I have recently become interested in Musar and the seemingly extravagant claims made for it by Israel Salanter. I am thinking that perhaps the Musar movement was right and that there is something about that basic set of books [the six classical ones I mean] which instills good character traits in people. While I am not totally convinced,  I am still tending in this direction. In fact, I brought this up with one fellow I know and his thought that it sounds good and further that someone should put the basic Musar cannon into dots. What this would mean would be someone should get together the basic Musar books of the disciples of Israel Salanter and make a set out of them and put dots into them.
That would be the books of Reb Israel Salanter, "HaTvuna," "Or Israel" of Isaac Blasser, The second recent volume of the writings of Isaac Blasser that came out recently in Israel, The "Madgragat HaAdam," "Chachma and Musar" from Simcha Zizel. 


This maybe is not on the deep philosophical level of Kant or Plato but these are still very good books and perhaps in fact do instill something precious into people.

I agree learning is not everything.  I have long held that something like the Boy Scouts of America is very important for children  and this instills values into people that no books could ever do.

The problem is that it seems to me that this is not very workable in Brooklyn.  At any rate is it my suggestion to start the Orthodox Jewish Boy Scouts of America  that meet every week and would learn out door skills and survival skills and what things like “team work” and “loyalty” and “human decency” mean in real life.

 Also I must mention later books of Musar after the direct disciples of Israel Salanter are not very good. They became "frum" [in the non complementary connotation of that word].  In my recommendation of Musar i meant specifically the books of the first generation disciples

The interesting subject for today is what is called Musar. This has relevance for Jews and gentiles alike.
It is a subject that is built from certain foundations and then reaches its peak in the person of Israel Salanter.
The essence of Musar is the  idea that everyone should learn one of five basic books of Morality written during the Middle ages on the subject of ethics. To this is added the idea of the subconscious that Israel Salanter borrowed from Schopenhauer. The idea is this:by daily review of these books something of their ideas on ethics gets into the subconscious.

But there are a few unstated insights about this idea that are not stated explicitly. One is a very well known Jewish idea but sadly enough Christians seem to be completely unaware of it.It is the idea that during the Middle Ages people were very careful in what they wrote about philosophy and theological subjects. It is what is called in the Jewish world "Rishonim." It means not that people that wrote then were somehow divinely inspired.It does not mean that. It means that they were extremely careful not to write things that would be logical fallacies. This care and caution was shot to smithereens after the time of Hume who in spite of his great and original thought wrote in basic logically fallacies--so much so that it leaves me wondering if he did so on purpose. since then philosophy is dominated by circular reasoning including Hegel who assumes what he wants to prove. [As Habermas noted that in the phenomenology Hegel tries to prove the identity of Subject and Object--but in fact he assumes it right from the start.] You never see this in writing from Jewish Christian or Muslim philosophers from the Middle Ages.

Christians probably have some equivalent of Jewish Musar from the middle ages but i am not sure of what it could be. They should probably make and effort to dig it up. What I means is Musar may be based on philosophical thought but these are books that are specifically about morality, not philosophy.

This means that learning Aquinas would not be in this category of Musar.

At any rate back to the Jewish subject of Musar

This subject was highly misunderstood after Israel Salanter. The reason was that the divide between reform Jews and orthodox Jews had grown to such a degree that the emphasis of people like Maimonides on science and philosophy was ignored. So Musar was taken to be a radical anti science anti philosophy doctrine and any books from the actual Musar books that said differently were explained away.


Something is curious about Musar in terms of the treatment of the soul. This subject is too big for this blog right now. But just briefly let me mention that the Jewish treatment of the soul was influenced by the brethren of purity. In fact the whole move away from Neo Platonic thought in Ibn Ezra [who accepts the Neo Platonic scheme point black] and Saadia Geon to Aristotelian thought in Maimonides seems to have been influenced by the Muslim philosophers of those times.  But as we reach the Musar Movement of Israel Salanter it seems the idea of the soul have changed to the general Christian concept  of an ethereal essence.
 I really have no time to go into this right now but it would make a great term paper.

Reb Israel did borrow the idea of the self from Hobbes and the subconsciousness from Schopenhauer and other ideas developed by Enlightenment philosophers. Later on the Musar movement made a move to deny this debt. The prime directive in the Jewish Orthodox would today is never acknowledge a debt to a Christin or Muslim thinker.



 The Rambam (Maimonides) and Saadia Geon always acknowledged from where they borrowed their ideas. That is what makes them interesting and it helps to see what they are adding or improving on.

I have a love hate relationship with the Musar movement of Israel Salanter.

It is hard to disagree with the basic three core themes. (1) Fear of God is the most important thing in the world. (2) Good Character traits are a basic component of Fear of God (3) The way to get to Fer of God and good character traits is by learning the traditional books called Musar-- books of ethics written by medial Jewish authorities like Maimonides.
He borrowed from  Schopenhauer the idea of the subconscious 


[Schopenhauer was the most widely discussed philosopher in the German-speaking world in the time of R.Israel Salanter.]

And the system of R. Salanter was based on the concept of the subconscious--i.e. to read Musar in such a way that it will penetrate into the subconscious. [See letter 6 in Or Israel. he calls the subconscious there by its German name. It is not possible to imagine he did not know about this from the Gemran speaking world he was in at the time in Konigsberg.the city of Kant]
This is all good.

Where Musar went wrong is a whole different subject in itself.
Perhaps someone could devote a academic study on this subject?

Musar became "Frumkeit."
Reform Jews to them are the arch enemy, "the prime enemy" (Glavni Protivnick) as the Russians used to say about the USA.
Somehow Musar the idea that we the frum orthodox are all righteous and holy and everyone else is criminally insane.
To me this seems to indicate a slight disconnection with reality.

"Traditionally, Natural Law jurisprudence tends to come from Aristotelians, or at least Thomists. From that, we might suppose that Aristotle could have a natural law theory. But the Thomists don't think of ethics in empirical terms, as did Aristotle."

Here is my question about the Rambam in an expanded version and the answer of Dr Kelly Ross to my short version of the question.




Jean Paul Sartre, famously asserted that, "Without God, all is permitted." This was supposed to be a quote from Dostoyevsky (1821-1881). This is a misquote. [The actual statements is without hell, all is permitted.] Besides that it is not true. The manifest ignorance and absurdity of Sartre's pronouncement is evident when we reflect that he ignores one of the oldest and best known theories in Western philosophy: Plato's Theory of Forms. For Plato, meaning, value, and morality exist independently of any god or Deity, and this is quite characteristic of Greek philosophy in general.
And the general approach of all Jewish thinkers from Saadia Geon and the Duties of the Heart until the Rambam was firmly on the side of Plato.
With the Rambam things get confusing. He wants to retain Natural law which comes from Saadia Geon and is pretty much stated openly in the Talmud. But he wants to move towards Aristotle away from Plato's form of the Good. I still do not know if anyone has addressed this serious issue in the Rambam.

Dear Dr Ross. Could Aristotle have natural law theory? You write he hold from heteronomous authority. But does that have to be so?




Dr Ross: "Traditionally, Natural Law jurisprudence tends to come from Aristotelians, or at least Thomists. From that, we might suppose that Aristotle could have a natural law theory. But the Thomists don't think of ethics in empirical terms, as did Aristotle. Instead, natural law comes from the Mind of God in what is overall a theistic system. But Aristotle's God doesn't worry about human phronesis (prudence), and his conception of even human "wisdom" (sophia) precludes practical issues or applications. As Aristotle says, ethics is not for the young, because they literally have not learned enough from experience. Yet the old themselves are liable to notice that the young are often the most passionate about justice. And if this passion is often expressed in foolish, destructive, or vicious ways, where is the fault? The old are just as likely to become cynical as wise, or pessimistic rather than dedicated. Aristotle certainly had no political ideals to promote; and he may not have appreciated himself how the institution of "mixed" forms of government he described, as praised by Polybius or James Madison, represented in ideal in its own right, as an accommodation with the ignorance or self-interest of human nature. Even now, a substantial body of political opinion is impatient with checks and balances and divided authority.

