za37 midi za37 nwc

za36 midi za36 nwcformat

Rambam in Laws of Things that are Forbidden to bring upon the Altar chapter 3 law 10 . In chapter three, the Rambam brings the statement of R. Oshiya that if one sanctifies a traifa [animal with an internal defect that would cause it to die within a year], the sanctification is not valid at all. It is as if he sanctified wood or stones. He must sell the animal and bring that money to the temple to bring sacrifices on the altar, for it is not like an animal with an external defect. In chapter 2 law 10, he says one who brings a sacrifice and it is found to be traif, it is not redeemed, but is sent to pasture until it dies on its own. Clearly, the first case is when he sanctified an animal that he knew is traif. It is not like an animal with either a passing external defect or a permanent defect. The law in that case is if it has a permanent external defect then it is redeemed and the proceeds go the Temple. Before it is redeemed it cannot be sheared or used for plowing. But in a case when became traif came before it was sanctified, the sanctification is not valid except in so far as the proceeds of the sale go to the altar. The Raavad asks in chapter 3 law what is the difference between the case of one who sanctified a traif and one who sanctified a baal mum? Both are sold and the proceeds go to the Temple. Because of this some achronim say when the Rambam wrote, "It is not like an animal with an external defect," he means a non-permanent one in which case it goes to pasture until it gets permanent one and then is redeemed. However, it appears to me that there is a difference between being sold and being redeemed. In being redeemed, the cohen needs to evaluate the value of the animal before it is sold, and it can only be sold for that much. I think in the case of one who sanctified a traifa, that it is totally hulin, but the money of the sale goes to buy sacrifices. It is as if he had made an oath to bring sacrifices. The money is not sanctified at all, nor the animal that is sold to bring get that money. I might mention that Rav Shach sides with the Raavad. He says if he says this animal is a karban then it is nothing, but if he said it is for the altar then it is like a permanent defect. Rav Isar Meltzer writes that in the case of one who sanctified a traifa, it is unlike the case of a permanent defect because one who sanctifies an animal with a permanent defect, it can be sheared and used for work after it is redeemed, while in our case it can be sheared even before it is sold I think there is a middle category between total hulin and an animal that has sanctification of monetary value. Such a middle category is something that you have to sell and bring the money as a karban even though it does not have sanctification of monetary value. [e.g., a person says on a male goat "This is for a sin offering," it has no holiness, not of body nor of monetary value but is sold in order to buy a female goat tobring as a sin offering.] However, there is a possible refutation of this idea because in the Gemara Temura 17b the gemara brings a refutation of Shmuel from a braita that says in the case of one who sanctified a traifa, it does not need a permanent defect to be redeemed. There the language is to be redeemed, not to be sold. However, the Rambam uses the language to be sold and furthermore he writes that it is not like an animal with a defect. He does not say it is not like an animal with a temporary defect. It is possible that the Rambam understands the law of R, Oshiya that the animal has no category of holiness at all. However the stronges argument that the Rambam means that the traifa has holines of monetary value is he awrite one who sanctifie a traifa it is as if he asanctified wood or stones, and in fact if one say s about wood or stones these are for a in offering they get holiness of monetay value wood ____ רמב''ם in איסורי המזבח פרק ג' ה''י . The רמב''ם brings the statement of ר' אושעיא that if one sanctifies a טריפה [animal with an internal defect that would cause it to die within a year], the הקדשה is not valid at all. It is as if he sanctified wood or stones. He must sell the animal and bring that money to the temple to bring sacrifices on the altar, for it is not like an animal with an מום. In פרק ב' ה''י, he says one who brings a קרבן and it is found to be טריף, it is not נפדה, but is sent to pasture until it dies on its own. Clearly, the first case is when he sanctified an animal that he knew is טריף. It is not like an animal with either a מום עובר or a מום קבוע. The law in that case is if it has a מום קבוע then it is נפדה and the כסף go the Temple. Before it is נפדה it cannot be sheared or used for plowing. But in a case when became טריפה came before it was sanctified, the sanctification is not valid except in so far as the proceeds of the sale go to the altar. The