather it depends on how much people want to buy it.

And Hegel's model was in any case meant to help avoid the insane chaos that was the French Revolution.
And what then is up with China?
Dr Michael Huemer and Kelley Ross are against Communism in any and all forms for very good reasons and yet how else can one take control of chaos before it gets out of hand? Anyone who has been to Ukraine knows there is some kind of elements in the population that are simply crimnal and there is  alarge percent. They are not WASPS [White Anglo Saxon Protestants]. And then good elemenst are either in fact Russian DNA or Russia leaning.

In the Talmud in Nazir you have a case around page 32 or so where two people see someone coming. One thinks it is George and the other says it is Simon. The one that said it is George says "if it is Simon I will be a nazirite." The one that says it is Simon says "if it is George I will be  a Nazirite" If it is Simon the first one who thought it is George is a nazirite.

Why is this any different from nidrei zeruzim of other kinds of vow where one really does not intend the vow to actually become obligated?

I always had a kind of conflict between learning fast as I wanted to do{as I saw in a few books] in Shar Yashuv and the fact that Rav Friefeld and his son Moti were always recommending review.

So what I did was this kind of compromise that I would do the actual paragraph of the gemara twice with Rashi and also one time the English translation in the Soncino.

The idea of a sort of minimal review seemed to help me then and later on also when I was in university learning Physics I also had this kind of minimal review approach. That is one time to review the page or paragraph and go on.

This is not exactly the way of Rav Nahman that was to read the words i.e. say them in a whisper or out loud, and go on without review until you reach the end of the book and then review. But neither was it was Rav Freifeld was.


In Shar Yashuv [a Litvak yeshiva that went more or less along the path of the Gra.] They were doing Gemara in a deep way that was different from the Mir where I went later on. In Shar Yashuv the way was kind of what is called in Israel" To calculate the sugia" that is intense analysis ofg the actual words of the Gemara and Tosphot. Later in the Mir and especially with Rav Shmuel Berenbaum I saw a different approach that was based on Rav Haim Soloveichik which was global--and not concentrated on that one page in front of you. I benefited from both approaches but again as I mentioned up above when it came to personal; learning I found this kind of method of review of the paragraph twice and going on to be the thing that worked for me best. 

The basic background in Bava Mezia 101a as far as I can recall is this:
The Mishna brings the law that a renter of a field in Israel from an non Jew, takes maasar (tithe) and then pays the non Jew (probably Arab). The reason is that you can not pay your debts with tevel (produce that has not had tithes taken from it). R. Yehuda adds "also a sharecropper must take tithes and then pay." The Gemara says at first it looks like a gentile has no possesion in such a way that the crops are not obligated in tithe and a sharecropper is like a renter.

Then the Gemara brings a braita that says that R Yehuda said his law only in the case of a gentile that took the ground without paying for it. That is he stole it.  So the Gemara concludes that there is possesion and a sharecropper is not like a renter.


Sharecropping is when the worker shares some percent of the crops like Frank Hamer used to do before he became a Texas Ranger and brought down Bonnie and Clyde. 

Some questions in Bava Mezia 101a

The main question in בבא מציעא קא ע''א was noted by my learning partner. Why does the גמרא change to מקבל לאו כחוכר דמי that means the אריס is not like the חוכר. Another question is what is the relevance of the ברייתא to the משנה?  Obviously the ברייתא disagrees with the משנה concerning the opinion of  ר' יהודה. So what possible conclusion can you draw from the ברייתא to the משנה? The next question ought to be this. Let us say that we can learn something from the ברייתא to the משנה. Clearly the גמרא holds that we can do so. So we have to learn one of two things. אפשרות א' יש קניין ללא יהודי בארץ ישראל and leave the law of ר' יהודה concerning אריסות in ישראל in its place. Or אפשרות שנייה say ר' יהודה  is only talking about a specific field and leave אין קניין in place. For some reason the גמרא changes to יש קניין and also to a specific field and then changes something that there is no need to change. מקבל לאו כחוכר.
But furthermore רש''י and the רמב''ם have a different way of explaining the גמרא than תוספות. For some reason רש''י and the רמב''ם think the conclusion of the גמרא holds even if אין קניין which is exactly what the גמרא says is impossible to say. And besides that, what does יש קניין means? This seems to vary according to which גמרא you are learning בכורות , גיטין, או בבא מציעא.  The way that at least the גמרא looks to be in בבא מציעא is יש קניין, but if a ישראלי buys the field back, then it is obligated in תרומה and מעשר. So what is the difference between יש קניין לאין קניין. They both hold תבואה that grew in the possession of a אינו יהודי and were finished in the hands of a אינו יהודי אז אינה חייבת בתרומה. And they both hold if the Israeli buys it back then the crops are obligated.