Best wishes,
Kelley Ross

Concerning Conversion to Judaism

The first thing to notice in the Rambam/Maimonides is that there are two operative levels of Gerut/conversion. The first is simply to become Jewish. For this one needs a lower level of conditions [an easier set of conditions].  The next and highest level is to be acceptable for marriage in the Jewish world.

Now the main and simple condition for the first level is something so simple it is amazing that few have ever noticed it. This simple condition is not on their radar because they do not agree that it is something that even exists. This condition is "ratzon" (desire) to be Jewish. The Rambam says:  The Torah was given to the Jewish people and to anyone who wants to accept it"

To give you an example of how simple this is take the case of a slave that a Jew buys from a gentile. The Halacha is that as they are getting ready to put him in the mikvah for the sake of being a Jewish slave, he jumps into the mikvah on his own in front of the people standing around and says he is going into the mikvah for the sake of being Jewish. He becomes automatically Jewish and he is obligated in all the mitzvot and he can no longer be owned as a slave. (That is the buyer loses his money because he can no longer own the labor of the fellow). We see here that the desire of the Beit din is not necessary to make someone Jewish. He becomes Jewish even against their desire. It depends only on his own desire.

However when we look into the Rambam about laws of marriage we find a whole more stringent set of conditions. There he needs  (accepting the mitzvot) in front of three judges.



On a side issue in terms of Conversion of Women. The Tosphot in Yevamot does allow the a case in which the woman goes to the mikvah on her own and the acceptance of the Mitzvot alone is in front of three judges. The Rambam however requires that the Mikvah also be in front of three judges. The way to do this is to get a lot of Styrofoam slices and put them over the mikvah, then the woman gets into the mikvah that is covered in Styrofoam and then the three judges come into the room. Then she dips herself totally under the water in front of them and they see the acceptable dipping but nothing else.

A further point here is that become Jewish is not dependent of the will of the judges or anyone at all except the actually person involved. Judges can’t make someone Jewish and they can’t unmake some from being Jewish.


One last point. There was an old tradition to accept converts and not make things hard for them as is customary today. I agree with this approach for several reasons. One is that it is the Halacha. The other is that apparently some people are afraid the convert is not "all that well put together." But so what? People  anyway have no problem throwing anyone they don't like out of their communities the instant that the person rubs them the wrong way.--Jew or Gentile. It is just that when it is a Jew that rubs them the wrong way they find lots of clever ways of disavowing that person's Jewishness. A good example is Sephardic communities. To Sephardim all Ashkenazim are not Jewish;--- period. They just go along with the act as long as it benefits them but when it comes to a crunch and the poor ashkenazic Jew is down and out on his luck the Sefardi simply says to himself, "Well, he is not really Jewish anyway, so why bother to help him?" [And for Sephardim, American Ashkenazim are in the general category of Amalek. 


]

The Musar movement

I am looking a bit at Israel Salanter and Isaac Blazer. The Musar movement seems to have an idea of heteronomous authority. But that shouldn't be a surprise to me. This I think was the tendency of Torah thought for a long time, and I think that it was solidified by the Rambam who was going with Aristotle.
Once anyone is going with Aristotle they will have to end up with authority coming from outside of ones self. There is no absolute Form of the Good in Aristotle, so where else would authority comes from but divine command?

On the other hand, Divine command Theory has something going for it. The "self" itself is to Kant one example of a thing in itself, and we know that Schopenhauer considers the Will the be the absolute Ding an Sich. 



The Musar Movement. It looks to me they had some amazing insights.--especially about what they call negiot- rationalizations and excuses. This is a important insight. This is where the evil inclination is not buried like the Id. It is known and a person is doing what he knows to be wrong but he excuses it with negiot.  and rationalizations.

Is there a mitzvah to learn Torah to get a salary?

Is there a mitzvah to learn Torah to get a salary?

How would you go about thinking about this question logically?

At first sight it seems like the same question as "Is there a mitzvah to put on tefilin purely for the sake of money?" This seems simple. You simply divide the action from the intension. The intension is bad. You are not supposed to use the Holy Torah for money. But the action looks good.

But as we think deeper into this we can see that learning Torah is different. It is like the types of work on Sabbath that the intension is linked to the act. For example once who erases not in order to write has not done any work at all. It is not even a work done for a different intension. It simply is not work.

For it to be work it has to have the "on condition to write."

Same with Torah Learning. The Rambam says one who learns on condition to receive money has no mitzvah and loses his portion in the next world. That means the act itself has lost the category of a mitzvah and entered into the category of a sin of the most grievous type possible.

To see the opinion of Maimonides on this subject look into Pirkei Avot Chapter 4 Mishna 5 and in the laws of Talmud Torah. He could not have been clearer.

This helps us to understand the difference between people in authentic Lithuanian yeshivas that learn Torah for its own sake  as opposed to people that see in Torah an easy way to make money and scam people. 

Chaim Soloveichik and Shabat

Chaim Soloveichik and Shabat 
I can already begin to see the light with him. I am still in the middle of figuring him out concerning Sabbath but I think I can see where he is going. He looks at the second "Some say" in pesachim with the argument between Abyee and Rava about pleasure that comes to a person against their will.
The second "some say" holds straight down the board that to R. Shimon we consider intention alone. To R. Yehuda the basic idea is that he does not care about intention.

But however it works out in pesachim, we can see already that this might be a help to Reb Chaim. He would want Pesik Raisha to be forbidden to R. Yehuda even if it is against his will and permitted to R. Shimon.
The only thing left to Reb Chaim is to bridge the gap between Shabbat and other types of prohibitions. Stay tuned



[In plain English this all means that Reb Chaim has a ready made answer to answer the contradiction in the Rabam about piecing a boil on shabat. Once you consider it a work not intended that is pesik reish you answer the Rambam poskins like Shmuel in work not intended. But Reb Chaim still has to prove that R. Yehuda will disagree so that we will still have an an argument between him and R. Shimon in Keritut.]

Is there a mitzvah to learn Torah to get a salary?(Or, on the other hand is there a mitzvah to learn Torah not for money, and in fact to receive no money from doing so?)

Is there a mitzvah to learn Torah to get a salary?
How would you go about thinking about this question logically?
At first sight it seems like the same question as "Is there a mitzvah to put on tefilin purely for the sake of money?" This seems simple. You simply divide the action from the intention. The intension is bad. You are not supposed to use the Holy Torah for money. But the action looks good.
B

But as we think deeper into this we can see that learning Torah is different. It is like the types of work on Sabbath that the intension is linked to the act. For example once who erases not in order to write has not done any work at all. It is not even a work done for a different intension. It simply is not work.
For it to be work it has to have the "on condition to write."
Same with Torah Learning The Rambam says one who learns on condition to receive money has no mitzvah and loses his portion in the next world. That means the act itself has lost the category of a mitzvah and entered into the category of a sin of the most grievous type.

To see the opinion of Maimonides on this subject look into Pirkei Avot Chapter 4  and in the laws of Talmud Torah. He could not have been clearer.

Sometimes parents hear things like this: "Nobody can tell me what to believe ...".It seems that this might be a claim: "No one has the moral right to tell me what to believe."

Sometimes parents hear things like this:  "Nobody can tell me what to do or believe ..."
What exactly is this a defense against? It seems that it might be claiming one of the following:
1. No one can force me to believe something I don't want to believe.
2. No one has the moral right to tell me what to believe.
3. No one has the intellectual right to tell me what to believe.

1. Well, no one can force you to believe something -- true enough. But what exactly does this mean? Perhaps it says something like this: No matter how strongly someone else believes that I'm wrong, that will not cause me to believe otherwise.
 I can imagine cases in which this strength of will might be noble, even heroic. Saints and martyrs come to mind. But small children also come to mind, and inexperienced adolescents, and stubborn husbands. In other words, this trait might be a virtue, but it might be a vice, too. And so by itself, it does not recommend itself as a strategy.

2. On the face of it, it is not obvious that NO ONE has the moral right to tell me what to do. I can imagine a young cashier with sticky fingers, and his boss or colleague or parent reprimanding him. I can imagine a Colonel in the army lecturing a cocky new Lieutenant on the issue of courage. The Colonel has been there, done that, seen more, and faced more, and would seem to have the moral right to tell the Lieutenant what to think and how to act. I can imagine a seasoned teacher lecturing a younger teacher on the virtues of being patient with students, or on being overly easy in grading. And so, it seems that this claim needs to be justified.