Raavad asks in פרק ג' ה''י what is the difference between the case of one who sanctified a טריף and one who sanctified a בעל מום? Both are sold and the proceeds go to the Temple. Because of this some אחרונים say when the רמב''ם wrote, "It is not like an animal with an מום," he means a מום עובר one in which case it goes to pasture until it gets permanent one and then is redeemed. However, it appears to me that there is a difference between being sold and being נפדה. In being redeemed, the כהן needs to evaluate the value of the animal before it is sold, and it can only be sold for that much. I think in the case of one who sanctified a טריפה, that it is totally חולין, but the money of the sale goes to buy sacrifices. It is as if he had made an oath to bring sacrifices. The money is not sanctified at all, nor the animal that is sold to bring get that money. I might mention that רב שך sides with the ראב''ד. He says if he says this animal is a קרבן then it is nothing, but if he said it is for the altar then it is like a מום קבוע. רב איסק מלצר writes that in the case of one who sanctified a טריפה, it is unlike the case of a permanent defect because one who sanctifies an animal with a permanent defect, it can be sheared and used for work after it is redeemed while in our case it can be sheared even before it is sold I think there is a middle category between total חולין and an animal that has קדושת דמים. Such a middle category is something that you have to sell and bring the money as a קרבן even though it does not have קדושת דמים. [e.g., a person says on a male goat "This is for a חאטת," it has no holiness, not of body nor of קדושת דמים but is sold in order to buy a female goat to bring as a חאטת.] However, there is a possible refutation of this idea because in the גמרא תמורה י''ז ע''ב the גמרא brings a refutation of שמואל from a ברייתא that says in the case of one who sanctified aטריפה, it does not need a מום קבוע to be redeemed. There the language is to be נפדה, not to be sold. However, the רמב''ם uses the language to be sold and furthermore he writes that it is not like an animal מום. He does not say it is not like an animal with a מום עובר. It is possible that the רמב''ם understands the law of ר' אושיעא that the animal has no category of holiness at all. However the strongest argument that the רמב''ם means that the טריפה has קדושת דמים is he writes “one who sanctifies a טריפה it is as if he sanctified wood or stones,” and in fact if one says about wood or stones these are for a חאטת they get holiness of monetary value רמב''ם באיסורי המזבח פרק ג' ה''י . הרמב''ם מביא את דברי ר' אושעיא שאם מקדשים טריפה [בהמה עם מום פנימי שיגרום למותה תוך שנה], אין הקדשה תקפה כלל, וכאילו הוא קידש עצים או אבנים. הוא חייב למכור את הבהמה ולהביא את הכסף הזה למקדש כדי להביא קרבנות על המזבח, כי אין זה דומה לבהמה עם מום. בפרק ב' ה''י אומר המביא קרבן ונמצא טריף, אינו נפדה, אלא נשלח למרעה עד שמת מעצמו. ברור שהמקרה הראשון הוא כאשר הוא קידש בהמה שידע שהיא טריף. זה לא כמו בהמה עם מום עובר או מום קבוע. הדין במקרה כזה הוא שאם יש לו מום קבוע אז זה נפדה והכסף ללכת למקדש. לפני שהוא נפדה אי אפשר לגזור או להשתמש בו לחריש. אבל במקרה שנעשה טריפה בא לפני שנתקדשה, אין ההקדיש תקף, אלא במידה שתמורת המכירה עולה למזבח. הראב"ד שואל בפרק ג' ה''י מה ההבדל בין מי שהקדיש טריף למי שהקדיש בעל מום? שניהם נמכרים והרווחים הולכים לבית המקדש. משום כך אומרים אחרונים כשכתב הרמב''ם "אינו דומה לבהמה עם מום", כוונתו למום עובר, שאז היא הולכת למרעה עד שהיא מקבלת מום קבוע ואז נפדה. עם זאת, נראה לי שיש הבדל בין להימכר לבין להיות נפדה. בפדיון צריך הכהן להעריך את שווי הבהמה לפני מכירתה, וניתן למכור אותה רק בסכום כזה. אני חושב שבמקרה של מי שקידש טריפה, שזה לגמרי חולין, אבל הכסף של המכירה הולך לקנות קרבנות. זה כאילו נדר שבועה להביא קרבנות. הכסף אינו מקודש כלל. אני יכול להזכיר שרב שך מצדד כראב''ד. הוא אומר שאם הוא אומר שהבהמה הזו קרבן אז זה לא כלום, אבל אם הוא אמר שהיא למזבח אז זה כמו מצב של מום קבוע. רב איסר מלצר כותב שבמקרה של מי שקידש טריפה, אין זה דומה לפגם קבוע כי מי שמקדש בהמה עם מום קבוע, ניתן לגזור ולהשתמש לעבודה לאחר שנפדה, אבל במקרה שלנו ניתן לגזור אותה עוד לפני שהיא נמכרת. אני חושב שיש קטגוריית ביניים בין חולין טוטאלית לבין חיה שיש לה קדושת דמים. קטגוריה אמצעית כזו היא משהו שצריך למכור ולהביא את הכסף כקרבן למרות שאין בה קדושת דמים. [למשל, אדם אומר על עז "זה לחטאת", אין לו קדושה, לא של גוף ולא של קדושת דמים אלא נמכר כדי לקנות עז נקבה להביא כחטאת.] אולם ישנה הפרכה לרעיון זה משום שבגמרא תמורה י''ז ע''ב מביא הגמרא הפרכת שמואל מברייתא שאומר במקרה של מי שהקדיש טריפה, אינו צריך מום קבוע להיות נפדה. שם השפה להיות נפדה, לא להימכר. אולם הרמב''ם משתמש בלשון למכירה, ועוד הוא כותב שזה לא כמו בהמה עם מום. הוא לא אומר שזה לא כמו בהמה עם מום עובר. יתכן שהרמב''ם מבין את דין של ר' אושעיא שלבהמה אין כלל קטגוריית קדושה. אולם הטיעון החזק ביותר שהרמב''ם מתכוון לכך שלטריפה יש קדושת דמים הוא כותב "מי שמקדיש טריפה כאילו הקדיש עצים או אבנים", ולמעשה אם אומרים על עצים או אבנים "אלו הם בשביל חטאת" הם מקבלים קדושת דמים

