A pressing problem today is the ease of genetically engineering and manipulation of viruses and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. These two thing together make the world we live in a dangerous place. For Muslims there is no such thing as  a deterrent. And deterrent (mutually assured destruction) was the only thing in the past that kept the world safe. How do you deter someone who is set on doing a suicide bombing of innocents?
 Islam provides good justification for murder of innocents --the promise of reward in the next world for anyone dying in jihad against infidels.

While religious fever is a normal human trait, but a religious Jew has other things on his mind than Jihad. A person that is Jewish and gets somewhat fanatic, will spend all day long learning Torah or go to Uman for Rosh Hashanah. A Christian who becomes fanatic will spend his or her time in some soup kitchen. A Muslim who becomes fanatic blows up Jews and Christians. There is no parity here. Islam is a religion of peace only for Muslims that do not believe it. It is a religion of war for the Muslims that do believe in it and for their victims.

And today with the ease of manipulation of viruses, Jihad against the West becomes more of a practical possibility for Muslims in a fairly easy way.

My recommendation would be to send in a few Jesuits. In fact that might be the only practical advice I could give. I was thinking if perhaps to send in a few Mirrer Yeshiva students but that seems less practical. Thought it might be desirable. After all the best option would be to teach them Torah. But Jesuits have had traditionally more success in that direction.

Reform movement of Judaism.

While I was growing up in Beverly Hills my family went to Temple Israel in Hollywood. [note 1]

That is where I had my bar mitzvah. This was basically a very positive experience. [note 2] But I have two areas of criticism that I would like to address to the Reform movement of Judaism. One area is the area of bein adam lechavero between man and his fellow man. The other is between man and God [bein Adam Lemakom].
It is known that Reform has issues with many mitzvot. I am not sure how to deal with that here. But it does seem to me they went a little bit too much in the direction of making things permitted that the Torah forbids.  While I can imagine they would say that the Orthodox have gone too far in making things forbidden that the Torah allows. But here I want to give a critique of the Reform not the Orthodox.

 But there is another area that I think most Reform shuls synagogues would agree that we should improve on: that is Musar. [Musar meaning classical Musar; the books of Jewish ethics written during the Middle Ages and Renaissance.]

The advantage that Musar has for all Jews including Reform Jews is not just in character improvement but in the area of world view. Without Musar it is very difficult to come up with a consistent world view that corresponds to the world view of the Torah. That is you can read the Star of Redemption of Rosenzweig and the Guide for the Perplexed of Maimonides and still the world view of the Torah can be far off. Because world view is not the same as philosophy. It is the exact opposite of philosophy. It philosophy examines ones beliefs. world view is the glasses one wears to see the world .
 Perhaps Reform were too optimist they they would find and understand the basic approach of the Torah without use of dusty Medieval books.  And to some degree you can understand why. Reform is based in the USA and Americans  are by nature optimistic and the 1950s were unique in the history of the USA as being the ear people thought everything was possible. To eradicate all disease and racism and better the lot of all mankind. And when you had  the great Sartre and Freud to understand the nature of Human life who needed medical moralists? Nowadays all that seem incredibly naive but then it was common place

I know some people want to disenfranchise reform Jews completely but that seems to be based on an an approach that assumes that Orthodox Judaism is perfect. I think if I would have to choose between Reform and Orthodox I would go with Reform  simply because they have a lot of the between man and his fellow man part of the Torah in the right order of priorities.   Still I think they need Musar to improve their approach.


[note 1] This had nothing to do with movies. It was just that my Dad's place of work was at TRW which was in commuting distance while he was working on laser communication for the SDI project or Star Wars as it came to be called.]

[note 2] If I would be in Los Angeles I would never go near the Orthodox there because in the world view of Torah the between man and his fellow man comes before rituals. If I would be too far from Temple Israel on Shabat  then I would just have to buy myself a set of the Talmud and Shulchan Aruch and learn at home. But I would not go to any Orthodox place because the Orthodox in Los Angeles are not Kosher.