השאלה המרכזית בבבא מציעא קא ע''א צוין על ידי שותף הלמידה שלי. מדוע משנה הגמרא מקבל לאו כחוכר דמי (פירושו האריס לא כמו החוכר). שאלה נוספת היא מה היא הרלוונטיות של ברייתא אל המשנה? ברור שהברייתא חולקת על המשנה לגבי דעתו של ר' יהודה. אז איזו מסקנה אפשרית אתה יכול להסיק מן הברייתא אל המשנה? השאלה הבאה צריכה להיות זו. תן לנו לומר שאנחנו יכולים ללמוד משהו מן הברייתא אל המשנה. ברור הגמרא גורסת כי אנו יכולים לעשות זאת. אז אנחנו צריכים ללמוד אחד משני דברים. אפשרות א 'יש קניין ללא יהודי בארץ ישראל ולהשאיר את החוק של ר' יהודה בנוגע לאריסות בישראל במקומו. או אפשרות שנייה, אומרים ר" יהודה רק מדבר על שדה מסוים ולהשאיר אין קניין במקום. מסיבה כלשהי גמרא עושה השינויים הבאים: יש קניין גם שדה מסוים ולאחר מכן היא משנה משהו שאין צורך לשנות,היינו מקבל לאו כחוכר
אבל יתרה מכך לרש''י ולרמב''ם יש דרך אחרת להסביר את הגמרא מתוספות. מסיבהלא ידועה לי רש''י ורמב''ם חושבים שהמסקנה קיימת גם אם אין קניין וזה בדיוק מה הגמרא אומרת שאי אפשר לומר. וחוץ מזה, מה כוונת יש קניין? זה נראה להשתנות לפי הגמרא שאתה לומד בכורות, גיטין, או בבא מציעא. הדרך שהגמרא בבבא מציעא מבינה יש קניין היא שאם ישראלי קונה את השדה בחזרה, אז הוא מחויבת בתרומה ומעשר. אז מה ההבדל בין יש קניין לאין הקניין? שניהם מחזיקים תבואה שגדלה ברשותו של אינו יהודי וסיומו של העבודה היה בידי אינו יהודי אז התבוה אינה חייבת בתרומה. ושניהם מחזיקים אם הישראלי קונה את הקרקע בחזרה ואז תבואה מחויבת.

I am no philosopher but from the little that I know it seems to be that the school of thought of Kelly Ross [The Kant Friesian School]  is very important. The thing that I think is important about it is that the specific approach of Kelly Ross is an expansion  of Leonard Nelson. [However to give credit where credit is due I have the impression that in Poland they do learn the approach of Leonard Nelson]

The thing is that I am not saying that that is the only thing in philosophy which looks important to me. I also think Micheael Huemer and Danny Frederik and Hegel are very important in terms of the logos that is needed to come to truth and justice. That is I think that philosophy is not just important for it's conclusions but also as a way of life--the need to search for the truth.

LT Hobhouse and Bradly repudiated the meta-physical theory of the state which was more or less started by Hegel. They might be right about that. It seems to me that in terms of the state and its function Thomas Jefferson has things right.

Bava Mezia 101a

The main issue in Bava Mezia 101a was noted by my learning partner (D Bronson) why does the Gemara change to the sharecropper is not like the renter.But there are a lot more questions that are there but they are no easy for me to explain simply. One issue is what is the relevance of the Braita to the Mishna? Obviously the Braita disagrees with the mishna concerning the opinion of R> Yehuda. So what possible conclusion can you draw from the Braita to the Misha. The next question ought to be this: let us say that we can learn something from the braita to the Mishna as clearly the Gemara holds that we can do. So we have to learn one of two things: 1 there is possession and leave the law of ר' יהודה concerning אריסות in Israel in its place. Or 2 say R Yehuda is only talking about a specific field and leave there is no possession in place. For some reason the Gemara changes to there is possession and also to a specific field and then changes something that there is no need to change.
These seems to be questions with no answers I can imagine. But furthermore Rashi and the Rambam have a different way of explaining the Gemara than Tosphot and Tosphot. Tosphot is clear but for some reason rashi and the Rambam think the conclusion of the gemara holds even if there is possession which is exactly what the Gemara says is impossible to say. And besides that what does there is possession means? This seems to vary according to which gemra you are learning behorot, Gitin, bava mezia .... The way that at least the Gemara looks to be in Bava Mezia is there is possession but if a Israel buys they field back then it is obligated in truman and maasar --and so what is the difference between there is possession of there is no possession. They both hold crops that grew in the possession of a gentile and were finished in the hands of a gentile are no obligated in truma. And they both hold if the Israeli buys it back then the crops are obligated.

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The main question in בבא מציעא קא ע''א was noted by my learning partner. Why does the גמרא change to מקבל לאו כחוכר דמי that means the אריס is not like the חוכר. Another question is what is the relevance of the ברייתא to the משנה?  Obviously the ברייתא disagrees with the משנה concerning the opinion of  ר' יהודה. So what possible conclusion can you draw from the ברייתא to the משנה? The next question ought to be this. Let us say that we can learn something from the ברייתא to the משנה. Clearly the גמרא holds that we can do so. So we have to learn one of two things. אפשרות א' יש קניין ללא יהודי בארץ ישראל and leave the law of ר' יהודה concerning אריסות in ישראל in its place. Or אפשרות שנייה say ר' יהודה  is only talking about a specific field and leave אין קניין in place. For some reason the גמרא changes to יש קניין and also to a specific field and then changes something that there is no need to change. מקבל לאו כחוכר.
But furthermore רש''י and the רמב''ם have a different way of explaining the גמרא than תוספות. For some reason רש''י and the רמב''ם think the conclusion of the גמרא holds even if אין קניין which is exactly what the גמרא says is impossible to say. And besides that, what does יש קניין means? This seems to vary according to which גמרא you are learning בכורות , גיטין, או בבא מציעא.  The way that at least the גמרא looks to be in בבא מציעא is יש קניין, but if a ישראלי buys the field back, then it is obligated in תרומה and מעשר. So what is the difference between יש קניין לאין קניין. They both hold תבואה that grew in the possession of a אינו יהודי and were finished in the hands of a אינו יהודי אז אינה חייבת בתרומה. And they both hold if the Israeli buys it back then the crops are obligated.