contradiction between John Locke's idea of basic human rights and Darwin

it is an odd sort of fact that peopleare not aware that there is a basic contradiction between John Locke's idea of basic human rights and Darwin. According to Darwin,there is no such thing. There is no such thing as an immutable species with immutable traits. Rather, species evolve and small differences in the DNA are just begining stages of complete separation between the groups that eventually become completely different species. [THE PROBLEM that i am adressing here is that some unfortunate souls think that they can believe both at the same time and in that way can get points for their profile. They are not aware that these two theseses are in direct oppositiThe point is that it is not clear that John Locke had the absolute truth--as we see the system of the USA is not immune to corruption from within. It all was foreseen in Alan Bloom's the Closing of the American Mind. So, between the emphasis on the individual of John Locke and the emphasis of Hegel on the state there is still no clear solution. It is along the lines of being undecidable

za35 midi za35 nwc

What is threatening Western civilization? Written by Michael Huemer

Q: What is threatening Western civilization? Is it nuclear war? Misaligned AI? Global warming? A: Meh. I mean, sure, nuclear war could be bad. But the real problem is contemporary woke, progressive ideology. Q: Wow. What is this ideology? A: Basically, Wokism views America and the West as deeply unjust, oppressive, racist, sexist, etc. It blames “cis-het” (cisgender, heterosexual) white men for this evil. It is also the source of cancel culture, a phenomenon in which hysterical, ignorant mobs try to ruin the lives of people who harbor forbidden thoughts. Progressivism is a broader set of views, which includes wokeness but also includes some other left-wing ideas, such as climate alarmism and opposition to capitalism. Q: Sounds silly. But how is it a threat to Western civilization? A: A few things. (i) It sows discord by teaching people that their true “identity” is some particular group within society (based on race, gender, etc.), and that some other group within society is their group’s enemy. (ii) It undermines loyalty and trust in Western civilization by teaching that the foundation of Western civilization is oppression and evil. (iii) It attacks the norms of free expression that are essential to the pursuit of truth as well as the peaceful resolution of disputes. (iv) It attacks the norms of meritocracy and individualism that are essential to the prosperity of our society. Q: Wow, that sounds bad. But isn’t Wokism just a fringe view of a few inconsequential crazies in the universities? Surely it doesn’t have any real influence on our society. A: That’s what moderate, old-school Democrats would like to think. They don’t want to have to criticize anyone on “their side”, so they try to make excuses and minimize the problem. In Progressive Myths (a book by Dr. Huemer ), you’ll see many quotations indicating how prominent, influential sources spread false, woke propaganda. You’ll see mainstream news sources making factually false reports to support the woke narrative about a given story. You’ll see public officials, up to and including the President, helping to spread these false narratives. You’ll see academic researchers mischaracterizing academic research or suppressing information to support progressive narratives. Woke progressivism has taken over huge swaths of the nation’s educational system, its media, and its entertainment industries. This ideology has been dictating what normal people learn about our society, and woke people have zero concern for objectivity; they have no problem whatsoever with blatant propaganda, suppression of dissent, and deception. In 2021, the year after the George Floyd protests, the S&P 100 companies hired >300,000 new employees. (These are 100 huge companies that appear in the S&P 100 stock market index. They include the likes of Apple, Amazon, Bank of America, Chevron, etc.) Of these new employees, just 6% were white; the other 94% were “POC”s (“people of color”, as the woke refer to non-white people). Bear in mind that about 60% of the country are white. This is obvious and extreme racial discrimination, and it’s obviously driven by the Woke scapegoating of white people. Of course, this is blatantly illegal under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. But the woke progressives don’t care. They reject the Civil Rights Act; they think racial discrimination is great, as long as it targets the right group. And they have no fear of anyone actually enforcing the law against them, because the people whose job is to enforce that law are themselves woke ideologues, who will only enforce the law against “the other side”, not against their own side. Btw, Republicans hold roughly half of elected offices in the U.S., but the bureaucracy is mainly leftists, and leftists, as a rule, will not do anything against other leftists. Even moderates who privately know that the wokists are insane will generally not speak up, and they certainly won’t (if they are in a position to do so) do something so rash as trying to take legal action against woke causes. The Woke now control most of the government and most of our large companies, in addition to almost all of our information-producing institutions. Q: I dunno, what’s so great about Western civilization? Why not burn it down? A: Our current society is vastly better than the situation of almost all people throughout human history, on almost all dimensions of human well-being. I won’t go into detail here, but this is discussed more in the book. For now, let’s just say that most people in history lived lives of constant hardship, danger, physical suffering, oppression, and fear of violence. Contemporary America is a Shangri-La of which people in most of the world and almost all of history could not even dream. The progressives living in this paradise are so thoroughly sheltered that they cannot even comprehend what actual hardship is. If they had to experience a day of life in the Middle Ages, or North Korea today, they’d probably die. And this is relevant, because if we disrupt our current society in a large way, the most likely result is “regression to the mean”; that is, a move back toward the normal state of humanity, which is state of abject misery. The minimum “social science” education of every Westerner should include this knowledge, so that everyone appreciates what we currently have and is not eager to throw it away. But discussion of the greatness of our civilization is anathema to the wokeה progressives.Q: Right, of course. But how does your book combat woke progressivism? A: I expose some of the myths that progressives have been using to spread their ideology. Q: Like what? A: Like the myth that unarmed black people are frequently murdered by white people out of pure racism. That women get paid 30% less than men for the same work due to sexism. That global warming is shortly going to destroy human civilization. That most rich people get rich by inheritance, and that it’s almost impossible to get ahead in America once you’re born poor. Q: I guess that seems kind of useful. But that doesn’t prove in general that America and the West aren’t oppressive. Won’t woke people just say that there are some other ways in which we’re horrible, or some other evidence of our racism and sexism? A: Yes, they definitely will. Wokists are almost impervious to evidence. If you rebut one of their examples, they’ll just shift to some other alleged example, without at all diminishing their confidence in their general claims about how horrible our society is. Q: So you have to refute all of their examples of how our society is evil? A: No, that would be impossible. The underlying ideological claim is too broad, and there is an unlimited range of things that someone might say in support of such a broad claim. Q: So then how can you deprogram the Wokists? A: I think there’s probably no way to do it. Q: Well, then what good can your stupid book possibly do? A: I hope that there are some open-minded people who will read it, and it will stop them from becoming woke ideologues. Q: But since you can’t refute every alleged piece of evidence for Wokism, how can it do that? A: Once you see 20 examples of progressive deceptions, you should notice the pattern and know not to trust information that people give you to support progressive ideas. Basically, after reading the book, the next time someone tells you some new piece of evidence that supports progressive ideology, your reaction, if you’re rational, should be “I bet that’s BS.” After reading about what actually happened to Trayvon Martin and Michael Brown, the next time you hear about an innocent, unarmed black man being murdered by a white racist, your initial thought should be, “Yeah, I bet that’s not what happened.” Of course, initial media reports might turn out to be accurate, so don’t completely rule that out. But more likely they aren’t. Q: I guess that makes sense. Then why won’t that work on people who are already Woke? A: Basically because most of them have already adopted certain belief-system defenses that prevent them from revising their belief system. For example, they actually believe that it is morally wrong to question the woke worldview. And you can’t argue them out of that belief either, because they think it would be immoral for them to seriously entertain your arguments.