How to combat Islam:--Learn Torah

The way today to deal with the threat of Evil in its forms is not by guns but it is by learning Torah. That is to learn Gemara, Rashi, and Tosphot, and Musar every day.  That does not mean that that is all one must do every day. Torah is not meant to be used for making a living and I do not approve of using it in that fashion. But I do think that uniformly across the board that people should learn Torah and especially Musar.

Musar has the advantage that it gives one an idea of the world view of Torah in an accurate fashion.


Musar in general refers to books written during the Middle Ages devoted to the moral precepts of the Torah but the main advantage today is the clarity it brings to world view issues.



Ideally, I think people should learn a page per day of one of the classical Musar books (e.g Chovot Levavaot) and also one page from one of the books of the disciples of Israel Salanter (e.g Madragat HaAdam by Joseph Horowitz from Navardok, Or Israel by Issac Blazer).

Two day ago I wrote on my blog here a question on the Talmud in tractate Sanhedrin page 61a.

At the time I had not looked up the Maharam from Lublin. [which is printed together with the Maharsha].
While I was waiting for my learning partner today I glanced at the Maharam and saw he asks exactly my question. Sorry about that.

On one hand as far as the Internet goes it is nice I can show that my thinking is accurate. But if this was a chidush [idea] in my notebooks, this would be an embarrassment that I did not even look up the Marharam.

Of course it is interesting also that no one else noticed this. It seems that such a simple fact that my question had already been asked by the Maharam might have been noticed by someone. This probably shows that people that there are not very many people that learn Talmud that looks at my blog. Maybe they are too busy learning. Good for them.

One thing you do see with idolatry --that it depends on intention. It says in the Mishna [Sanhedrin 60b], "These people are liable for idolatry: one who sacrifices or serves it according to its usual way, or one who accepts it as his god and says to it 'You are my god.' This is simple if intention is not involved. (I mean to say that case one is different from case two.) But to answer a contradiction with a later Mishna, Rav Hamenuna says [on the next page--Sanhedrin 61a] it means even the first cases a have intention-but the intention is not until they are served.
Logistically this makes sense but it certainly is not the simple way of looking at the Mishna. that means this principle of intention is so important that the Gemara is willing to interpret the mishna in an very un-obvious way to make it work out right.--also because of the later Mishna.
This is like in Shabat where we require thought work ["melechet machshevet"] to be liable.

But at this point we have to ask, What kind of intention makes one liable? Clearly it can't be to consider the idol to be a creator. No ancient gods were creators. They all found some preexisting substance to form the world from. Rather they had spiritual powers. And this seems to be the most simple basic intention one needs to be liable for idolatry. To bring some kind of sacrifice, or to burn incense or to pour a libation or to bow or to serve according to his way to a person that one thinks has spiritual powers in order to gain some benefit or in order to get closer to God [as per the Rambam on Perek Chelek].
I would venture a guess that the Geon from Villna might have thought that the chasidm of his time had crossed the line from monotheism towards polytheism.


 So  however I can see many people  that get involved in Breslov seems to make a tzadik the center of their attention and this troubles me because of the idolatry problem

On the issue of idolatry Sanhedrin 61a.

