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Conversations of Rav Nachman of Breslov #76. Also see the teaching: "All who accept on themselves the yoke of Torah, the yoke of government and the yoke of flesh and blood are removed from him."

I have a few approaches to learning that I would like to recommend. sometimes one approach seems best and other times another. One way I mentioned in the Conversations of Rav Nachman of Breslov #76 to say the words and go on. Even if one does not understand immediately he will eventually understand when he goes on to the end of the book and then reviews it many times. This I found helpful not just in Gemara but also in some of the important commentaries on the Talmud, like Rav Shach' Avi Ezri and Rav Isar Meltzer; Even Haazel. I also have used this method in math and physics. another method was low methodical saying the words of every page or even every sentence forwards and backwards and in fact that method helped me get though my course at Polytechnic Institute of NYU. Another method is what is in fact practiced in the secular world of listening to lectures by experts in the subject. That one is probably the best since it really was the reason for any success at Polytechnic and also at the Mir in NY where I heard classes and lectures by Reb Shmuel Berenbaum. I highly doubt if I had been able to get anywhere in these subjects without listening to the experts. Study alone at home was helpful in getting ready to absorb the message, but the real quality learning was from listening to lectures. Can you imagine if I had been able to play the violin by learning books? Obviously not. It had to be by learning from the best. on. Even though this approach to learning is effective in Torah, Math and Physics, still i would like to place a special emphasis on the Mishna: All who accept on themselves the yoke of Torah, the yoke of government and the yoke of people are removed from him. My learning partner (David Bronson mentioned to me the importance of this teaching.)

Bava Metzia page 2a, 3a, 37b. Rambam Laws of two people arguing in court ch 9, law 7. Laws of Robery ch four, law 10.