I think that Rav Nahman was not in the category of the excommunication of the Gra however I do think the excommunication was valid.
The reason is something I saw in a commentary of the Rambam Mishna LaMeleh in the beginning of laws of vows [Nedarim] where he brings the Beit Yoseph who brings the Tashbaz that a herem has a category of both a vow and an oath. There the ML himself disagrees and says it only has the category of a vow. Still the point is it is valid.
That is just like one can forbid the use of a loaf of bread on another by saying this loaf of bread is a korban [sanctified for the altar] to you"--so a herem excommunication also has that same kind of validity.

The reason this is relevant to me even though others ignore this issue is that I am horrified by how the Dark Side has taken over the religious world in Israel. I wish that the Gra and Rav Shach would have been listened to. 

Rav Nahman from Uman did not think very highly of being more strict than the letter of the law.

Rav Nahman from Uman did not think very highly of "Chumrot" which is to say being more strict than the letter of the law. I was in the same Na Nach Breslov place and they were learning the beginning of Rav Nahman's book the LM vol 1:8. He does not mention this idea there but he does go into the idea that is related. The actual place is in LM vol 2 around chapter 44 I think and also around 82.
There Rav Nahman does bring up the problem of religious authorities that are demonic for the first time -and that is a recurring theme in the LM.
I was reminded of this by reading the Commentary of Rav Joseph Karo on the Rambam where he brings the case of Shmuel the amora telling one person that he must use the oil of gentiles or he would declare him a zaken mamre rebellious elder.

I was at the Na Nach Nachma Nachman from Uman [in Israel]  place today and did some learning. Then I went to take a nap and when I woke up I had an idea that might help R. Shimshon [a grandson of Rashi].
The question that the Radvaz raised on R Shimshon was that if in the grain stack there is half tithes and half secular grain then how can one take a tithe for it. The answer is that he takes double and calls a name only on a half.
That is like this. In the Mishna in Trume 4 we have a mishna that goes like  this: המפריש מקצת ת''ום מוציא ממנו תרומה עליו אבל לא למקום אחר One who separates only a part of truma or tithe [maisar] takes out truma from it but not to another place. RS [R. Shimshon] says the idea is that the separation is valid but he needs to complete the amount.
The is the basic background. Now the question is let's say that now the stack is half tevel and half secular. So how can he take tithe? [This question is of the Radvaz.]
The answer is this. Let's say that you have 100lbs of grain and one takes 5 lbs for tithe instead of ten. So now the stack is half tevel and half hulin. So what to do is to separate another 10 lbs and to say: "the five lbs of tevel in this ten lbs is now tithe for the rest of the 50 lbs of tevel that are in the stack." Then the stack is now completely  taken care of. but your ten lbs is now half tithe and half secular. Then you could give the whole thing to a Levi. You would lose a little bit of your own grain but tehstack would be okay.

This answer clearly helps R. Shimshon. However there is still the Rambam left to try to answer for. The problem in the Rambam is the exact same one that comes up in R Shimshon but the answer I gave for RS does not work for the Rambam. The issue is this. In Truma 3 law 7 the Rambam brings that same mishna but holds the separation is not valid at all.  But in law 6 he says one who intends to separate 1/60 but instead took 1/61 --the separation is valid but he finishes the required amount. As Rav Shach points out in the Avi Ezri we see that the difference between law 6 and law 7 is that is law 6 he intends to finish the amount. In law 7 he does not. So in law 7 the separation is not valid.
The answer for the Rambam I think is that here he talks about truma alone and in that there is no problem of amounts. If he continues the process it is valid even if he takes just 1/60-1/61. And in fact in laws of tithe the Rambam does not bring up the issue of when he intends to take more. So in that case as far as I can see he would say the same thing as I wrote up above for R Shimshon.

[The police still have my computer so I am still borrowing. I am not upset with the police because they easily could have put me away for ten years if they had wanted to. Instead they had compassion on me and that same night I was arrested, the officer Moshe Cohen asked me two questions. One was to make a search and the other he mentioned perhaps my son would be willing to sign for me. So we all went (about ten police officers) and the police actually did not search because Moshe my son answered the door and said there was nothing to search for and then they asked if he would be willing to come and sign for me and he said yes. That was one of the greatest moments in my life when I heard my son willing to stand up for. me. Still I am sad that I have not written any music or ideas in Torah.]

I had a thought also about something that Rav Shach [on laws of Truma ] I know does talk about in the Avi Ezri. [I do not recall what he said].
The mishna says one who takes only a fraction of the truma or tithe takes out truma from it but not to a different place. R. Meir said also to a different place. R. Shimshon says the idea is it is truma or tithe but he needs to finish. Example: 100 lbs tevel. He takes 5 lbs tithe. It is tithe but he takes another 5 lbs. The idea is to R Shimshon that the original stack is mixed with tevel and hulin but when he takes more tithe we says he is taking from the tevel.
 Rashi says something similar on a different topic in Gitin 47b.   Jew and gentile own crops together. Tevel and hulin are mixed to R. Yehuda Hanasi. Rashi says you take a tithe and assume you are taking tevel.