3. This is the weakest position, and can't withstand even the slightest scrutiny. All you have to do is to imagine the relationship between someone who is bright and inexperienced in something, and someone who is bright and experienced in that same thing. The latter does have the intellectual right to tell the other what to believe -- at least in some situations. Indeed, it is one of the most maddening things to have someone who makes unjustified and false claims about something about which you know well. Yes ... you DO have an intellectual right to correct him.

So, it seems that the claim that "nobody can tell me what to believe" is simply not true, or at least if it is true, it has to be justified and defended. It is certainly not obviously true.

(This doesn't even touch upon the issue of social implication. Once my beliefs and actions effect other people, they no longer belong to just me -- they are public. They automatically open themselves up to public scrutiny, and I do not have the same proprietary rights to them that I had when they effected only me.)

All humans need to make decisions concerning the right thing to do. Most humans want to do what is good. It is good to do the right thing. Often knowing what is the right thing to do, knowing what is right, and knowing what is good is not all that easy. Answers to the questions, "What is the right thing to do?" and "What is the good ?" aren't obvious to many or universally agreed upon. Yet, humans need answers to these questions. Situations requiring moral deliberation and ethical principles.

1. "Well, it's true for me ...."
Many students have a difficult time seeing a distinction between the following two statements:

a. It's true.
b. It's true for me.

But there IS a difference, and it is important to see the difference, and most people see the difference when it comes to things like mathematics, science, accounting, engineering, law, etc.

Here's the question: What does "for me" add to "It's true"? What I mean is, why would anyone say "It's true for me"? Let's say, for example, your favorite physics teacher asks you to tell her what the rate of fall is for a body located approximately at the surface of the Earth. Let's say that you are a student of physics and know with more certainty than that Bush is president, that bodies fall at 9.4 meters per second per second. If you write on your exam that bodies fall at 9.4 mXsec2, your instructor would put an annoying red "X" next to your answer.

"But wait a darn minute, there, ma'am: it's true for me that bodies fall at 9.4 mXsec2!"





Examples of situations requiring moral deliberation and ethical principles.
Question 1: A friend of yours wants you to join his club and sponsors you for membership. Being a member of this club will greatly enhance your career plans. However, once you are inducted, you realize that there is an unwritten rule that no baal teshuvas [newly religious] are allowed membership.

Question 2: You meet some friends at a shabat meal and find yourself seated beside a rather attractive person. During the course of the evening, you have an enjoyable conversation and you promise to call that person to set up a date. When the person gets up to leave, you suddenly realize that he/she is physically handicapped.
Do you still call for the date?
Question 3: You have just earned a degree in Chemistry. Your best job offer comes from a laboratory that does experiments in chemical warfare. You do not agree with this practice, but you also realize that if you turn down the job, they will hire someone else who might do the job 'too well'.
Do You take the Job?
Question 5: You have been friends with a couple for several years. Now they are involved in a messy divorce and child custody battle. One of them asks you to testify on his/her behalf.
Do you agree to testify?

Question 6: When checking your mailbox one day, you discover a letter addressed to you from a legal firm in Florida. Inside is a letter explaining that you have been identified as a herd owner in a cattle farm that is now in receivership in the state of Florida. The letter further informs you that now that all accounts with creditors have been settled, the remaining proceeds from the sale of the herd are to be distributed among the shareholders. Enclosed is a check, made out to you, for a substantial amount of money. You know that you are not the person for whom this check is intended, since you have never invested in cattle or anything else. Upon reading the letter further, you discover that the funds due any unidentified herdowner will revert to the state of Florida after the passage of 7 years. It has now been 6.5 years since the cattle were sold. This means if you send the check back the money will most likely go to the state.
Do you cash the check?

Question 7: A close friend of yours comes to you and reveals that she is pregnant. Her partner does not know yet, and she is extremely upset. "This is just not the time to have a baby" she says, "I'm thinking of having an abortion, but I'm not sure if it is the right thing to do." She assures you that she and her partner tried to prevent becoming pregnant, but that it obviously did not work.
What would you tell her to do ?

Question 8: You're a West Point cadet bound by a strict honor code. You witness another cadet, who is also a friend, cheating on a test.
Do you turn them in?

An example will help illustrate the function of these principles in an applied ethical discussion. In 1982, a couple from Bloomington, Indiana gave birth to a baby with severe mental and physical disabilities. Among other complications, the infant, known as Baby Doe, had its stomach disconnected from its throat and was thus unable to receive nourishment. Although this stomach deformity was correctable through surgery, the couple did not want to raise a severely disabled child and therefore chose to deny surgery, food, and water for the infant. Local courts supported the parents’ decision, and six days later Baby Doe died. Should corrective surgery have been performed for Baby Doe? Arguments in favor of corrective surgery derive from the infant’s right to life and the principle of paternalism which stipulates that we should pursue the best interests of others when they are incapable of doing so themselves. Arguments against corrective surgery derive from the personal and social disbenefit which would result from such surgery. If Baby Doe survived, its quality of life would have been poor and in any case it probably would have died at an early age. Also, from the parent’s perspective, Baby Doe’s survival would have been a significant emotional and financial burden. When examining both sides of the issue, the parents and the courts concluded that the arguments against surgery were stronger than the arguments for surgery. First, foregoing surgery appeared to be in the best interests of the infant, given the poor quality of life it would endure. Second, the status of Baby Doe’s right to life was not clear given the severity of the infant’s mental impairment. For, to possess moral rights, it takes more than merely having a human body: certain cognitive functions must also be present. The issue here involves what is often referred to as moral personhood, and is central to many applied ethical discussions.

Not all moral questions are dilemmas. Most are not. It is just that moral philosophy has tended to concentrate on moral dilemmas because there is an underlying assumption in Western countries about the basic principles of Judaic-Christian morality.

ETHICS: Relativism: Not only do relativists fail to offer a basis for criticizing those who are intolerant, but they cannot rationally criticize anyone who espouses what they might regard as a heinous principle. If, as seems to be the case, valid criticism supposes an objective or impartial standard, relativists cannot morally criticize anyone outside their own culture. Adolf Hitler's genocidal actions, so long as they are culturally accepted, are as morally legitimate as Mother Teresa's works of mercy. I

Shortly after  Clinton was first elected to the office of President of the United States there was an election of a school board in a Florida county. The majority of the school board were now members of the Christian Coalition, a conservative political action group. The school board voted that all public schools in the county would teach in all grades, as part of social studies, that the United States has a culture superior to that of many others . This was to be supported by the claims that the United States held the values of freedom and equality most high, was a democracy and provided for the welfare of many in need and a number of other claims.

Both President Clinton and his wife , Hillary Rodham Clinton, criticized the school board for their intolerance. They both proclaimed that the US does not have a superior culture but that all cultures are equally valued and are to be equally respected. These proclamations are affirmations of doctrines of the post modern movement and are part of the set of "politically correct" ideas currently popular.

Nine months after this event a young citizen of the United States was arrested in Singapore for acts of vandalism. Michael Fay confessed and was tried and found guilty and sentenced to a whipping. At that time many people in the USA were very upset with this situation. President Clinton wrote a letter to the president of Singapore and requested that the sentence be changed. President Clinton wrote that the act of whipping was barbaric.

The president of Singapore was offended by the letter and upheld the custom and laws of that land. How could President Clinton declare another countries practices or any countries practices as being barbaric if he believed that all cultures are equally praise worth? The President was being inconsistent. He also criticized the people of China and the government for their barbaric practices with regard to political and religious dissidents.


When he later ordered the bombing in Bosnia and one of the planes bombed the Chinese embassy, several nations, including the Chinese, called that act one of barbarism!

[http://www.qcc.cuny.edu/socialsciences/ppecorino/ethics_text/Chapter_3_Relativism/Relativism_Problems.htm]

The War on the Streets of Alexandria, Egypt Between Christians and Muslims

Remember everyone...this is what Democracy looks like! The Arab version of democracy basically means a political system that allows the murder of Christians by Muslims - that's the Arab Spring that Obama and the main stream media in America endorsed. Barack Hussein Obama subtly endorsed the extermination of Christians.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk

One person died and dozens were wounded during clashes between Muslims and Christians late Friday night outside a Coptic church in Egypt's second city, state newspaper Al-Ahram reported, in the latest violent sectarian row in the Muslim-majority country.

