בבא קמא כ''ב וכ''ג ותירוץ יותר טוב לרמב''ם

כתב הגר''א בדף כ''ג בבבא קמא ובשלחן ערוך פרק 418 הערה 33 שהרי''ף ורמב''ם גורסים שהגמרא שינה דעתו לגבי גישתו של ר' יוחנן בגלל שאלת רבא, אם האש חייבת בגלל חיציו, אז למה טמון (נסתר) לא חייב? (כלומר שאם היו דברים חבויים בערימה, אין הוא חייב בהם.) אלא ר' יוחנן מחזיק לגמרי כדעת ריש לקיש וההבדל היחיד ביניהם הוא ארבעת הדברים הנוספים שחייבים עליהם כשאדם עושה נזק בגופו ולא על ידי רכושו (כשורו). ההוכחה לכך ברורה. זה בגלל שהרי''ף והרמב''ם משאירים שניהם את התשובה הראשונה של הגמרא שהתכוונה לענות על שאלת רבא, (שבגלל שהיה חומה, נגמרו החצים שלו). הגמרא דחק את התשובה ההיא כי אם גמרו חיציו, אז גמרו לגבי נכסים שאינם נסתרים. אני כותב את זה כי ברור לי שהסיבה שהרמב''ם כתב שכאשר כלב לוקח לחם עם פחם לערימה והערימה נשרפת שהמקרה הוא שהכלב נשא אותו מעל הערימה, אבל לעולם לא הניח אותו ולכן החיוב הוא חצי נזק לכל מקום שדרכו של הפחם היה, ואין חובה על שאר הערימה. הסיבה היא שהרמב''ם פשוט הכריע כרישלקיש. הגר''א כתב שהרי''ף ורמב''ם הסבירן את הגמרא בדף כ''ג שר' יוחנן מחזיק למעשה כמו ריש לקיש, והמקרה הקודם שבו הכלב שם את הפחם על הערימה יהיה נזק מלא לכל הערימה. עם זאת, אני יכול להזכיר שהגישה הקודמת שלי להסבר הרמב"ם הייתה שהוא מחזיק שכוח כוחו אינו חייב (כמו שתוספות אמרו) הייתה תשובה ברת קיימא אלא שיותר הגיוני ששאר הערימה היה אחראי על רביעית מהנזק כפי שהרב"ד למעשה ששאל. עכשיו ההסברשל המשנה ופסק הרמב''ם לא כח כוחו, אלא שאש חייבת בגלל רכושו כמו השור שלו כמו שאמר ריש לקיש והנושא הפחם על הערימה זה צרורות או קרן של שור תם. בלילה הזה ראיתי שהרדב"ז כתב את תשובתי המקורית לרמב"ם שהמקרה הוא כח כוחו. ובהמשך הערב גיליתי את הערת הגר"א. אני חושב שגישת הגר"א יותר מדויקת________ קצת רקע לנושא הזה. אמר ר' יוחנן שהנזק של אש הוא בגלל חיציו וריש לקיש אמר שזה בגלל נזק מרכושו, למשל, השור שלו. שאלה הגמרא על ר' יוחנן שאם החבות תהיה בגלל נזק ישיר מפעולה אחת, אז למה טמון יהיה פטור? כלומר, אם שרף מישהו את ערימת החטים של מישהו אחר, ובתוכו הוחבא חפץ כלשהו, חובת התשלום היא רק על ערימת חיטים. התשובה שהגמרא נותנת לר' יוחנן היא שהייתה שם חומה שנפלה, ולפני שהייתה לאדם הזדמנות לתקן אותה, פרצה השריפה והלכה לנכס של השכן. אחר כך התנגד הגמרא לתשובה זו, ואמר באותו מקרה אז גם לדברים הפתוחים כמו הערימה עצמה, אין לחייבו. אז הגמרא אמר שלמעשה ר' יוחנן מסכים עם ריש לקיש, וההבדל היחיד ביניהם הוא בארבעת סוגי הנזק הנוספים שאדם אחראי להם כאשר הוא עושה נזק מפעולתו ולא מרכושו

bava kama pg 22 and 23. A better answer for the Rambam than the one I gave previously