The answer for R Shimshon at this point is unclear. I tried last night to think about it but came up with nothing. I ought to mention the person that asks on R Shimshon is the Radvaz. Sometimes it takes a long time for me to come up with an acceptable answer for the baali Hatosfot.

Bava Mezia 101a

I have had a few ideas that I have not written down in Talmud. Most I forget but at least for now I would like to write down a few things.[Most of the ideas were written in Uman.]
I think i had some idea in bava Kama but I forget it.]
Bava Mezia 101a.  My idea here last night as I was drifting off to sleep was that the Ri [R. Isaac the grandson of Rashi] can answer a very obvious and essential question in the Gemara that I think both Rashi and the Rambam would have a lot of trouble answering. The question is this: why change R. Yehuda? He said the serf would have to give a tithe for any field in Israel and then for seemingly no reason the Gemara changes it to only a field that he once owned and then sold (to the Rambam) or was simply stolen (to Rashi).  While the Gemara was right to change to "there is possession" but that gives no reason to the Rambam or Rashi to change the opinion of R Yehudah.

I assume either Rav Shach or Rav Chaim Soloveitchik answer this somewhere but as far as I can see right now, the Ri is more sensible. {Anyway as D. Bronson always told me "Tosphot is always right."]

Just for background information: The Mishna says that a renter from a gentile in Israel has to take the tithe and then pay the rent. He can not pay the rent with un-tithed fruit. R. Yehuda adds a serf also. The Gemara starts out thinking like Rabah that a gentile has possession and a serf is like a renter. Then it changes both. The Ri says it changes both because one depends on the other. But the Rambam and Rashi hold those are independent variables.

I already wrote something about this in my little booklet on Bava Mezia but this idea I think is new.

I have more time but my back is hurting. So to be short let me just mention that that rambam hold "there is no possession" and yet hold like the Gemara's conclusion in Bava Mezia 101 about R Yehuda and so clearly he holds like Rashi that the conclusion of the Gemara does not depend on whether there is or there is not possession.

about Ukraine

My basic feeling about Ukraine is that things were better under the rule of the USSR. There seems to be a kind of inherent anti semitism  which was held in check during the time of the Soviets but has recently come to the surface. In the last place I was staying there there was a tunnel dug for the sake of immediate escape that the Jewish family that owned the house had dug. If you have ever been to the Ukraine you can imagine how hard that must have been since the levels under the ground are mainly made of hard solid granite. That tunnel was a mile long (from the river Ostashivka until some escape route towards  the town center.) and was still standing a hundred years later. So the pogroms before the soviets took power were serious enough for that Jewish family to be really terrified.
[To this day I still have no idea how that family could have dug that tunnel without electricity. and only with shovels.]
So when I read Hobhouse and his critique of the Hegelian State, I take it with a grain of salt. I realize that there are times and places where a strong central government is needed.

Frankly I have to admit I was also terrified when I was there. The attacks on me were getting more and more frequent and violent.

[Besides that there was the odd fact that almost every person that I asked in Uman how things were during the time of the USSR, every single one told me things were better. You can ask anyone in Uman that lived during the time of the USSR and all of them will tell you the same exact words "Things were better then."]

[Because I still have no computer I have to be short. And to be fair L.T. Hobhouse realizes himself that the balance between government and the individual is a hard problem to solve. And he also realizes that all social questions come about because some kind of problem has arisen.

The trouble to me seems to be that Wasps in the USA assume everyone is like them. They think importing an American kind of democracy into the Ukraine would make everything hunky dory.
They ought to try renting a room for a while there and then find out what things are really like.

My feeling about Tora

My feeling about Tora is that the basic approach of the Gra and Rav Shach is correct.--and to a large degree I feel it would have made a lot of sense to stick with their basic ideas of learning Torah in depth and trust in God. However I did get involved in Breslov. That helped in many ways, but it also seems to have gotten me off track. It would be nice to find a kind of middle path in which one could partake of the great insights of Rav Nahman, and yet stay within the context of the straight Lithuanian Yeshiva world.

So nowadays I try to find the path of balance- Gemara Tosphot, Rav Shach's Avi Ezri, Math, Physics and exercise. That seems to work for me.

The path of balance certainly was the approach of some Rishonim-- as you can see in some of the Musar books of that period.

As for the actual fact that sometimes the right path is unclear -I go with Kant-- that reason has a limit. When it gets into areas of values (dinge an sich) it gets into contradictions. In any case, as far as I can I would like to get back to the straight Torah path of the Gra and Rav Shach. Besides that I have no idea why they both have been ignored to a large extent except to pay lip service to them.
And for some reason my efforts to get back into striaght Tora have always been foiled. Maaybe I simply do not have the merit to be able to sit and learn Torah? Or is there some deeper reason?

Side note --if you go by the actual new moon, then passover falls on April 18 at night. That is the first day is April 19)

My feeling about Philosophy is that Dr Kelley Ross and Michael Huemer are simply not that far apart. If it is a matter of reason knowing things (as per the Kant Fries school) of Reason recognizing things like universals (as per Michael Huemer) I just do not see the difference as it applies to me. I can see however in philosophy itself there is a big difference. but not so much in practical application.

That is reason recognizes universals. Among universals are objective moral values that do not depend on the observer.[Even though as one of the critics of Michale Huemer pointed out [Danny Frederick] there is a difference between universals as predicates and universals as laws of either math or morals. Still it seems to be both schools of though as very close.[ That is the Kant Fries and the Intuitionists.]

