בבא קמא דף כ''ג. אני תוהה על מה הוויכוח בין אביי לרבא? אביי שאל אם ר' יוחנן צודק (שנזק באש אחראי כי זה החצים שלו, כלומר נזק ישיר מגופו), אז למה שהוא לא יהיה אחראי לדברים נסתרים? ואביי ענה על השאלה שלו. המקרה הוא כשהיה קיר, והוא נפל, ולא היה לו הזדמנות לתקן אותו. לאחר מכן שאל רבא, "אם כן, הוא לא צריך להיות אחראי אפילו על דברים גלויים?" אז רבא אמר, "לכן, ר' יוחנן מחזיק עם ריש לקיש שהאש היא בגלל נזק באמצעות רכושו של אדם, וכל הסיבה שאמר ר' יוחנן בגלל החץ שלו היא בגלל ארבעה מיני נזקים נוספים. שאלתי היא מה המקרה? האם אביי מתכוון שאם היה קיר, והוא הדליק אש, והיא עברה על החומה, אבל למה הוא לא יהיה חייב אפילו אם הייתה חומה, והאש קפצה מעליו. ועל אחת כמה וכמה, אם היה קיר והוא נפל, והוא לא הספיק לתקן אותו, ובכל זאת הוא הדליק מדורה, וכביכול גם שם הוא לא היה אחראי לדברים הנסתרים. ורבא אמר שבמקרה הזה אפילו לדברים פתוחים הוא לא היה חייב. אם האש היא בגלל החצים שלו, אז הוא צריך להיות אחראי גם לדברים נסתרים וגם לדברים פתוחים. הדרך היחידה לדעת רבא לקבל את החובה להיות חייב על דברים פתוחים, ואי אחריות על דברים נסתרים, היא אם האש חייבת רק בגלל נזק על ידי רכושו. מכל מקום, אני יכול לראות את טעם הגר''א שאמר שהרי''ף רמב''ם וסמ''ג קבעו שר' יוחנן אינו אוחז באש הוא מחמת חיציו למעט תוספת אחריות של ארבעה מיני נזקים. הסיבה שהוא יודע זאת מהרמב''ם היא שהרמב''ם כתב לאש אין אחריות על דברים נסתרים. אם נתבונן בדיון בין אביי לרבא, נראה שאם היה חומה, הוא אינו אחראי לכלום, ואם לא היה חומה כלל, אזי הוא צריך להיות אחראי לכל נזק אלא אם כן אש אחראית רק בגלל נזק על ידי רכושוץ ------------------------------------------אציין שהדרך בה שמבין הגר"א את דברי הגמרא שונה ממה שהגמרא עשוי להיראות ממבט ראשון. הגמרא אומרת שר' יוחנן סבור שהאש אחראית גם בגלל חיציו וגם בגלל רכושו. זה נשמע כאילו זה אומר שבכל מקרה הוא אחראי לשניהם. כלומר, "ו" פירושו זה וזה, זה כמו בצומת. הגר''א מבין את המשמעות זה או זה, אבל לא שניהם. בחלק מהמקרים אש אחראית בגלל חיציו (במקרה של ארבעת סוגי הנזקים אחראים כאשר נגרם נזק על ידי הגוף), ובמקרים אחרים אש אחראית לנזק שנגרם על ידי רכוש

Bava Kama page 23. I am wondering what the argument between Abayee and Rava is about

