הרמב''ן אומר שיש הוכחה קלה שתחילתו בפשיעה וסופו באונס חייב אינו חל על מקרה שבו ההתחלה היא בשמירה פחותה, ואחר כך בא אונס. ההוכחה שהוא מביא בדף צ''ג בבא מציעא היא הברייתא בדף מ''ה בבא קמא ארבע באים במקום הבעלים: שואל, שוכר, שומר בתשלום ושומר ללא תשלום. אם הוזהר שור שלוש פעמים, והולך והורג מישהו, נהרג השור, ושלושת מיני השומרים משלמים כופר ומחזירים ערך השור לבעלים חוץ מהשומר ללא תשלום (שלא מחזיר כלום לבעלים של השור). הגמרא החליטה שהברייתא מתייחסת למקרה שבו כל הארבעה שמרו על השור עם שמירה מינימלית. וכן, הגמרא אומר שלפי ר' אלעזר יש לשחוט בהמה שכבר הוכחה כמסוכנת והמשנה שלנו מתייחסת למקרה כזה. מצד אחד, אני יכול להבין את הרמב''ן כי השומר שכר עשה כמות מינימלית של שמירה אבל כל השומרים היו צריכים לעשות את השמירה הראויה. כך שרק השומר ללא תשלום אינו מחויב לשלם. עם זאת, נראה שקשה להבין. הסיבה שאני אומר את זה היא שחוק ההתחלה בפשיעה וסופו באונס חייב הכוונה לשומר בתשלום (שומר שכר). זה לא יכול להיות השומר חינם כי בכל מקרה הוא לא חייב במקום שעשה שמירה מינימלית. אז זה חייב להתייחס לשומר בתשלום. אבל הוא חייב בברייתא אף על פי שעשה שמירה מינימלית. אז איך אתה יכול להחליט ממקרה שהוא חייב בתשלום, למרות שעשה שמירה מינימלית, למקרה שגם עשה שמירה מינימלית ובכל זאת להחליט שהוא לא חייב

The Ramban says that there is a light proof that the beginning with neglect and the end by force which is obligated in damage does not apply to a case in which the beginning is with minimal guarding, and then later cames force. The proof he brings on page 93 of Bava Metzia is the teaching on page 45 in Bava Kama, "Four come in place of the owner: a borrower, renter, paid guard and an unpaid guard. If an ox has been warned three times, and goes and kills someone, the ox is killed and 3 kinds of guard pay the fixed penalty and pay back to value of the ox to the owner except for the unpaid guard who does not pay back. The Gemara decided the braita is taking about a case where all four guarded the animal with minimal guarding. Also, the gemara says that according to R. Elazar, that an animal that has already proven dangerous must be slaughtered, and our mishna is referring to such a case. On one hand, I can see the point of the Ramban because the paid guard did a minimal amount of guarding, but all should have done the proper amount of guarding. so only the unpaid guard is not obligated to pay. However, it seems hard to understand. The reason I say this is the entire law of the "beginning by by neglect and the end with force is obligated to pay" is referring to the paid guard. It cannot be the unpaid one because in any case he is not obligated where he did minimal guarding. so, it must refer to the paid guard. But he is obligated in the braita even though he did minimal guarding. so how can you decide from a case where he is obligated to pay even though he did minimal guarding to a case where he also did minimal guarding and yet say he is not obligated.______________________________________________ The רמב''ן says that there is a slight proof that תחילתו בפשיעה וסופו באונס חייב does not apply to a case in which the beginning is with שמירה פחותה, and then later came force. The proof he brings on page צ''ג of בבא מציעא is the ברייתא on page מ''ה in בבא קמא four come in place of the owner: a borrower, renter, paid guard and an unpaid guard. If an ox has been warned three times, and goes and kills someone, the ox is killed, and the four kinds of guard pay the כופר and pay back to value of the ox to the owner. That is all three except for the unpaid guard who does not pay back. Theגמרא decided הברייתא is taking about a case where all four guarded the animal with minimal guarding שמירה פחותה . Also, theגמרא says that according to ר' אלעזר that an animal that has already proven dangerous must be slaughtered and our משנה is referring to such a case. On one hand, I can see the point of the רמב''ן because the שומר שכר did a minimal amount of guarding but all שומריםshould have done the proper amount of guarding. so only the unpaid guard is not obligated to pay. however, it seems hard to understand. The reason I say this is the law of the תחילתו בפשיעה וסופו באונס חייב is referring to the paid guard שומר שכר. It cannot be the שומר חינם because in any case he is not obligated where he did minimal guarding. so, it must refer to the paid guard. But he is obligated in the ברייתא even though he did minimal guarding. so how can you decide from a case where he is obligated to pay, even though he did minimal guarding, to a case where he also did minimal guarding and yet say he is not obligated.