Tractate Ketuboth pg 2.  In places where the courts are in session on Monday and Thursday, a virgin must be married on Wednesday. Rashi says the reason is so that if he finds that she is not a virgin, he can come to court the next day, and perhaps witnesses will come to testify about what they might know. Tosphot asks on this from later on on page 9. There R' Elazar said if a person comes to court and says, ''I found my wife to not be a virgin,'' he is believed to forbid her to himself. Then pg. 9 b Abyee brings a proof to R' Elazar. He says we can see R' Elazar is right from the Mishna that says a virgin must be married on Wednesday. The point of Tosphot is that to Rashi he comes to court not because he is believed, but so that witnesses will come. And the question of Tosphot on Rashi is  that Abyee clearly see says that the Mishna is a proof to R' Elazar that he is believed, not that that we do not know whether to believe him or not, and so call witnesses. 

  I am unclear about what the question of Tosphot is. To R Elazar, the Mishna is clear. He is believed to forbid her to himself, but must come to court to bring witnesses in order to make her lose her ketubah. If Tosphot has a question on Rashi, it should be from the opinion  that he is believed even to make her lose her ketubah, and  thus there is no need for witnesses. I am  sure that Tosphot has a question on Rashi, but it is not from Abyee or R' Elazar, but rather from the opinion (of Rav Yehuda in the name of Shmuel and Rav Nahman) that the husband can both forbid his wife to himself and make her to lose the ketubah because a person does not take the trouble to prepare a wedding feast with the intention of ruining it afterwards. Based on that why would he need witnesses? 

I believe that Tosphot understands that Rashi is referring to a wife of a israeli, not the wife of a kohen. And thus Rashi means that since he is believed in the case of a wife of a kohen, then even in the case of the wife of a Israeli, he could come to the court and hope that witnesses would come to clarify the situation. [After all, R. Elazar meant that the husband is believed that he found her not to be a virgin only in the case of the wife of a kohen or a wife that was engaged before the age of three, but not wedded until she came of age.] And because Rashi means this, then Tosphot has his question that if Rashi would be right, then there is no proof from the Mishna even in the case of the wife of a kohen because even if he is not believed , he would still come to court in the hope that witnesses will come.

And thus the statement of Abyee  poses a question on Rashi because to Abyee, the Mishna is a proof to R' Elazar.

After all, if he is coming to court because he might find witnesses, then he might come to court in the case of the wife of a kohen also just to find witnesses. Why should we say that he is believed?  

  To put this more simply, Tosphot is asking this. The way Abyee understands the mishna, he is coming to court because he is believed, not becaue he is hoping for wwitnesses. What ever the case of the Mishna is, it is clear that he comes to court because his plea is believed. ___________________________________________________________________________________

כתובות דף ב.  In places where the courts are in session on Monday and Thursday, a virgin must be married on Wednesday. רש''י says the reason is so that if he finds that she is not a virgin, he can come to court the next day, and perhaps witnesses will come to testify about what they might know. תוספות asks on this from later on on page 9. There ר' אלעזר said if a person comes to court and says, ''I found my wife to not be a virgin,'' he is believed to forbid her to himself. Then בדף ט'  אביי brings a proof to ר' אלעזר . He says we can see ר' אלעזר is right from the משנה that says a virgin must be married on Wednesday. The point of תוספות is that to רש''י he comes to court not because he is believed, but so that witnesses will come. And the question of תוספות on רש''י is  that אביי clearly see says that the משנה is a proof to ר' אלעזר that he is believed, not that that we do not know whether to believe him or not, and so call witnesses. You can ask what the question of תוספות is? To ר' אלעזר, the משנה is clear. He is believed to forbid her to himself, but must come to court to bring witnesses in order to make her lose her כתובה. If תוספות has a question on רש''י, it should be from the opinion that he is believed even to make her lose her בתובה and  thus there is no need for witnesses. It seems to me that תוספות has a good question on רש''י but it is not from אביי or ר' אלעזר .  

