Beginning of Bava Metzia

Someone sent to  two volumes of Rav Shach's Avi Ezri. One is gone. But in the one I still can read, he brings an amazing idea that the Rambam's idea of  דררא דממונא is when each one is saying a טענת ספק. He brings this from a book called אבן האזל.

Rav Shach himself uses this idea to answer some questions in laws of פקדון. but without actually seeing the arguments in  אבן האזל I can already see what the Rambam must have been thinking.

He must have seen that there are two opposing approaches to דררא דממונא in the Gemara. One is is Bava Batra that סומכוס Sumchos said his law {ממון  המוטל בספק חולקים בלי שבוע, money in doubt is divided with no oath} only in a case of דררא דממונא. The other is in the beginning  of Bava Metzia, that if Sumchos said his law in a case of דררא דממונא, then all the more so in a case that is not דררא דממונא. And I already mentioned in my little booklet on Bava Metzia that some of the Mishnas that the Gemara says are Sumchos do not seem to conform to the definition of Tosphot ספק לבית דין בלא טענותיהם.

So it is amazingly clear what the Rambam thought. He looked at the Gemara on page 100 and saw that there is an argument between two Amoraim about when Sumchos said his law. One said only when both say טענת שמא and the other opinion is even when both say טענת ברי. So the Rambam simply decided that that is the definition of דררא דממונא and that accounts for the difference between the two Gemaras in Bava Metzia and Bava Batra. That is the Gemara in the beginning of Bava Metzia is like the opinion Sumchos said his law in both cases (certainty and certainty) and the Gemara in Bava Batra is like the opinion Sumchos said his law only in the case of doubt and doubt.


The place to begin work on this would be to look at the those Mishnas that the Gemara says are Sumchos and to see how they fit with Tosphot and/or the Rambam. But I will have to leave that work for others since I have no Gemara.

I mentioned in my notes about the Maharam from Lublin conserning the fact that Tosphot's version of the Gemara in th beginning of Bava Metzia does not have דררא דממונא לזה ודררא דממונא לזה. That fact I used to help explain Tosphot on page 100b but it might help us here also to understand why Tosphot was not able to use the pshat/explanation that the Rambam uses. 



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  בספר של רב שך האבי עזרי he brings an amazing idea that the  idea of the רמב''ם that דררא דממונא is when each one is saying a טענת ספק. He brings this from a book called אבן האזל.

רב שך himself uses this idea to answer some questions in laws of פקדון. but without actually seeing the arguments in  אבן האזל I can already see what the רמב''ם must have been thinking.

He must have seen the there are two opposing approaches to דררא דממונא in the גמרא. One is is בבא בתרא that סומכוס  said his law ממון  המוטל בספק חולקים בלי שבוע only in a case of דררא דממונא. The other is in the beginning  of  בבא מציעא that is סומכוס  said his law in a case of דררא דממונא then all the more so in a case that is not דררא דממונא. And I already mentioned that some of the משניות that the גמרא says are סומכוס  do not seem to conform to the definition of תוספות ספק לבית דין בלא טענותיהם.

So it is amazingly clear what the רמב''ם thought. He looked at the גמרא on page דף ק' ע''א and saw that there is an argument between two אמוראים about when סומכוס  said his law. One said only when both say טענת שמא and the other opinion is even when both say טענת ברי. So the רמב''ם simply decided that that is the definition of דררא דממונא and that accounts for the difference between the two גמרות in  בבא מציעא and בבא בתרא. That is the גמרא in the beginning of  בבא מציעא is like the opinion סומכוס  said his law in both cases (certainty and certainty) and the גמרא in בבא בתרא is like the opinion סומכוס  said his law only in the case of doubt and doubt. 

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 ב''מ ק. בספר של רב שך האבי עזרי הוא מביא רעיון מדהים שהרעיון של הרמב''ם כי דררא דממונא היא כאשר כל אחד אומר טענת ספק. הוא מביא את זה מתוך ספר אבן האזל. רב שך עצמו משתמש ברעיון זה לענות על כמה שאלות בדיני פקדון. אבל מבלי לראות טיעוני האבן האזל אני כבר רואה מה רמב''ם חשב ודאי. הוא בוודאי ראה  שישנן שתי גישות מנוגדות בדררא דממונא בגמרא. אחת היא היא בבבא בתרא כי סומכוס אמר את החוק שלו ממון המוטל בספק חולקים בלי שבוע רק במקרה של דררא דממונא. השניה היא בתחילת בבא מציעא כי אם סומכוס אמר את החוק שלו במקרה של דררא דממונא, אז על אחת כמה וכמה במקרה שאינו דררא דממונא. וכבר הזכרתי שחלק של המשניות שהגמרא אומרת הן של סומכוס לא נראות עונות להגדרה של תוספות, ספק לבית דין בלא טענותיהם. אז זה ברור מה הרמב''ם חשב. הוא ראה בגמרא בעמוד דף ק' ע''א שיש ויכוח בין שני אמוראים לגבי מתי סומכוס אמר את החוק שלו. אחד אמר רק כאשר שניהם (הבעלי דין) אומרים טענת שמא ואת חוות הדעת האחרת היא גם כאשר שניהם אומרים טענת ברי. אז הרמב''ם פשוט החליט כי זו ההגדרה של דררא דממונא, וזה מסביר את ההבדלים בין שתי גמרות בבבא מציעא ובבא בתרא. זוהי הגמרא בתחילת בבא מציעא היא כדעת שסומכוס אמר את החוק שלו בשני המקרים (ודאות ודאות, ושמא ושמא) ואת הגמרא בבבא בתרא הוא כדעת שסומכוס אמר את החוק שלו רק במקרה של ספק וספק כשיטת רבא בבבא מציעא.

To me it seems that the left has lost the intellectual and moral high ground.

I see the problem was simply that the left had the power because it had what seemed to be true. Socialism seemed to be the wave of the future. To me it seems that the left has lost the intellectual and moral high ground. It will just take time until people see this. Sure in universities  Left wing drivel is still taught, but that is changing. And even the philosophy departments are changing for the better.
John Searle, Kelley Ross, Richard Epstein, Michael Huemer, etc. 


But that is not to imply the religious world is very good. Anyone who has ever been in a religious neighborhood knows  one immutable fact about the religious world שכן רע. They are evil neighbors.  Not just that they do not mind their own business but insist on poking their noses into everyone else's business and then go looking for even the slightest fault and then exploiting that to make some crusade against anyone they do not like.  Living anywhere near a religious person is an experience like no other of Hell on Earth.  

Some people seem to equate being religious with being righteous, moral and decent but from long experience I can say that is not true. In fact as a rule, the relationship is inverse. Righteous=1/ religious.
Clearly Reb Israel Salanter was aware of this and tried to correct it to by means of the emphasis on Musar thinking that people would see the main emphasis of Torah is on בין אדם לחבירו [human decency]- but the only people to have gotten that message are Reform and Conservative Jews.

Without the actual Talmud in front of me, it is hard to speculate. But I think that you have to say that Rav Shach has some way of understanding R. Yehuda (of the Mishna) in a different way than he is usually understood. R. Yehuda says ביעור חמץ the destruction of leaven is by fire. The way this is usually understood is based on a statement במה דברים אמורים קודם זמן איסורו אבל אחר זמן איסורו השבתתו בכל דבר. [When do we say this? Before the time it is forbidden. But after that time one can get rid of the leaven in any shape or form.]  Now based on a later on sugia [treatment of this subject] around page 93-95 in Pesachim it says leaven shall not be found is a prohibition that is transferred to a positive command. {לאו הניתק לעשה/a negative command that even if one transgress it he does not get lashes because it can be rectified by a positive command }That can only work if ביעור חמץ is only at the time of the prohibition. So to whom is that Gemara referring to? Apparently R. Yehuda.
This would at least help to understand the Rambam who does hold that ביעור is only at the time of the prohibition  and yet he gets lashes [because obviously he is going like the sages against R Yehuda] But the thing you see in the Rambam is the way he understood the argument between the sages and R. Yehuda--is what is the destruction of leaven? Anyway possible or only by fire? But both hold it is at the time of the prohibition. So this is how Rav Shach understands the Rambam and I think he must be basing it on that later Gemara.
Of course, none of this is like Rashi or Tosphot. And that leaves us with the obvious question what do Rashi and Tosphot do with that Gemara on page 93-95?

In any case there is clearly a lot of work that needs to be done here. Reb Chaim Soloveitchik also deals with this same question but I do not have his book nor the Gemara. At any rate his answer, is that לא יראה ולא ימצא is a positive and negative command--so that is how he answers for the Rambam which does not help us about the Gemara on 95.

In case it is unclear what I am saying here it is this. You can not have  לאו הניתק לעשה when the עשה starts before the לאו. They have to start and end at the same time for this law to apply.