The Gra wrote on page 23 in Bava Kama and in the Shulchan Aruch chapter 418 paragraph 33 that the Rif and Rambam hold that the Gemara changed its mind about the approach of R Yochanan because of the question of Rava, if fire is liable because of his arrows then why is hidden not obligated? (That is to say that if there were things hidden in the stack, he is not obligated for them.) Rather R Yochanan holds completely with the opinion of Reish Lakish and the only difference between them is the four extra thing that one is obligated for when one doe damage by his own body rather than by one property like hi ox. the proof of this is clear. It is because the Rif and Rambam both leave out the first answer of the Gemara that intended to answer the question of Rava, that because there was wall, his arrows are finished. The Gemara pushed out that answer because if his arrows are finished, then they would be finished in regard to possessions that are not hidden. I write this because it is clear to me that the reason the Rambam wrote that when a dog take a loaf with a coal to a stack and the stack is burnt up that the case is where the dog carried it over the stack, but never put it down and so the obligation is half damage for wherever the path of the coal was, and there is no obligation for the rest of the stack is that the Rambam simply decided the law like Reish Lakish because that is how he and the Rif explain the Gemara on page 23 that R Yochanan in fact hold like Reish Lakish and the previous case where he the dog put the coal on the stack would be full damage for the whole stack. However, I might mention that my previous approach to explain the Rambam was that he holds force of force is not obligated (like Tosphot said) was a viable answer except that it would make more sense that the rest of the stack would have been liable a fourth of the damage as the Raavad in fact ask.[and in fact the Rambam does hold that force of a force is not obligated at all.] but I think now that this case of the dog is not force of a force but simply fire is obligated because of his property like his ox like Reish Lakish said and carrying it over the stack is pebbles or horn of a tame ox. (This night I saw the Radvaz wrote my original answer for the Rambam that the case is force of his force. And later in the evening I discovered the comment of the Gra. I think the approach of the Gra is more accurate.) A little background for this subject. R Yochanan said that damage by fire is because of his arrows and Reish Lakish said it is because of damage by means of one’s property e.g., his ox. The Gemara asked on R Yochanan that if the liability would be because of direct damage by one own action, then why would hidden thing be exempt? That means, if one burnt someone else’s stack of wheat, and inside was hidden some object, the obligation to pay is only for a stack of wheat. The answer the Gemara gives for R Yochanan is that there had been a wall there which fell, and before the person had a chance to repair it, the fire broke out and went to the neighbor’s property. Then the Gemara objected to this answer and said in that case then even for the open things like the stack itself, he should not be obligated. So then the Gemara said that in fact R Yochanan agrees with Reish Lakish, and the only difference between them is in the four extra types of damage that one is liable for when he does damage by his own action rather than by his property _____________________________________________________________ The גר’’א wrote on page כ''ג in בבא קמא and in the שלחן ערוך חושן משפט פרק תי''ח הערה ל''ג that theרי’’ףand רמב’’ם hold that the גמרא changed its mind about the approach of ר’ יוחנן because of the question of רבא, if fire is liable because of his arrows then why is hidden טמון not obligated? (That is to say that if there were things hidden in the stack, he is not obligated for them.) Rather ר’ יוחנן holds completely with the opinion of ריש לקיש and the only difference between them is the four extra things that one is obligated for when one does damage by his own body rather than by one's property like his ox. The proof of this is clear. It is because the רי’’ף and רמב’’ם both leave out the first answer of the גמרא that intended to answer the question ofרבא , that because there was wall, his arrows are finished. The גמרא pushed out that answer because if his arrows are finished, then they would be finished in regard to possessions that are not hidden. I write this because it is clear to me that the reason the רמב’’ם wrote that when a dog take a loaf with a coal to a stack and the stack is burnt up that the case is where the dog carried it over the stack, but never put it down and so the obligation is half damage for wherever the path of the coal was, and there is no obligation for the rest of the stack is that the רמב’’ם simply decided the law like ריש לקיש because that is how he and the רי’’ף explain the גמראon page כ''ג that ר’ יוחנן in fact hold like ריש לקיש and the previous case where he the dog put the coal on the stack would be full damage for the whole stack. However, I might mention that my previous approach to explain the רמב’’ם was that he holds force of force is not obligated (like תוספות said) was a viable answer except that it would make more sense that the rest of the stack would have been liable a fourth of the damage as the ראב''ד in fact ask.[and in fact the רמב’’ם does hold that force of a force is not obligated at all.] but I think now that this case of the dog is not force of a force but simply fire is obligated because of his property like his ox like ריש לקיש said and carrying it over the stack is צרורות or horn of a tame ox. (This night I saw the Radvaz wrote my original answer for the רמב’’ם that the case is force of his force. And later in the evening I discovered the comment of the גר’’א. I think the approach of the גר’’א is more accurate.) A little background for this subject. ר’ יוחנן said that damage by אש is because of his arrows and ריש לקיש said it is because of damage by means of one’s property e.g., his ox. The גמרא asked on ר’ יוחנן that if the liability would be because of direct damage by one own action, then why would hidden thing טמון be exempt? That means, if one burnt someone else’s stack of wheat, and inside was hidden some object, the obligation to pay is only for a stack of wheat. The answer the גמרא gives for ר’ יוחנן is that there had been a wall there which fell, and before the person had a chance to repair it, the fire broke out and went to the neighbor’s property. Then the גמרא objected to this answer and said in that case then even for the open things like the stack itself, he should not be obligated. So, then the גמרא said that in fact ר’ יוחנן agrees with ריש לקיש, and the only difference between them is in the four extra types of damage that one is liable for when he does damage by his own action rather than by his property