I am  sure that תוספות has a question on רש''י, but it is not from אביי or ר' אלעזר, but rather from the opinion (ר' יהודה בשם שמואל) that the husband can both forbid his wife to himself and make her to lose the כתובה because a person does not take the trouble to prepare a wedding feast with the intention of ruining it afterwards. Based on that, why would he need witnesses? 

I believe that תוספות understands that רש''י is referring to a wife of a ישראלי, not the wife of a כהן. And thus רש''י means that since he is believed in the case of a wife of a כהן, then even in the case of the wife of a ישראלי, he could come to the court and hope that witnesses would come to clarify the situation. [After all, ר' אלעזר meant that the husband is believed that he found אשתו not to be a virgin only in the case of the wife of a כהן or a wife that was engaged before the age of three but not wedded until she came of age.] And because רש''י means this, then תוספות has his question that if רש''י would be right, then there is no proof from the משנה even in the case of the wife of a כהן because even if he is not believed , he would still come to court in the hope that witnesses will come. And thus the statement of אביי  poses a question on רש''י because to אביי, the משנה is a proof to ר' אלעזר.

After all, if he is coming to court because he might find witnesses, then he might come to court in the case of the wife of a כהן also just to find witnesses. Why should we say that he is believed?  

To put this more simply, תוספות is asking this. The way אביי understands the משנה, he is coming to court because he is believed, not becaue he is hoping for wwitnesses. What ever the case of the משנה is, it is clear that he comes to court becaue his טענה is believed. כתובות דף ב. במקומות בהם מתקיימים בתי הדין בימים שני וחמישי, בתולה חייבת להינשא ביום רביעי. רש''י אומר שהטעם הוא שאם ימצא שהיא לא בתולה יוכל לבוא למחרת לבית הדין ואולי יבואו עדים להעיד על מה שהם עשויים לדעת. תוספות שואלים על כך מעמוד ט' ע''א שם אמר ר' אלעזר שאם אדם בא לבית המשפט ואומר ''מצאתי שאשתי לא בתולה'', הוא נאמן לאוסרה לעצמו. ואז בדף ט' ע''ב אביי מביא הוכחה לר' אלעזר . הוא אומר שאנחנו יכולים לראות שר' אלעזר צודק מהמשנה שאומרת שבתולה חייבת להתחתן ביום רביעי. הטעם של תוספות הוא שלרש''י הוא בא לבית הדין לא בגלל שמאמינים לו, אלא כדי שיבואו עדים. ושאלת תוספות על רש''י היא שאבי ראה בבירור שהמשנה היא הוכחה לר' אלעזר שהוא נאמן, לא שאין אנו יודעים אם להאמין לו או לא, ולכן נקרא עדים. לא ברור לי מהי שאלת התוספות. לר' אלעזר המשנה ברורה. מאמינים שהוא אוסרה לעצמו, אבל חייב להגיע לבית המשפט (רב יהודה בשם שמואל) להביא עדים כדי לגרום לה לאבד את הכתובה שלה. אם יש לתוספות שאלה על רש''י, זו מדעת  שסובר שהוא נאמן אפילו שהיא תאבד את הכתובה, ובכך אין צורך לעדים. 

אני בטוח שיש לתוספות שאלה על רש''י, אבל זאת לא מאביי או מר' אלעזר, אלא מהדעה שהבעל יכול גם לאסור את אשתו על עצמו וגם לגרום לה לאבד את הכתובה בגלל שאדם לא טורח להכין סעודת חתונה מתוך כוונה להרוס אותה לאחר מכן. בהתבסס על זה, למה שהוא יצטרך עדים

אני מאמין שתוספות מבינים שרש''י מתייחס לאישה של ישראלי, לא לאשתו של כהן. ולפיכך רש''י משמע שמאחר שמאמנים לו במקרה של אשת כהן, אזי גם במקרה של אשת ישראלי יכול היה לבוא לבית הדין ולקוות שיבואו עדים לברר את המצב. [הרי ר' אלעזר התכוון שהבעל נאמן שמצא אשתו לא בתולה רק במקרה של אשת כהן או אישה שהתארסה לפני גיל שלוש אך לא נישאה עד שתבוא לגיל מתאים.] וכיון שזו כוונת רש''י, אזי לתוספות יש שאלתם שאם רש''י צודק, הרי אין הוכחה מהמשנה אפילו בעניין אשת כהן כי אפילו אם הוא לא נאמן, הוא עדיין יגיע לבית המשפט בתקווה שיבואו עדים. ולפיכך האמירה של אביי מעמידה שאלה על רש''י כי לאבי המשנה היא הוכחה לר' אלעזר

והרי אם הוא בא לבית דין כי הוא עלול למצוא עדים, אז הוא עשוי לבוא לבית הדין במקרה של אשת כהן גם רק כדי למצוא עדים. למה נגיד שמאמינים בו?