Reuters

2:26AM BST 18 May 2013

A quarrel between two young men, one Christian and one Muslim, morphed into a family feud that sparked clashes in a western district of Alexandria.

The two sides threw firebombs at each other before security forces intervened and cordoned off the area around the church.

Police arrested eight people after about two hours of fighting.

In addition to the political and economic turmoil Egypt has endured since Hosni Mubarak was overthrown in February 2011, tensions have risen between Muslims and Christians, especially since the election of Islamist President Mohamed Mursi in June.

Christians make up about 10 per cent of Egypt's 84 million people and have complained that the authorities have failed to protect them since Mubarak was ousted, giving radical Islamists a free hand.

Disturbing abuses of power

The revelations that the Justice Department had secretly seized journalists’ phone records and that the Internal Revenue Service had targeted conservative groups seeking tax-exempt status show that government’s heavy hand has not been lifted.


http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/colbert-king-disturbing-abuses-of-power/2013/05/17/915a7264-bea9-11e2-9b09-1638acc3942e_story.html

Paul Ryan: IRS Withheld Information From Congress.

I admit I gave up on the American republic a long time ago. While on paper it looks good but in practice it is not any difference than any totalitarian system. Now it is the tyranny of the socialists. It might take them some time to tear the USA down completely but they are certainly working hard at it.

Rav Chaim Soloveitchik essay on the subject of keeping Sabbath and work done not for its own sake.

I still have yet to study the Rav Chaim Soloveitchik essay on the subject of keeping Sabbath and work done not for its own sake. However, a few day ago I wrote my own answer on the issue of the contradiction in the Rambam/Maimonides.
 Yesterday [on Shavuot] I opened up the Reb Chaim (Chidushei HaRambam) without my learning partner and I noticed that the major issue he deals with is not the contradiction in the Rambam but the fact that the Talmud in Keritut does attribute the argument about stirring coals to the idea of it being a thing that is not intended.] So first of all even if my answer is correct it does not in any way relate to the major problem Reb Chaim is dealing with. and just off the top of my head without looking at it in depth it seems to me he is trying to say that it is as the Gemara itself says a thing not intended and he understands that the argument there depends on the Aruch [a rishon/first authority quoted by Tosphot]-- that a thing not intended but a pesik reisha (the work must happen in spite of the fact that he does not do it directly) is forbidden to Rabbi Yehuda because the pesik reisha bring the intention to the thing and to Rabbi Shimon it does not.

 If in fact this is what Reb Chaim means, then everything is fine. And as for the contradiction in the Rambam I am not sure of how he explains it. But my idea I think is true. If you just look at the Mishna, you will see that it seems to be saying that capturing any reptiles besides the main eight, if done not for the sake of keeping them is not a work on Shabat at all. Not that it is a work done not for its own sake.
 And I did not mention it, but as for chabura [wound] for the other thing the Rambam allows though it looks like a work not for its own sake --to answer that I plead the Talmud in Sanhedrin about mekalkel damaging which to Rabbi Yehuda is patur/ not liable and there a puncture in a wound is considered damaging--so no question on the Rambam even starts there.

The issue of conversion to Judaism

The issue of conversion to Judaism really depends on two different places in the Talmud, one in Tractate Sanhedrin and the other in Tractate Avoda Zara. It is not complicated at all.  However, when it comes down to what to do in practice you need three judges.  However since there is no such thing as a “judge” as defined by the Torah anymore; [A judge has to have ordination/semicha from Moses at Mount Sinai and that has stopped existing since the time of the early Amoraim  [in the middle of the times of the Talmud]] what you end up today is that you need simply three kosher witnesses which according to Tosphot can do the shelichut ["messenger service"] of the real judges that once existed a long time ago. The truth is this opinion deserves respect because it is coming from Tosphot. [Tosphot is always right. You just have to think into what he says long enough.]  However it is clear that this would not work at all to the Rambam. The witnesses do have to be male.  So in fact as sad as the state of affairs is for women converts there is simply not much you can do.  The dipping needs to be witnessed by three adult males and it does need to be seen that she is completely immersed. Believe me if there was a way to get out of this I would know about it and announce it from the rooftops.



While on the subject I might as well mention that conversion to Judaism today is largely considered as joining a community. This is however not the Torah approach. In Torah it is considered the act of a person that accepts the Torah-- i.e. the world view of the Torah and to do a certain minimum amount of mitzvot.

The idea as stated in the Shulchan Aruch and the Rambam is that when one comes to convert one does not tell them all the difficult details of the mitzvot. One simply tells them "chapter headings" [literally roshie perakim]. [That there is a general idea of shabat etc]


The reason the actual dipping needs to be seen is that it is a kind of act of witnessing something. A woman that goes to a mikvah in general needs no witness.the mikvah woman is there just for things like checking nails etc. Conversion is a whole different ball game. It needs to be effected and created by some act. This act is the dipping into a natural body of water in teh presence of three kosher judges with intention to keep the mitzvahs and believe world view of the Torah




I see the effect of cults on people in general--Jewish and gentile as being very destructive. If I was a law maker in any country I would be very careful about which religious groups I would allow to operate in my territory. Once  a group is known as a cult I think I would make it illegal without too much more thought.
Freedom of religion is not such an important value as to put the public into danger of lunatic cults.

 Today I want to say a few good word about Nietzsche to make up for what I wrote yesterday against him. The argument against him I might not get to today, but let me just say he is very important to read. He is part of a tradition that one needs to know in order to be literate.  Much Jewish philosophical writings of the twentieth century borrows  from him without mentioning his name. Certainly many of Freud's main theses are directly taken from Nietzsche. [Not just the idea but even the very name of the The Id is straight from Nietzsche]
 
He always has some good point. Most of what passes for "Leshem Shamim" behavior--for the sake of Heaven  is 99% of the time a cover for low drives. Yet there is another side of the coin. Much of what people do quietly without fanfare is in fact for the sake of heaven. Nietzsche tried to simplify what a human being is about but one sub-level of desire for power. Sometimes human beings do thing for other motives. Sometimes these motives are compassion or a desire for knowledge or desire to do what one knows is right.

 Consider an argument  against moral relativism by Michael Huemer:

 Consider such claims as

(a) Happiness is good.
(b) Honesty is a virtue.
(c) It is wrong to burn children just for the fun of it.

The anti-realist must disagree with such claims, not of course in the sense of asserting their contraries, but in the sense of holding them false. He would not say happiness is bad, but he must insist that happiness is not good. Yet surely, if those evaluations are either true or false, they are true, rather than false.

This objection may appear to border on begging the question. But what we have to ask ourselves is this: what arguments is the anti-realist able to offer against moral realism; and are the premises of any of these arguments more initially plausible than each of (a)-(c)? We must choose between rejecting (a)-(c) (along with all other moral claims), and rejecting the anti-realist's premises. Only if he can adduce some premises that are (jointly) more certain than any of (a)-(c) can he hope to convince us to resolve the dilemma in his favor.

Perhaps the anti-realist would deny he is committed to holding all first-order evaluations false. Perhaps moral claims contain one or more false presuppositions and are for that reason neither true nor false, just as "The King of France is bald" is neither true nor false because it presupposes but does not state that there is a King of France. Nevertheless, at least this much is clear: the anti-realist of the 'error theory' variety can not hold moral claims to be true. So whether or not he accepts the law of excluded middle and concludes that "Happiness is good" is false, he must at least maintain that it is not true. And from the point of view of maintaining our first-order moral discourse, this is no improvement. A claim that contains false presuppositions is as clearly unassertable as a claim that is false. I cannot say, "The King of France is bald, but there is no King of France." And nor can I say, "Murder is wrong, but there are no objective values," if the existence of objective values is presupposed in first-order moral claims.