On the issue of idolatry I have a great idea. It it concerns the Talmud [or as I prefer Gemara] in Sanhedrin 61a.  Just for background let me say that you can't do idolatry either according to the usual way of worship of the idol, or by one of four other ways: sacrifice, burning, pouring, bowing. Rav Acha juxtaposes a statement of Rava  and Rabbi Elazar in order to ask a question. And I would like to suggest a question on his answer that I think it is an amazingly obvious question that I think that someone else must have asked it before me.
The idea of Rava is to learn worship not according to the way of that idol from "he will bow" instead of "he will sacrifice", and that would tell us all kinds of service of honor would be forbidden--even not service according to the way of that idol.
Then Rav Acha asks on Rava from the statement of Rabbi Elazer who says: How do we know one can't sacrifice to Mercury? From the verse, "So that they shall no longer bring their sacrifices to the goats."
The question of Rav Acha is this: If we already know from "bowing" all kinds of service of honor, then why do we also need this other way of Rabbi Elezar to tell us less than what we already know?\ The Gemara answers: The statement of Rabbi Elezar refers to when one sacrifices in order to make G-d mad, not to serve idols. Now I think we can all agree that this answer sounds strained. If we look at the verse we can see that the idea is God says, "I am making this law that they bring their sacrifices to the tabernacle  in order that they should no longer bring their sacrifices to the goats (idols)." Surely they were not bringing their sacrifices to the goats (idols) in order to make God mad, but rather to worship idolatry. And since God is making this parallelism, it would have to mean: They should no longer bring their sacrifices to goats (idols)  in order to make me mad and rather bring their sacrifices to me to make me mad. [Of course, you could say its really is anti parallel--and God means rather: They should bring their sacrifices to me to make the goats (idols) mad.] It does not matter anyway because all I am doing is showing how the answer of the Gemara is anything but obvious in order to build up my question that the Gemara could have proposed an alternative answer.\So my question is this. Why did not the Gemara say simply that Rabbi Elazar refers to Mercury and other idols that are worshiped in ways of dishonor, and Rava was referring to idols that are worshiped in a way of honor? That is the same way the Gemara divides worship not according to it way into four parts -worship of dishonor and idols of dishonor and worship of honor and idols of honor so do the same here. One answer here is you need only Markulis [Mercury] and you know idolatry of honor by a  a-fortiori. But that can't work because we don't make prohibitions based on a fortiori.

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On the issue of idolatry.  סנהדרין ס''א ע''א.  Just for background let me say that it i forbidden do idolatry either according to the usual דרך of worship of the idol, or by any one of four other ways: sacrifice, burning, pouring, bowing. רב אחא juxtaposes a statement of רבא  and ר' אלעזר in order to ask a question. And I would like to suggest a question on his answer, The idea of רבא is to learn the prohibition of worship not according to the דרך of that idol from "he will bow" instead of  "he will sacrifice", and that would tell us all kinds of service דרך honor would be forbidden, even not service according to the דרך of that idol. Then רב אחא asks on רבא from the statement of ר' אלעזר who says: How do we know one can't sacrifice to מרקולית? From the verse, "So that they shall no longer bring their sacrifices to the goats."
The question of רב אחא is this: If we already know from "bowing" all kinds of service of honor, then why do we also need this other way of ר' אלעזר to tell us less than what we already know?\ The גמרא answers: The statement of ר' אלעזר refers to when one sacrifices in order to להכעיס השם, not to serve idols. This answer sounds strained. If we look at the verse we can see that the idea is השם says, "I am making this law that they bring their sacrifices to the tabernacle  in order that they should no longer bring their sacrifices to the goats (idols)." Surely they were not bringing their sacrifices to the goats (idols) in order להכעיס השם , but rather to worship idolatry. The answer of the גמרא is not  obvious.  My question is that the גמרא could have proposed an alternative answer. Why did not the גמרא say simply that ר' אלעזר refers to מרקולית and other idols that are worshiped in דרך  of חרפה, and רבא was referring to idols that are worshiped in a דרך  of honor? That is the same way the גמרא divides worship not according to it's דרך into four parts: worship דרך dishonor and idols of dishonor and worship דרך honor and idols of honor, so do the same here. One answer here is you need only מרקולית and you know idolatry of honor by a  קל וחומר. But that can't work because we don't make prohibitions based on a קל וחומר.בעניין עבודת האלילים. סנהדרין ס''א ע''א. רק לרקע אגיד שאסור לעבוד אלילים או לפי הדרך הרגילה של עבודת האליל, או בכל אחת מארבע דרכים אחרות: הקרבה, שריפה, מזיגה, השתחוות. רב אחא מצמיד הצהרה של רבא ור' אלעזר על מנת לשאול שאלה. ואני רוצה להציע שאלה על תשובתו, הרעיון של רבא הוא ללמוד את איסור הפולחן שלא לפי דרכו של אותו אליל מ"ישתחוה" במקום "יקריב", וזה היה אומר לנו כל מיני שירותים בדרך כבוד יהיו אסורים, אפילו לא שירות לפי דרכו של אותו אליל. ואז רב אחא שואל על רבא מדברי ר' אלעזר האומר: איך נדע שאי אפשר להקריב ולית? מהפסוק "כדי שלא יביאו עוד את זבחיהם לעזים".

