Religious fanaticism leads to anything except good character.]

The basic idea of the Rambam and Saadia Gaon of  a synthesis between Torah and  Greek Thought is important but today a new synthesis would have to  take into account the insights of Kant and Hegel. Most people would rather that the Rambam had never attempted such a synthesis in the first place but that to me indicates a lack of faith in the Rambam more than true faith in Torah.

[The reasons why the synthesis is needed between Faith and Reason is clear to anyone who has observed communities that are based on faith alone, and reject reason. Religious fanaticism leads to anything except good character. Why this should be so is an open question, but a hint can be gained from the Rambam in his showing the intermediate step of Natural Law was necessary between the  "ravings of the Sabians" and the Giving of Torah. Also it is possible to suggest that Torah in its pure form is on the level of the Platonic forms that   the hit the ground of being --the individual. דרך ארץ קדמה לתורה. Another suggestion is it is a kind of Hegelian dialectical process. [I mean to say that being things need a ground of being to exist. Being itself. Platonic forms hit that ground and become individual things]



The goal would be to make full use of the Rambam and the  Ari, the Gra, and Kant and Hegel.
I  mentioned this a few times about 6 years ago. But today it seems all the more necessary.

I admit most of the work in this direction was already done by Dr Kelley Ross. However he does ignore important ideas of Hegel. But the main ideas are already in place. That is you would have to equate what is called immediate non-intuitive knowledge with faith.

Falsification is not how new ideas are discovered. It is an important part of the Kant Friesian system but does not explain the processes of reason. But neither does Dr Michael Huemer where reason simply recognizes universals. However Dr Huemer does have a kind of dialectical process in his system in which things that are recognize by reason can be defeated by other concepts that turn out to have more intuitively clear consequences. So in any case Hegel's dialectical process in fact seem to be at the root of all new advances in reason
But furthermore the dialectical process the way most understand it is confined to reason but there does not seem to be any reason to limit it in that range. It could easily work between conflicting areas of value as per the Kant-Friesian system

Even if I am not the man for this job clearly the job in need to be done. It is perfectly possible to get a good synthesis of Reason and Revelation  and to base it on the labors of predecessors like the Rambam -and also to have the sense of what to reject. [I think people are right for taking the Guide of the Rambam as the best guide to how to go about this. The purpose of this is that without it, authentic Torah is not possible. People go into a whole array of delusions they image are real Torah and you end up with the nightmare world of the religious.

extra degrees of strictness do not help to come to righteousness.

The most remarkable thesis of the Rambam is  the synthesis of Reason with Revelation which scandalizes people today as much as it did in his own days.  I would not have paid any attention to it if not for my encountering problems in the religious world in the most unpleasant  possibles ways.
This is what got me to thinking the strictly religious approach is highly unkosher and that something is really wrong. My first feeling was to go with the idea of the religious not being strict enough. That is I thought they were ignoring essential aspects of Torah while focusing on rituals. Eventually I gave up on that and simply decided extra degrees of strictness do not help to come to righteousness.

A lot of this was based more on observation more than on abstract principles.
My basic set of principles today is different than what I would have said at the time all this was going on.
Today my set of principles  would be (1) Learning Torah with making full use of the great Litvak Gedolim like Rav Shach and Reb Chaim Soloveitchik.
(2) Learning Math and Physics.
(3) The Rambam's approach of combining reason and Revelation but I would not stop at Aristotle as he did but also make use of the German idealism especially Hegel and Kelley Ross.
(4) Learning the Ari, Isaac Luria but avoiding the cults of the Sitra Achra which claim to be going by him.
(5) Bitul Torah  is an even more important concept than learning Torah. Bitul Torah negates the idea of doing things outside of learning Torah as having any great significance. It says that it is  a sin to be doing other things even you could be learning Torah. This concept comes from a verse in the Torah כי דבר ה' בזה ונכרתה הנפש ההיא מקרב ינה For he despised the word of God and that soul shall be cut off from among its people. And the Gemara in Sanhedrim explains that verse as referring to anyone who is able to be learning Torah and does not do so. However I should add the Rambam who considered Physics and Metaphysics as a part of the Oral Law.

This is in fact one of the drawbacks of the religious world which has in it too many groups that are simply Sitra Achra [Dark Side] cults trying to get themselves accepted as valid.

Some of the main ideas I have found most important in Torah I have found in the books of Musar from the Middle Ages, especially the emphasis there on good character. The trouble nowadays
 when people become religious usually their character deteriorates  exponentially.