Bava Kama page 23. I am wondering what the argument between Abayee and Rava is about? Abayee asked if R Yochanan is right (that damage by fire is liable because it is his arrows, i.e., direct damage by his body), then why would he be not liable for hidden things? And Abyee answered his own question. The case is when there was a wall, and it fell down, and he did not have a chance to repair it. Rava then asked, “If so, he should not be liable even for open things?” so Rava said, “Therefore, R Yochanan holds with Reish Lakish that fire is because of damage by means of one’s property, and the whole reason R. Yochanan said because of his arrows is because of four extra kinds of damage. My question is what is the case? Does Abaye mean that if there was a wall, and he lit a fire, and it went over the wall, that he would not be liable? But why? Supposedly he lit some kind of bonfire in his backway and there was a wall, and the fire jumped over it. Why would he be not liable? And all the more so, if there was a wall, and it fell, and he did not have time to repair it and still he lit a bonfire, and supposedly there too he would not be liable for hidden things and Rava said in that case even for open things he would not be liable. But this seems even worse. If there was no wall because it fell (even though he did not have time to fix it), if fire is because of his arrows, then he should be liable for both hidden and open things. Why was he lighting a bonfire? Maybe he was cold? But then, he should build the wall and then light the fire? The only way according to Rava to get the obligation to be on open things, and nonliability for hidden things, is if fire is obligated only because of damage by means of one’s property. ______________At any rate, I can see the point of the Gra that the Rif Rambam and Semag held that R Yochanan does not hold fire is because of his arrows except for the added liability of four kind of damage. The reason he knows this from the Rambam is that the Rambam wrote for fire one is not liable for hidden things. If we look at the discussion between Abaye and Rava, we see that if there was a wall, he is not liable for anything, and if there was no wall at all, then he should be liable for all damage unless fire is liable only because of damage by means of one’sproperty. I should mention that the way the Gra understands the statement of the Gemara is different than what the Gemara might appear at first sight. The Gemara says that R. Yochanan holds that fire is liable because of both his arrows and his property. That sounds like it means in all case it is liable for both. That is, “and” means this and that that as in intersection. The Gra understands the meaning is this or that, but not both. In some case fire is liable because of his arrows (in the case of the four types of damage one is liable for when damage is done by one body that are extra), and in other cases fire is liable for damage that would-be caused by one property. _______________________________________________________________________בבא קמא page כ''ג. I am wondering what the argument between אביי and רבא is about? אביי asked if ר’ יוחנן is right (that damage by fire is liable because it is his arrows, i.e., direct damage by his body), then why would he be not liable for hidden things? And אביי answered his own question. The case is when there was a wall, and it fell down, and he did not have a chance to repair it. רבא then asked, “If so, he should not be liable even for open things?” so רבא said, “Therefore, ר’ יוחנן holds with ריש לקיש that fire is because of damage by means of one’s property, and the whole reason ר’ יוחנן said because of his arrow is because of four extra kinds of damage. My question is what is the case? Does אביי mean that if there was a wall, and he lit a fire, and it went over the wall, that he would not be liable? But why? Supposedly he lit some kind of bonfire in his backway and there was a wall, and the fire jumped over it. Why would he be not liable? And all the more so, if there was a wall, and it fell, and he did not have time to repair it and still he lit a bonfire, and supposedly there too he would not be liable for hidden things and רבא said in that case even for open things he would not be liable. But this seems even worse. If there was no wall (even though he did not have time to fix it), if fire is because of his arrows, then he should be liable for both hidden and open things. Why was he lighting a bonfire? Maybe he was cold? But then, he should build the wall and then light the fire? The only way according to רבא to get the obligation to be on open things, and nonliability for hidden things, is if fire is obligated only because of damage by means of one’s property. At any rate, I can see the point of the גר''א that the רי''ף רמב''ם and סמ''ג held that ר’ יוחנן does not hold fire is because of his arrows except for the added liability of four kind of damage. The reason he knows this from the רמב’’ם is that the רמב’’ם wrote for fire one is not liable for hidden things. If we look at the discussion between אביי and רבא, we see that if there was a wall, he is not liable for anything, and if there was no wall at all, then he should be liable for all damage unless fire is liable only because of damage by means of one’s property. I should mention that the way the גר''א understands the statement of the גמרא is different than what the גמרא might appear at first sight. The גמרא says that ר' יוחנן holds that fire is liable because of both his arrows and his property. That sounds like it means in all case it is liable for both. That is, “and” means this and that that as in intersection. The גר''א understands the meaning is this or that, but not both. In some case fire is liable because of his arrows (in the case of the four types of damage one is liable for when damage is done by one body that are extra), and in other cases fire is liable for damage that would-be caused by one property.