Daughter of an Am Haaretz.

I noticed in the Rambam on the mishna [Sanhedrin chapter 9]that he says it is a sin to marry the daughter of an Am Haaretz [person ignorant of Mishna and Talmud.] I had thought that it is simply not advisable.

I wonder if I had taken this advice how things might have turned out differently.
For when I was discussing marriage with my future wife she asked what would happen if there would be no parnasa [money]? And I said I would go and find a job. [The background here is that I was in the Mir Yeshiva in NY at the time and we were planning on my continuing to learn Torah.]
This might very well be the reason that in fact later things fell apart. I might have answered like the sages said in the Chapters of the Fathers one who accepts on himself the yoke of Torah there is removed from him the yoke of the government and of making a living. I might have said if there is no money then I am not learning Torah hard enough and thus I should work harder on learning.

I am not saying eveything about the Litvak world that revolves on the Gra is right. I realize there is an array of values. But what I am saying is that I had found the one thing that worked for me. Learning Torah at the Mir. It seems to me that it was a failure on my part not to be committed to this approach at all cost.

[Nowdays I have a wider constalation of values but for me to list them here would make no sense since many of them apparanetly conflict one with the other. My question is how to resolve this conflict? ]

The dialect of Hegel unfolds in time.

 I want to consider the possibility that the dialect of Hegel unfolds in time. This clearly is not like McTaggart, but I think that it makes sense. That is the basic process is really what you see in the Neo Platonic school of Plotinus. But with Plotinus is is logos which is bringing things about. But in any case the idea is this whole vast process of Hegel is unfolding in time. And this helps a lot. It helps to understand the main problem of this generation of disappointment. For example me. I went very deeply into the Litvak Torah world, but as is usual with the process of thesis anti thesis I found things not perfect. So what needs to be done is to get to the synthesis that finds what is right is both the thesis and antithesis.

The Mishna in Bava kama 36

The law of the Torah is an ox that has not yet considered  to be expected to gore only pays half damages. An ox gores 4 other oxen one after the other but still remains "tam". Each one was worth 200. [It perhaps did it not one after the other exactly] R Meir says the last one gets the whole amount and if anything is left over it goes the one before that etc. R. Shimon says the order is 100/100. The next time the division is 100/50/50. The next time 100/50/25/25.

In another case R. Ishmael considered the damaged ox to be a debtor.But R Akiva thinks the owners of each ox become partners with the owner.

The problem our Gemara brings up on page 36 is who is R. Meir going like? It concludes like R Ishmael. [I would expand on this but I have no computer and and just borrowing a friends for a few minutes.] The next opinion of RS is like R Akiva.

But if it is like RI then the first owner of the first damaged ox should get the whole sum, not the last. The Gemara says each owner of the subsequent ox grabbed the ox to hold it until he gets paid.

The Rif says R Shimon agrees if he grabs it he is a paid guard and he agrees with RM.
Both R. Ephraim and Rav Zarahia the Baal Hamaor degree with the Rif. As you can easily see why. If he would be right then there was no reason to say the opinion of RM is like RI. It could be R Akiva also.

The answer that I think makes sense here is the debate in Pesahim 30. A lender is not paid back on time so he gets some property of the borrower. So when is he considered to own that property? This is a debate over there but the Rif must be thinking that our gemara over here in Bava Kama is like the opinion the lender owns the property only after he collects it. But the Rif is thinking that the ox is different. It becomes a pledge and is owned from the time of the goring and if so then there would be no difference between R Akiva and R Ishmael and so in truth R Shimon who is like R akiva in our case is talking about a different case than R Meir.
Sorry I can not explain this in more detail. If you look it up it will be more clear. Anyway you can see this idea of mine in Tosphot Bava kama pg 33. where Tosphot brings it for a different reason.

The Rambam uses every opportunity to say that one should not use Torah to make money. So why has it become such a bussiness? I am not sure but today i met a girl from Brazil who recently arrived in Israel who mentioned that a lot of people in Israel are having trouble with making ends meet. [making enough to get by.] So the fact that a lot of people do not work but rather use Torah to make money makes little sense.

One thing I saw in my first yeshiva in Far Rockaway was the opinion of the Gra that every word of Torah is worth more that all the other commandments of Torah.He brings this from the Yerushalmi Talmud. And that fact sunk deeply into me. The only thing that has changed much is that because of the opinion of Maimonides and other rishonim is that I include Physics and math in the category of Torah.

When it come to Torah I try to spend time in the local Na Nach (Breslov) group's place. That seems to be the only place I can learn Torah.

But if I could I would try to have a balance between these separate areas of study.
But when it comes to Physics i try to use the approach of Rav Nahman of just saying the words as fast as possible and going on. I would try to show this from Rav Nahman's main books but I have to go since i have no computer and I am just borrowing a friend's.



[Maimonides also includes the Metaphysics of Aristotle in the category of learning Torah but I have not been able to spend much time in that area. And modern philosophy seems to have gotten off track in that area.]

Where you see clearly the approach of Maimonides about the importance of Physics is in the story brought in the very last chapter of a volume in the Guide [I forget which]. Where the people around the palace of the King are the people that learn Talmud and the people in the palace are the physicists.and philosophers.