בבא קמא דף י''ח וכ''ב עם הכלב, הכיכר והפחם.

יש כמה שאלות שאני רוצה להעלות בנושא בבא קמא דף י''ח וכ''ב עם הכלב, הכיכר והפחם. דבר אחד הוא שאותה גמרא הולכת הלוך ושוב מדוע חובת שריפת הערימה היא חצי נזק לתנא של המשנה ותשלום מלא לפי ר' אלעזר. זה מתחיל שזה בגלל צרורות, ואז הולך לקרן של שור תם (שמתפרע) (קרן התם) ברשות הניזק, וחוזר לצרורות. אבל אז בגלל שרבא יש שאלה לגבי אזהרה על צרורות (אבנים קטנות), הגמרא צריכה להסיק שהמקרה הוא של קרן התם ברשות הניזק. אז למה בהמשך דף כ''ב, מניח הגמרא שהחיוב הוא בגלל אש? אולי תרצה לענות שהחובה לא צריכה להיות בגלל אש כי הכלב הוא שעושה את זה, לא אדם. אבל אז למה אחר כך להגיד שזה בגלל אש? אולי אתה יכול להגיד שזה בגלל ריש לקיש שמחזיק בחובת האש היא על האדם שבבעלותו האש. אז אולי הפתרון לבעיה שלנו כאן הוא שבעל הכלב חייב על שביל הפחם על הערימה בגלל קרן (שור תם) (כשהכלב גרר את הפחם על הערימה), ועל שריפת הערימה שתשלם בעל הפחם? לדעת תוספות חובה משותפת לבעל הכלב ולבעל הפחם

There are a few questions I would like to bring up about the subject in Bava Kama page 18 and 22 with the dog, loaf and coal. One thing is that that Gemara goes back and forth as to why the obligation for the burning of the stack is 1/2 to the tana of the Mishna and full payment according to R. Elazar. It starts out that it is because of pebbles, then goes the horn of a tame ox (that goes wild), and goes back to pebbles. But then because of Rava having a question about warning on pebbles, the Gemara has to conclude that the case is in fact that of a tame ox. So then why later on page 22, the Gemara assumes the obligation is because of fire? You might want to answer that the obligation ought not be because of fire because it is the dog that is doing it, not a person. But then, why later say it is because of fire? Maybe you might say it is because of Reish Lakish who holds the obligation of fire is on the person that owns the fire. So perhaps the solution to our problem here is that the owner of the dog is obligated because of horn of a tame ox on the path of the coal (when the dog dragged the coal over the stack), and for the burning of the stack that will be paid by the owner of the coal? And then it makes sense to say that the owner of the dog is not obligated for the burning of the stack, only the path of the coal, . This I think is close to Tosphot that the obligation is shared by the owner of the dog and the owner of the coal. ______________________________________________________________________________________ There are a few questions I would like to bring up about the subject inבבא קמא page י''ח and כ''ב with the dog, loaf and coal. One thing is that that Gemara goes back and forth as to why the obligation for the burning of the stack is 1/2 to the תנא of the משנה and full payment according to ר’ אלעזר. It starts out that it is because of צרורות, then goes the horn of a tame ox (that goes wild) קרן התם ברשות הניזק, and goes back to צרורות. But then because of רבא having a question about warning on צרורות (אבנים קטנות), the גמרא has to conclude that the case is that of a קרן התם ברשות הניזק. So then why later on page כ''ב, the גמרא assumes the obligation is because of fire? You might want to answer that the obligation ought not be because of fire because it is the dog that is doing it, not a person. But then, why later say it is because of fire? Maybe you might say it is because of ריש לקיש who holds the obligation of fire is on the person that owns the fire. So perhaps the solution to our problem here is that the owner of the dog is obligated because of horn of a שור תם on the path of the coal (when the dog dragged the coal over the stack), and for the burning of the stack that will be paid by the owner of the coal? And then it makes sense to say that the owner of the dog is not obligated for the burning of the stack, only the path of the coal. This I think is close to תוספות that the obligation is shared by the owner of the dog and the owner of the coal.

My father-in-law (when he got to America) was totally penniless after being in the Russian Gulag system for years