Religious Zionism seems right to me to a large degree. Rav Kook defended this based on ideas he got from Hegel

Religious Zionism seems right to me to a large degree. Rav Kook defended this based on ideas he got from Hegel

 It seems to me that Hegel gives a good defense of nationalism. But as you can see Hegel and John Locke were not so far apart in terms of what kind of nation they were defending–that is one the insures the freedoms of the citizens. That you can see in Hegel in many places here he talks about what kind of essence a human being has–for example: Hegel’s Idea of Philosophy, by Quentin Lauer, S.J. with a new translation of Hegel’s Introduction to the History of Philosophy.


In John Locke there are a few problems like empiricism, blank slate, property rights based on a labor theory of value. [The last was noted by Dr Richard Epstein.] 

Brett Stevens has an interview with a follower of Rav Kahana  on his site.

I do not see how a person's whole sense of worth should be based on group identity. To me that does not seem at all like what the Torah says. But in fact in all religious groups the sense of worth is based on group identity. That is why I say all religious groups are cults and have nothing to do with authentic Torah. [Unless we would be talking about the few authentic Litvak yeshivas] 

I was asked by Israel Rosen in Israel about Jewish Nationalism because he was in a kollel in which this was a debate. I said Jewish Nationalism has support from the Zohar (as is obvious to anyone who has read even one page.)

The main mitzvah of the religious world is to be against Israel and to get the money of Reform and Conservative Jews (real Jews). That is one reason I say the religious world is diametrically opposed to the Torah.  You can pretty much know what the Torah really says to do by looking at the religious and do everything the exact opposite of what they do. They are filled with the Sitra Achra sadlly enough.


The was a pamphlet at the Western Wall that was tracing the chaos and Reign of Terror in France to Rousseau and the totally different kind of Democracy in the USA to John Locke, which is a true point. But on the same hand the problems in the USA with the total emptiness of society can also be traced to John Locke. To me the approach of the Rambam makes a lot more sense.

I did not want to go into it here but in fact Reb Aaron Kotler has a Musar book and in that book he wrote that for the State of Israel דינא דמלכותא דינא the law of the country is the law.

t32 a minor [t32 in midi]

 t31 F major  [t31 in midi]

universal values

There were great people that saw the importance of certain values and their emphasis of these values made it easier for regular people to recognize the importance of these principle of how to live. Allen Bloom called them ''value creators,'' but I prefer to think of them as people that recognized values that were already there, but no one had seen them. Or if people had seen them, they did not recognize their importance.
When I was going through a crisis in life, determining what values to hold onto was a big deal to me. 
I do not now if I ever made  a list, but here I would like to jot down some of the most important of them.
(1) Learning Torah, the Oral and Written Law, and Musar in particular [Mediaeval books on Ethics, along with the writings of the disciples of Reb Israel Salanter that focus on good character and fear of God.]
(2) Not to make money by learning Torah nor to accept charity nor to be part of institutions that use Torah for personal gain, or promote that. Avoid Jewish Religious cults at all cost. That means all the cults the Gra put into Cherem [excommunication] because he saw their root was in the Sitra Achra, Devil, and Satan..
(3) To speak the truth at all cost, no matter what.
(4) Not to touch what does not belong to me.
(5) Compassion on all of God's creations.
(6) Honor and obey my Mom and Dad and all the Ten Commandments.
(7) To learn as fast as possible-saying the words in order and going on. But then when I finish a few sections to do review, going section by section or chapter by chapter in reverse order.
(8) Talking with God in my own language.
(9) Self Reliance, not to depend on charity and not to accept it.
(10) Fresh air and sunshine and lots of exercise every day. 
(11) Physics and Mathematics. [First thing in the morning before anything else.]
(12) Survival skills.
(13) Trust in God with no effort [בטחון בלי השתדלות]


[I am not saying I am a worthy proponent of these great values. But I have to share them because they are important.]
For each true value there is a counterfeit value, values of the Sitra Achra that are made to sound good and inspiring. One needs great depth and discernment to tell to true from the false. So when I write these positive values I mean to say these all came to with great difficulty. ]

An oath for a guard who was required to guard an object

The issue of גוללין. That is when one is required to take an oath for one reason, then the טוען can add other things that the נטען would not normally be   required to swear on. There is not usually a שבוע like עבדים קרקעות ושטרות. 
The ראב''ד agrees with this, but he does say that there is a שבוע that the guarded object is not ברשותו. 

(הלכות טוען ונטען פרק ה' הלכה ו) Therefore I ask why not say גוללין? If the שומר has to take an oath that it is not ברשותו, then why not add the other things that normally the שומר would not take an oath for. That is עבדים קרקעות ושטרות let him swear they were  lost by גניבה או אבידה? The answer I think is that that is the very reason for the law in itself that one takes no oath in those cases to tell us that in itself that you do not do גוללין



) ב''מ צ''ז ע''א סוגיית גוללין בתוספות . כלומר כאשר האדם נדרש להישבע מסיבה אחת, ואז הטוען יכול להוסיף דברים אחרים שהנטען בדרך כלל לא יידרש להישבע עליהם. שאלה: אין בדרך כלל שבוע בעבדים קרקעות ושטרות. הראב''ד (ברמב''ם הלכות טוען ונטען פרק ה' הלכה ו') מסכים עם קביעה זו, אבל הוא אומר כי יש שבוע שהאובייקט השמור אינו ברשותו. ולכן, אני שואל, למה לא לומר גוללין? אם לשומר יש להישבע  שהחפץ לא ברשותו, אז למה לא להוסיף את השאר שבדרך כלל השומר לא מחוייב לקחת שבועה עבורם. כלומר עבדים קרקעות ושטרות, ולתת לו להישבע שהם אבדו ידי גניבה או אבידה? התשובה לדעתי שזו הסיבה עבור החוק כשאחד לוקח שום שבועה במקרים אלה, לספר לנו  כי לא עושים גוללין

This comes up in Tosphot Bava Metzia 97a and later also. The Sota unfaithful wife is given the bitter waters to drink, and she must swear she was not unfaithful. Then the husband can add things to the oath that she would not be required to wear upon [as for example sex before marriage.] From this is learned to "roll" גוללין to put upon a person swearing other things. This is like in a court room when one takes the stand, the prosecutor can and does ask things that the person was not thinking he would be asked. 

So we have a law one takes no oath if he was made a guard to guard documents, land or slaves and they were lost. Then they were lost. He must take an oath he did not willfully not guard to the Raavad that they are not in his possession. So why not "roll" upon him lose also? I answer that is what the special exclusion comes for.   

leaven on Passover

I do not have any great ideas today but I just wanted to make  a note to remind myself to think about a few issues. At least of i write them down I might remember them.
The first issue is leaven on Passover. The question is דברים שבלב אינם דברים. "Things in the heart are not things." This I asked on Bitul Hametz (the formula of nullification of leaven) done the day before Passover. It occurred to me that Tosphot somewhere in Ketuboth goes into this in detail, and from what I recall he says we only say this when the things in the heart are contradicted by the words in one's mouth. So that answers that question. That Tosphot is somewhere in the middle of Ketubot and I forgot the page #.

The other issue is Tosphot's opinion that Bitul {nullifying }is valid because of hefker and the Ran also brings this. I asked about the Gemara in Pesachim 93-95 that says לא יראה ולא ימצא (there hall not be seen nor found any leaven) is a לאו הניתק לעשה (negative command that can be corrected by a positive action).
The answer is implicit in the question. That is probably the very reason for Tosphot. That is--Bitul is not the עשה (positive command) But rather פורר וזורה לרוח (throw the leaven out to the wind) after the time it is forbidden.

Another issue is the fact that Rav Shach noticed in the Rambam that the Rambam makes a clear distinction between Biur chametz and bitul Chametz which is an astounding observation. The implications are vast. That means that when the sages and R. Yehuda disagree about biur chametz that means they are disagreeing about after the sixth hour on the day before Passover.
Thus before 6th hour the things to do are either bitul or "hashbata" to make the leaven rest. And after the 6th hour the only thing to do is "biur." So R. Yehuda does say to burn the leaven before the 6th because of hashbata and after the 6th because of biur. And the ages say before and after to get rid of it in any fashion. And R. Yehud agrees to get rid of the leaven after teh 6th hour in any fashion but because of the special verse about notar he adds a mitzvah to o it by burning.




Someone had the grace and kindness to send to me two volumes of Rav Shach's Avi Ezri. [One of which I already lost]. But in the one I still have there is an answer to a question I asked on the Rambam in the little book of Ideas in  Bava Metzia. His answer I read only quickly but I think he divides שכירות (renting) into different kinds of categories. But as I was reading it a different kind of answer occurred to me.  This is in Bava Metzia in ch. 8 about the זבל שבחצר (garbage in the coutyard) where the Rambam says the exact opposite of what it says in the Gemara. [That is pretty common in the Rambam but still each case has to be considered.] There  we have that the זבל (garbage) belongs to the שוכר (renter) if the animals belong to him. But if they are animals of others then to whom does the  זבל (garbage) belongs to? That is where the Rambam and the Gemara seem to disagree. But it occurred to me the Rambam is not talking about fertilizer but rather straight forward garbage that needs to be taken out of the courtyard and that he he says is the responsibility of the משכיר (owner). That is not the question of the Gemara about to who does the fertilizer in the courtyard belong and that the Gemara says goes to the renter. But why would there be this difference?