השאלה של רב אחא היא זו: אם כבר יודעים מ"השתחוות" כל מיני שירות של כבוד, אז למה צריך גם את הדרך האחרת הזו של ר' אלעזר שיגיד לנו פחות ממה שאנחנו כבר יודעים? עונה הגמרא : ההצהרה של ר' אלעזר מתייחסת כאשר מקריבים על מנת להכעיס השם, לא לשרת אלילים. התשובה הזו נשמעת מתוחה. אם נתבונן בפסוק נוכל לראות שהרעיון הוא השם אומר "אני עושה את החוק הזה שהם יביאו את קרבנותיהם למשכן כדי שלא יביאו עוד את קרבנותיהם לעזים (האלילים)." ודאי לא היו מביאים את קורבנותיהם לעזים (אלילים) כדי להכעיס השם, אלא לעבוד עבודת אלילים. תשובת הגמרא אינה ברורה. השאלה שלי היא שהגמרא הייתה יכולה להציע תשובה חלופית. מדוע לא אמרה הגמרא בפשטות שר' אלעזר מתייחס למרקולית ושאר אלילים שעובדים בדרך חרפה, ורבא התכוון לאלילים שעובדים בדרך של כבוד? כך הגמרא מחלק את הפולחן שלא לפי דרכו לארבעה חלקים: דרך פולחן של קלון ואלילי קלון ודרך פולחן של כבוד ואלילי כבוד, אז יעשה גם כאן.  אולי תשובה אחת כאן היא שאתה צריך רק מרקולית ואתה יודע עבודת אלילים של כבוד על ידי קל וחומר. אבל זה לא יכול לעבוד כי אנחנו לא עושים איסורים על סמך קל וחומר. אין מזהירים מן הדין

As far as I know in Iran there is a "Hate America Day." The Great Satan they call it. And they are actively developing nuclear weapons to destroy the Great Satan. Then the ISIS (Sunni) comes along and now Iran (Shiite)  is asking American aid to help defeat the ISIS. Does this make sense to anyone?

Why would the USA help Iran? It is not like they are some kind of democratic ally. And it has been the policy of the USA to help democracies ever since Wilson. And to me this looks to be a good idea. Helping people whose every prayer is for the destruction of the USA makes little sense to me.


 The  Wilson  doctrine of self determination was seen right away as being incoherent by a close advisor [self determination for whom? cities? Counties? Nations? Communities> Religions in one nations? different nations in one community? . Wilson afterwards regretted the idea and said he did not expect there to be a new nation every single day that was claiming the right to self determination.] still the basic idea of  helping democracies makes a lot of sense to me. Not helping all kinds of self determination. But the kind that supports democratic values.

Evil in its forms

My feeling about the evil inclination is that it has several different aspects to it. One is physical desire. Nowadays it is not a popular concept, but  during the Middle Ages this was considered the major aspect of the evil inclination. See the Chovot Levavot {The Musar book called Duties of the Heart} for example. The other is a kind of evil inclination that  Israel Salanter talked about, the spiritual evil inclination. That is a inclination that comes to a person that is directed towards evil even when physical desires oppose it. The "Imp of the Perverse," as Edward Allen Poe called it.

 But I would like to suggest a third and forth evil inclination. One is bad worldviews. The other is bad attitudes.

Bad worldviews are easy to identify. For example a person can have very good characteristics. He can be kind, and clean, and considerate, and perfectly psychologically healthy, but believe that to get entrance into Gan Eden he must behead as many Christian or Jewish infidels as possible. That is, he is Muslim.

But some world view issues are more difficult to identify. Even things written in books of  ethics and morality like Musar books might not be applicable across the board.  Also there is the problem of conflicting values in Torah itself. I might mention the conflict between working and learning Torah for one thing. Or honoring ones parents as opposed to other activities that might or might not be required by Torah.