I think that how religious a girl makes no difference. What matters is how devoted to Torah she is. The idea of the sages of marrying a daughter of a Torah scholar to me means to marry a girl who is devoted to the idea that her husband and children should learn Torah at all cost. Religiosity has nothing to do with this. I can see that there are plenty of girls who are religious, but are not interested in her husband learning Torah. That does not count as a daughter of a true Torah scholar. [Sadly Torah has become a easy way to make a living. Girls with sense (but no fear of God) will marry these kinds of hypocrites. What really matters is the people who will stick with Torah at the cost of having no money

בבא קמא דף כ''ב ע''א . עלו לי שלוש שאלות. אחת על ריש לקיש. אחת על איך רש''י מסביר ריש לקיש, ואחרת על איך ר' חננאל מסביר ריש לקיש. הסוגיא הבסיסית היא זו. ריש לקיש אמר ששריפה חייבת בנזק מלא בגלל נזק שנגרם לרכוש. בעוד ר' יוחנן אוחז שאש חייבת כי זו כמו חיצים. לרי''ף ורש''י, הרעיון של ר' יוחנן הוא שהאש חייבת כאילו אחד בעצמו גרם נזק, לא רכושו) כפי שהיה קורה אם השור שלו גרם נזק. (הגמרא שואל שאלה על ריש לקיש מהמשנה. לכלב יש כיכר עם פחם בתוכו והולך וגורם לערימה להישרף. את תשלום של הלחם הוא נזק שלם, ובגלל הערימה חצי נזק. השאלה מהמשנה הזו על ריש לקיש היא שהפחם לא שייך לבעלים של הכלב. ריש לקיש עונה שהמקרה של המשנה הוא שהכלב זרק את הלחם עם הפחם בתוכו על הערימה, ומחויב או בגלל שזהו שינוי מהדרך הרגילה ובכך אחראי בחצי נזק כמו קרן התם או בגלל צרורות. (אם הכלב היה מניח אותו על הערימה, הבעלים של הכלב היה אחראי במלוא הנזק.) השאלה שיש לי כאן היא שהשאלה והתשובה אינן מתאימות זו לזו. השאלה הייתה מדוע הבעלים של הכלב צריך להיות אחראי בכלל? אחרי הכל, זה לא הפחם שלו. תשובה: בעל הכלב אחראי בגלל שינוי או צרורות? איך זה עונה על השאלה? הפחם עדיין לא שייך לו. תשובה לכך יכולה להיות שהגמרא בשלב זה חושב שבעל הפחם יישא באחריות אם לא ישמור על גחלתו. אבל כדי למצוא כיצד הבעלים של הכלב עלול להיות אחראי גם, ריש לקיש מוצא את התרחיש הזה שבו הכלב זרק אותו. כך אפשר להסביר את המשנה שהתשלום הוא חצי נזק. (מאוחר יותר, הגמרא למעשה, גורסת שבעל הפחם אכן שמר על הפחם שלו.) עכשיו, רבינו חננאל אמר שהתשובה של ריש לקיש היא שהכלב זרק את הפחם, ואז הפחם לא עזב את תחום בעל הפחם. זה בהתייחסות למסכת שבת שבה (אני חושב שאני זוכר אולי) יש דעה שנחיתה לא אותו דבר כמו להרים ולהניח. בדרך כלל צריך להרים ולהניח ארבע אמות, או מתחום אחד לשני, אבל איך זה עונה על השאלה על ריש לקיש? למה בעלים של הכלב חייב?ויש לשאול שאלה נוספת. ר' יוחנן אמר שהחובה לאש היא בגלל חיציו, וריש לקיש לא הסכים לזה כי חיציו נעים מכוח האדם, ואילו האש נעה מעצמה. מכיוון שכך, אני שואל לפי ריש לקיש מדוע הבעלים של הכלב לא יצטרך לשלם עבור כל הערימה? הרי לריש לקיש אין צורך שחובת האש תהיה נעה רק מכוחו הישיר של האדם שהדליק. מספיק שהוא הדליק אותו, והוא נע ברוח רגילה