I had a few more thoughts that I already forgot.

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ביטול חמץ. The question is דברים שבלב אינם דברים.  This is a question on nullification of leaven done the day before Passover. Answer:  תוספות somewhere in כתובות says we only say this the things in the heart are contradicted by the words in one's mouth of by one's actions. So that answers that question. The other issue is the opinion of  תוספות  that nullifying is valid because of הפקר and the ר''ן also brings this. I asked about the גמרא in פסחים דף צ''ג that says לא יראה ולא ימצא  is a לאו הניתק לעשה. The answer is implicit in the question. That is probably the very reason for תוספות. That is ביטול is not the עשה. But rather פורר וזורה לרוח after the time it is forbidden. This is in בבא מציעא  about the זבל שבחצרת garbage in the courtyard, where the רמב''ם says the exact opposite of what it says in the גמרא. There  we have that the זבל garbage belongs to the שוכר if the animals belong to him. But if they are animals of others then to whom does the זבל garbage belongs to? That is where the רמב''ם and the גמרא seem to disagree. The answer of  רב שך is to divide שכירות  into different kinds of categories. A different kind of answer occurred to me. But it occurred to me the רמב''ם is not talking about fertilizer but rather  garbage that needs to be taken out of the courtyard and that he he says is the responsibility of the משכיר . That is not the question of the גמרא about to who does the fertilizer in the courtyard belong to? The גמרא says that goes to the שוכר. But why would there be this difference?

ביטול חמץ. השאלה היא דברים שבלב אינם דברים. זוהי שאלה על ביטול חמץ דנעשה יום לפני פסח. תשובה: תוספות איפשהו בכתובות אומר שאנחנו רק אומרים את זה אם הדברים בלב הם סותרו על ידי המילים בפה של אחד או על ידי פעולות שלו. אז זה עונה על השאלה הזאת. הנושא השני הוא על דעתו של  תוספות ביטול חמץ (שמְבַטֵל את החמץ)  תקף בגלל הפקר (ואת ר''ן גם מביא את זה). שאלתי היא מן הגמרא בפסחים דף צ''ג שאומרת לא יראה ולא ימצא הוא לאו הניתק לעשה. התשובה היא מובלעת בעצם השאלה. זו כנראה הסיבה עבור תוספות. כלומר ביטול אינו עשה. אלא פורר וזורה לרוח. 

 בבבא מציעא על האשפה שבחצר (זבל בחצר), שבו רמב''ם אומר את ההיפך הגמור ממה שכתוב בגמרא. יש לנו כי אשפת הזבל שייכת לשוכר אם החיות שייכות לו. אבל אם הם חיות של אחרים אז למי  הזבל שייך? זה מקום שבו רמב''ם ואת הגמרא נראים שלא מסכימים. התשובה של רב שך היא לחלק שכירות לתוך סוגים שונים של קטגוריות. סוג שונה של תשובה עלה על דעתי.  אבל זה עלה לי את שהרמב''ם אינו מדבר על דשן אלא אשפה שצריכה להילקח מחוץ לחצר ושהוא באחריות המשכירה. זה לא השאלה של הגמרא עומד למי הדשן בחצר שייכת? הגמרא אומרת שזה שהולך לשוכר. אבל מדוע צריך להיות ההבדל הזה

Another issue is just remembered is גוללין. That is also I think not a very big deal but still I think worth writing. That is the Rambam holds for שומרים there is a שבוע that the שומר was not פושע. That applies even in a case where there is not usually a שבוע Like עבדים קרקעות ושטרות. The Raavad disagrees with this but he does say that there is a שבוע that the guarded object is not ברשותו. Therefore I ask why not say גוללין? If the שומר has to take an oath that he was not פושע or it is not ברשותו then why not add the other things that normally the שומר would not take an oath for. That is עבדים קרקעות ושטרות let him swear they were  lost by גניבה או אבידה? The answer I think is that that is the very reason for the law in itself that one takes no oath in those cases to tell us that in itself that you do not do גוללין

Fake Jews. The religious world is fake Jewish

The problem with the religious world is they are fake Jews. That is they they have to dress up as Jews, to get donations from real Jews. Their entire world view is based on the question how to get charity from real Jews. This problem is also in the Sephardi world who are half Arab as per Islam the women of the conquered are raped and besides that the Jewish women were simply taken as wives of the Arabs as well documented in history of the Islamic conquest of the Middle East.

In any case I make it a point not be be fooled by the religious clothing of the fake Jews.

[There is a related issue here about "Semicha" which is no longer in existence.  It stopped sometime in the middle of the time the Talmud was being written down. So the problem of fraud also exists in people that are "Torah Scholars that are demons" as Reb Nachman phrased it. In his major book it is mentioned in a side note that this idea comes from the Zohar, but in fact it was Reb Nachman that specifically noted the problem with supposed teachers of Torah. This problem is well known to the Na Nach groups that follow Reb Nachman's teachings as per Reb Israel Oddesor made a point to emphasize this aspect.]



The whole issue of legitimacy of authority got mixed up. In the Christian world they have ordination as an attempt to decipher. But in the Jewish world the stringent indication of counterfeit authority is ordination. This is because true ordination stopped during the Talmud period. And that kind of ordination is the only kind the Torah recognizes as valid. So what you have today is anyone claiming ordination is by definition a fraud.
To some degree this was recognized in authentic yeshivas where true Torah was learned like the Mir in NY. But even there a kind of blind eye was turned to people that went to get the false kind of ordination you have nowadays. 
There is a such a thing as a true Torah scholar but that is more or less an unofficial position. That is a person that is recognized as knowing the Torah well and usually there is no doubt to who this applies.
The best thing is to refuse to ask questions or go to these false prophets of the Baal and to do with them like Elisha the true prophet of God did with the false prophets. 

learning Torah and trusting God alone.

I think if all I had to say was to separate learning Torah from   dependence on any institution or building that would already be enough. The fox knows many small things about about how to get by. But the hedgehog knows just one big thing. I am like the hedgehog in that I know one big thing-- learning Torah and trusting God alone. That is not to make your learning Torah dependent on any organization or kollel check. 

This is not to discount the importance of organizations. Sometimes they in fact accomplish what they set  out to do. But in the Torah world, most organizations work against Torah. [The phony teachers are horrifying monsters that frighten children at night and give them nightmares.] This is something well known in the Na Nach world. Most yeshivas make a song and dance how they are for everyone to learn Torah, but what they really mean is everyone that has rich American parents.   It is a grave error to make your learning Torah dependent on people and organizations that are actual enemies of Torah- תלמידי חכמים שדים יהודאיים. Most people that make their living by making Torah into their personal servants are no friends of Torah. 

Furthermore the whole religious world I think is one big idol. They have convinced themselves they need to be served by the rest of the Jewish people and humanity.
For the sake of fairness let me at least mention a few organizations that I believe are helpful for Torah, Bnei Akiva [or the equivalent of religious Zionist groups, the three major NY yeshivas, Chaim Berlin, Mir, Torah Vedaat and Ponovitch in Israel (and its off shoots).  Also Temple Israel in Hollywood which is good, but a little bit on the secular side. Sinai Synagogue in Westwood also is very good. The best of all I think I would have to say is Ponovitch.


But outside of the straight Litvak yeshiva world all religious organizations are iron furnaces of insanity, petri dishes of mental illness.

Counter Enlightenment

Hamann (Johann Georg Hamann) and Joseph de Maistre were pretty much counter Enlightenment with the later emphasizing the Catholic Church.
Allen Bloom seems to have taken the question of Enlightenment versus Counter Enlightenment as not being settled.
 Kant and Hegel held the Enlightenment had some things right and some things wrong. That is they saw the Counter Enlightenment had some things right and some things wrong. So they saw the middle approach not as a compromise but as a solution.


Hegel was I think the equivalent of Aquinas and Maimonides in looking for a balanced approach between Revelation and Reason . So in that sense he predated the thinkers that thought a middle path between Enlightenment and Counter Enlightenment was proper. And he had the larger "nation" in mind-but not any nation, but one founded on principle of Justice and Freedom. Not as Popper thought the Prussian state, but rather in an explicit quote he was thinking of the USA. [See  Walter Kaufmann on Hegel.]

It is not the case that the USA is solely John Locke or Enlightenment. It has had and still has a strong religious foundation base on the best of the Judaic-Christian civilization of Europe and the best of Athens and Rome. There is no need to disparage it.The election of Trump I thinks shows this very well.