So this approach of Reb Israel Salanter of combining learning Torah along with Musar makes a lot of sense to me. but besides that I founds lots of very important ideas about practical living in books of Musar.[The idea of learning fast in the אורחות צדיקים is one idea I used in Torah  and also in Physics.]
[Trust in God with no effort I also discovered in books of Musar and that certainly has been a help to when ever i have listened to it.]

It would be hard to put it all into words but some important idea I gained from my parents and teachers in high school. Other very important ideas from my teachers in yeshiva and still more from reading Musar and Dante, Plato and the Rambam.

It might be a good thing to try and consolidate it all. But the main thing I discovered was not what good ideas to adopt but rather the importance of learning common sense about what kinds of people to avoid and what kinds of groups and ideas to avoid.

This is in fact one of the drawbacks of the religious world which has in it too many groups  that are simply Sitra Achra [Dark Side] cults trying to get themselves accepted as valid.

Rambam laws of acquisition 20;14

So now that I have arrived at this conclusion that what matters here is רשות, not ownership, it is possible to raise a question on רב שך. He brings the תוספתא that says  המוכר פרה לחבירו ונגנבה זה אומר ברשוך נגנבה וזה אומר ברשותך יחלוקו and says that can not be talking about the רשות But rather the time of the קנין. To answer  this question let me just say if this teaching would be like the sages then clearly there would be no question that the seller would have to bring a proof that the theft happened after the sale. But this is סומכוס and so we are not discussing who has to bring a proof. The only question is the time of the sale in relation to the time of the theft.

אז עכשיו שהגענו למסקנה הזו כי מה שחשוב כאן הוא רשות, לא בעלות, אפשר להעלות שאלה על רב שך. הוא מביא את תוספתא שאומרת המוכר פרה לחבירו ונגנבה זה אומר ברשוך נגנבה וזה אומר ברשותך יחלוקו, ואומר כי לא ניתן לדבר על הרשות אלא הזמן של קנין. [כנראה שלא כמו שפירש את ההלכה ברמב''ם]. כדי לענות על שאלה זו, אני רק אגיד שאם הוראה זו תהיה כמו החכמים אז ברור שלא תהיה שאלה כי המוכר היה צריך להביא הוכחות כי הגניבה קרתה לאחר המכירה. אבל זה סומכוס ולכן אנחנו לא דנים מי צריך להביא ראיה. השאלה היחידה היא הזמן של מכירה ביחס לזמן הגניבה.

I have thought hard on the basic aspects  Nachman from Uman and my basic feeling is that his advice and ideas are very valuable. It is not that all the groups founded that go by his name are very good but that he himself had very important ideas concerning Torah.
The main problem is that people generally associate his name with the groups that the Gra put into excommunication.
 It is a problem that his good ideas get used to seduce and influence others to do bad stuff.

I have vision about the importance of learning Torah as the central focus. But it is like a star in the center of a constellation of related values..
Some people have related values but lack the central focus.

The basic way this works is in the context of an authentic Litvak yeshiva. In such a place the areas of focus become clear. 

What this weary world needs most is clarity of vision

What this weary world needs most is clarity of vision. The problem that most people get into is they find some value they can see is clear and good. Yet they are unaware that that value is connected to other values which are far from good or decent. No value is a value unto itself but is always connected to other values and often those other values are downright evil.
I could go on with many examples but I am sure you can provide your own examples since thss phenomenon is so widespread.


Most consciousness traps work in this way. They emphasis some good and true area of value but unseen with that area are other areas of values that are negative.
For this reason there really is no other choice but to be committed to simple learning Torah and doing what it says.--especially the Ten Commandments and to learn Rav Shach's Avi Ezri and to volunteer for the IDF.

As I think about Rav Shach's treatment of the Rambam, laws of Acquisition 20:14 and 15 I realize there is something deep and subtle going on there that I have not yet grasped. What makes the case of the exchange of animals a case where we consider the owner of the cow to have not yet taken possession of the חמור  even though the owner of the חמור has taken possession of the cow? It is true that the חמור has not yet come into his domain but he still owns it.