Other problem include the fact that learning Torah in fact does not give immunity from the evil inclination. .
 Now one way to solve conflicting values in Torah would seem to be to go to the Rambam. He divides mitzvot of the Torah according to their purpose. Many mitzvot are to prevent idolatry. Many others are for peace of the country. Some are for other purposes. And we know that the reason for mitzvot according to the Rambam does determine to some degree how they are applied. [as we see with the rich widow that the Rambam decides like R. Yehuda against R. Shimon but gives a reason for it that the reason of the Torah still applies to her.]That is in the view of the Rambam the Torah has certain commandments that it is the purpose of the Torah to bring one to. Telos-- "purpose" Ethics. So a command not to serve other gods would be purpose of many other mitzvot. For example not to wear  tattoo, or not to make an idol even if one does not worship it. etc. The purpose of many mitzvot is peace of the state. So in application the mitzvot that are to bring to that would have to be applied only in a way that in fact brings to peace of the State.

So I suggest to learn Musar. That is the classical books of Musar that R. Israel Salanter founded his movement upon. This is for the purpose of  gaining a Torah world view. Plus there are several books by the close disciples of R. Salanter. The main benefit of these books I believe is in fact in the area of world view. --not so much what people think it is supposed to do--correcting ones character.[It does not matter if you are religious or not or even if your are Jewish or not--these are important books for world view issues.]


\


Appendix: Musar means classical Musar e.g. Chovot Levavot, Orchot Tzadikim and the books of Moshe Chaim Lutzato and the student of  Gaon from Villna-- Reb Chaim from Voloshin.
 You can find things that you disagree with but it gives a basic framework for a Torah World view.

Breslov has a wide appeal to people because people are looking for a real tzadik. and this list of people includes me.The problem seems to be what is called in Breslov "mefursamim of sheker" (leaders that are considered to be tzadikm but are not).

The main thing that I think people find in Breslov is emotional appeal [power].  That is it is not just they are looking for a tzadik but they find some kind of inspiration.. I mean if you are like me you want a unified clear idea of Torah. Now you could just as well go to the Rambam's Guide for the Perplexed for this reason. But the Guide has a bit too much medieval science in it to be compelling.


I might mention that leaders of Breslov tend to be unfamiliar with traditional Jewish writing. [Like The Guide for the Perplexed of Maimonides or the Emunot VeDeot of Saadia Geon.]

You have the opinion of Rava in the Talmud that one is liable for idolatry only when he accepts the idol  as his god. Abyee disagrees with this but the law is like Rava [as is always the case except in 6 specific cases where the Talmud says the law is like Abyee.][Sanhedrin 61b]

I had thought that perhaps the idea of "accepting as ones god," means to be initiated into the cult of that particular god. But my learning partner pointed out that this is unlikely. It would mean that doing downright straight forward idolatry would be not guilty as long as one has not become a devote. That is, one could walk into  the temple of Zeus, and bring a sacrifice with intension to gain some benefit [like rain (as was the original idea of Zeus before the Greeks elevated his status)], and still not be liable as long as one has not been initiated into the cult. This seems very unlikely.


So far as concerning idolatry I am still in the beginning stages of collecting information. But so far it looks to me that to be liable there is no need for a physical object. E.G. lets us say that some archangel comes down to earth  perhaps even the particular angel that the ancients associated with the name Zeus and this angel appears to a person and the person bows down to it. Would this be liable?

At this point it seems to me the most basic idea of idolatry is the worship of any being besides the First Cause in order to get closer to the First Cause or to gain some benefit. But this benefit has to be not in a natural way. There has to be some idea of this alternative being has some power over some aspect of the world or human life that is beyond normal physical reality.

And I should mention that you can tell what prohibitions in the Torah are more severe than others by the punishment. Idolatry is stoning. [Some of  the sexual relations in Leviticus also--and that includes homosexuality.]

In terms of the Talmud in Sanhedrin page 61a I want here to state what I think is a major question.

It is the question of Rav Acha from Diphti on Rava. His question is if Rava would be right then what does how do they serve come to tell us. Now at first it looked to me like he could even skip this part of his argument and go right to his question--the contradiction between Rabbi Elazar and Rava. But this I realized afterwards was wrong. He needed to lead up to his question because he wanted to make sure that bowing would be placed in the area of service not according to the way of that idol. And then he could ask the question from the statement of Rabbi Elazar.