Consider the statement: Value judgments are universally false

This theory is really quite outrageous. It implies, among other things, that it is not the case that people generally ought to eat when hungry; that Hitler was not a bad person; that happiness is not good; and so on. I submit that this is simply absurd. I feel much more confidence in those denied judgements, as I think nearly everybody does, than I can imagine feeling in any philosophical arguments for relativism. At least, I think it would take an extremely strong argument to shake my confidence that happiness is preferable to misery, or the like. And there does not seem to be any argument at all with that import. It is hard to see how there could be.

things designed to trap one mind in a world of illusion.-

False wisdom not based on objective reality but man made inventions and legal conventional and usages are things like languages or psychology and other pseudo sciences. psychology and other pseudo sciences fall into this category of man made illusions.

They are things designed as traps for one's mind into a world of illusion.--like many of the false eastern cults would have wonderful inspiring books that were also consciousness traps in this way.

This that the Rambam/ Maimonides clearly held were good and important subjects of study were sciences based on objective reality-things he called physics but clearly meant to include chemistry. Also when he emphasized learning Aristotle it is not the same thing as what is called in later centuries, “philosophy.” It is in fact a real crime against Aristotle to put him in the same box as madmen like  Sartre. When the Rambam/ Maimonides emphasized Aristotle he was not referring to the madmen called philosophers of the twentieth century.


What does the Rambam expect to accomplish with getting people to learn Physics and Metaphysics [in his terminology]? In the Guide he expects Physics to result in Fear of God and metaphysics in Love of God. While in the Yad HaChazaka he seems to include both effects into one also for both subjects. How I ask can this work?
I claim that what the Rambam means by love of God and fear of God is not what modern terminology refers to. 
Nor did he mean people that know how to use the right buzz words about halacha and frumkeit .

I have not time to defend this here but the Rambam thinks that Fear of God starts when one learn Physics and this opens a spring or a well deep inside of him that is not visible on the surface. And it might never get to the surface. It is deeply buried inside a hidden region of the consciousness that the person himself is never aware of

I am still on electricity on Sabbath and work not for its own sake.

I am still on electricity on Sabbath and work not for its own sake. If we look at the Talmud in Sabbath in a normal way we see that the Talmud is accepting Abyee that he is not intending the work and saying it is pesik reish and he does not care if the work happens that this Gemara is understanding teh whole idea of not intending the work different than the rambam. And this is a good thing. For the Rambam does not poskin like Rabbi Shimon, rather like Rabbi Yehuda. So by this we get an opening into how we might possible explain the Rambam. But where is this opening? If we simply ignore this Gemara and just look at the rambam things seem to get worse. Once there is a pesik resiha then automatically the intention goes onto the work.


Besides this I should comment that so far there does not seem to be any difference between a work not intended that is pesik reisha and a work not done for its own sake.

It could be at this point it might be wise for me to open the Reb Chaim Solovechik.  

Is a Jew obligated to serve in the IDF (Israeli Defense Force)?

I consider the fact that Muslims are at war with Israel, puts Israel in a defensive position. And as we see in the Talmud in Eruvin [as brought in the Rambam] this is something for which that one can carry on Shabat. It this puts it in the category of Milchment Mitzvah . At any rate we can safely say it is a mitzvah. And we know the Halacha that if there is before a person two mitzvot: (1) Learning Torah, and  (2) Another mitzvah (even the smallest mitzvah), then one has to stop learning to do the mitzvah.
In conclusion, people that do not serve in IDF  are not kosher Jews.
And the Ultra religious that object to this are not on the level of the Rambam to be able to disagree with this. And frankly, most of them don't know how to learn anyway. [Just because they dress up like with black clothing  does not mean they can learn.] So why even care about what they say?

[ Ultra Orthodox  are going with the idea of the super-organism to decide  and not on actual Halacha. What I mean is that Ultra religious have been trying to form a super-organism called Ultra religious which would in  theory be divided into two parts. One  would form the ruling Brahmin class of the Jewish people. Then there would be the untouchables, the secular Jews, who would be supporting them by hard labor. This model of the Jewish people is not based on the Torah, so it is no surprise that many Jews in Israel are not in favor of it.]

Electricity on Sabbath

This blog is mainly for philosophy but right now while it is on my mind I wanted to discuss an important Tosphot in the Talmud as it relates to the subject of electricity on Sabbath This is the Tosphot in Kritut 20b-second on the page. First I want to point out that today I glanced at the Reb Chaim Solovetich on this subject an he in fact says something about the Rambam that I was saying about Tosphot.
I said a simple idea.: according to the idea at the end of that Tophot you have an answer for the original question without having to turn the whole subject/sugia into an issue of work that is not done for its own sake. The idea is to say that the whole issue is a pesik reisha [inevitable event] that is not acceptable to him. The Aruch says that to R Shimon he is not liable. Now we can say that to R. Yehuda he is liable and so you have explained the sugia.
[and this fits like a glove into the sugia since in fact we know he does not what the coals to be burnt--it is clearly a not intended act.]




Reb Chaim simply says what I said and puts it into the Rambam. And gives a good reason why it should be so.

This is a point I have said already a few time son my other blog. But right now I wanted to mention an important reason why tosphot puts together the idea of unintended work along with a work not done for its own sake after he gives his idea that the own sugia is talking about work done not for its own sake.The reason is that he is trying to say that to R. Yehuda that not only is it a work done not for its own sake but also it is not intended and still he says he is liable--because it is a work done not for its own sake. And this explains exactly why in the next Braita that the Talmud brings that it only says it is a work done not for its own sake and does not mention that it is not intended --because it is intended and yet still R. Shimon says it is not liable. This is the usual way of the Gemara to show the stronger side of each opinion.

Now it is this next Braita in which he is stirring the wood to get warm but he is not trying to make coals that we see that if one turns on a light on Sabbath to have light but not to make a filament that it is a work done not for its own sake.--even if you accept the idea that this is a work of building. [What I mean is that this idea of turning on a light being building is already highly doubtful in my eyes.]


[Just for a bit of background. To the Rambam, to make a coal on Shabat is  work. We in fact see this in the Talmud itself in Kritut. This is in fact not related to the reason the Chazon Ish said lighting a light bulb is forbidden. But in either case it is a work not done for its own sake. This is a type of work made by people who have nothing better to do all day that to think of what they can forbid other Jews to do on Shabat ]

System builders--the heyday of this was in pre World War I Germany

The main Jewish System builders were the Rambam/Maimonidess and Isaac Luria
[The main branches of Isaac Luria were Shalom Sharabi and Moshe Chaim Lutzato. They organized the system of Luria in an impressive way but they were not system builders.]

[The first thing you need for any legitimate system is self consistency. That is why I am dismissing all the kook Kabalah and Chasidut out there. But the Ari'zal himself is very impressive.]


There is something nice I noticed about Rabbi Isaac Luria. Even if you question his system it still is pretty impressive.

I don't know if there is much or a connection but it is hard not to notice the similarity between Hegel and the Luria System. It is not just the groups of  triads. I have not mentioned this in my blogs because I am trying not to say anything nice about Hegel if I can help it. I am literally horrified by some of the things he writes. And no one learns  Hegel without somehow changing in some fundamental way.

And this relates to the fact that I have also been trying not to say much of anything nice about the USSR--the prime Hegelian system.

I mean I am in a unique position to see a lot of the good they accomplished but my horror at any type of Authoritarian system prevents me from being very complementary.

"Torah for its own sake" does not mean that one depends on charity or on extorting the State of Israel to pay for this activity.

The theory of "Torah for its own sake" should be explained here. This is a theory which I agree with. It is that Learning Torah [i.e. the Old Testament and the Talmud-or as it is known the Oral and written law] is a mitzvah of prime importance. I personally feel there is a objective reality behind this idea. That means I do not think this reality depends on the subject. This is like when I say something is yellow. I also mean it is objectivity yellow and does not depend on who is looking at it. This is how I look at the Torah and the Talmud.--as objectively holy. and not dependent on who is reading them. 
Torah, I feel, should have two effects. One is character correction, and the other attachment with the Divine. Often we find these two effects are not present. 

Now as for the idea of learning Torah for its own sake. This ideal is built on statements in the Talmud and on this idea of learning Torah as being the highest service of God that one can aspire to. In this world view it is proper to trust in God and to learn Torah all day long and to depend on the idea that God will provide for ones needs.

However it does not mean that one depends on charity or on extorting the State of Israel to pay for this activity. It further does not imply shirking ones obligation to his community as in serving in the IDF.