I was at the sea and on the way back it occurred to me a kind of clarity in the approach of rav shach in the rambam. The sign I use to remember this is GMT [Greenwich Meridian Time] Gezela (theft), mechira (stealing) and tofsim (holding). [The case of theft is one wants to give back an object that he stole, but does not know from which one of two people he stole it. The case of buying is one sold an object to two people and does not remember to which one of them. The case of holding is two people are holding an object, and each one says, "It belongs to me." In each case you divide the value of the object.] These are the three cases the Rambam says one divides. The case where you do not say this is in the case of holding an object for two people, and it is not known which one owns it. There you say the part that is argued about should stay in its place. The Rambam does not make the sort of difference of the Ri Migash. [If both are holding it, they divide it, but if not, it stays in its place.] The difference according to Rav Shach is that when they are certain, they divide the object. And you can see that goes according to the idea of the Gemara and brought in Tosphot that what is in the hands of a person is assumed to belong to him. But that certainly can not be the case if he himself is in doubt. Rather, it is assumed to belong to him when he says, ‘’ It belongs to me for sure.’’ And, in fact, in the cases where each is holding it and in the case of a sale, they are certain. Only the case of theft you have to say they divide when they are certain, and it stays in its place when they are in doubt. [This would answer the contradiction between the Rambam and the Gemara. The Rambam says they divide and the Gemara on page 37b says “It stays in its place.”] The question that this idea would not answer is the case of holding an object for two people. There each is certain, and you say its stays in its place. I imagine this is the reason that Rav Shmuel Rozovski says the opposite i.e., the case where you divide is because of a doubt, and that there comes the laws money that is in doubt stays in its place as the R’’an suggests. But what would be the difference between theft and a deposit if both are certain and neither is holding it and yet the case of theft you divide and the deposit stays put? I can answer somewhat like the gemara says how ca you compare theft with a deposit? the case of theft is such that there is no reason to leave the object in the hands of he who stole it. Even if there is no proof for either side and even if one is lying and even if the division can’t be correct, still you give it to them both a and they divide it between themselves. (That is not the same as when the court itself divides the value in half and gives a half to both parties.) But in the case of a deposit both gave their object to him by their own volition. Now there is no way of knowing to whom belong the part that is argued over, therefore it stays in its place. That is because it is where the actual owner put it. Until proof is brought, that is where it stays. __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ I was at the sea and on the way back it occurred to me a kind of clarity in the approach of רב שך in the רמב''ם. The sign I use to remember this is GMT [Greenwich Meridian Time] Gezela (theft), mechira (stealing) and tofsim (holding). These are the three caseS the רמב''ם says one divides. The case where you do not say this is in the case of holding aפקדון for two people and it is not known which one owns it. There you say the part that is argued about should stay in its place. The רמב''ם does not make the sort of difference of the ר''י מיגש. [If both are holding it, they divide it, but if not, it stays in