Karl Popper was unfair to Hegel and this led to Dr. Kelly Ross [of the Kant Fries School] also being unfavorable to him.  Popper thought Hegel was responsible for the totalitarian regimes his saw in his days. But he was right to the degree that Marx did borrow from Hegel. In university courses that were preparation for work in the KGB, Hegel was taught and was considered an important step before Marx [along with Feuerbach]. In USSR universities they credited Hegel with the "moment in time" idea, but clearly Marx borrowed a lot more than that from him. So the Left using [or misusing] Hegel is not new and it continues. But the reason is because the right simply ignores Hegel. 


The religious world tries to present an image of a just society. That is why the "Shabat table" is such an important factor-because it tries to convey this image to naive Reform and Conservative Jews. The truth is it is a terrible horrific nightmare. It has all the elements of Kafka short story. You want a free and just society? I can not think of anything better than any society based on the constitutions of the USA which is totally different from the French and European kinds of systems based on Rousseau. It accepts the importance of faith and simply makes a proper dividing line between it and the state. There is some kind of Achilles  heel or stumbling block in the religious world that the authorities, the teachers of Torah, are  demons sent to punish us. There seems to be no respite from the but to escape towards secular society which respects your basic rights. 
The last person in the world you want your wife of children talking with is some demonic Torah scholar of the religious world.  [The Torah itself is holy, but the trouble is the Sitra Achra has found ways of usurping it by pretending to be keeping it by extensive rituals and black clothing of that is supposed to mean they keep Torah. The uniform fools people. (In fact, any uniform fools people as Dr Michael Huemer pointed out. Some kind of make believe uniform was created and a when a person dressed in it told some to put an extra nickel into a parking meter, people were much more inclined to obey than if the same person dressed in normal clothing told them the same thing. As long as they need you the pretense will continue.) But as soon as you are down an out on your luck, their true face will reveal itself. They are traitorous lying scum.

The religious world is one vast altar that requires a constant sacrifice of naive Reform Jews. On that Altar which all that
is living Reform Jews, "Zionim" Zionist Jews, Goyim must be sacrificed without end, without measure, without pause, until the consummation of things, until all is extinct.

 This is not the time for  forgiveness because these demonic Torah scholars are people who have not repented, these are people who are trying to destroy you and are quite willing to harm your family and your children in the process. Take them down and take them out without hesitation. If you have any  working under you, fire them. Above all, understand that the normal rules of live and let live are no longer in effect. 

But at the same time, it is important to learn and keep Torah in the authentic way. Either on your own, or to find true allies. There are Torah True Institutions like Ponovitch and the Great New York Litvak Yeshivas and the Bnei Akiva schools. The only issue is to remove the satanic demons that dress up like authentic Torah scholars.

Bitul Torah is a sin. That is not learning Torah when one is able is a sin.

To me it seems like the package deal of learning Torah along with trust in God makes things go better. That is you might not be sitting and learning Torah all day, and you might not have complete trust in God but if you have a little bit of both I think that creates a tidal wave of success.

That is to say in theory perfect trust in God ought to work, but in  a practical sense there seem to be some limits to have far one can take this. Similarly learning Torah in theory ought to be all day every second. [That refers to either the written Law--the Old Testament, and/or the Oral Law which means simply the books of the חז''ל "Chazal" the sages.That last category is means The Two Talmuds, the Halachic Midrashim and the Agadic Midrashim.] In any case there are limits to how much one can learn Torah. But putting both ideas together makes a working combination.

The idea of התמדה in Torah is well founded. It comes from the idea that Bitul Torah is a sin. That is not learning Torah when one is able is a sin. Thus there are plenty of things one needs to do --to learn a vocation, to get married etc. But everything one needs to do needs to be weighed on the scales of "Bitul Torah"--that is "Is this other thing a mitzvah that can not be done by anyone else?" If not then it is forbidden.
[I would be amiss if I did not mention that Physics and Metaphysics as mentioned by the Rambam are not Bitul Torah but that does not leave the door open for any and all secular activities or studies. It is a specific provision stated by the Rambam and implicit in most Musar books from the Middle Ages. ]


Popper blamed  Hegel for totalitarian systems- unfairly. Yet in one way his was right that Hegel was used by the USSR. In University courses for preparation for work in in KGB, Hegel was taught and considered as a favorable preliminary step towards Marxism in that Marx borrowed some major concepts of his and the left still does.

trust in God and learning Torah

There was something really great about the whole idea of trust in God and learning Torah that really worked. This was the way that Navardok spread. The idea was that if one takes on himself to learn Torah, then all his other needs are taken care off. This was actually mentioned by Reb Israel Salanter in the magazine he published in Vilnius. But he was careful not to emphasis any particular aspect of Musar, because he thought every person will find what they need in it. But Joseph Jozel Horwitz went with this idea to the limits. And it worked. The idea in a nutshell is God helps those who depend totally on him, not those that depend on their own actions.
This I found really works mainly, if you do not put it to a test. And at a certain point in my life I did not want to go too far with trust {Bitachon} because I did not want a situation in which I thought I needed something and not get it and that might reflect baldly on faith itself.
This approach I still feel is  a viable option.
To get a good idea of this approach it is best to get the actual book of Navardok which is one of the classical Musar books to come out of the Musar movement.

Bitul Chametz (nullifying leaven bread)

It is a true point that Tosphot holds Bitul Chametz (nullifying leaven bread) is from hefker הפקר (abandoning) as he says in Pesachim page 4.
That is he holds that when we say on the day before Passover. "All the leaved bread or leaven itself that I own is הפקר (abandoned) like the dirt of the earth," we mean it is הפקר (abandoned). I do not have any Gemaras to be able to look up anything, but off hand I think we can see plenty of questions that just jump out at you even without thinking. First of all the dirt of the earth is not הפקר abandoned. Almost all wars in human history are fought over the dirt of the earth--land.
But that is not all. Neither Rashi nor the Rambam hold from this idea of "hefker." And from what I recall there is some kind of argument in Nedarim if Hefker needs to be in front of a witness.
And  a further question comes up is what about יאוש [letting go] which comes up about lost objects? Is this hefker here in Passover the same kind of thing as "giving up" on a lost object?
That is,-- with lost object we do not need the guy to be מפקיר. Just the fact that he gives up, that makes picking it up not longer in the category of stealing.
And what about that long Tosphot in Ketuboth about when we say דברים שבלב אינם דברים? {"Things in the heart are not things".} While here we say מבטלו בלבו ודיו he is nullifies it {the leaven} in his heart and that is enough.
The questions just keep piling up. What about that whole Sugia in Pesachim circa 93-94 where the Gemara says one does not get מכות (lashes)  because it is a לאו ניתק לעשה?

Incidentally, that whole thing about דברים שבלב אינם דברים comes up about a fellow that wanted to go to Israel and sold his property with that in mind and then changed his mind. The question there comes up in terms of when do we say things in the heart are not things--and  if there was some condition on the sale then he needed to say it and when do we say one needs a תנאי כפול כבני גד וראובן
[Sorry, I do not remember where that Tosphot is. Last time I saw it I was in Israel in Netivot and I wanted to look it up concerning אין אדם מקנה דבר שלא בא לעולם]
I seem to recall that Tosphot said we only say דברים שבלב אינן דברים only when his heart and his words or actions contradict each other-so that would at least take care of one of the above mentioned questions.



 I mean to ask if  ביטול חמץ is from הפקר and is a fulfillment of  אך ביום הראשון תשביתו שאור מבתיכם then how is this an מצוות עשה?
In any case the opinions of Rashi and the Rambam here also need some work.

Ari, Issac Luria

I have a great deal of respect for the Ari, Issac Luria but  I also am aware that almost all people that claim to follow him and his path are demons. Reb Nachman hinted to this often in his Lekutai Moharan. This is in itself a good reason to avoid the religious world in its entirety.

Reb Nachman's statements in this regard are not well known because they are hinted at in his published books but explicit in the השמטות on the חיי מוהר''ן which was only printed once a long time ago by the Na Nach group.. However I have heard that that actual השמטות were collected [by Rav Shmuel Horvitz] and are available in print in the bookstore on Rechov Salant in Mea Shearim.


I should mention that the חרם signed by the Gra --if you actually take the time to read it, did not apply to Reb Nachman which is why I feel free to read his books. But in terms of what the Gra did actually forbid I believe is forbidden and remains forbidden because of the same problems that Reb Nachman saw. To ignore the signature of the Gra is to invite insanity. And every time one ignores it, he or she invites another drop of insanity into his or her soul.

[The Ari is quite an amazing thinker and I think it was in part by learning his books that when i got to Israel the Divine Presence started shining on me and my family.  Eventually I pushed that away since I did not feel the ability to remain attached to God on that level. It was just a bit too much for my poor soul.]



[In terms of learning the Ari I feel besides his basic works there are a few schools of thought later on which are fine commentaries of the Ari like the books of Rav Yaakov Abuchatzeira, and the Rashash (Shalom Sharabi) and the Ramchal.]