[Now why should Torah learning have these desired effect you might ask: Character correction and devekut?
Because holiness is intimately connected with character. If you see a person with bad character you can bet that he is not connected in any way to anything Divine. If you see someone you think  is a tzadik--does miracles etc, but has bad traits then you can bet that his powers comes from the Intermediate Zone or perhaps even the three prime kelipot--the dark side.]

Maimonides: a pre-Kant Kantian.

To continue my thought in the Maimonides essay a few days ago I want to mention that there is good reason to see in him a kind of pre-Kantian Kant.
One reason is that even though he decides we do not go by Rabbi Shimon in using the reason for  a verse to decide how the verse is applied (דורש טעמה דקרא);--still you can see in Bava Metzia that he does just that.
Take a look at the Magid Mishna and other commentaries on the Rambam and you will be disappointed.
Here is a case where the Rambam decides the law in two opposite ways in Mishna Torah and no one has a good reason for why.
But if you decide that the Rambam was looking at this like Kant then everything becomes crystal clear. The reason for the law is one ground of value and the actual statement of the verse in the Torah is another ground of value.
And the Rambam holds that the argument between R. Shimon and the first Tana is this: Rabbi Shimon goes only by the reason for the law. The first Tana goes by both the reason and the actual simple meaning of the verse. Now these can contradict. So what? Then we will have to decide between them. But the idea is not like others that thought you go only by what the verse says, not the reason.

 The point in short is not just to point out how to understand the Rambam [Maimonides] but also the deeper reason that Maimonides makes sense.
I believe you can do this with most of what Maimonides writes even things that seem ridiculous. And example if the reason he gives for the laws of pollution. The reason given is so as to not come too often into the Holy Temple in Jerusalem. This sounds silly until you understand he means the reason G-d made the laws of pollution is for this reason. He is not suggesting that it is not a reality, but giving the reason for the reality. In a deep way this could be understood about pollution as a force of the Dark Side. We can understand that God made this in order for it to be hard to come into Holiness. 

Maimonides

There are lots of subtleties in the writings of Maimonides that are not apparent on the first reading. You can see this easily in the book of Chaim Solovechik. (Chidushei HaRambam) Before him you basically had to accept it on faith that Maimonides had some deep reason for the way he would decide a law, but you almost never knew what it was. All you had was people trying to dig up some source in the Talmud and trying to show that it all fit together.
No one has done anything like this with the Guide for the Perplexed, and this is sad because it is likely that the same type of thing could be done.
Today I wanted to say one deep point in Maimonides. When he says it is a mitzvah to know that G-d exists he is not referring to faith. When talking about the first commandment in the Ten Commandments he always uses the word "to know" that God exists. With Maimonides this knowing means by the two types of knowing that Aristotle claimed could exist. (1) Things we know by induction. This is called a Posteriori Analytics (2) Things we know by deduction in the books of Aristotle are called A Priori Analytics.
Now it is a known fact that I have claimed here that Maimonides was a Pre-Kantian Kantian. So you can expect that I will try to combine these two types of knowledge into one.
That is I will take note that both inductive knowledge has the problem that Hume noted and that you can never know how many samples you should have until you can make a logic induction. Also there is no reason to say the next sample should not be different from the preceding ones. You do not know this at any rate by logic. Now Hume admitted we have synthetic knowledge based on what we see. But it is not based on logic. But what results is the modern skepticism that denies knowledge of anything.

The rationalist thought that reason alone could result in knowledge. But then you get the regress of reason the fact that all the systems of the rationalists contradicted each other.

 What you have with Kant a class of knowledge that you know by reason by it does not have to be so. You have to observe it in some way. That is-- he is combining these two categories into one category and by that he is expecting the building to stand --like an arch that each side without the other would fall. This is what I think Maimonides is doing. [There are lots of indications in the Guide about this but also you can see that Aristotle himself did not accept either type of knowledge by itself. he did not go with the empiricists that only accepted induction nor like the rationalist that accepted only deduction.]

 I should mention that there are in fact two good arguments for God. The First Cause idea which is purely inductive. This does not work in any deductive way. The other argument from Anselm of Canterbury which Godel sharpened up. This is purely deductive. Together they fit. This is what Maimonides was thinking-- that to know something you need to know it from these two sides

The flaws in the case against the argument From design -by Steven Dutch

Steven Dutch


The Case Against the Argument From Design
We cannot validly reason from earthly parallels to the Universe as a whole.
Since the creation of the universe was a unique event, we cannot say anything about it.
The order in nature could equally well result from the intrinsic properties of matter itself.
The existence of pain and suffering cast serious doubt on the existence of a benevolent Intelligence.

[I] Critique

The nature of science has changed dramatically since Hume's day, and the changes illustrate some holes in Philo's reasoning that probably would not have been apparent to Hume or anyone else at the time.
In Hume's day, the only rigorously known scientific laws were gravitation and Newton's laws of motion. The fact that these had successfully explained the motions of the planets had profoundly impressed all of society. Also, Newton had successfully explained why Kepler's empirical laws of planetary motion worked, and even made a correction to them. Still, nobody in Hume's day suspected the extent to which it would be possible to explain laws of nature in terms of still higher laws. Hume's trio was restricted to finding order in nature solely in the complex phenomena of the natural world, something that might not be the case today.
In Hume's day the stars were considered so inconceivably remote that it seemed impossible ever to have any real knowledge of them. Double stars, where one star orbits another, would be the first direct demonstration that gravitation applied among the stars. Spectroscopy, with its incredible power to analyze the physics and chemistry of the stars, was a century in the future. Quantum mechanics, which successfully explains what spectroscopy observes, was three quarters of a century beyond that. So we can forgive Hume for not envisioning how deeply we would be able to test the hypothesis that the laws of nature are the same everywhere. Nevertheless, Philo's argument that we cannot reason from earthly examples to the universe as a whole is flatly, definitively, wrong.
Mid-18th century Edinburgh was home to one of those brilliant collections of minds that appear from time to time, called the Scottish Enlightenment. Hume probably knew James Watt. A few years before the Dialogue was first published, Watt realized that existing steam engines were inefficient because they alternately heated and cooled the same vessel. He envisioned a completely new design in which spent steam was exhausted to a separate vessel to be condensed. His invention would launch the Industrial Revolution. So what? You envision a new way of doing things and build it. This is how technology works, right? Not in Hume's day. Hume could have Philo argue (Part VIII) "In all instances we have ever seen, ideas are copied from real objects...You reverse this order and give thought the precedence." The idea of conceiving something totally new and making it happen, the essence of modern technology, is completely opposite to the mental processes of Hume's time. We can forgive Hume for not foreseeing the extent to which abstract thought could precede the creation of objects, but again Philo's argument is flatly, definitively, wrong.


 [II] A Sample With N = 1

"When two species of objects have always been observed to be conjoined together, I can infer, by custom, the existence of one wherever I see the existence of the other. And this I call an argument from experience. But how this argument can have place, where the objects ... are single, individual, without parallel, or specific resemblance, may be difficult to explain..... To ascertain this reasoning, it were requisite that we had experience of the origin of worlds..."

Here's another case where Hume utterly (and nobody can blame him) failed to foresee the growth of science. He would doubtless be astonished at how much we can infer about the origin of the universe.

But let's look at the validity of the argument even in Hume's day. The French mathematician Laplace would publish the first speculation on the origin of the solar system shortly after Hume's death. It simply is not true that we cannot reason about a unique event.


 [III]  Hume's Central Circularity

The issue to be decided is whether the order in nature is the result of intelligent design. If it is, then the properties of matter (the color, luster and density of gold, for example) are also the result of intelligent design. Postulating a dichotomy between intelligent design and the properties of matter therefore amounts to postulating a priori that there is no design in nature. Hume (and all who follow him) essentially follow a grand circularity:
Matter and the laws of nature are defined a priori to be separate from any intelligent design.
Order in nature is shown to be the result of the laws of nature and the properties of matter
Therefore order in nature is not the result of intelligent design

Nowhere is the circularity more blatant than Jacques Monod's Chance and Necessity. Monod starts by asking what criteria one would use for deciding something was intelligently designed and defines two criteria: repetition and geometric regularity. But, he hastens to add, these criteria apply only at the microscopic level. The distinction is entirely ad hoc because, if we applied it at the microscopic level, the Argument from Design would follow automatically. In any case, the distinction is nonsense, since macroscopic non-biological structures like crystals, cloud patterns and orbital resonances in the Solar System display repetition and geometric regularity, and microscopic structures like computer chips are of clearly intelligent origin (the bug in the first Pentium chip notwithstanding).