I myself had never even noticed this until I saw it quouted in a book by David Hartman

Rav Nachman emphasized not to masturbate but this can be taken too far in that people think this is worse than actual things that are forbidden in the Torah.Even though Rav Nahman was certainly right that it needs a correction to say the ten Psalms [16,32, 41, 42, 59, 77,90, 105 137, 150.] but still it is not an actual prohibition in the Torah.

The way to learn Torah is to say the words and go on.

The way Rav Nahman said to learn Torah was to say the words and go on. [See Conversations of Rav Nahman 76. Also there are places like the Le.M I perek 12 which indicate the same idea::דע כי על ידי אמצעות הדיבור יכולים לבוא לתבונות התורה לעומקה. The LeM is the major work of Rav Nahman. 

This approach I found to be the only way I could learn Physics and Math also.

But it took me a long time until I stated applying this method to Physics. My parents had always been very pleased when I showed interest in Physics, but until I saw this in the חובות לבבות and also Maimonides the message did not really sink into me.

 But I should add the idea of review ten times as away of doing one's in depth sessions. This I heard in Shar Yashuv by Rav Freifeld. And the in depth session should be in the morning and the fast sessions in the afternoon as they do in all Litvak yeshivot.

I have found it best to learn in the local Na Nach synagogue. I tried a Litvack place for a while but that did not work out very well. [Na Nach is agroup of Breslov people that follow Rav Nachman from Uman.]

the mishna in Bava Kama the beginning of chapter 4.
The basic order is this you keep on dividing the amount by half. But instead of it going to the last one it always goes to the first one. In that way each Nizak (person that was damaged) keeps slipping down one notch.

[Just for background information the mishna says if an ox gores another ox then they divide [as it says in the Torah] the sum of the goring ox. So if both were 200 and the gored ox is now worth nothing, then each gets 100. If it gores again then the last one gets 100 and the two early ones get 50 each. If it gores again the last one gets 100, the earlier one50 and the last two 25 each.

The problem I think there is with philosophy is that it got involved in trivial questions. It nowadays asks how do we know stuff  epistemology and metaphysics It denies completely.
Originally it was asking what is the meaning of it all?

One thing that always turned me off to philosophy is when they start talking about language. The reason I see this as a waste of time is that there is a serious difference between language and real facts.The difference is this: real facts are objective. They exist even if there were no people around to notice them. Language on the other hand is completely and absolutely subjective. The words one says and that one hears have no meaning at all except for what people attach to them. There is nothing objective about it at all.

Still there are nowadays some real remarkable thinkers in philosophy.  Kelley Ross and Michael Huemer.

Hegel and Heidegger were certainly thinking about the big picture but besides Heidigger, twentieth century philosophy got to be a real wasteland of triviality.

Rav Shmuel Berenbaum once gave a talk in the Mir in NY that when one marries a woman there are two kinds of acquisition that happen. One is marriage and the other is monetary acquisitions.
He used this idea to asnwer some questions that I forgot. However I had a few thoughts about this. One is that this idea actually comes from the Gemara in Ketuboth itself between Abyee and Rava.

The other thought I had is to ask how can this fit with the Rambam who holds that when two people make an agreement to make partnership and have witness and sign an document that nothing happens since there is nothing upon which the acquisition can occur. אין קנין חל על דבר שלא בא לעולםץ So for a while I thought Rav Shmuel was only talking according to the opinion of the Raavad. But then it occurred to me that there are obligations that happen just because of a persons status.

I am rushing to write this so I am being too short I know. Anyway I think that the Rambam was only talking about a partnership in which there is no physical acquisitions. But with marriage there is on someone upon whom the obligations occur. It is a case of קנין דקל לפירותיו

I had a lot of thoughts about this but I have no time to write. But I did want to add just one short thought: that all the things that the husband acquires are all rabbinical laws --see Ketubotthis chapter 4 and 5. Not that this makes any difference but it is a point because perhaps one can say that  kind of acquisition can occur by means of a Torah kind of Acquisition.

Bava Metzia 115. Tosphot first words "widow" on page 115.

I have an idea on a way to answer the question the Maharasha asks on the Maharshal. The main idea is based on the statement of Shmuel on page 113 that a messenger of the court can not go into the house of the borrower to take a pledge when the time to repay the loan has come and the borrower has not yet paid. Rav Joseph asks on Shmuel from two verses about a widow and a mill stone that one can not take either and it uses the word לא תחבול "do not take the pledge of a widow". The word implies going into the house. The Gemara answers for the widow and millstone the messenger of the court transgress two prohibitions while for any other borrower only one prohibition.

The Tosphot asks why does the Gemara not ask from the mishna on pg 115? and they answer that the answer would be the same as it gives for the question of Rav Joseph.
The Maharshal says Rav Joseph is asking from two braitot. The maharsha says the question of Tosphot is not like the Maharshal thought to be on Rav Joseph but on the later Gemara that does ask from two braitot.

As you know I have no computer to be able to spend time writing this so I can only write in short my basic idea. My idea is this. That we can answer for the Maharshal thus: the Gemara would not have wanted to ask from the Mishna after the question of Rav Joseph from two verses because in fact the answer would have been the same as the answer for Rav Joseph while the question that the Gemara in fact asks later from a braita the Gemara makes progress--it discovers that there is an argumentbetween the Tenaim about the opinion of Shmuel. Therefore it makes more sense to say the question obn Tosphot is in fact on Rav josph himself.