Music T30

t30 D major

Purim]

Xerxes is as far as I know is אחשורוש [from Purim] because that is how the name is pronounced in Persian. [Achash-vei-rosh]
He had two dreams telling him to attack Athens and all of the Hellenes. That was after he had thought to do so anyway. His chief adviser told him not to do so. At night he saw a handsome man standing over him telling him if he does not attack Greece he would lose everything just as fast as he gained everything. Then he had a second dream along the same lines. And then his put his chief adviser in his royal robes, and sat him down on his throne at night to sleep. The same man came to his adviser and said "Are you the one who has been telling Xerxes not to attack Athens? You are jerk." Or something along those lines.[I forget the exact words.]
When he attacked his allies were numerous. Everyone thought he would win and joined him. No one joined the Hellenes. Even those that had agreed to ally themselves with Athens stayed away from the battle to see which side would prevail.
300 Spartans and about 4000 other men from other parts of Greece stopped about 1/2 a million men.
And the Spartans would have won if not for one betrayer who showed the Persians and alternative route to get behind the Greek lines.



Xerxes was the last great king of Persia and from then on its glory and might fell.

He was murdered by the chief of his armed guards.

Bava Metzia page 97B

I wanted to mention that in a previous essay I suggested that what Tosphot meant in Bava Metzia page 97B is that the law of Rav Yehuda even without Abyee would have to come from Shmuel means the statement of Shmuel in Ketubot.
This was based on the idea of Rav Shach that חזקה דהשתא וחזקה מעיקרא cancel each other which he brings from Tosphot in Nida page 2b.
But now I would like to go into the astounding ramifications of this idea. It means that Shmuel does go by a ברי גרוע  a weak certainty. That implies lots of things. It means that Tosphot is saying that in Bava Kama when Shmuel says the Mishna there is like סומכוס but the חכמים say המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה that is not because of a weak certainty. Rather the reason is that both parties are saying the same kind of certainty. But if there would be a case where one is certain even with a weak certainty that would overthrow even חזקת ממון as is in fact the case in Ketubot. This mean Tosphot is throwing out his previous answer to the contradiction between Rav Yehuda and Shmuel and giving a totally new answer. And this new answer also answer the question that I asked a few years ago about what does Tosphot do with the first Mishna in the chapter 10 הבית והעלייה. There I noticed that we say ברי עדיף  even though there it is a weak ברי which is a contradiction to the first answer of Tosphot. But now with this new answer everything is good. And we also learn a new דין. That is that Tosphot is holding that we go by a weak ברי even in a case of חזקת ממון. This is because that is exactly what Tosphot is saying over there about the law in Ketubot that we believe her because she has a weak ברי even to be מוציא ממון. Now I just wanted to explain what I mean that in Bava Kama the reason we say המוציא מחבירו עליו הריאה is not because we we ignore a weak ברי. Not at all. The reason is rather because both certainties are equal. Neither person was there. So it makes no difference how certain each one is. Both certainties are equal. So in Ketubot we believe her because she has a certainty even though it is weak because she knows her husband was not there in order to be able to give  a different version of the events.

Now Tosphot in the end does suggest that we do not have to say this. So Tosphot does revert to his previous answer that we do not go by a weak Bari and we do go by a strong bari. Still I think we can see this is a argument in Tosphot itself between two different possible answers for the contradiction between Rav Yehuda and Shmuel.
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 בבא מציעא page צ''ז ע''ב תוספות said  that the law of רב יהודה would have to come from שמואל even without אביי means the statement of שמואל in כתובות.This was based on the idea of רב שך that חזקה דהשתא וחזקה מעיקרא cancel each other which he brings from תוספות in נדה דף ב' ע''ב.
But now I would like to go into the astounding ramifications of this idea. It means that שמואל does go by a ברי גרוע  a weak certainty. That implies lots of things. It means that תוספות is saying that in בבא קמא when שמואל says the משנה there is like סומכוס but the חכמים say המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה that is not because of a weak certainty. Rather the reason is that both parties are saying the same kind of certainty. But if there would be a case where one is certain, even with a weak certainty, that would defeat even חזקת ממון as is in fact the case in כתובות. This means תוספות is rejecting  his previous answer to the contradiction between רב יהודה and שמואל, and giving a totally new answer. And this new answer also answer the question that I asked a few years ago about what does תוספות do with the first משנה  in the tenth chapter של בבא מציעא הבית והעלייה. There I noticed that we say ברי עדיף  even though there it is a weak certainty  which is a contradiction to the first answer of תוספות. But now with this new answer everything is good. And we also learn a new דין. That is that תוספות is holding by the opinion  that we go by a weak certainty  even against  חזקת ממון. This is because that is exactly what תוספות is saying over there about the law in כתובות that we believe her because she has a weak ברי even to be מוציא ממון. Now I just wanted to explain what I mean that in בבא קמא the reason we say המוציא מחבירו עליו הריאה is not because we we ignore a weak ברי. Not at all. The reason is rather because both certainties are equal. Neither person was there. So it makes no difference how certain each one is. Both certainties are equal. So in כתובות we believe her because she has a certainty even though it is a weak certainty because she knows her husband was not there in order to be able to give  a different version of the events.Now תוספות in the end does suggest that we do not have to say this. So תוספות does revert to his previous answer that we do not go by a weak certainty and we do go by a strong certainty. Still I think we can see this is a argument in תוספות itself between two different possible answers for the contradiction between רב יהודה and שמואל.


 בבא מציעא דף צ''ז ע''ב תוספות אמר כי החוק של רב יהודה יצטרך לבא משמואל אפילו בלי אביי. רציתי לומר זה  מכוון שמואל בכתובות. זו התבססה על הרעיון של רב שך כי חזקה דהשתא וחזקה מעיקרא מבטלות זו את זו שהוא מביא מן תוספות בנדה דף ב' ע''ב. אבל עכשיו אני רוצה להיכנס להשלכות של הרעיון הזה. זה אומר שמואל אכן מחזיק מברי גרוע, ודאות חלשה. זה אומר  כי בבבא קמא כאשר שמואל אומר המשנה שם כמו סומכוס אבל חכמים אומרים המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה, כי הוא לא בשל ודאות חלשה. במקום זאת הסיבה היא ששני הצדדים אומרים את אותו סוג של ודאות. אבל אם  יהיה מקרה שבו אחד בטוח, אפילו עם ודאות חלשה, כי זה יביס גם חזקת ממון כפי שקורה הלכה למעשה במקרה בכתובות. משמעות הדבר תוספות דוחה התשובה הקודמת שלו לסתירה בין רב יהודה ואת שמואל, ונותן תשובה חדשה לגמרי. והתשובה החדשה הזאת גם עונה על השאלה ששאלתי לפני כמה שנים על מה עושה תוספות  עם המשנה הראשונה בפרק העשירי של בבא מציעא הבית והעלייה. שם אנחנו אומרים ברי עדיף למרות שיש בו ודאות חלשה וזו סתירה לתשובה הראשונה של תוספות. אבל עכשיו עם התשובה החדשה הזו הכל טוב. ואנחנו גם לומדים דין חדש. זה הוא כי תוספות מחזיק  בסברה כי נלך לפי ודאות חלשה אפילו נגד חזקת ממון. הסיבה לכך היא כי זה בדיוק מה שתוספות אומר שם על החוק הכתוב שאנחנו מאמינים לה כי יש לה ודאות חלשה אפילו להיות מוציא ממון. עכשיו אני רק רציתי להסביר למה אני מתכוון כי בבא קמא הסיבה שאנחנו אומרים מוציא מחבירו עליו ריאה היא לא בגלל שאנחנו מתעלמים מברי גרוע (חלש). בכלל לא. הסיבה היא דווקא בגלל הוודאויות הם שווות. אדם לא היה שם. אז זה לא משנה איך  כל אחד הוא בטוח בטענתו. ודאויות שניהם שווות. אז בכתובות אנו מאמינים לה כי יש לה ודאות למרות שזה ודאות חלשה כי היא יודעת שבעלה לא היה שם כדי להיות מסוגל לתת גירסה שונה של האירועים. עכשיו תוספות בסופו של הדבר אכן מרמז כי אין לנו להגיד את זה. אז תוספות אינו חוזר מן התשובה הקודמת שלו שאנחנו לא הולכים לפי ודאות חלשה וכן אנחנו הולכים לפי ודאות חזקה. ובכל זאת אני חושב שאנחנו יכולים לראות את זה הוא כטיעון בתוספות עצמו בין שתי תשובות אפשריות שונות עבור הסתירה בין רב יהודה ואת שמואל


There is a lot to think about how this applies to our Mishna in Bava Metzia 97a and later on page 100 but this is as far as I got today. I mean it seems there is a lot to think about in terms of why Rav Yehuda says what he says about our Mishna. I do not have the Gemara but from what I remember he is deriving his law from the part of our Mishna in which there is certainty and doubt in which case certainty wins. But what about the סומכוס part where there are two doubts and so they divide. Still this seems about as far as I can figure this all out for today.