במילים פשוטות יותר, תוספות שואלים את זה. איך שאביי מבין את המשנה, הבעל מגיע לבית המשפט כי מאמינים לו, לא בגלל שהוא מקווה לעדים. לא משנה מה המקרה של המשנה, ברור שהוא מגיע לבית המשפט בגלל שטענה שלו נאמנת.

 za34 midi  [same piece in nwc] 

Gemara Nida 2

 Rav Isar Melzer [book Even Haazel] and Rav Shach {book Avi Ezri} disagree on how to solve a difficult Rambam, and yet both answers have problems with them. [ [Rav Meltzer was a teacher of Rav Shach in Slutzk. Later Rav Shach was a teacher in Kletzk in the yeshiva of the son in law of Rav Meltzer, i.e., Rav Aaron Kotler ]] I realized that both answers can work only if put together. Gemara Nida2. The Mishna says a person went into a mikve [pool] and it was found lacking the full volume, all the pure things which were handled [based on the  assumption that that mikve was okay] are impure. R Shimon says in a private domain they are in doubt. In a public domain they are pure. The Gemara asks from this law: ''a barrel of wine was separated in order to use it for separating truma, and was found to be sour. For three days, the wine that was fixed is ok. After that it is a doubt.'' R Hanina from Sura says the teaching about barrel is R Shimon. the reason for the sages (the first Tana) is that two Hazakot work together. That is the mikve is now lacking and the person that went into it was unclean. These hazakot [statuses] work together to defeat one hazaka [status] that the Mikve was ok until the minute it was found to be not okay. The Rambam holds by both laws, that of the Mikve, and that of the barrel even though the Gemara holds that both laws contradict each other. Rav Isar Meltzer points out that the mikve is different from the barrel. The only doubt in the case of the mikve is the person or things that went into it. The Mikve itself we know is not OK. So two Chazot can work together to say that what went into it is also not ok. But for the Barrel, we know at least some part of it is definitely truma. So it is a doubt, and we can not use two hazakot to make what was fixed by it  to be definitely not ok when it itself is a doubt. The problem with this answer is that  making the two laws not contradict each other can help the Rambam, but does not answer the fact that the Gemara holds both laws contradict. Rav Shach holds that the Rambam decided the Halacha like the second answer of the Gemara that ignores the issue of Hazaka and rather says the sages and R Shimon differ on how to learn from the beginning of tuma to the end or the opposite. Thus two hazakot against one is not the argument between the sages and R Shimon. So when the Rambam writes like the law of the Mishna about Mikve that what went into it is still unclean, that means it is a doubt. jut like the case of the barrel.  the problem is that the mishna and Rambam both write what went into the Mikve is unclean, not that it is a doubt. The answer to this is that in fact the Rambam did  decide the law like the second answer of the Gemara and both the Mishna on mikve and teaching on the barrel are both the sages, not R Shimon and that two hazakot can work only for the Mikve but not the barrel as Isaar Meltzer pointed out.

Might I add here a side note that I think that since these great roshei yeshiva are no longer with us, we ought to make it a point to learn the Avi Ezri of Rav Shach, the Even HaAzel of Rav Isar Meltzer. The Chidushim of Reb Aaron Kotler [of Kletzk] and Rav Shmuel Rozovski [Ponovitch]. i would recommend both learning in depth and also fast. but if for lack of time one can not do both then in depth is more important.--ie learn one whole section of any one of these books one day and then review it the next day and so on for a month. [If some day the ideas of reb shmuel berenbaum [rosh yeshiva of the mir in the usa] are ever printed then I recommend his ideas also]

Later note: After writing the above, I noticed that Rav Shach has a slightly different answer in Laws of Truma where he explains that two hazakot [statuses] always can only make a doubt. Thus the wine that was fixed by the wine in the barrel that became vinegar is only a doubt. [The two hazakot  are the hazaka of the wine being tevel and the hazaka of the barrel that is now vinegar. So we say that backwards in time, it was vinegar at the time it fixed the wine. But the unclean person that went into the mikve is definitely still unclean, because of two hazakot, and also that we learn from sota that a doubt is considered a certainty. That is, the law of sota helps to turn the doubt into a certainty. In this way, the Rambam still must  be going like the second answer in nida page 3 on the question posed on page 2.  ] 

______________________________________________________________________________

 

רב איסר מלצר and רב שך disagree on how to solve a difficult רמב''ם and yet both answers have problems with them. I realized that both answers can work only if put together. גמרא נידה  דף ב' ע''ב . The משנה says a person went into a מקוה  and it was found lacking the full volume, all the pure things which were handled based on the  assumption that that מקוה was okay are impure. ר' שמעון says in a רשות היחיד they are in doubt. In a רשות הרבים they are pure. The גמרא asks from this law: ''a חבית of wine was separated in order to use it for separating תרומה, and was found to be vinegar. For three days, the wine that was fixed is ok. After that it is a doubt.'' ר חנינא from סורא says the teaching about חבית is ר' שמעון. The reason for the חכמים ( the first תנא) is that two חזקות work together. That is the מקוה is now lacking and the person that went into it was unclean. These חזקות work together to defeat one חזקה that the מקוה was ok until the minute it was found to be not okay. The רמב''ם  holds by both laws, that of the מקוה, and that of the חבית even though the גמרא holds that both laws contradict each other. רב איסר מלצר points out that the מקוה is different from the חבית. The only doubt in the case of the מקוה is the person or things that went into it. The מקווה itself we know is not OK. So two חזקות can work together to say that what went into it is also not ok. But for the חבית, we know at least some part of it is definitely תרומה. So it is a doubt, and we can not use two חזקות to make what was fixed by it  to be definitely not ok when it itself is a doubt. The problem with this answer is that  making the two laws not contradict each other can help the רמב''ם, but does not answer the fact that the גמרא holds both laws contradict. רב שך holds that the רמב''ם decided the הלכה like the second answer of the גמרא that ignores the issue of חזקה and rather says the תנא קמא and ר' שמעון differ on how to learn from סוטה. Thus two חזקות against one (תרתי לריעתא) is not the   argument between the תנא קמא and ר' שמעון. So when the רמב''ם writes like the law of the משנה about מקוה that what went into it is still unclean, that means it is a doubt, just like the case of the חבית.  The problem is that the משנה  and רמב''ם both write what went into the מקוה is unclean, not that it is in doubt. The answer to this is that in fact the רמב''ם did  decide the law like the second answer of the גמרא, and both the משנה on מקוה and teaching on the חבית are both the תנא קמא, not ר' שמעון and that two חזקות can work only for the מקוה, but not the חבית as רב איסר מלצר pointed out. so what went into the מקוה הוא טמא but wine that מתוקן by the חבית is in doubt. 