The father of Trump gave to my father-in-law a job and a place to live when he got to America totally penniless after being in the Russian Gulag system for years. My father-in-law might have bee accepted into the Red Army (he was Jewish), but he was born into an area at the time was registered as German, so they sent him to the Gulag, while his brother (the borders had shifted) was registered a being born in Poland). In fact he was in the Red Army (and killed in the war). My father-in-law, Bill Finn [he had changed his name when he got to America. He wa finkelstein] was talented. He rose to the head worker of the work camp because of his ability to fix just about anything thtr got broke. When the war ended, he finally got to the USA, and met his future wife Rita Finn, my mother-in-law. she was born in Germany proper -Berlin, but had escaped by the Kinder-Transport to England where he received lodging with a family that was kind to take her in, but also that abused her in ways I would rather not explain. That put in her a deep hatred of men for the rest of her life, but did not stop her from marrying my father-in-law, and bearing three fine daughters. (she inserted that hatred into her daughter who became my wife. My wife was okay,-- until she was not ). I might say that my own family history is a lot less colorful. My grandparents escaped to America when they saw have things were going under the Russian czar Alexander with the pogroms and etc.…. So, my parents grew up as honest, loyal, hard-working Americans. My dad went to Cal Tech to get his degree in Mechanical Engineering, and from then on worked mostly in Aero-space, the U-2, the InfraRed Telescope for the Army,(note article in Lifw Magazine August 1954, pg 25) and in satellite communication for SDI. He made an extra fine camera for the U-2 which was much more accurate that the regular one, but had the disadvantage of being bulky so was not used regularly.

This is one of the amazing essays that Dr. Kelley Ross has on his web site, and I think that I ought to highly recommend it even though I never got a chance to get through this theory as thoroughly as I would have liked. This approach of Dr. Ross has never taken hold is because it has a terrible pedigree. First, it starts with Jacob Fries who was an anti semitic. But he had one important insight that corrected a lot in Kant’s Philosophy. That is you need to start from somewhere. Logical forms alone cannot provide a starting basis for a a-prior knowledge. Then, it gets up to Leonard Nelson who improved this approach a lot Finally this gets up to Kelley Ross who has the insight that you have to add the insight of Karl Poper that any theory to be true, needs to be able to be refuted by evidence. That means, that even though knowledge start with immediate non-intuitive knowledge, it can be refuted by further investigation. Just like Newton’ Gravity and Maxwell’ Electrodynamics conflicted, until Einstein decided that Maxwell was right and Newton was an approximation. I am not anywhere near the great depth of thinking of any of these philosophers and yet I still have my own two cents to add here. I feel the conflict between Hegel and Fries is sad. Each one had some very great insights- and some shockingly stupid ideas—just like all of us. (I have been astoundingly and amazingly wrong and stupid. somehow, I imagine that is not an inaccurate description of a lot of us) Hegel thought the idiotic idea of Gothe about color d superior to obvious evidence of Newton’ theory. He was ignored by all empirical scient of his time for being really stubbornly wrong. Yet Frie had hi own hare of dumb idea. A pamphlet recommending the extermination of the Jews? I guess he would not have been a convivial dinner companion. On the other hand, Hegel realized that Kant was on to something when he came up with this triad scheme (that nowadays is thought of a thesis antithesis and aufhaben] (German nationalism Hegel thought was a dumb joke and even coined a phrase for it) but Fries was also right that reason ha to tart with some any kind of axion. You have to put your foot down somewhere in order to be proven right or wrong. But if you change, then you can never be proven wrong-even to yourself. You will just convince yourself, you never meant what you meant to say. It shock me until today that I have never hear of anyone who realized that Hegel simply using Plotinus’s: Good, Logos, Being in reverse order

There is something odd going on with the international date line. I saw that the Radvaz deals with this question. He first was asked if it is one period in time everywhere, - and he says no. Because the first shabat was in the Sinai desert. Therefore, it is to each individual according to his place. And then he brings the question of where the day starts, and he brings the same sources as the Chazon Ish, the Kuzari and the seder Olam who say it starts in the far east ( after the end of the continent, not in the middle). so everything is clear. It does not start in the exact opposite of Jerusalem, but rather somewhere in the middle of the Pacific Ocean . To me this means everything is clear. But the Chazon Ish held a different day that what is set by the international date line. He starts the day exactly opposite Jerusalem and he says he based this on the Kuzari and seder Olam. To me it seems that if the middle of longitude is in Greenwich Mean Time (GMT), then the date line is in the middle of the Pacific Ocean, and that the day starts at the very far end of the far east (Just like the Goyim say). But take a look at a map. If you assume Jerusalem is in the middle, and the day starts on the exact opposite side, then the date line is in the middle of Asia and then yom kipur comes out a different day. Then, Rav Isar Zalman Metlzar said, “The Chazon Ish was wrong.” The complaint that the Chazon Ish said about this was that Rav Izar Meltzar did not write this in his book on the Rambam. But if you look at the introduction to his book, the Even HaAzael, you will see that Rav Meltzar said openly that he did not include in his book the ideas that he said the yeshiva. The book is focused only on the Rambam. The fact that an important decision was left out means nothing. i also saw in the radvaz an issue that occurred to me --the problem of having the ketubah written and signed before the actual wedding-that is a document that is able to be collected on before the date of it time when it is valid in fact. Thet ketubah not valid. I did not read and learn the whole answer of the radvaz in depth, but years ago I decided that since my own ketutbah was written and signed in such a way it was not valid and wrote another one for my wife