i was at a litvak beit midrash which is different than a yeshiva. A yeshiva is built for a certain age group 18-24; while a beit midrash is for all ages -who ever wants to come and learn Torah. so I my area there is such a place and I was there thinking about Reish Lakish in Bava Kama page 22a and three questions occurred to me. One on reish lakish. one on how Rashi explains Reish Lakish, and another on how Rabbainu Chananel explains Reish Lakish, but later on the way to the seashore an answer for Rashi occurred to me. the basic idea is this Reish Lakish said that fire is obligated in full damage because of nizkei mamon damage due to one’s property. While R Yochanan holds fire is obligated because it is like one’s arrows. To the Rif and Rashi, the idea of R Yochanan is that fire is obligated as if one himself caused damage, not hi property a would be the case if hi ox caused damage. The gemara asks a question on Reish Lakish the from the mishna. A dog has a loaf with a coal in it and goes and causes a stack to get burnt up. the damage for the loaf i full damage and payment for the stack is half damage. the question from this mishna on reish lakish is that the coal does not belong to the owner of the dog. Reish Lakish answers the case of the mishna is where the dog threw the loaf with the coal inside it on the stack. Thus, the payment for the loaf is full damage, for the place the coal landed is half damage, and he is not obligated at all for the rest of the stack. Rashi explains this statement thus. If throwing the loaf and coal is obligated either because it i a change from the normal way and thus liable in half damage like horn of a tame animal or because of pebbles. If he would have put it down on the stack, the owner of the dog would be liable in full damage. the question I have here is that the question and answer to not fit together. The question was, why should the owner of the dog be liable at all? After all, it is not his coal. Answer: The owner of the dog is liable because of change or pebbles? How does that answer the question? The coal still does not belong to him. An answer to this might be that the gemara at this point is thinking that the owner of the coal would be liable if he did not guard his coal. But to find how the owner of the dog might also be liable Reish Lakish find this scenario i where the dog threw it. In that way it is possible to explain the mishna that the payment is half damage. Later the gemara in fact holds that the owner of the coal did in fact guard his coal. Now Rabbainu Chananel said the answer of Reish Lakish is that the dog threw the coal, so the coal has not left the domain of the owner of the coal. This is in reference to Tracate shabat where (I think I recall) there is an opinion (or maybe all opinions? I forget!) is that throwing and landing are not the same thing as picking up and putting down. Normally to be obligated for carrying on shabat one needs to pick up and put down four cubits away or from one domain to another by which the domain is changed. how ever how does this answer the question on Reish Lakish? The question was why is the owner of the dog liable anything and we answer that there is a reason to make the owner of the coal liable. This does not follow. A third question is this. R Yochanan said that the obligation for fire is because of his arrows. Reish Lakih disagreed with this because his arrows move from the force of the person while fire moves on its own accord. This being so, I ask according to Reish Lakish why should the owner of the dog not have to pay for the whole stack? After all, to Reish Lakis there is no need for the obligation of force to be moving only from the direct force of the person that lite it. It is enough that he lite it, and the it moves by a common wind. ___________________________________________________________________ קמא page כ''ב ע''א . three questions occurred to me. One on ריש לקיש. one on how רש''י explains ריש לקיש, and another on how ר' חננאל explains ריש לקיש _______ the basic סוגיא is this. ריש לקיש said that fire is obligated in full damage because of damage due to one’s property. While ר’ יוחנן holds fire is obligated because it is like one’s