its place.] Even though the רמב''ם does not mention the idea of the גמרא of where there is definitely a liar, nor the idea of the division might be correct it, still he might hold with these ideas as I will mention soon. But the main difference according to רב שך is that when they are certain, they divide the object. And you can see that goes according to the idea of the גמרא and brought in תוספות that what is in the hands of a person is assumed to belong to him. But that can certainly not be the case if he himself is in doubt. Rather, it is assumed to belong to him when it says, ‘’ It belongs to me for sure.’’ And, in fact, in the cases where each is holding it and in the case of a sale, they are certain. Only the case of theft you have to say they divide when they are certain, and it stays in its place when they are in doubt. [This would answer the contradiction between the רמב''ם and the גמרא. The רמב''ם says they divide and the גמרא on page ל''ז ע''בsays “It stays in its place.”] The question that this idea would not answer the case of holding an object for two people. there each is certain and you say its stays in its place. I imagine this is the reason that רב שמואל רוזובסקי says the opposite i.e., the case where you divide is because of a doubt and that there comes the law המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיהas the ר''ן suggests. But רב שך can answer that you divide when they are certain and also because the law what is in the hands of a person is assumed to belong to him and like the גמרא says the division might be true and there is not a liar for a certainty. But in the case of holding an object for two people, even though each one is certain, but neither is holding it and there is a liar for sure and the division can not be correct. __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ בבא מציעא ב' ע''א ג' ע''א ל''ז ע''ב רמב''ם טוען ונטען פרק ט' הלכה ז', גזילה פרק ד' חלכה י יש שלושת המקרים שהרמב''ם אומרכל אחד מחלק.[[המקרה של גזלה הוא שרוצה להחזיר חפץ שגנב, אבל לא יודע מאיזה אחד משני אנשים הוא גנב אותו. במקרה של קנייה הוא מכר חפץ לשני אנשים ואינו זוכר למי מהם. המקרה של תופסים הוא שני אנשים מחזיקים חפץ וכל אחד אומר "זה שייך לי". בכל מקרה אתה מחלק את הערך של האובייקט]] המקרה שבו אתה לא אומר זאת הוא במקרה של החזקת פיקדון לשני אנשים ולא ידוע למי שייך. שם אתה אומר שהחלק שמתווכחים עליו צריך להישאר במקומו. הרמב''ם אינו עושה את סוג ההבדל של הר''י מיגש. [אם שניהם מחזיקים בו, מחלקים אותו, אבל אם לא, הוא נשאר במקומו.] אף על פי שהרמב''ם לא מזכיר את רעיון הגמרא איפה בהחלט יש שקרן, וגם לא את רעיון שהחלוקה עשויה להיות נכונה, ובכל זאת הוא עשוי להחזיק ברעיונות האלה כפי שאציין בקרוב. אבל עיקר ההבדל לפי רב שך הוא שכשהם בטוחים מחלקים את החפץ. ותוכל לראות שזה הולך כרעיון הגמרא והביא בתוספות שמה שיש ביד אדם שייך לו. אבל זה בהחלט לא יכול להיות המקרה אם הוא עצמו בספק. אדרבא, מניחים שזה שייך לו כשאומר ''זה שייך לי בוודאות'' ולמעשה, במקרים שכל אחד מחזיק בו ובמקרה של מכירה, הם בטוחים. רק במקרה של גניבה יש לומר שהם מחלקים כשהם בטוחים, וזה נשאר במקומו כשהם בספק. [זה יענה על הסתירה בין הרמב''ם לגמרא. הרמב''ם אומר שהם מחלקים והגמרא בדף ל''ז ע''ב אומר "נשאר במקומו".] השאלה שרעיון זה לא יענה במקרה של החזקת חפץ לשני אנשים. שם כל אחד בטוח ואתה אומר שהוא נשאר במקומו. אני מתאר לעצמי שזאת הסיבה שרב שמואל רוזובסקי אומר את ההיפך כלומר, המקרה שבו אתה מחלק הוא בגלל ספק וששם מגיע החוק המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה כמו שהר''ן מציע אני מבין שזה לא בדיוק מה שרב שך אומר, (הוא משווה הרמב''ם עם הר''י מיגש שהעיקר תלוי באוחזים) אבל אני עדיין סומך מ על הרעיון הבסיסי שלו שאתה מחלק כששניהם בטוחים. אבל אני יכול לראות מה קבע הרב שמואל רוזובסקי [שמחלקים כששניהם בספק] כי הוא סומך על הרעיון של רב חיים מבריסק שצריכים לקיים ''החזרת החפץ'', מה שיכול להיות אם שני הצדדים מוטלים בספק, אך לא היכן שאחד משקר