But then my learning partner asked, "Why does he not ask straight from Rabbi Elazar onto the original Braita?" 
Now at first I thought that that was the question of Tosphot but it turned out that that is not true. Tosphot asks something that superficially looks like the question of my learning partner but is not in fact the same. Topshot ask if the question from "How do they serve?" (Deuteronomy 12) is valid for "bowing" (Deuteronomy 17) why is it not also a question on "sacrifice" (Exodus 22)? And that is relevant only to that stage of the argument. The question from my learning partner is totally different. It is not Rabbi Elazar starting with a completely different set of assumptions from the Braita? So why not ask straight out from the beginning: "Do we learn serve not according to the normal way from "he who sacrifices to false gods will be destroyed"(Exodus 22) or do we learn from "So they shall no longer sacrifice to the goats."(Leviticus)

Just for reference for those who do not have the Talmud Sanhedrin in front of them here is the basic idea:

Braita: serve to an idols according to the non-normal way of that idol is forbidden because of  "he who sacrifices to idols will be destroyed"

Rava: why not learn from "he will go and bow"?
Rav Acaha: If Rava would be right that we could ask from bowing then what would we do with he how do they serve? It has to be for dishonorable service. But then what would we do with Rabbi Elazar who says, "We know one can't sacrifice to Mercury because of the verse 'so they shall no longer sacrifice to goats.'" 

I see in the world today several causes for alarm. War between Russia and the Ukraine. The threat of a Muslim Atom Bomb in the hands of a fanatic Muslim State that sees jihad  and suicide in the cause of Allah as the highest mitzvah. The  fact that the USA seems to be in the hands of a Socialist.

These are all cause of worry. My solution is to repent. But repentance in my way of thinking means to find out what the Torah requires of me and to do it.   We can’t assume that what our preconceived ideas of repentance are actually correspond to what the Torah thinks repentance requires. For one thing the Torah has several areas of value which almost by definition have to conflict.  And you can see this problem when ever you try to go about actually keeping the Torah. 

No to Kiruv (Kiruv means making people into Orthodox Jews). Kiruv has the problem that it takes people away from one area of Torah value--honoring ones parents and other areas of human relations and places them in another area--like keeping Shabat. So Kiruv is not what is needed. 


That also is not what is needed. What we need is simply places devoted to the idea that everyone should learn Torah and do what it says. Period.

I thought that sometimes it is easier to understand things in the Talmud if you learn them in Hebrew rather than in English translation. So with that in mind I decided to place here my ideas on the Talmudic tractate Sanhedrin page 61 in Hebrew. And after that an English translation.