Sorry if this is not clear enough but if you look up the Maharsha you will see easily my point here.

book of Esther

In the book of Esther it never says to people that live in walled cities to make Purim on the 15th. All it says is Jews that live in unwalled cities make it on the 14th and then right away goes on to say that Mordecai sent letters throughout Peria to make Purim on the 14 and the 15th. It says nothing about Jews that live in walled cities. This might account for the fact that Rav Nahman of Breslov said that Shushan Purim is also Purim.

[The way I noticed this is because right after the verse saying that Jews in un-walled cities make Purim on 14th you expect it to say something about Jews in walled cities. But instead it simply skips the subject.]

[a wife that refuses her husband] is not well known Mishna Ketuboth פרק אף על פי

The law of a מורדת [a wife that refuses sex to her husband] is not well known so I thought to bring some of the details.[Even though there is a lot of things in this subject that are confusing to me.] In the Mishna itself you only get the bare outlines of the subject. But in the Tur and the Shulhan Aruch of Rav Joseph Karo you get a lot more details--surprising details in fact.
The first thing that is a surprise is that this law applies to a woman that wants a divorce.
So since I have little time and no computer [except on borrowed time from a friend] I would like to write the basic ideas.
The first category is a woman that refuses her husband but wants her ketubah. and she says מאיס עלי.[That is she claims she is not able to live with him anymore because he is wasting all his money or that she simply can not have sex with him because of disgust.]
That category gets the regular law of a rebellious wife that loses her ketubah. [There is a announcement in the local synagogue that she is a rebellious wife and she will lose her ketubah for four weeks. then after 4 weeks some say she loses her whole ketubah right away and some say only after 12 months.
The next category is she does not ask for the ketubah. She still get the same law but she does not have to live with him. In the first category she is forced to work for him.

In any case this is certainly one of those areas that are sensitive and sadlly no very well known.


[During those four weeks there seems to be a degree of confusion how much she loses of her ketunah every week. Or at least I can not figure it out. It seems to be 7 dinars [a dinar equals silver of the weight of 12 barley beans. That is a dinar in the time of the Talmud. But a dinar of the Torah is 8 times more. But it seems that everyone agrees it is a dinar of the Talmud period. The problem that I am having here is the next opinion in the mishna that says she loses a "tarpik" and the Rav of Bartenura explains that to be a tarpik of the Torah. So I can not figure of if he is thinking the dinar also is of the Torah of not.]

[I had to go through this kind of thing myself and the sad thing is that my wife was talked into getting rid of me by the religious leaders that present themselves as being pro family values. So I saw first hand what a lot of people say about the Jewish religious world--that it is evil and insane and just the opposite of Torah values. Rav Nahman of Brslov already said as much but I simply did not pay attention to him until the facts presented themselves to me in the most harsh way possible. The religious make a big show of righteousness but the facts are very different.]

When I was growing up you never saw a book by Hegel or any of the German idealists around in libraries of in bookstores. Never. In my high school library I recall there was some side writings by Kant but not any of the three Critiques.

But lots of the post modern garbage was out there. Lots.

Thinking back to it I think people were blaming Kant and Hegel  for WWI and WWII.

Why I mention this is that even though Hegel has problems still I think that McTaggart deals with a lot of them very well. And as for Kant I think that there also are plenty of problems but I think Leonard Nelson and the Friesian School of Kelley Ross deals with them very well.

Possession by the dark side from a biological perspective

The problem of possession by the Dark Side is not something that people think much about nowadays. And even when Rav Nahman from Breslov mentions the problem with religious leaders as being in general possessed by the Dark Side, few people really connect the dots.

I also would not think much about it except I saw recently a book by Daniel Defoe that goes into this problem and as I was thinking about it I was reminded about Howard Bloom's The Lucifer Principle.
And then it occurred to me the whole thing about toxo-Plasmosis.That even in the physical realm there is such a thing.If I would have a computer and be able to blog I might have written about this but now since I can's I simply am recommending that people pay a bit more attention to what Rav Nahman [Breslov and Uman] was saying because it has a strong basis in evidence and also makes sense beyond what it seems like at first.

To see the idea of possession by the dark side from a biological perspective see the lectures of Sapolsky at Stanford.

Howard Bloom approaches the subject from a different angle--that of the super-organism.
In the Middle Ages this was also a large subject. Even in Rouen where the trial of Joan [Jeene] of Arc was there were multiple trials on the issue at the same time. How can you tell if someone's visions are from the realm of hiliness or not?

I feel that sometimes you see in  life that everything is going well for a good long time and then everything falls apart. You can see this with Joan of Arc who had astounding success --for a while. A 17 year old girl declared war on the one of the  powerful Empires in the world and won. She said she would raise raise the seige of Orleans--and did so. She said she would have Charles VII crowned King in Reims and led him through enemy territory and had him crowned King of all France. And then she was captured and burnt at the stake. But somehow even in her fall there was something astounding. The trial was recorded almost word for word. Without that all there would be today would be an unconfirmed legend.

Now I do not think that I or anyone else can compare ourselves to Joan of Arc but still there is a lesson to learn from all that--that things can go great for sometime and then suddenly stop. But even in that time of fall there is still the compassion of God and helps in hidden ways.

an idea from the Ramban [Rav Moshe ben Nachman]

I hope that someone that has learn authentic Torah will start a blog. I am clocking out of blogging out of force of circumstances.I have no computer is it is only on rare occasions I can borrow from a friend.