A complaint about Hegel is that he idolizes the state and detracts from the importance and significance of the individual. But this critique seems to me to be unfair because his general approach across the board is that nothing has reality except in so far as it corresponds to its true concept. And so one might ask ''what is the true idea of a state? Hegel sensed this and said that “the USA is the state of the future,” meaning that its principles corresponded most closely with the ideal state. See the essay of Kaufman about Hegel. On the other hand the approach of Leonard Nelson and Kelley Ross is also important as to answering the problem of how knowledge is possible as different and my point here is that Hegel is better understood as a philosopher, not a political activist. And if he was advocating anything it certainly was not the Prussian state as historical evidence shows but rather the English and later the American model. [see the cambridge book on hegel where different authors explain different aspects of hegel.]

za51 midi same piece in nwc format

the beginning of Bava Metzia [and the answer of Shmuel Rozovski, the rosh yeshiva of Ponovitch before Rav Shach.]

I have not been writing about the beginning of Bava Metzia because I see there are a few different approaches to solve the conundrum of why in the begining you have two people holding onto a garment that you divide, while in a case in Bava Metzia 37a you have cases of a deposit and theft where there is one case where you say the object being argued over should be left in neither’s possession, and in another case you say nothing and the parties decide it between themselves. The main approaches to solve this mystery are Rav Shach, Rav Isar Meltzer, Rav Chaim of Brisk and Rav Shmuel Rozovski. Reb Chaim and Rav Shmuel Rozovski are very similar in approach. Rav Shach has radical new approach in which he explains the position of the Rambam as being based on the idea that the case in the beginning of Bava Metzia is they divide because you say that "What is in one's possession is assumed to belong to him," without needing any further proof. Rav Isar Meltzar has a new approach to the idea of "derara demomona" by which he solves these problems. Some of the major problems come from the Rambam, but there are two arguments between Rashi and Tosphot conerning "derara demomona" and the reason in the first mishna you say divide. [I hope that i might gain some clarity into this subject, but for now I am just trying to get some idea of what the problems are and possible solutions] I might mention that I am limited by the fact that is do not have my learning partner, David Bronson, to learn with any more. His razor-sharp computer mind made getting to the depths of any subject highly accessible for me. I have just these great thinkers of the Litvack world, David Bronson was invaluable in his way of electron micro scoping a subject. But since I do not have him with me, I look to the great sages of the Litvak world that have a more global perspective In the meantime, I want to mention here that the answer of rav shmuel rozovski makes a lot of sense to me. he brings from the ran that there is a possibility that the law of the mishna of dividing is because of a doubt. The proof comes from Bava Metzia pg 6 where a braita continues the mishna and says if one grabs the vessel in from of us, we say we do not take it from him. Thus, if the law of the mishna would be for a certainly that the vessel belongs to both then why not take it from him after we already know and have decided the law of dividing. but if the law of the mishna came from a doubt then it makes sense to leave it in the possession of he who grabed it since now it is in his domain.[shmuel rozovski was the rosh yeshiva of ponovitch before rav shach.]But it seems to me that there is still an important question to ask here. it seems to me the reason you say the object stays in the hands of him who grabbed it is because silence is like admitting as the Gemara state openly. thus it is not because of doubt. And in the opposite case you take it away, that is because silence is not admitting and so we give it back to being divided, not because dividing is because of a certainty. I might mention that is can see what Rav Shach is saying. He is trying to give an answer to explain the Rambam why in some cases you say divide and in other cases you say it remains in its place until Eliyahu comes. He says if there is no doubt, then you divide like in the case both are holding. In a case where there is a doubt, you say it stays in its place until Eliyahu comes. ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ why in the begining משנה you have two people holding onto a garment that you divide? רב שמואל רוזובסקי brings from the ר''ן that there is a possibility that the law of the משנה of dividing is because of a doubt. The proof comes from בבבא מציעא ף ו' ע''א where a ברייתא continues the משנה and says if one תופס the vessel in from of us, we say we do not take it from him. Thus, if the law of the משנה would be for a certainly that the vessel belongs to both, then why not take it from him after we already know and have decided the law of dividing. But if the law of the משנה came from a doubt, then it makes sense to leave it in the possession of he who grabed it since now it is in his domain. But it seems to me that there is still an important question to ask here. It seems to me the reason you say the object stays in the hands of him who grabbed it is because silence is like admitting as the גמרא states openly. Thus, it is not because of doubt. And in the opposite case you take it away, that is because silence is not admitting and so we give it back to being divided, not because dividing is because of a certainty. I might mention that is can see what רב שך is saying. He is trying to give an answer to explain the רמב''ם why in some cases you say "Divide!" and in other cases you say "It remains in its place until Eliyahu comes." He says if there is no doubt, then you divide like in the case both are holding. In a case where there is a doubt, you say it stays in its place until Eliyahu comes. למה במשנה ראשונה בבבא מציעא יש לך שני אנשים אוחזים בבגד שאתה מחלק? רב שמואל רוזובסקי מביא מהר''ן שיש אפשרות שדין משנה שהחלוקה היא מחמת ספק. ההוכחה באה מבבא מציעא דף ו' ע''א. שם ברייתא ממשיכה את המשנה, ואומרת אם אחד תופס את הכלי בתוכנו, אנו אומרים שאיננו לוקחים אותו ממנו. לפיכך, אם דין המשנה יהיה בוודאי שהכלי שייך לשניהם, אז למה לא ניקח אותו ממנו לאחר שכבר ידענו והכרענו דין חילוק. אבל אם דין המשנה בא מתוך ספק, אז הגיוני להשאירו ברשות מי שחטף אותו כיון שכעת הוא ברשותו. אבל נראה לי שעדיין יש כאן שאלה חשובה. נראה לי שהסיבה שאתה אומר שהחפץ נשאר בידיו של מי שתפס אותו היא בגלל שהשתיקה היא כמו להודות כפי שהגמרא קובעת בגלוי. לפיכך, זה לא בגלל ספק. ובמקרה הפוך אתה לוקח את זה, זה בגלל שהשתיקה היא לא הודאה, ולכן אנחנו מחזירים את זה להיות מחולק, לא בגלל שהחלוקה היא בגלל ודאות אני יכול להזכיר שזה יכול לראות מה רב שך אומר. הוא מנסה לתת תשובה להסביר את הרמב''ם מדוע במקרים מסוימים אתה אומר "תחלק!" ובמקרים אחרים אתה אומר "זה נשאר במקומו עד שיבוא אליהו". הוא אומר שאם אין ספק, אז אתה מחלק כמו במקרה שניהם מחזיקים. במקרה שיש ספק, אתה אומר שהוא נשאר במקומו עד שיבוא אליהו

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