Later note: After writing the above, I noticed that רב שך has a slightly different answer in הלכות תרומה where he explains that two חזקות [statuses] always can only make a doubt. Thus the wine that was fixed by the wine in the barrel that became vinegar is only a doubt. [The two חזקות  are the חזקה of the wine being טבל and the חזקה of the barrel that is now vinegar. So we say that backwards in time, it was vinegar at the time it fixed the wine. But the unclean person that went into the מקוה is definitely still unclean, because of two חזקות, and also that we learn from סוטה that a doubt is considered a certainty. That is, the law of סוטה helps to turn the doubt into a certainty. In this way, the רמב''ם still must  be going like the second answer in נידה דף ג' ע''א  on the question posed on דף ב' ע''ב.

__________________________________________________________________________________

רב איסר מלצר (ה' אישות פרק י' ) ורב שך (ה' סוטה פרק א' ה''ג) חלוקים בדעתם כיצד לפתור רמב''ם קשה ובכל זאת בשתי התשובות יש בעייות. הבנתי ששתי התשובות יכולות לעבוד רק אם הן משולבות יחד. גמרא נידה דף ב' ע''ב . המשנה אומרת שאדם נכנס למקוה שנמצא חסר נפח מלא, כל הדברים הטהורים שטופלו על סמך ההנחה שהמקוה הזו הייתה בסדר הם לא טהורים. ר' שמעון אומר ברשות היחיד שהם בספק. ברשות הרבים הם טהורים. שואלת הגמרא מדין זה: ''חבית של יין הופרד כדי להשתמש בו להפרדת תרומה, ונמצא שהוא חומץ. במשך שלושה ימים, היין שתוקן בסדר. אחר כך ספק.'' ר חנינא מסורא אומר שההוראה על חבית היא ר' שמעון. הסיבה לחכמים (תנא הראשון) היא ששתי חזקות פועלות יחד. זה מקוה שחסרה עכשיו והאדם שנכנס אליה היה טמא. החזקות האלה פועלות יחד כדי להביס חזקה אחת שהמקוה הייתה בסדר עד לרגע שנמצא שהיא לא בסדר. הרמב''ם קובע כשני הדינים, זה של מקוה, ושל החבית למרות שהגמרא סובר ששני הדינים סותרים זה את זה. רב איסר מלצר מציין כי מקוה שונה מהבית. הספק היחיד במקרה של מקוה הוא האדם או הדברים שנכנסו אליו. המקווה עצמה שאנו מכירים אינה בסדר. אז שני חזקות יכולים לעבוד יחד כדי להגיד שמה שנכנס לזה גם לא בסדר. אבל עבור החבית, אנחנו יודעים שלפחות חלק ממנו הוא בהחלט תרומה. אז זה ספק, ואנחנו לא יכולים להשתמש בשתי חזקות כדי לגרום למה שתוקן על ידי זה להיות בהחלט לא בסדר כאשר זה עצמו הוא ספק. הבעיה בתשובה זו היא שעשיית שני ההלכות לא סותרות זו את זו יכולה לעזור לרמב''ם, אבל לא עונה על כך שהגמרא מחזיק ששתי ההלכות סותרות. רב שך סובר שהרמב''ם הכריע את ההלכה כמו התשובה השניה של הגמרא שמתעלם מסוגיית החזקה, ואדרבה אומר התנא קמא ור' שמעון חלוקים כיצד ללמוד מסוטה. לפיכך שתי חזקות כנגד אחת (תרתי לריעתא) אינו הוויכוח בין התנא קמא לר' שמעון. אז כשהרמב''ם כותב כמו דין המשנה על מקוה שמה שנכנס אליו עדיין טמא, זה אומר שזה ספק, ממש כמו התנא קמא. הבעיה היא שהמשנה והרמב''ם כותבים מה שנכנס למקוה טמא, לא שיש ספק. התשובה לכך היא שלמעשה הרמב''ם כן הכריע את הדין כמו התשובה השניה של הגמרא, וגם המשנה על מקוה וגם הוראה על החבית הן התנא קמא, לא ר' שמעון, וששתי חזקות יכולות לעבוד רק עבור מקוה, אבל לא את החבית כפי שציין רב איסר מלצר. אז מה נכנס לקוה הוא טמא, אבל היין המתוקן על ידי החבית שמוטל בספק הוא גם ספק.