 [IV] Lacuna Matata (Don't Sweat the Holes)

There's probably no greater lacuna in Hume's reasoning than in Part IX. Demea asks why there should be something rather than nothing, and why the universe we know instead of something else. By definition there can be no external cause, hence the only explanation is a logically necessary Being who "carries the Reason of his existence in himself, and who cannot be supposed not to exist without an express contradiction." (I run into people who quite literally cannot conceive of their religious beliefs being wrong, for whom the very concept of the Koran being wrong is a logical contradiction.)

Hume puts the reply in the mouth of Cleanthes, who says it only to forestall Philo. Hume presumably assigns this role to Cleanthes to spare Philo the burden of attacking every religious doctrine and thereby alienating readers, but it's quite definite here that Cleanthes is voicing Hume's own convictions. He says:
Nothing is demonstrable, unless the contrary implies a contradiction. Nothing, that is distinctly conceivable, implies a contradiction. Whatever we conceive as existent, we can also conceive as non-existent. There is no Being, therefore, whose non-existence implies a contradiction. Consequently there is no Being, whose existence is demonstrable.

This is essentially disproof by outright denial. We can conceive of God as non-existent, hence God cannot be logically necessary. The only thing missing is any proof that the conception of God as non-existent is valid even in principle. Cleanthes shortly cites the idea that 2 + 2 = 5 as an example of a logical contradiction. By the logic above, if I say I can conceive of 2 + 2 = 5 not being a contradiction, that makes it non-contradictory, since I can conceive of the contradiction being non-existent.

Cleanthes (Hume) goes on to say that the universe might well contain hidden attributes that would make its non-existence seem as contradictory as the non-existence of God. Considering how hard Hume hammers elsewhere at the unproven nature of religious conjectures and their ad hoc nature, postulating wholly unknown properties for the universe is a nice case of the pot calling the kettle black.

But there's more. Cleanthes (Hume) says the only argument that persuades him the universe (rather than God) is not the necessarily existent entity is the fact that we can validly conceive of it being different. "But it seems a great partiality not to perceive, that the same argument extends equally to the Deity." Let this soak in. The entire thrust of Hume's arguments up till now, mostly as voiced by Philo, have been that we cannot reason from our knowledge of design on earth to design in the universe. Now Hume uses Cleanthes to assert that because we can conceive of matter being different than it is, we are justified in conceiving of God being different than he is. If there is something about God that makes him logically necessary and immutable, it must be attributes we do not know, and we have no way of knowing whether the same qualities might not reside in nature. We're back to proof by postulating unknown hypothetical properties of the universe.

Hume essentially gets away with using mutually contradictory arguments by putting them in the mouths of two different characters, but nothing could be clearer than that Cleanthes, in this section, is relating Hume's ideas exactly.

 [V] A Truly Weird Argument

In Part VII, Philo describes that in Indian mythology, the universe was spun by a great spider, and goes on to say:
And were there a planet wholly inhabited by spiders (which is very possible) this inference would there appear as natural and irrefragible as that which in our planet ascribes the origin of all things to design and intelligence, as explained by Cleanthes.

This argument is so wonderfully naive and blatantly anthropomorphic one hardly knows where to begin. A good starting point is to say duh..., any primitive intelligent species is likely to picture God as a larger version of itself. Spiders on this planet don't, as far as we know, have any conception of God so we don't need to worry about what they think, if indeed they have any more cognition than a personal computer.

So Philo's hypothetical spider planet would have to be inhabited by intelligent spiders. Just as human thinkers in Hume's day had long since concluded that it was mere imagination to picture God in human form, by the time Philo's spiders reached a similar level of development, the more intelligent ones should have gotten over their primitive arachnomorphism and reached the same conclusion. No doubt their artists would still picture God as a spider, but they would realize that was an image, not necessarily reality. (The only people on our planet who really seem to believe God is an old man with a long white beard are cartoonists and atheists.)

Spider webs, of course, are a matter of biology rather than conscious effort, but a race of spiders that remained at that level would be unlikely to have enough consciousness to speculate about God. Who knows what sorts of webs intelligent spiders might spin? (Just imagine the webs a spider mathematician might weave!) And even if we postulate a race of spiders that did nothing but spin webs and engage in philosophy while waiting for hapless flies, this argument still embodies the fundamental circularity of assuming that complexity in nature (spinnerets and spider webs in this case) are not the result of design, then using their "naturalness" to "prove" that the complexity is not the result of design.

 [VI] The Problem With Disproofs Of Design

When I was attending geology field camp, a favorite pastime was hunting for arrowheads. There was no doubt about their authenticity. They were exquisitely chipped on both sides (in contrast to the clumsy modern ones sold in tourist traps) and made of obsidian, a rock not found in our field area. Most of my classmates did well to find one or two. I found dozens. In fact it got downright obscene. I found arrowheads in camp along trails that people had walked every day for weeks. The most surreal case was finding an arrowhead in my shoe one morning. I presume it was the gift of a pack rat because I guarantee none of my classmates would have given up a nice arrowhead for a practical joke!

I also found quite a few chips of red and yellow chert. They occurred in batches, and this rock, too, was foreign to the area, but I never found a full-fledged artifact of these materials. All things considered, I think it's safe to assume they were left by Indians.

At the opposite extreme of probability, the late anthropologist Louis Leakey spent a number of years excavating a site in the Calico Hills, California, convinced that he had discovered artifacts that pushed the arrival of humans in the Americas back to 100,000 years or more. The purported artifacts included flakes and crudely chipped pebbles. The problem is that the claimed artifacts come from an alluvial fan, not the gentlest depositional environment. With fist-sized pebbles being carried by flash floods, it would be surprising if there weren't a few that got chipped en route in a manner reminiscent of an artifact. Most geologists and anthropologists are convinced that's exactly what happened. (You'd never know this to look at most of the Web sites on the subject, which start at taking the artifacts at face value and drift off to the fringe from there. Very few pictures of the claimed artifacts are on line, something that hardly speaks well for their status as revolutionary discoveries or the confidence of their backers.)

So here we have chips, flakes, and chipped rocks. Are they artifacts of intelligent origin? In one case circumstantial evidence suggests they are, in the other case, not. But they're ambiguous. Maybe some single band of early humans got to Calico through some improbable series of adventures, lived for a while, then died out. We can never rule out the hypothesis short of a time machine.

Moral: If something looks complex enough to be of intelligent design, one possible interpretation is always that it is of intelligent design. It may not be, but in the absence of disconfirming evidence, intelligent design is always a viable hypothesis. We can say that it's not the only possible explanation, maybe even that it's not the most likely explanation, but it's extremely hard to dismiss the idea entirely. Intelligent design is always a possible interpretation of any sufficiently complex object.

 [VII] Why Try to Disprove Design?

In his Enquiry, Hume accurately described the Argument From Design as "useless" because in and of itself it can never "establish any new principles of conduct and behavior." The Argument From Design only shows at best that there is intelligent design in the universe; it tells us nothing about whether the entity cares about human beings, communicates with them, or has moral scruples. Of itself, intelligent design does not validate any theology beyond deism.

On the other hand, intelligent design does not violate any known facts or logical principles. So why does it meet with such fierce opposition? True, many people leap immediately from the notion of intelligent design to the theology of their particular sect, but the proper response by anyone who claims intellectual rigor is to show the hidden assumptions in that leap of reasoning.

Still, it's legitimate to raise the possibility that order in the universe arises solely from the properties of the universe itself. Or is it? We know that some cases of complex order are the result of intelligent design. We do not know that any other origin for complex order is possible. What basis do we have even for postulating such a possibility? The bottom line is that none of the criticisms of the Argument From Design are compelled by any empirical or logical evidence; they are inspired solely by the desire to discredit the Argument From Design for the sake of discrediting it.