Even if the police decide to give me back my computer, that does not mean I will be able to go back to writing music or ideas in Torah like I used to do in Uman. I realized even before I got to Israel that it was likely that things would be hard here. But to have my own daughter making false allegations against me was not expected.

In any case since I have a few minutes here I would like to take the opportunity to write an idea from the Ramban and a question I have about his idea.

In Bava Metzia there is a case of a person that loses an object and before he gives up on it someone else picks it up with intent to keep it. That is he decides to steal it. But then later after the owner has given up on it he decides to give it back to the owner. The Gemara says at that pointy he is simply giving back a present-. not fixing the original sin of theft.
The Baal HaMeor asks on this that the Torah holds there is a way to fix theft -and that is to give backthe object. השב תשיבם לאחיך.
The Ramban answers that that is only on regular theft. But here it is a case of an object that has been lost and then taken in theft. The difference is that theft is not owned by the thief if the owner gives up on it. But my question is that I am not sure why that makes a difference.[ The Ramban is saying the fixing of theft by giving it back is only as long the act is continued. But here the act is over so the is no correction.]

Dr Michael Hueemer has a tremendous amount of great ideas non his site. However I have not been able to see his point about no state having any authority.  A British philosopher Danny Frederick also has criticized this idea of Dr Huemer. The idea of government being a contract also has brought both of their critiques. But looking at the war between Sparta and Athens I can see that contract theory  and agreement to follow a certain form of government makes a big difference.  

Shulchan Aruch of Rav Joseph Karo. I can see why my learning partner did not think to learn it unless one knows the Gemara. [It was written to be a review of the Tur and Beit Yoseph which brings the Gemara and Rishonim.]

I have been seeing interesting things in the Shulchan Aruch of Rav Joseph Karo recently. I can see why my learning partner did not think to learn it unless one knows the Gemara but I have been seeing that there is a lot of interesting things there even when one has not leaned the Gemara. For example a few days ago I noticed the question is there is such a thing as giving up an obligation like a loan? This is brought in Choshen Mishpat 164 in the Taz and the Ketzot HaChoshen that are arguing about the law that the Rema brings there that there is such a thing as giving up on a loan--not forgiving it but giving up. The Rema brings a case that a Jewish town made a loan to the prince and the prince promised to reduce the taxes in return. In the end he did not reduce the taxes and the town gave up on the loan. Then the prince much later died and his son paid back the loan. I was not going to write about this but the subject is certainly interesting but also complicated and I have no had time to delve into it. 

If one has crops that he has not taken any tithe from and he puts let's say wine in a jar and closes it and calls it maasar sheni [the second maasar] then the jar itself becomes maasar sheni. [Tractate maasar sheni 3. mishna 12]

Both the Mishna Rishona [a commentary by a person named Ephraim Isaac] and the Tiferet Israel ask on this from tracatate Msaasar sheni 1 mishna 4 and 5. There it says if you buy a closed jar of wine of maasar sheni in Jerusalem the jar goes out from the category of the second maasar to become secular.

To me it seems there is a difference between calling a name of maasar sheni to crops that have not been tithed yet and buying something with maasar Sheni. So I do not see any question in the first place.

The Tiferet Israel answers this question from the mishna in which one sells closed jars in a place where one usually buys open jars, but that answer depends on there being some connection between calling a name and buying.
 

[The problem that the Tiferet Israel deals with is why are the jars not consecrated? But to me it seems the reason is the same that when buys a animal with the money of the second tithe that the leather is not consecrated.] 

There is something I noticed in Ketuboth. I had done Ketuboth as well as I could when I was in Shar Yashuv [That is Rav Friefeld's yeshiva in Far Rockaway.] Though I was just a beginner then, I still did it with most of the Tosphot and Tosphot HaRosh and some Tur Shulchan Aruch along with it. So when I got to Israel and discovered that courts were awarding מזונות ]alimony to divorced women it seemed strange to   me. There is on one hand an award of money to a widow until she collects the Ketubah. But from everything I recalled in Ketuboth that does not apply to a divorced woman. She gets the Ketubah and that is all.

A woman gets married. Her מעשה ידיה [money she makes by working] and any objects she finds go to the husband.

A woman gets married. Her מעשה ידיה [money she makes by working] and any objects she finds go to the husband. So why does the Rashba in Ketuboth in the chapter that starts האשה שנפלו say what she finds is נכסי מלוג? [Or at least that is how the Tosphot Yom Tov quotes the Rashba].

 נכסי מלוג is property she owns before the marriage. The husband gets the profits of the property, but she retains the title.

A woman owns property she brings into the marriage, but not wat money she makes while married nor any portion of her husband's. The reason a woman wants a  divorce is supposed to be that she no longer wants a connection with her husband. But nowadays the opposite is the case. She gets a divorce in order to hurt her husband as much a possible through children, money and any other means necessary.

[I wish this was clear to people. There are three kinds of property. Property the woman owns as she comes into the marriage but is not written into the ketubah. The husband can use it. Or if it is property that one gets rent from, that is owned by the husband.  But the property itself is owned by the woman. If the marriage ends, she gets that property. The same thing applies for property written into the ketubah, except that if it goes down in value, and the marriage ends, the husband has to make up for that loss in value. The third type of property  is what a woman makes while married. That is owned by the husband in full.

Obviously she does not magically own her husbands property just by the fact of being married to him.