הערה מאוחרת: לאחר כתיבת האמור לעיל, שמתי לב שלרב שך יש תשובה מעט שונה בהלכות תרומה. שם הוא מסביר ששתי חזקות [סטטוסים] תמיד יכולים רק להטיל ספק. לפיכך היין שנתקן על ידי היין בחבית שהפך לחומץ הוא רק בספק. [שתי החזקות הן חזקה של היין שהוא טבל וחזקה של החבית שהיא עכשיו חומץ. אז אנחנו אומרים שאחור בזמן, זה היה חומץ בזמן שהוא תיקן את היין. אבל הטמא שנכנס למקוה בודאי עדיין טמא, משום שתי חזקות, שלכן אנו למדים מסוטה שספק נחשב וודאי. כלומר, דין סוטה עוזר להפוך את הספק לוודאות. 

באופן זה, הרמב''ם עדיין ודאי הולך כמו התשובה השניה בנידה דף ג' ע''א בשאלה המובאת בדף ב' ע''ב.

 za33 midi  za33 nwc

music file za 32

za32 midi    za32 in nwc format   [files go from ''a'' to ''z'' but after ''z'' start again with ''za''. each letter should have about a 100 files. but many were not put on the internet. and many were lost. some early files had names, but after some time they got just a letter.  ]

 Rav Yehuda said (Ketuboth page 76) in a case when one who owns an ox exchanges the  ox with a donkey and then goes and finds the donkey dead, that the owner of the donkey has to bring proof the donkey was alive at the time of the sale. Rami said that the person in whose domain the problem was found has to bring proof. All the rishonim except the RIF and Rambam (Laws of Sales 20) hold that the point of Rami is the owner of the ox has to bring proof because the finding occurred after the exchange was made. However the Rambam holds even to Rami, the owner of the donkey must bring proof. Rav Shach said the reason is that when a sale is made, it is incumbent on the seller the verify that the object he is selling is the object being bought. But this can not help to answer the problem because in the very next halacha, the Rambam brings a case where an animal was sold and it turned out to be traif. There the buyer has to bring proof. If Rav Shach would be correct, then the seller would have to bring proof. Therefore to me it seems that Rav Isar Meltzer was correct when he said the reason the owner of the donkey must bring proof because the donkey has not yet entered the domain of the buyer. The Rambam did not say the "possession" of the buyer but rather the "domain" of the buyer. This is different from the animal that is traif that has already come into the domain of the buyer. 

רב יהודה said בשם שמואל in a case when one who owns an ox exchanges the  ox with a donkey, and then goes and finds the donkey dead, that the owner of the donkey has to bring proof the donkey was alive at the time of the sale. רמי said that the person in whose domain the problem was found has to bring proof. All the ראשונים except the רמב'ם hold hold that the point of רמי is the owner of the ox has to bring proof because the finding occurred after the exchange was made. However the רמב'ם holdS הלכות מכירה כ' הלכה י''ד וט''ו even to רמי, the owner of the donkey must bring proof. רב שך said the reason is that when a sale is made it is incumbent on the seller the verify that the object he is selling is the object being bought. but this can not help to answer the problem because in the very next הלכה the רמב'ם brings a case where an animal was sold and it turned out to be טריף. There the buyer has to bring proof. If רב שך would be correct, the the seller would have to bring proof. Therefore to me it seems that רב איסר מלצר בספרו אבן האזל was correct when he said the reason the owner of the donkey must bring proof because the donkey has not yet entered the domain of the buyer. The רמב'ם did not say the "possession" of the buyer, but rather the "domain" of the buyer. This is different from the animal that is טריף that has already come into the domain of the buyer. 

כתובות ע''ו ע''ב

רב יהודה אמר בשם שמואל במקרה שבו מי שבבעלותו שור מחליף את השור בחמור, ואז הולך ומוצא את החמור מת, שעל בעל החמור להביא הוכחה שהחמור היה חי בזמן המכירה. רמי אמר שהאדם שבתחום שלו נמצאה הבעיה צריך להביא הוכחות. כל הראשונים מלבד הרי''ף והרמב"ם גורסים שנקודת רמי הוא בעל השור צריך להביא הוכחה כי הממצא התרחש לאחר ביצוע ההחלפה. אולם הרמב"ם מחזיק הלכות מכירה כ' הלכה י''ד וט''ו אפילו לרמי, בעל החמור חייב להביא הוכחה. רב שך אמר שהסיבה היא שכאשר מתבצעת מכירה זה מוטל על המוכר לוודא שהחפץ שהוא מוכר הוא החפץ הנקנה. אבל זה לא יכול לעזור לענות על הבעיה כי בהלכה הבאה הרמב"ם מביא מקרה שבו נמכרה חיה והתברר שהיא טריף. שם הקונה צריך להביא הוכחה. אם רב שך יהיה נכון, המוכר יצטרך להביא הוכחה. לפיכך נראה לי שצדק רב איסר מלצר כשאמר הטעם שעל בעל החמור להביא הוכחה כי טרם נכנס החמור לתחום הקונה. הרמב"ם לא אמר "חזקתו" של הקונה אלא "רשות" של הקונה. זה שונה מהחיה שהיא טריף שכבר נכנסה לתחום של הקונה

      za31 midi           za31 nwc format