סנהדרין ס: אני רוצה קודם כל להציע את הגמרא בקצרה ואחר כך מחלוקת תוספות עם בעל המאור, ואחר כל זה להציע שתי קושיות על בעל המאור. הברייתא אומרת שלומדים עבודה שלא כדרכה מזביחה (היינו מן הפסוק "זובח לאלהים יחרם") [שמות כב].
רבא בר רב חנן שואל,"למה אין יכולים ללמוד את זה מהשתחוויה ("וילך וישתחווה") [דברים יז]. רב אחא מדפתי שאל על רבא בר רב חנן, "אם היינו לומדים מהשתחוייה, אז מה היה 'איכה יעבדו הגויים את אלהיהם' בא למעט? [היינו מה היה בא לפטור?]
תוספות ובעל המאור שואלים על רב אחא, למה הוא שאל רק על השתחווייה? למה הוא לא שאל גם על זביחה? היינו, אם לומדים שלא כדרכה מזביחה, מה בא "איכה יעבדו" למעט? תוספות עונים ששואלים רק על השתחווייה בגלל שאם משתמשים עם השתחווייה אז שייך לשאול מה בא "איכה יעבדו" לומר לנו. זה בגלל שמהשתחווייה אפשר ללמוד את הכול, אפילו עבודה כדרכה. האופן לראות את זה הוא לדגש שבשלב הזה הגמרא חושבת שהשתחווייה כוללת גם עבודה של בזיון. רואים את זה מן התירוץ לשאלת רב אחא שהשתחווייה לא כוללת עבודה של בזיון. אבל מזביחה לא היינו כוללים עבודה של בזיון, ולכן שייך לא לשאול למה בא "איכה יעבדו"? הוא בא לומר עבודה כדרכה חייבת. אבל בעל המאור הולך בכיוון אחר. הוא ראה ששאלת הגמרא היא מה איכה יעבדו בא למעט (לפטור). היינו שהיא בא לרבות מה שהוא ולמעט מה שהוא. ובהמשך הגמרא משתדלת למצוא דבר ש"איכה יעבדו" יכול לפטור. לפי ההקדמה הזאת הוא אומר שמן זביחה היינו מחייבים נשיקה למגפפים[עבודה זרה שדרכה בחיבוק]. ואז בא "איכה יעבדו" לומר לנו שאינו חייב.
שתי שאלות יש לי פה על שיטת המאור. אם זה נכון ש"איכה יעבדו" בא לפטור נושק למגפפים, אז למה לשאול על השתחווייה? תגיד שהשתחוייה בא לחייב נושק למגפפים. ותגיד ש"איכה יעבדו" בא לפתור אותו.



שאלה שנייה איך התירוץ עובד? איך היינו חושבים שזביחה בא לחייב נושק למגגפים מראש? אין סיבה לחשוב שזביחה היה כולל נשיקה למגפפים. אפשר לראות את זה על ידי זה שנזכרים שמשתמשים עם זביחה בשביל להרבות עבודות פנים. אין שום הווה אמינא שזביחה היה כולל שום דבר אחר. רק השתחווייה חשבנו שהיא באה לרבות כל דרך כבוד.

Sanhedrin 60b and 61a.

I put this on the Internet so here I am just going to put down the gemara in brief and then two questions I have on the Meor and also to mention one clearly invalid question.

 First of all the Braita says you learn service not according to the way from sacrifice. Rava Bar Rav Chanan asks, "Why can't we learn that from "bowing" and use "sacrifice" for something else?

Rav Acha from Diphti objects to this question of Rava bar rav Chanan and says how could we use "bowing" (Deuteronomy chapter 17, parshat Shophtim)? If we would use "bowing" (to include other types of service) then what would "How do the nations serve their gods?" come to exclude? (That is what would it come to permit?) Tosphot and the Baal HaMeor both ask on Rav Acha: Why does he make this objection only on Rava Bar Rav Chanan when he tries to use "bowing" to include? [To forbid] Why does he not ask also on the braita that uses 'sacrifice' (exodus 22)(mishpatim)? [To include other types of serve no according to it way] That is if we use "sacrifice" to be inclusive, then what does, "How do they serve?" come to exclude?

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Tosphot answers to this that we only ask on bowing because if we used "bowing" then we could ask, "What does "how do they serve" come to tell us? Since from "bowing" we could include everything [even service according to it way]. The way to see this is to note that at this point the Gemara is thinking that "bowing" includes also all service that is not honorable. You can see this from the way the Gemara answers the question of Rav Acaha by saying that "bowing" would not include dishonorable service. So we see that up to that point we thought it did include dishonorable service. But from "sacrifice" we would not include service that is not dishonorable whether according to it way or not, so we could not ask, "What do we use 'How do the nations serve?" We use it for all service that is according to its way that is dishonorable.

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But the Baal Hameor takes a different approach. He notices that the the question of the Gemara is "What does the verse, 'How do the nations serve their gods?' come to exclude?" That is, it has to include something and exclude something else. And in fact you can see this from the way the gemara continues. It tries to find what does "How do they serve?" come to allow?

He says that from "sacrifice" alone we would forbid kissing idols that one usually hugs or visa versa. And that "how do they serve" come to tell us that this area is not liable.