The answer to this question is that the essential thing here is it is the domain that matters, not ownership. This is like we see in the Rambam laws of Acquisition 22:9. if one has an object that he has given to another for safekeeping, he can still give it away or sell it because it is considered to be in his domain. But if the person he gave it to for safekeeping denies the whole thing, then the owner can no longer sell it of give it away because it is no considered any longer to be in his domain.
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 רמב''ם , ה'מכירה  פרק כ' הלכה י''ד והלכה ט''ו.  What makes the case of the exchange of animals a case where we consider the owner of the cow to have not yet taken possession of the חמור  even though the בעל of the חמור has taken possession of the cow? It is true that the חמור has not yet come into his domain but he still owns it.

The answer to this question is that the essential thing here is it is the רשות that matters, not ownership. This is like we see in the רמב''ם , ה'מכירה  פרק כ''ב הלכה ט . if one has an object that he has given to another for safekeeping, he can still give it away or sell it because it is considered to be in his domain. But if the person he gave it to for safekeeping denies the whole thing, then the owner can no longer sell it of give it away because it is no considered any longer to be in his  רשות.

 רמב''ם, ה' מכירה פרק כ" הלכה י''ד והלכה ט''ו. מה שהופך את המקרה של חילופי חיות מקרה שבו אנו רואים את הבעלים של הפרה  כמו שלא לקח עדיין ברשותו את החמור אף שהבעלים של החמור קנו  את הפרה?  נכון כי החמור טרם הגיע אל התחום שלו אבל הוא עדיין החמור של בעלים של הפרה. התשובה לשאלה זו היא כי הדבר העקרי הנה הוא הרשות שחשובה, לא בעלות. זה כמו שאנו רואים רמב''ם, ה' מכירה פרק כ''ב הלכה ט'. אם לאחד יש אובייקט שהוא נתן למשנהו למשמרת, הוא עדיין יכול לתת אותו או למכור אתו כי זה נחשב בתחום שלו. אבל אם האדם  שניתן לו למשמרת מכחיש את העניין, אז הבעלים כבר לא יכולים למכור אותו או לתת אותו כי הוא לא נחשב עוד להיות ברשות שלו.

So now that I have arrived at this amazing conclusion that what matters here is רשות, not ownership, it is possible to raise a question on Rav Shach. He brings the Tosephta that says  המוכר פרה לחבירו ונגנבה זה אומר ברשוך נגנבה וזה אומר ברשותך יחלוקו and says that can not be talking about the רשות But rather the time of the קנין. To answer  this question let me just say if this teaching would be like the sages then clearly there would be no question that the seller would have to bring a proof that the theft happened after the sale. But this is סומכוס and so we are not discussing who has to bring a proof. the only question is the time of the sale in relation to the time of the theft.


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 I am really not sure of what is going on in the רמב''ם and in רב שך. The way I understood the רמב''ם ה' מכירה כ:י''ד is when there is an exchange of animals and one is found dead that the seller of that animal has to bring the proof. That is different than in רמב''ם ה' מכירה כ:ט''ו in which an animal is found טרף  in which case the buyer has to bring a proof.  I thought and I think the reason for the difference is חזקת הגוף. The animal had חזקת כשרות until the last possible moment. In the case the גמרא brings in כתובות ע''ו י''ב the bride was found with a blemish and the father has to bring a proof it happened after the engagement. So there we do not go by חזקת כשרות and חזקת הגוף. Nor in the exchange of two animals do we go by חזקת הגוף that it was alive until the last possible minute. Perhaps it is possible to suggest a a reason for the רמב''ם  that is based on תוספות in נידה ב:ב that חזקת השתא cancels חזקה מעיקרא unless some other חזקה comes along to strengthen the חזקה מעיקרא? But then why would that not work for the טבח In ה' מיכרה כ:ט''ו

I had one or two more points to make today in reference to the ideas I rote own yesterday on Rav Shach's question on the Tosephta.
First of all I am really not sure of what is going on in the Rambam and in Rav Shach. The way I understood the Rambam [Laws of Acquisition 20:14] is when there is an exchange of animals and one is found dead that the seller of that animal has to bring the proof. That is different than in ch 20 law 15 in which an animal is found Treif [it had a puncture in its lung] in which case the buyer has to bring a proof.  I thought and I think the reason for the difference is חזקת הגוף. The animal had חזקת כשרות until the last possible moment. In the case the gemara brings in Ketuboth 76B the bride was found with a blemish and the father has to bring a proof it happened after the engagement. So there we do not go by חזקת כשרות and חזקת הגוף. Nor in the exchange of two animals do we go by חזקת הגוף that it was alive until the last possible minute. Perhaps it is possible to suggest a a reason for the Rambam that is based on Tosphot in Nida page 2b that חזקת השתא cancels חזקה מעיקרא unless some other חזקה comes along to strengthen the חזקה מעיקרא? But then why would that not work for the טבח In ה' מיכרה כ:ט''ו








On a side issue The Ketzot says in a case an object was stolen and it is not know if it was before or after the קנין the proof is upon the buyer. Rav Shach simply points out this is in contradiction to both the Rambam and Rav Joseph Karo-but like almost all other Rishonim like the Rosh and the Ran.