Passover

My feeling about Passover is that it ought to be based on the molad [conjuntion], not on the day after the molad when the moon can become visible. My reasoning has nothing to do with the Gemara in Rosh Hashana where it is clear that the time for setting the time of the new moon is after 18 or more hours after the molad. Rather my reasoning is based on the Gemara in Sanhedrin where R Elazar said that if the lower court does not sanctify the new moon in it proper time, then the heavenly court does so. I have thought for a long time that the called Hebrew Calander is simply copy and paste of the Calander of Athens. I also think that while it is good to do spring cleaning, however to base that on chametz is disingenuous. After all, to get rid of chametz all one needs to do is to say all chametz that is in my possession is null. And that is enough [as long as one’s intention is sincere not to eat or posses chametz during Passover. However, the bill of sale that is customary I think is invalid based on the Gemara in Ketuboth where a mother signed all her possession over to her daughter without it really being sincere, and when he recovered her health the property wag oven back to the mother. A bill of sale has to be with intention to do the sale, not a trick to avoid the law.

za72 F minor midi za72 nwc format

I bet neither Rousseau nor Kant had any real experience with a ”noble savage”. Noble savage I think existed only in the minds of these two philosophers

I am thinking that Rav Nachman of Breslov was talking about Kant when he criticized some famous philosopher in his time. It probably was not Hume like I had thought at first because Kant was rapidly gaining public attention at that that time in Germany. Georg Hamann was probably right that whole Critique of Pure Reason was misguided. some tried to fix in the gaps. But I am wondering how could these really smart German philosophers miss people like John Locke or the American Revolution. Had they never heard of Locke of the Constitution of the USA ? They were all plenty impressed with the Terrible French revolution with the streets of Paris literally turned red from the blood of the guillotine. Kant had only one picture in his house that of Rousseau! The great inspiration behind of French revolution. {I bet neither Rousseau nor Kant had any real experience with a ”noble savage”. Noble savage I think existed only in the minds of these two philosophers ,In real life you just leave out the “noble” part and leave in the “savage”. } Maybe Philosophy ought to turn to more sensible people like John Locke and Thomas Reid. In the enlightenment people rightly understood the danger of religious fanaticism, but not the equal and even more serios problem of political fanaticism believing in utopia that is only if everyone would agree with them

נראה לי שרב שך לומד את הסוגיא בדף כ''ג בבא קמא באופן שדומה לגר''א כי הוא אומר בנזקי ממון פרק י''ד הלכה ט''ו שאף על פי שהאש חייבת מחמת חיציו, עדיין אין זה בדיוק כמו חיציו. הוא מביא הוכחה מדברים נסתרים. על דברים נסתרים יהיה אחראי על נזק באמצעות חיצים, אך במקרה של שריפה, אין חייבים כאשר מדובר בדברים שאין נוהגים להחביא בתוך ערימה. אז רב שך אכן לומד כמו הגר''א לפחות מבחינת התוצאה שאש אינה כחיציו לכלום חוץ מארבעת סוגי הנזק. ציינתי קודם שהגר''א כתב שדרך הרי"ף רמב''ם וסמ''ג לומדים את דף כ''ג הוא שר' יוחנן מחזיק אחרת ממה שחשבנו במקור. בהתחלה חשבנו שהוא התכוון לאש בגלל שהחיצים שלו, פירוש שזה נזק מפעולה ישירה של האדם. כעת במקום זאת, אנו חושבים שזה רק כמו נזק באמצעות רכושו של האדם כמו השור שלו, וזה כמו אש רק לגבי ארבעה סוגים נוספים של תשלום

It seems to me that Rav Shach is learning the sugia on page 23 of bava kama in away that is similar to the Gra because he says in Nizkei Mamon 14 chapter halacha 15 that even though fire is liable because of his arrows still it is not exactly like his arrows. He brings a proof from hidden things. For hidden things, one would be liable by actual damage by means of one’s arrows, but in the case of fire, one is not obligated when it is for things that are not customarily hidden inside a stack. So, Rav Shach does learn like the Gra at least in terms of the result that fire is not like his arrows for anything except the four types of damage. I have mentioned before that the Gra wrote that the way the Rif Rambam and semag learn the subject of page 23 is that R Yochanas holds differently than what we thought originally. At first, we thought he meant fire is because his arrows mean it is damage by one’s direct action. Now instead we think it is only like damage by mean of one’s property like his ox, and it is like fire only in term of four extra type of payment.