The basic two questions on the Baal HaMeor are these. If you are right that "How do they serve?איכה יעבדו" is coming to allow the in between areas of quadrant II [kissing idols that one usually hugs] then why ask on "bowing"? I.e., you say that if we would learn from "sacrifice" then we would not ask what do we use "How do they serve?" for because we have something we would use it for [to absolve from guilt]: the in-between areas of quadrant II.

But then why not say the same thing with bowing? Also there say that "how do they serve?" is coming to allow the in between areas of quadrant II.

Question 2: how does the answer of the Meor work? How would we use sacrifice to forbid those things in order to need how do they serve in order to allow them? There is no reason to assume that sacrifice would include kissing things that you hug. We can see this by the fact that when we do use sacrifice to include things it only come to include inner services. No one has the slightest idea that it would include anything more. It was only for bowing that we thought it could include more.

The answer to both of these questions is the difference between potential and action. Bowing means in action  that kissing an idol that one hugs is liable. Therefore it makes sense to ask then what does how do the gentiles serve their idols come to permit. but sacrifice only means that would in potential could enlarge the field of forbidden-ness and therefore how do they serve come to tell us that we do not do so. So the Baal HaMeor makes perfect sense.

  

Sanhedrin [page 60b]

In Sanhedrin [page 60b] we find a braita that says we learn  from the word "sacrifice"זובח לאלהים יחרם to tell us also pouring and burning (עבודות פנים). The reason is that "sacrifice" was in the set of idolatry and came out of the set . And we know that in that case it comes out to teach us something about the whole set. כל דבר שהיה בכלל ויצא מן הכלל בא ללמד על הכלל כולו Rava bar Rav Chanan asked why not learn from, "he will bow down?"וישתחחוו Rav Acha asked, “How is that a good question? If we would learn from ‘bowing’ then what would “how do the nations serve their idols’ come to tell us?”
The Gemara concludes that it teaches us about service not according to its way of idols that are not served in an honorable way.
Tosphot and the Baal HaMeor [that is the book called the Meor Hagadol on the Rif (Isaac Alfasi) in the back of the Gemara] both ask on Rav Acha, “Why not ask on “sacrifice” also what does ‘how do the nations serve their gods’ come to tell us?

 Baal HaMeor  that we could not ask what do we learn from "How do they serve?" איכה יעבדו  because we learn something from it-- kissing idols that one usually hugs.

Tosphot takes a different approach. He says something very deep. He considers that fact that at the point of the question the Gemara is thinking that "bowing" tells us even not in an honorable way. We see this from the fact that the answer of the Talmud is that it does not in fact include service in a dishonorable way.
 Tosphot is saying that when the Gemara asks, "What do we need 'how do they serve?'" it means it literally-- that we would learning everything from bowing. And if that is the case then the answer of Topshot is common sense--if we would be learning from sacrifice then there is a large area that we would need “how do  they serve?” for that is service according to its way that is dishonorable.

Now once we understand Tosphot then we can see its advantage over the Baal HaMeor. Just think about the fact that in fact we do learn from "Sacrifice!" Not from Bowing. So according to the Baal HaMeor how do we know that kissing an idol that one usually hugs is liable?
 I noticed the Maharsha asks some question on the Baal HaMeor and answers it also. I am not sure if it is the above question because I have not had a chance yet to look into it. But I think at this point we can all agree that the Tosphot approach is prima facie better since it gets everything right  with no complications.

I noticed yesterday the story of Israel Odessaer getting involved in Breslov.  This story as long as it was did conform what I had suspected for a long time. That the people that are considered "tzadikim" (saints) in breslov tend to be unsuccessful students.

.  And then after a few years they forget their origins, and become "tzadikim". And then naive Baali Teshuva [Newly religious people] start laying the groundwork to claim that they are hidden tzdikim (saints) that know the whole Shas (Talmud) and Poskim [one word that includes the whole set of Rif, Rosh, Rambam, Tur, Shulchan Aruch].


And people that follow the Petak [the letter Reb Isael Odessar believed he had to received from  Nachman of Uman that contained the phrase Na Nach Nachem Nachman from Uman] tend to be claiming deep kabalistic secrets for the petak when they have barely learned a page of the Zohar and certainly not Arizal.