The final idea today is the Ari, Isaac Luria. To intend the intentions can be a long and difficult process. Therefore it is  a good idea to get either the small Sidur of the Reshash or the large one.

The small one seems good to me but I have heard that Rav Mordedchai Sharabi said there were some mistakes in it. I myself used the large one [which has the intentions of the Ari in expanded form by the Grandson of the Reshash.] If one is lacking the background for that I think the best idea is to learn  the Eitz Chaim of the Ari and Reb Chaim Vital.  When to do this? I think after having finished Shas twice. {That is what Reb Shmuel Berenbaum told me.} To do this learning however for me at this point seems to be pointless but I still can see its great value for people that are sensitive to that area of value.

[The Ashlag edition of  the writings of the Arizal are the best.] In any case when it comes to Kabalah, the Ashkenazim world is way too filled with the teachings of the Sitra Achra in disguise.

The תוספתא ב''מ פרק ג says המוכר פרה לחבירו ונגנבה זה אומר ברשותך נגנבה וזה אומר ברשותך יחלוקו This is clearly like סומכוס ממון המוטל בספק חולקים. In the רמב''ם laws of מכירה כ:י''ד רב שך says clearly the argument is when the theft occurred before or after the קנין. This can not be they are arguing in whose domain the animal was when it was stolen, because that would not be דררא דממונא. We need they should themselves be in doubt for there to be דררא דממונא But then it should be a simple case of מי שנולד הספק ברשותו עליו להביא את הראיה. That is the question of Rav Shach I would like to suggest a possible answer to this question based on the version of the גמרא in ב''מ page ק that says אלא הא מני סומכוס. That is the גמרא there says that סומכוס says ממון המוטל בספק חולקים even when the animal there gave birth in the domain of the seller. Thus even when there is חזקת רשות we find that סומכוס still says his law. התוספתא ב''מ פרק ג' אומרת המוכר פרה לחבירו ונגנבה זה אומר ברשותך נגנבה וזה אומר ברשותך יחלוקו. זהו בבירור כסומכוס, - ממון המוטל בספק חולקים. ברמב''ם הלכות מכירה כ:י''ד רב שך אומר בבירור הטענות הן בזמן הגניבה התרחשה לפני או אחרי קנין. זה לא יכול להיות שהם מתווכחים על התחום אשר החיה הייתה כשנגנבה משום שזה לא יהיה דררא דממונא. אנחנו צריכים שטוענים יהיו  בספק כדי שיהיה דררא דממונא. אבל אז רב שך שאול שזה צריך להיות שאלה פשוטה של מי שנולד ספק ברשותו עליו להביא את הראיה גם לבסומכוס. ברצוני להציע תשובה אפשרית לשאלה זו מבוססת על הגרסה של הגמרא בב''מ דף ק. שאומרת "אלא הא מני סומכוס". זוהי שגמרא שם אומרת כי סומכוס אומר ממון מוטל בספק חולקים גם כאשר החיה הולידה בתחום המוכר. לכן גם כאשר קיימת חזקת רשות אנו מוצאים כי סומכוס עדיין אומר החוק שלו. I still am puzzled about some things here like the fact that the Tosephta seems to need to be explained as the question is when did the theft occur before or after the acquisition while in the Rambam Laws of Acquisition 20:14 and 20:15 the question is in whose domain did the problem occur.

The Tosephta (BM ch 3) says המוכר פרה לחבירו ונגנבה זה אומר ברשותך נגנבה וזה אומר ברשותך יחלוקו This is clearly like Sumchos ממון המוטל בספק חולקים.  Rav Shach says clearly the argument is when the theft occurred before or after the קנין. This can not be they are arguing  in whose domain the animal as when it was stolen because that would not be דררא דממונא. we need they should themselves be in doubt for there to be דררא דממונא
But then it should be a simple case of מי שנולד הספק ברשותו עליו להביא את הראיה
I would like to suggest a possible answer to this question based on the version of the Gemara in BM page 100 that says אלא הא מני סומכוס. That is the gemara there says that סומכוס says ממון המוטל בספק חולקים even when the animal there gave birth in the domain of the seller. Thus even when there is חזקת רשות we find that סומכוס still says his law.