 [VIII] The Red Herring

Parts X and XI are given over to a debate about suffering and its implications for a benevolent intelligence. Although any discussion about the nature of God has to confront this issue, it is completely premature in a debate about the existence of God. Most of Hume's readers, of course, would have thought in terms of either the God they pictured in their own theology, or no God at all (other conceptions of God being merely spurious fantasies). They would have considered Cleanthes' arguments for a benevolent intelligence inseparable from the issue of design in general. But that's no excuse for a modern reader to conflate the two issues.


[IX] Where Should We Look For Design?

It's worth looking at a list of what was not known in Hume's day:
Maxwell's Equations and the nature of electromagnetism
The Periodic Table
The structure of the atom
The nature of chemical reactions
Quantum Mechanics
Relativity
Genetics
The DNA code
Evolution by natural selection
The laws of thermodynamics
Spectroscopy
The nature of galaxies

So, although science was making thrilling progress in understanding the workings of the world, the "laws of nature" in Hume's day were mostly restricted to empirical descriptions of phenomena, and therefore the argument for and against design was waged mostly in the realm of complex natural phenomena. For every case Cleanthes can cite of two natural phenomena meshing smoothly together, Philo can cite a counter-example where the feedback fails. A century later Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection would pretty much demolish this line of reasoning.

However, a modern day Cleanthes (as opposed to his semi-literate wannabes) wouldn't point to the way a hummingbird's bill is precisely shaped to fit a certain flower (or vice versa). He would point instead to the symmetries found in physics and the way a relatively small set of fundamental laws give rise to such a vast range of complex phenomena (the Cleanthes wannabes are mostly too illiterate even to have any idea of physics). He would also point to the fact that a very slight change in some fundamental constants would either have prevented complex atoms from forming at all, or would have allowed the stars to exhaust their nuclear fuel before life could evolve.

By way of analogy, consider a chess board well into the game. Is this a product of intelligent design? The pieces might very well look randomly arrayed, although a skilled player could easily spot that some arrangements cannot be achieved in normal play. For example, one side cannot lack a king, or have a pawn in its own back row. There is a checkmate position involving a king and two knights against a lone king, but it cannot be achieved in normal play (the lone king can always evade checkmate). But there would be many positions that are ambiguous. For every masterful position Cleanthes cites as clear evidence of intelligence, Philo cites one with two passed pawns. Cleanthes suggests that some positions are artificially created as problems; Philo accuses him of creating ad hoc excuses to avoid acknowledging failures of the design hypothesis. Cleanthes argues the pieces are clearly of intelligent manufacture; Philo notes that seashells are even more intricate and are wholly natural. Cleanthes points to the geometric regularity of the board; Philo cites crystals and honeycombs as equally regular but natural structures.

The reason chess has been played as long and seriously as it has is not because people like the pieces and the board (a nice chess board and set has esthetic appeal because of our reverence for the game), but because a very sparse set of rules leads to a fantastic variety of possible outcomes. And it's in the rules, not in the pieces, the board, or any particular arrangement on the board, that we must look for intelligence. (Chess isn't a perfect analogy. There are ad hoc rules like capturing en passant. The Japanese game Go might be a better analogy for pure intelligent design, but chess is more familiar.)

Philo, of course, has not been asleep at the wheel. He would point out that the beauty of chess is rooted in the underlying laws of logic and mathematics in the universe. He would also point to hypotheses that perhaps there are many universes, and we merely occupy one where the laws of physics allow matter to evolve into complex forms.

Cleanthes would wonder, in turn, why it's valid to criticize theological concepts as ad hoc, while it's simultaneously permissible to postulate the existence of universes whose existence is entirely unproven and which may be forever untestable. He'd also wonder why the order in the universe is such a pressing scientific problem as to justify postulating a vast number of alternate universes but not to justify postulating an intelligent designer.

Reb Chaim Soloveichik

There is a Kashe  [an attack type of question] on Reb Chaim. He starts out his ideas in Tractate Shabat with a question of the Magid Mishna on the Rambam.  But then he ignores the answer of the Magid Mishna and starts out immediately with a different approach of his own. This is at a time when the answer of the Magid Mishna seems satisfactory.
  My answer to this question on Reb Chaim will be that in fact the answer of the Magid Mishna is seriously flawed.
  The Gemara in Shabat 107b brings three opinions about the statement of Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav. The Magid says that the Rambam throws out the second opinion. This in fact sounds very reasonable. Why not? We throw out "some say" all the time. This works well for the second "Some say." But once you get to the third everything falls apart. The third one refers to the Mishna, "a person traps a snake on Shabat not to be bitten is not liable."

  The third "some say" says that this Mishna is the opinion of Rabbi Shimon [that a person that does  work on Shabat not for its normal purpose is not liable]. [I.e he does not decide like  Rabbi Yehuda.] [And Shmuel is posek [decides the law] like this Mishna and the Rambam also.] This presents a question on the Rambam who holds by Rabbi Yehuda that a work done not for its purpose is still liable.

Now this whole same discussion went on for the mishna about opening a wound on Shabat. Rav Judah in the name of Rav said this is like Rabbi Shimon. This is a question on the Rambam also because he holds one can open the wound and he still holds like Rabbi Yehuda. Not that question was easy for the Magid to answer. He said the Rambam simply throws out the second "some say." I.e. that that mishna is also like Rabbi Yehuda and it is  allowed because it is not work at all. He does not open it like the doctors do. This fits perfectly. But when you get to the next "Some say," it falls apart.
I mean to say that in theory you could have the Rambam come along and say, "I say trapping the snake is A.O.K. even to Rabbi Yehuda because the reason one is not liable is not because of a work done not for its own sake, but because it is mitasek (i.e. not done in the normal way) exactly like Shmuel says about it. [And this works perfectly for Shmuel [who in fact holds by Rabbi Yehuda just like the Rambam and says it is a case of Mitasek]. But this is the place it all falls apart. The Rambam does not say it is mitasek (i.e. not done in the normal way) . He says he traps the snake in the normal way. [Not jut that he flips a vessel on it but he ties it up. That is not mitasek] This is why Reb Chaim had to throw out the Magid Mishna.]

The lesson from all this for Jews and Gentiles is simple: There is a place to go to relearn ethics. It is rigorous study of the Torah and Talmud. 
As  Pedro Blas Gonzalez  wrote in "Schopenhauer on Conscience
as the Ground of Ethics":
"While the predominant notions of ethics today are totally devoid of any religious content, moral higher ground or the capacity for transcendence, ethics, as so many today like to think of this, essentially remains a tool at the disposition of those who are socially-politically "committed." 
One clear-cut evidence for this is that nothing can be deemed ethical today that is difficult to embrace or live by. Our predominant rendition of "ethics" is conveniently and curiously geared to the exigencies of our hedonistic age. For this and other reasons, nothing ethical, according to our gurus today, can showcase an intrinsic aspect of resistance to our whims and desires."

Philosophy and philosophers.

 Not only do they have nothing of interest to say about the meaning or value of life, but even the linguistic study of languages that seems to be their main interest they get wrong.  If we start with Leibniz and Kant we get a fair account of analytic truths. Frege wanted to expand on this. Now Frege was the father of modern logic, and invented the language need to program computers. So I would rather not get on his case. But the fact is that when he tried to expand on Kant's idea, he fell into a fallacy. Not all truths are contained in the definition of a thing. If you take the logical result that use can use simple logic to derive all concepts then you can have no concepts. Wittgenstein rightfully noted the fallacy of Frege. He noted the logical conclusion of Frege would mean all sentences are synonymous. But instead of going back to the more sensible approach of Kant, he launched the post modern revolution in which philosophy has been wallowing in for almost a century.


 some of the fallacies of philosopher like Hume who he pinned down with an observation that if you have only one window pane to cover two windows then why would you move it to cover the open window? The answer is you wouldn't.  Hume =pure circular reasoning. 


 But one glance at general chasidut today will tell us that something is seriously flawed in this system.  It is not just that people have a evil inclination, but that the system itself does not make anything closely resembling a moral decent human being,-- but rather monstrosities and caricatures of humans.

The reason why Hume is learned in universities in spite of his constant falling into circular logic and Nietzsche in spite of the incoherence of his positions is I think because people simply do not want Metaphysics. This became the rallying point of Twentieth Century Anglo American philosophy. I use the word philosophy here rather loosely.