I should add that the thoughts I have on this subject are mainly concerned with the types of חזקות in each case and how that question affects what Tosphot is saying. Further the fact that the Mishna is like Sumchos might make some important differences, but no one on the page seems concerned with that. They do bring it up on page 100 but what I would like to think about is how the argument between the Rashbam and Tosphot there might affects things over here in page 97.

If you are wondering what I mean, it is this: In Bava Kama there is חזקת ממון-and that seems to be the only kind of חזקה over there with the events there. Later there are different kinds of חזקה that the Geara brings up. חזקת מרא קמא וחזקת רשות. I guess you might say that I am wondering how far Tosphot wants to take this idea of a certainty that can defeat a חזקה. We do see he is thinking of חזקת ממון but what about the later type in the mishna in page 100?--[It is for these reasons that people learn a learning partner. To be able to go through the details. But when that i not possible like with me, I guess I just have to try to figure out what Tosphot is thinking here  by myself.]
In any case you can see what the Musar book אורחות צדיקים meant that originally the Tosphot were a lot larger and later they were edited down. Clearly here Tosphot was dealing with a completely different answer than his first answer but apparently  a lot was edited out by the editors.

That is once slander [or the dust of slander אבק לשון הרע] has been said in front of three, then it is considered to already be known in public, and there is no further prohibition to repeat it.

There is a famous law about באפי תלתא "in front of three." That is once slander [or the dust of slander אבק לשון הרע] has been said in front of three, then it is considered to already be known in public,  and there is no further prohibition to repeat it. The question on this is simple. Who is asking?  One of the three. He is asking "Can I repeat it, since it was said in front of three?"  Then just tell him, "No," and then there will no longer be three people making it known.

A similar situation arises in Gitin also in הלכות מכירה.

הרי זה גיטך על מנת שלא תנשאי לפלוני "This is your divorce, if you do not get married to Smith." If she gets married to Smith, there is no divorce-- and so she can't get married to Smith. That is--the marriage is not valid. So only if it is a valid divorce, can it be invalid.

Secular readers already know this as the "Liar's Paradox." It comes up in mathematics. The set of all sets. The Liar' Paradox was answered well by Dr. Kelley Ross based on the Kantian idea of the ground of validity.  The math thing I forget.

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On a side note: In my mind the best Halacha book is the Tur with the Beit Joseph (טור בית יוסף). Also the Hayee Adam (חיי אדם) by a disciple of the Gra. The Aruch Hashulchan (ערוך השלחן) is  a great halacah book also.
In the long run the only real halacha book is the Gemara itself because, that is in the final analysis the only thing that determines halacha. This is obvious to anyone who has ever learned even one word of the Shach, Taz, or Beit Joseph.The approach of all baali halacha is to find out what the Gemara holds. As Reb Chaim from Voloshin puts it "אין לנו אלא דינא דגמרא" ''We only are concerned about the Law of the Gemara.'' Nothing else matters. {That was in a letter he wrote about why he disagreed with some decision of some famous person. He said as I mentioned, that it does not matter how great or smart someone is. All that matters is what the Gemara says.  And he also said over what the Gra said "לא לישא פנים בהלכה" ''not recognize faces in halacah.'' That is a phrase used for a judge to decide a case on its own merits, not on who is being represented.}
[But of course, it matters what Rishonim thought. Obviously they were better at Gemara than we are. But we respect what they say  only because we believe they understood the Gemara better than we do.- which is perfectly true.]
The Shulchan Aruch of Rav Joseph Karo is a short version of his Beit Yoseph and I think the Tur Beit Yoseph is better. Still there is one way to do the Shulchan Aruch itself which makes a lot of sense that is to do it with the Beer Heteiv and Shaari Teshuva. I did not learn the whole Shulchan Aruch of Rav Yoseph Karo in that way, but I did do a lot of Choshen Mishpat in that way --with the Beer Heteiv and Pischei Teshuva right on the page and  I found that a really great way of doing it.--Short and sweet and to the point.

For the Glory of God, a new song.

T29 A Minor [T29 in midi] A28  [A28 in midi format]

The Sitra Achra, the Dark Side

The problem with the Sitra Achra is the more you try to avoid it the more it runs after you.

Some people think there is not such concept as demons in the Torah even though they are quite well documented in the Ari and Zohar and the Talmud itself.
The trouble is people in  the religious world tend to think they are immune by the very fact of their being religious.

The dark side, evil, teachers of Torah are in fact devils in disguise. This is a serious problem in the religious world much more than in the secular world.

The reason is to a large degree is that there is a close connection between good character and holiness. Since the Jewish secular world, with all its flaws, tends to stress good character above all, therefore they tend to be more protected from the Dark Side than the religious who stress rituals at the expense of human decency.

[I am no expert on this subject and in fact I have no idea how to avoid the Dark Side at all. All I can say is all the supposed solutions seems to be in fact traps.]

Teshuva repentance in a practical sense seems impossible. For when one  tries to undo something he has done wrong the general result is to make things worse-as we see in the Torah by the people that tried to go to Israel after the events of the spies when it was decreed the generation of the desert should not enter the Land of Israel.

[To synthesize Reason and Faith.]Reb Israel Salanter and the Musar Movement

I do not have an essay about this in mind. But just for my own sake I wanted to jot down some quicke ideas about how Reb Israel Salanter and the Musar Movement [{Learning the Ethics  of the Medieval Sages}, ]come to answer a problem that most people have not heard of but still is very much a part of the modern world. Enlightenment versus Counter Enlightenment.
If I would have energy to expand on this I would try to show briefly the two streams of enlightenment thought. It all started with Hobbes, but Enlightenment thought branched out into John Locke versus Rousseau. [And Kant and Hegel tried to bridge the gap between Enlightenment and Counter Enlightenment.] But Counter Enlightenment also branched out into two streams, the secular counter enlightenment (Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, pagan) and religious counter enlightenment Meistre, Hamann. Pentecostal.
My basic approach is to say that the Musar (Litvak) yeshiva movement which more or less was based on the Rambam and Saadia Gaon's approaches combine the best of both approaches.[To synthesize Reason and Faith.]

It would be hard to go into this in detail, but the basic idea is that in learning Musar one internalizes the ethics of the Law of Moses, that is the Oral and Written Law. 

Rambam הלכות מכירה פרק ה' הלכה ד'

You buy 50 crates of wine from Joe. [and you did משיכה and or הגבהה-you lifted  them if that was possible and if not then you pulled them.]  You owe him 50 dollars. Then you are taking with him and he finds out you have 50 sheep you want to sell.  The surprising thing is he can tell you I absolve you of your debt if you sell to me the 50 sheep, and if you agree then he acquires the sheep without doing any action.

So what is the difference between this and marriage? If you have given a woman 50 dollars as a loan and then tell her then loan is forgiven if you marry me and she says "Yes", the marriage is not existent.


In the Shulchan Aruch there is a commentary called the Netivot. This is one of the early commentaries that yeshivas started learning before Reb Chaim Soloveitchik arrived on the scene.
His answer to this it is is like הכרזה of the Beit Din in which the lender acquires the property of the borrower without doing any action.

Rav Shach [from Ponovitch] says the difference is one is נתינה (giving over something) and the other is מחילה (forgiving a debt). And one of his proofs is that marrying by means of forgiving a loan is valid if there is an object that is a guarantee and you give her the object back.


I still have trouble understanding this. In the case of the buyer and seller a transaction is made and is valid without any action being done. Simply forgiving the debt makes the transaction valid.

[Sometimes I say I have trouble understanding something as a euphemism, but not here. I believe Rav Shach has a good explanation for this but I just have not merited to understand it yet. I can see the two kinds of debt are different. One comes from a loan and the other from a buying selling arrangement. So from the fact that the original debt came from a transaction in which there was a real transfer of goods--by means of an act of acquisition, i can see how the later transaction can stem and be dependent on that and thus not need any further action.. Clearly this is what Rav Shach must be getting at but still it is fuzzy in my mind,  And I only read his essay on this yesterday for the first time so it makes sense to say I simply have not had time to absorb what he is saying.

Rav Shach brings from the Rashba a proof.

(This Rashba was a friend of the Ramban[from Spain, not the Rashba mentioned in Tosphot who is Rav Shimshon Ben Avraham])


The idea is this he says to her you are married to me by a hundred dollars and then gives her an object as  guarantee she is not married. This is different from the case where he forgives her debt and returns her guarantee. In the later case there is a קנין acquisition, in the first case merely a שיעבוד Obligation.