Repentance involves the most simple level of what you are aware of and could be reasonably be expected to know better. But there is another level beyond the horizon of one's consciousness. Things that are so wrong that one is no even aware that they are wrong.

אין אדם מקנה דבר שלא בא לעולם.
One can not cause to acquire something that is not yet in one's possession. יבמות צ''ג.
ר. מאיר  says one can and this seems to depend on Aristotle's idea of the sea battle that will take place tomorrow.  Is it true now? Or is it true only when the sea battle takes place?


Though he can not cause it to be acquired now,  but it is true now that it will be acquired.
רב agrees with ר. מאיר if he says "מעכשיו". There is a three way argument between תוספות, the רשב''א and the רמב''ן what that means.

This way of mine seem to fit with how רב שך explains תוספות and the רשב''א.
See רמב''ם laws of מכירה כ''ב:ה''א

אין אדם מקנה דבר שלא בא לעולם.
One can not cause to acquire something that is not yet in one's possession. Yevamot 93.
R Meir says one can and this seems to depend on Aristotle's idea of the sea battle that will take place tomorrow. That is though he can not cause it to be acquired now but it is true now that it will be acquired.
Rav agrees with R. Meir if he says "from now." There is a three way argument between Tosphot, the Rashba and the Ramban what that means.


See Rambam laws of Acquisition 22:1

IDF (Israeli Defense Force)

Serving in IDF (Israeli Defense Force)  is important from several angles. The major angle is the same reason why the Jewish community in Safed that was started by the disciples of the Gra organized a community protection force. It does not have to be any more profound than that. It also helps to know the important fact that both Reb Moshe Feinstein and Reb Aaron Kotler said in Israel "דינא דמלכותא דינא" (the law of the country is the law)
But it might be more profound that that.
But my claim is more simple. If all we had would be Reb Moshe and Reb Aaron Kotler that would be enough to establish the law.

My own feeling about this subject is mainly based on the little bit of reading I did about Jewish Communities during the Middle Ages. [That is in the Teshuvot of the teacher of the Rosh, Rav Meir from Rotenberg]. Still there are troubles in Israel because of the Sephardim trying to get rid of the Ashkenazim. Not all. but enough to make it worthwhile to be aware of this problem.

The issue of Christianity comes up from time to time. The basic approach I have towards this is based on Rav Avraham Abulafia--a mystic from the Middle Ages who said about Jesus some pretty positive things. [The idea of Rav Abulafia seems to be that he was the messiah son of Joseph that is mentioned in the Gemara Suka.] Not that that makes the basic approaches of Christianity right, but it does show a different side to the whole issue. In other words--the problems are well known--Paul certainly opened the gates to an approach which was not the approach of Jesus at all. But on the other the general attitude that I have encountered is that one has to say and believe that Jesus was a bad guy, and that is the one and only thing that makes one kosher--that also seems wrong. It does not seem to reflect on a commitment to truth but rather to ideology. From my point of view, Jesus never said he was God nor claimed any kind of worship. It is hard to see from where that belief comes from the in New Testament. He did claim to be a son of God. But that is not different from what God said to Moses to tell Pharaoh, "My son my first born is Israel". Nor does it seem all that different from the verse in Deuteronomy; "You are the children of the Lord your God, Do not make a tattoo on your bodies."Nor did Jesus nullify any commandments at all, even of the words of the scribes. "The scribes sit on the seat of Moses, and so, all that they teach and command that you must do." However, it also seems that the issue is more important than what could be swept under the carpet. Certain people are sent into this world to bring some kind of great good into the world e.g., Moses. And from my perspective, there are certain positive things associated with Jesus that can not be gotten through any other channel [e.g., The Golden Rule]. [So in so far as Christians learn and emulate Jesus, they are right. But in so far as they worship him, that is wrong. One should worship God alone.]

Since it is clear that the Rambam holds the פטור of מתעסק בשבת is because מלאכת מחשבת אסרה תורה then how does he understand Abyee in Sanhedrin 62b? Abyee says one who bows down to a statue and he did not know it is an idol לא כלום הוא