Avraham rosenblum
Sep 7
to Kelley
Dear Dr Ross. You wrote here : However, a stricter empiricism again creates the difficulty that the apparent "form" of an object cannot provide knowledge of an end (an entelechy) that is only implicit in the present object, and so hidden to present knowledge.
This seems to be the only statement in that essay about the problems with Aristotle.
I thought there were more serious problems with Aristotle like this: from Stanford: Some maintain that Aristotle’s theory is ultimately inconsistent, on the grounds that it is committed to all three of the following propositions:
(i) Substance is form.
(ii) Form is universal.
(iii) No universal is a substance.
This seems important because the Maimonides is considered to be going with Aristotle. It does not seem that he would have missed these problems. Is there perhaps ways to answer these things? Or Perhaps Maimonides was aware of these problems and therefore took a kind of Middle path between Aristotle and the Neo-Platonists. Sincerely Avraham Rosenblum
Dear Mr. Rosenblum,
Aristotle’s forms must be hidden in part, for we cannot tell from the inspection of an acorn what the grown tree will look like. The Aristotelian “form” thus becomes separate from its obvious meaning in Greek, i.e. eidos as image. Since Aristotle wants to be a kind of Empiricist, with the “form” derived in some way from the perception of the object, the universal that is mentally abstracted from the image carries with it things that are not actually visible.
In a Kantian theory, what we know about universals will only apply to phenomenal objects. The status of abstract (universal) objects among things-in-themselves is left open, as with other matters of transcendence. At the same time, hidden features of universals obviously cannot be abstracted directly from perception. Thus, what the oak will look like is a matter of speculation, scientific investigation, or just waiting around for the tree to grow from the acorn. What scientific investigation has learned, of course, is that the form of the oak is determined by the DNA in the acorn. The “entelechy” has a physical basis, but this could be not gathered from the mere inspection of the acorn. Aristotle’s “entelechy” was thus for real, but not in the way he thought.
I would agree that Aristotle affirms (i) and (ii), but I don’t really see (iii). Universals are forms, and forms are substance. I think that Maimonides is actually a Neoplatonist, where the chain of Being is grades of form, and universality, from the four elements up to the One.
So I am curious why you, or anyone, would say that “No universal is a substance” in Aristotle.
Best wishes,
KR
Sep 7
to Kelley
Dear Dr Ross. You wrote here : However, a stricter empiricism again creates the difficulty that the apparent "form" of an object cannot provide knowledge of an end (an entelechy) that is only implicit in the present object, and so hidden to present knowledge.
This seems to be the only statement in that essay about the problems with Aristotle.
I thought there were more serious problems with Aristotle like this: from Stanford: Some maintain that Aristotle’s theory is ultimately inconsistent, on the grounds that it is committed to all three of the following propositions:
(i) Substance is form.
(ii) Form is universal.
(iii) No universal is a substance.
This seems important because the Maimonides is considered to be going with Aristotle. It does not seem that he would have missed these problems. Is there perhaps ways to answer these things? Or Perhaps Maimonides was aware of these problems and therefore took a kind of Middle path between Aristotle and the Neo-Platonists. Sincerely Avraham Rosenblum
Dear Mr. Rosenblum,
Aristotle’s forms must be hidden in part, for we cannot tell from the inspection of an acorn what the grown tree will look like. The Aristotelian “form” thus becomes separate from its obvious meaning in Greek, i.e. eidos as image. Since Aristotle wants to be a kind of Empiricist, with the “form” derived in some way from the perception of the object, the universal that is mentally abstracted from the image carries with it things that are not actually visible.
In a Kantian theory, what we know about universals will only apply to phenomenal objects. The status of abstract (universal) objects among things-in-themselves is left open, as with other matters of transcendence. At the same time, hidden features of universals obviously cannot be abstracted directly from perception. Thus, what the oak will look like is a matter of speculation, scientific investigation, or just waiting around for the tree to grow from the acorn. What scientific investigation has learned, of course, is that the form of the oak is determined by the DNA in the acorn. The “entelechy” has a physical basis, but this could be not gathered from the mere inspection of the acorn. Aristotle’s “entelechy” was thus for real, but not in the way he thought.
I would agree that Aristotle affirms (i) and (ii), but I don’t really see (iii). Universals are forms, and forms are substance. I think that Maimonides is actually a Neoplatonist, where the chain of Being is grades of form, and universality, from the four elements up to the One.
So I am curious why you, or anyone, would say that “No universal is a substance” in Aristotle.
Best wishes,
KR