It occurred to me that we can understand Rav Shach's answer here based on R. Isaac in Shavuot 43.
To put t simply R. Isaac says a  משכון guarantee for a loan is owed by the lender. [And the Rif and Rambam both decided like R Isaac.] This one simple fact makes this who subject crystal clear. So a משכון for a loan is owned, but a משכון for getting married is not.
So we he says to her you are married to me by the fact that I forgive your debt and he gives back the משכון she is married because in fact he owned the משכון and so in giving it back he is giving something to her, not just forgiving a debt. But when he says You are married to me by the 100 dollars I will give to you and give her a משכון, she is not married because the משכון there is for a different kind of debt, not debt from a loan but a debt that he owes for marriage. So we definitely see this kind of distinction that Rav Shach is making between forgiving a debt and giving something that depends on from where the debt comes from.

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יש לוקח שקונה מטלטלים  from a seller and he did משיכה and or הגבהה.  הלוקח lifted  them if that was possible, and if not then he pulled them.  The לוקח owes to the seller חמישים זוז. Then המוכר finds out ללוקח יש חמישים crates of wine he wants to sell.  נמוכר  can tell him, "I absolve you of your debt, if you sell to me the חמישים crates of wine. If הלוקח agrees, then המוכר acquires the crates of wine without doing any action של קניין

So what is the difference between this and קידושין? If you have given a woman חמישים זוז as a loan and then tell her, "The loan is forgiven if you be married to me," and she says "Yes", the קידושין is not existent.



The answer of the נתיבות to this it is is like הכרזה וגביה of the בית דין in which the lender acquires the property of the borrower without doing any action.

רב שך  says the difference is one is נתינהת giving over something, and the other is מחילה, forgiving a debt. And one of his proofs is that marrying by means of forgiving a loan is valid if there is an object that is a משכון and you give her the object back.


I still have trouble understanding this. In the case of the buyer and seller, a transaction is made and is valid without any action being done. Simply forgiving the debt makes the transaction valid.

 I can see the two kinds of debt are different. One comes from a loan and the other from a buying selling arrangement. So from the fact that the original debt came from a transaction in which there was a real transfer of goods, by means of an act of acquisition, I can see how the later transaction can stem and be dependent on that and thus not need any further action. Clearly this is what רב שך must be getting at. 
רב שך brings from the רשב''א a proof.


The idea is this he says to her "You are married to me by a מנה" and then gives her an object as  guarantee she is not married. This is different from the case where he forgives her debt and returns her guarantee. In the later case there is a קנין acquisition, in the first case merely a שיעבוד obligation.

It occurred to me that we can understand the answer of רב שך here based on ר. יצחק in שבועות מ''ג.
To put it simply ר. יצחק says a  משכון guarantee for a loan is owed by the lender. And the רי''ף and רמב''ם both decided like ר. יצחק. This one simple fact makes this who subject crystal clear. So a משכון for a loan is owned, but a משכון for getting married is not.
So we he says to her, "You are married to me by the fact that I forgive your debt," and he gives back the משכון, she is מקודשת because in fact he owned the משכוןת and so in giving it back, he is giving something to her, not just forgiving a debt. But when he says "You are married to me by the מנה I will give to you," and gives her a משכון, she is not married because the משכון there is for a different kind of debt, not debt from a loan, but a debt that he owes for קידושין. So we definitely see this kind of distinction that רב שך is making between forgiving a debt and giving something that depends on from where the debt comes from. We also learn something new about R. Isaac that he meant his law to apply only to a משכון that come from  loan, not a different kind of משכון

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קידושין מ''ז. רמב''ם ה' מכירה ה:ד יש לוקח שקונה מטלטלים ממוכר והוא עשה משיכה או הגבהה. הלוקח הרים אותם אם זה היה אפשרי, ואם לא אז הוא משך אותם. הלוקח חייב למוכר חמישים זוז. ואז למוכר מתגלה שללוקח יש חמישים ארגזי יין שהוא רוצה למכור. המוכר יכול להגיד לו, "אני פוטר אותך מן החוב שלך, אם אתה מוכר לי חמישים ארגזי היין." אם הלוקח מסכים, אז המוכר רוכש את ארגזי היין  מבלי לעשות שום פעולה של קניין. אז מה ההבדל בין זה לבין קידושין? אם אדם נותן לאישה חמישים זוז כהלוואה, ואז אומר לה, "ההלוואה נסלחת, אם את מסכימה להיות נשוי לי," והיא אומרת "כן", הקידושין אינן קיימים. התשובה של הנתיבות לכך היא שזה כמו הכרזה וגבייה של בית הדין שבו המלווה רוכש הנכס של הלווה בלי לעשות שום פעולה. רב שך אומר שההבדל הוא אחת נתינת משהו, והשנייה היא מחילה, סליחת חוב. ואחת ההוכחות שלו היא שאם אדם מתחתן באמצעות סליחת הלוואה, זו תקפה אם יש אובייקט (הוא משכון) והוא נותן לה את האובייקט בחזרה. עדיין אני מתקשה להבין את זה. במקרה של הקונה ומוכר, העסקה היא בתוקף מבלי לעשות שום פעולה. כל שעל המוכר לעשות הוא סליחת החוב שהופך את העסקה תקפה. אני יכול לראות ששני סוגי החוב שונים. אחד מגיע מהלוואה והשני מסדר מכירה וקנייה. אז מן העובדה כי החוב המקורי הגיע מעסקה בה חלה העברה אמיתית של מוצרים, באמצעות מעשה של רכישה, אני יכול לראות איך העסקה המאוחרת יותר יכולה לנבוע מעסקה הראשונה ובכך לא צריכה יותר לזו פעולה. ברור שלזה מה שרב שך חייב לחתור להגיע. רב שך מביא מן רשב''א הוכחה. הרעיון הוא כזה, אדם אומר לה "את נשוי לי על ידי מנה" ואז נותן לה אובייקט כערובה, היא לא נשואה. זה שונה מהמקרה שבו הוא סולח החוב שלה ומחזיר הערבות שלה.  (במקרה אחר יש רכישת המשכון על ידי האישה, במקרה השני יש רק חובת שיעבוד.) עלה בדעתי כי אנו יכולים להבין  שהתשובה של רב שך כאן מבוססת על ר. יצחק בשבועות מ''ג. במילים פשוטות ר. יצחק אומר ערבות משכון עבור הלוואה הוא רכוש המלווה. ואת הרי''ף ורמב''ם החליטו כמו ר. יצחק.  עובדה פשוטה זו עושה את הנושא הזה ברור. אז משכון עבור הלוואה בבעלות, אלא משכון עבור קידושין הוא לא. אז אם אדם אומר לה, "את מקודשת לי על ידי העובדה כי אני סולח את החוב שלך," והוא נותן בחזרה את המשכון, היא מקודשת כי למעשה הוא בעלים של משכון וכך כשהוא נותן אותו בחזרה, הוא נותן לה משהו, לא רק סליחת חוב. אבל כשהוא אומר "את מקודשת לי על ידי המנה שאני אתן לך," ונותן לה משכון, היא לא נשואה, כי משכון זה בגלל סוג אחר של חוב, לא חוב הלוואה, אלא חוב שהוא חייב עבור קידושין. אז אנחנו בהחלט רואים את זה סוג של הבחנה כי רב שך עושה בין סולח חוב ולתת משהו תלוי מאיפה  מקורו של החוב. כמו כן, אנו לומדים משהו חדש על ר' יצחק שהוא התכוון שהחוק שלו חל רק על משכון שמגיע להלוואה, לא סוג אחר של משכון.
added to
Ideas in Shas





I hope  the above is clear. We can  see that what is going on in Kidushin is very much dependent on R Isaac and also from Rav Shach we can see something new about R. Isaac statement in itself.
You must say that what Rav Shach means is everything depends on what kind of arrangement caused the debt and we see that R.Isaac in the Gemara must have meant his law for a guarantee for loan only.

Reb Nachman thought most teachers of Torah are monsters

Reb Nachman thought most teachers of Torah are  monsters שדין יהודאיים, the so called teachers of Torah,  scourges sent by the Lord to punish a nation that had departed from the true faith,  drunk with lunacy and insanity.  They are best described as half men, half beasts, monstrous centaurs. [Reb Nachman was a great tzadik, but he was not infallible, and he definitely opened to door to the kind of tzadik worship that is pure idolatry that infects his supposed followers. His emphasis of Shmirat Habrit mainly leads to more sin that it helps. Still if a tzadik should be judged by the misuse he is put to, then no tzadik would come out OK.]

The way many Jews dealt with this was simple to leave them, and create havens of safety away from them: (1) Reform Judaism, (2) Conservative Judaism, (3) the State of Israel.

As you can tell these solutions never appealed to me much because Reform,  and Conservative seemed to leave out the hallowed, sacred aspects of Torah.

The best solution in my mind is the Litvak yeshiva which keeps to the Torah without the insanity that fills the religious nightmare world.

Still the Litvak yeshivas are too close to the religious monsters for comfort.

The Gra tried to deal with this problem with obviously no success as he was ignored in total.