arrows. To the רי''ף and רש''י, the idea of ר’ יוחנן is that fire is obligated as if one himself caused damage, not his property) as would be the case if his ox caused damage (. The גמרא asks a question on ריש לקיש the from the משנה. A dog has a loaf with a coal in it and goes and causes a stack to get burnt up. The damage for the loaf is full damage, and payment for the stack is half damage. The question from this משנה on ריש לקיש is that the coal does not belong to the owner of the dog. ריש לקיש answers the case of the משנה is where the dog threw the loaf with the coal inside it on the stack. Thus, the payment for the loaf is full damage, for the place the coal landed is half damage, and he is not obligated at all for the rest of the stack. רש''י explains this statement thus. If throwing the loaf and coal is obligated either because it is a change from the normal way and thus liable in half damage like horn of a קרן התם or because of צרורות. If הכלב would have put it down on the stack, the owner of the dog would be liable in full damage. The question I have here is that the question and answer Do not fit together WELL. The question was, why should the owner of the dog be liable at all? After all, it is not his coal. Answer: The owner of the dog is liable because of change or צרורות? How does that answer the question? The coal still does not belong to him. An answer to this might be that the גמרא at this point is thinking that the owner of the coal would be liable if he did not guard his coal. But to find how the owner of the dog might also be liable ריש לקיש finds this scenario where the dog threw it. In that way, it is possible to explain the משנה that the payment is half damage. )Later the גמרא, in fact, holds that the owner of the coal did, in fact, guard his coal.( Now, רבינו חננאלsaid the answer of ריש לקיש is that the dog threw the coal, so the coal has not left the domain of the owner of the coal. This is in reference to מסכת שבת where (I think I recall) there is an opinion (or maybe all opinions? I forget!) is that throwing and landing are not the same thing as picking up and putting down. Normally to be obligated for carrying on שבת one needs to pick up and put down four cubits away, or from one domain to another by which the domain is changed. However how does this answer the question on ריש לקיש? The question was why is the owner of the dog liable anything? and we answer that there is a reason to make the owner of the coal liable. This does not follow. A third question is this. ר’ יוחנן said that the obligation for fire is because of his arrows. ריש לקיש disagreed with this because his arrows move from the force of the person, while fire moves on its own accord. This being so, I ask according to ריש לקיש why should the owner of the dog not have to pay for the whole stack? After all, to ריש לקישthere is no need for the obligation of force to be moving only from the direct force of the person that lit it. It is enough that he lite it, and the it moves by a common wind.

Kant, and Leonard Nelson

I have a natural inclination toward philosophy and thus it is a bias that I see it as important. But even if I am biased towards it, in Middle Ages it was also considered important in the important formulation of the Middle Ages, faith and reason. But in the period from the fall of Rome until about the time of the Rambam, it was Plato who was foremost. Then slowly, the emphasis changed toward Aristotle. That started with the fact that the Muslim world had always been more interested in Aristotle than Plato. But with the Rambam, that changed toward Aristotle and the with Aquinas that set the stage even for Europe. That of course puttered out with Bacon. Philosophy in itself began to deal with a new set of problems; the Mind body problem, and politics; until a kind of synthesis came about in Kant, and Leonard Nelson. so now, I think that if we would go with the Medieval authorities that saw philosophy as important like The Rambam, then we ought to study Kant. But clearly there are plenty of people who reject any learning of philosophy at all. still, I tend not to agree with that. evil.

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