They often resort to the problem of Lashon HaRa (slander) which is always a one way street. They can speak slander about anyone they want to, but no one can speak bad about them.

In any case there is a mizvah to warn people about traps they can fall into.

{Rambam laws of buying chapter 5 halacah 4 }

 If a person buys some goods, and then owes money. Then the buyer wants to sell stuff of his own {Rambam, Laws of Buying, chapter 5, halacah 4.} and then seller tells him, "Sell it to me, and your debt will be paid." At that point, the original seller does not have to do any act of acquisition. The Raavad as you can imagine disagrees with this (twice). The Gemara in Kidushin  says if this were so, then it would have to work for kidushin (marriage) also. And we know it does not. The Netivot has an answer for the Rambam and Rav Shach also. But  for now I just wanted to state what the problem is just for the sake of information. The problem is that in marrying a woman, one can not do so by a loan. This is  a famous halacha. That is to say: you loaned her money. Then you want to marry her. So instead of giving her a ring you say, "The debt you owes to me is forgiven." That does not work, and the reason is as the Gemara says הלוואה להוצאה נתנה  a loan is given to be spent. [That is the money of the loan already belongs to her.]

So what is the difference between this case and the above case of the buyer and seller? The buyer owes money. The seller then forgives the debt and the property of the buyer goes automatically to the seller.

I confess I did not understand Rav Shach's answer to this problem but I did see how he blew all the other proposed solutions out of the water. His seems to revolve on the money owed by the woman is forgiven as opposed to the money owed by the buyer which creates an act of purchase. I can see that the origins of the money owed in the two cases are different.One is in fact a loan. The other is money owed because of goods bought. Still I have  a hard time understanding why that would make any difference

Can a government force people to provide health care for others?

This goes to an argument between Richard Epstein and Dr. Michael Huemer. There is a legitimate argument for limited government. You have to see that debate. But the basic idea is the need for government is not the same as need for private institutions.
Can a government force people to provide health care for others?
My notes on
http://www.breitbart.com/  have mainly been along the lines of Reb Nachman who said to avoid doctors.
There is a lot to go into about this, but the main idea I wanted to say today was simply without any elaboration, that government is not a social contract. That is, there is something different about the need for a government that is not the same as an extension of social contract theory either of the Rashbam in Bava Metzia, nor John Locke nor Rousseau. 

I have to say that Richard Epstein wins the debate here. But that means that since government is a ding an sich a thing in itself its rights of contract are not unlimited. That is more or less what Epstein would say and does say I think. But he is looking at Roman Law and the Constitution of the USA. I am looking into the very essence of government in itself that I think is limited. 

people can be idols and idiots. Sometimes the smartest are the worst.

The religious world seems to have a problem concerning idolatry. And it does not help that the concept itself is fuzzy. And even worse is when people try to define it in such a way that leaves out their particular version of idolatry. 
One particular problem is the accepted belief that is something is authentically Jewish, it  can not be idolatry. And if some is not Jewish, then it automatically comes under the suspicion of being idolatrous. 
But, in fact, an idol of a gentile can be nullified. That is if the gentile himself abandons its worship. Not  Jewish idol.
The basic problems with idolatry are three things. One is the idol itself, another is things offered to the idol and the last is things that are vessels or ornaments  made to serve the idol. People can be things offered to idols, and they do not have to agree to it. As in fact in the days when people were, in fact, offered to idols it was never the case that they agreed. Rather by the time they realized what was happening it was too late to turn around. By joining their cult, one  becomes a thing offered to their idol.

And people can be idols themselves as we see in Sanhedrin pg 63  האומר עבדוני ואמר כן חייב. (A person says, "Serve me" is killed for seducing to idol worship. A person that agrees and says "yes" is also killed for worshiping an idol.) That is not only is the person that says "Serve me" is an idol and is killed for being a מסית ומדיח, but also the person that agrees and says, "yes" is also killed for serving an idol.

Idols an the vessels that serve them and food and vessels offered to them are forbidden to derive benefit from. They are also unclean [טמא]. What happens to the טומאה uncleanliness if the people that served it nullify it? In all the above cases the uncleanliness disappears except for food offered to the idol. That obviously remains forbidden, but the uncleanliness is a doubt if it goes off.

An idol that is worshiped by gentiles can be nullified and an idol that is worshiped by Jews can not.  What happens to the טומאה uncleanliness? This all starts in Tractate Avoda Zara 52a. R. Yochanan asked  R. Yanai what happens to the uncleanliness of food offered to an idol. The question is asked why did he ask about food? Why not ask about vessels? Vessels are not a question since they can be made pure by dipping them in a river or fresh spring thus the "Tumah" uncleanliness also goes off. Why then did he not ask about the idol itself? The idol itself is not question for since its status as an idol can go off of it when people no longer worship it, then its uncleanliness also goes off. But food is a doubt because it has no way of getting clean by dipping it in a river or ocean or spring.

There the Rambam and Tosphot and the Raavad all hold vessels that were offered to the idol and vessels used to serve the idol can have their uncleanliness taken off. But Rashi explains in that Gemara that vessels can be made pure just like their use for idolatry can be nullified. So Rashi obviously is explains our gemara here as referring on to vessels that are used to serve the idol, not to vessels that were offered to the idol since their prohibition for use never comes off.

Thus it is important not to serve a Jewish idol since the uncleanliness and the prohibition can never come off. We also see this in Sanhedrin circa 65. When a Jew leaves serving  a Jewish idol he dies (because his source of life is cut off.)  We actually since this in gentiles also. Even a gentile when he leaves a cult that he was involved with, he looses his life source and dies spiritually--and sometimes physically. This you always see in people that break away from cults. They never get back on  track no matter how hard they try. Or they just go and join some worse cult.

Each of the different schools of Musar

Each of the different schools of Musar {Ethics} of Reb Israel Salanter emphasized a different facet or face of Musar.  And this tendency I have traced to different aspects of Musar in itself.
This can be confusing. And outside of that there were great people like Reb Chaim Solveitchik that simply did not let Musar into their yeshivas. To Reb Chaim, Yeshiva was for Gemara, Rashi, Tosphot. Full Stop. [This opinion, as far as I know, was shared by the Chazon Ish].

None of them liked the השכלה (Haskalah) which was the Jewish version of the Enlightenment.

The arguments against the Enlightenment itself seem to me to be appropriate the the Jewish version.
That is, starting from Jonathan Swift  up to and including Johann  Georg Hamann and Joseph de Maistre. I think you could include Allen Bloom, because in the long run his book is a critique on the Enlightenment from the aspects of seeings its bad effects (Closing of the American Mind.)

The most powerful critique is of course The Closing of the American Mind . Every sentence in that book contains a whole university education all in itself.

It is for this reason that I see the Rambam as giving a solution to this problem with his balanced approach (1) The Oral and Written Law of Moses (2) Physics (3) Metaphysics. That is he saw each of these as an important component of every persons's education. That is as universal and necessary. Sine qua non. Without which nothing else can happen.

My own approach to Musar is that it is like water. You need it but you do not want to drink so much as to overload your kidneys.
To me is is an essential vitamin, but I can not see how doing it hours every day [as the Musar movement intended] would help anything. There also seems to be no evidence that more that 30 minutes per day helps anything. 
While Reb Israel Salanter was certainly right about the need for character development, learning tons of Musar does not seem to help. If anything, it hurts. 
Instead, I suggest a Jewish version of the Boy Scouts, or like they have in Israel the "Tzofim" [Scouts].

That is to put it all together-- my idea of  a proper education is the Law of Moses [Oral and Written Law] Physics, Metaphysics, Survival Skills, Music.

There are problems with religion that the counter Enlightenment does not deal with very well. But the experience of living in the religious world has convinced me the truth of Reb Nachman who said most teachers of Torah were demonic.  תלמידי חכמים שדיין יהודאיים. Rav Israel Oddessar the founder of the Na Nach group certainly stressed this point and from what I have seen he was right on the money. So to my view this balanced approach of the Rambam make the most sense.

The problem is this. There are good arguments for the importance of keeping the Law of Moses, the oral and written Law. But as soon as one wants to do that, right away the Satan sends his messengers to mess the whole thing up. Most often the very desire to keep the holy Torah causes people more sin than if they had just remained secular. The way the messengers of Satan get into the door is by  a kind of scam in which they try present themselves as Torah teachers. My impression is that the best thing to do with them is to shoot them on sight. [If not for the problem that that would mess up the drive way or side walk.] The enlightenment did not arrive in a vacuum. Nor did the Rambam decide to combine faith with Aristotle and Plato because of some whim. He saw faith a reason as being so connect that one could not exist without the other. Faith as we see in the religious world  without Plato and Aristotle becomes fanatic insanity --not just for individuals but for whole communities. This is clear to anyone who has lived in a religious community. On the other hand Reason without the Revelation from Sinai is like a iron oven of ice.