Bava Batra page 22 בבא בתרא כ''ב

On the way back from the sea today, there occurred to me a way to explain the Rishonim on Bava Batra page 22. Thus: the law is like Rava except in yal keyam. Also the law is like the later authority which clearly Ravina is. The Gemara says "Ravina and Rav Ashi are the end of horah"--the ability to make a peak din. If you put these two facts together you are forced into some compromise, some middle position that can contain both. [Otherwise they directly contradict each other.] The Gemara Bava Batra page 22 says Rava says one can't dig a hole next to the borderline and Abyee says he can. The Gemara asks on Rava from the Mishna מרחיקין את המשרה מן הירק  והחרדל מן הדבורים רבי יוסי אומר עד שאתה אומר הרחק חרדלך מדבוראי הרחק דבוריך מן חרדלי שבאות ואוכלות לגלוגי חרדלי ואי לא סמיך היכא  משכחת לה רב פפא אמר בלוקח  But almost all Rishonim say the law is not like Rava except for digging a pit alone because a pit is like shooting arrows. Still once there is something the neighbor has put there that can be damaged, he has to take away what can cause damage.  The Rambam holds  if you have something that could cause damage to one's neighbor on the boundary between oneself and his neighbor, but there is nothing there right now, he has to take it away if the neighbor puts something there that could be damaged. Most other rishonim hold he does not have to take away  his object if he came first.

Thus the main idea of the Rishonim is that Ravina means the person that can be damaged he himself has to keep away (because the law is like R. Yose)  unless the thing that can cause damage causes damage immediately.   Thus that is the case of Rava. Other than that there is a right of who came first can stay. the argument then is how long can he stay? Forever?, or until the neighbor puts something that can be damaged there?

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On the way back from the sea today, there occurred to me a way to explain the ראשונים on בבא בתרא כ''ב ע''ב. Thus: the law is like רבא except in יעל כגם. Also the law is like the later authority which clearly רבינא is. The גמרא says "רבינא and רב אשי are the סוף הוראה"--the ability to make a פסק דין. If you put these two facts together you are forced into some compromise, some middle position that can contain both . [Otherwise they directly contradict each other. ]  רבא says one can't dig a hole next to the borderline and אביי says he can. The גמרא asks on רבא from   מרחיקין את המשרה מן הירק  והחרדל מן הדבורים רבי יוסי אומר עד שאתה אומר הרחק חרדלך מדבוראי הרחק דבוריך מן חרדלי שבאות ואוכלות לגלוגי חרדלי ואי לא סמיך היכא  משכחת לה רב פפא אמר בלוקח  But almost all ראשונים say the law is not like רבא except for digging a בור alone because a בור is like shooting arrows גיריה דיליה. Still once there is something the neighbor has put there that can be damaged, he has to take away what can cause damage.  The רמב''ם holds  if you have something that could cause damage to one's neighbor on the boundary between oneself and his neighbor, but there is nothing there right now, he has to take it away if the neighbor puts something there that could be damaged. Most other ראשונים hold he does not have to take away  his object if he came first. Thus the main idea of the ראשונים is that רבינא means the person that can be damaged he himself has to keep away unless the thing that can cause damage causes damage immediately. Thus that is the case of רבא. Other than that, there is a right of who came first can stay. The argument then is how long can he stay? Forever? or until the neighbor puts something that can be damaged? there._____________________________________________________________________________

כדי להסביר את הראשונים על בבא בתרא כ''ב ע''ב. הלכך: הדין כרבא אלא ביע''ל קג''ם. גם הדין הוא כמו הסמכות המאוחרת שברור שרבינא היא. הגמרא אומרת "רבינא ורב אשי סוף הוראה"--היכולת לעשות פסק דין. אם אתה מחבר את שתי העובדות האלה יחד אתה נאלץ לבצע איזושהי פשרה, איזו עמדה אמצעית שיכולה להכיל את שניהם. רבא אומר שאי אפשר לחפור בור ליד הגבול ואבי אומר שהוא יכול. הגמרא שואלת על רבא מרחיקין את המשרה מן הירק והחרדל מן הדבורים רבי יוסי אומר עד שאתה אומר הרחק חרדלך מדבוראי הרחק דבוריך מן חרדלי שבאות ואוכלות לגלוגי חרדלי ואי לא סמיך היכא משכחת לה רב פפא אמר בלוקח אבל כמעט כל הראשונים אומרים שהחוק אינו כמו רבא חוץ מחפירת בור לבד כי בור הוא כמו ירי חיצים (גיריה דיליה). ובכל זאת ברגע שיש משהו שהשכן שם שם שיכול להינזק, הוא צריך לקחת מה שיכול לגרום לנזק. הרמב''ם אוחז אם יש משהו שעלול לגרום נזק לשכן בגבול שבינו לבין שכנו, אבל אין שם כלום כרגע, הוא צריך לקחת אותו אם השכן שם משהו שעלול להינזק. רוב ראשונים אחרים טוענים שהוא לא צריך לקחת את החפץ אם הוא הגיע ראשון. לפיכך הרעיון המרכזי של הראשונים הוא שרבינא פירושו של האדם שיכול להינזק שהוא עצמו צריך להרחיק (כי הדין הוא כמו ר' יוסי) אלא אם הדבר שיכול לגרום נזק גורם נזק מיד. אז זה המקרה של רבא. מלבד זאת, יש זכות מי בא ראשון יכול להישאר. הטענה אם כן היא כמה זמן הוא יכול להישאר? לָנֶצַח? או עד שהשכן שם משהו שיכול להינזק?

 Rav Nahman of Breslov warned to stay away from doctors [Sichot HaRan. Conversations of the Rav Nahman]. That was at a time 200 years ago when medicine was still based on the four elements. However this advice is still highly relevant. THERE are procedures and medicines that have been around for 50 years and are well established and are okay. But less than that 50 year period  one ought to avoid.

 Michael Huemer says that Bayesian probability can solve the problem of induction. But is that all that different from justified opinion? That last being the flimsy definition of knowledge. Dr. Huemer' opinion is surely better than that, but still does not bridge the gap.  A priori is different in essence from empirical knowledge as Leonard Nelson pointed out.

 The Rambam holds  if you have something that could cause damage to one's neighbor on the boundary between oneself and his neighbor, but there is nothing there right now, he has to take it away if the neighbor puts something there that could be damaged. This is based on the Gemara Bava Batra page 22. Rava says one can't dig a hole next to the borderline and Abyee says he can. The Gemara asks on Rava from the Mishna מרחיקין את המשרה מן הירק  והחרדל מן הדבורים רבי יוסי אומר עד שאתה אומר הרחק חרדלך מדבוראי הרחק דבוריך מן חרדלי שבאות ואוכלות לגלוגי חרדלי ואי לא סמיך היכא  משכחת לה רב פפא אמר בלוקח from this it is clear that even to have anything by the boundary in the first place is forbidden--since the law is always like Rava except for yal kegam. But almost all Rishonim say the law is not like Rava except for digging a pit alone. still once there is something the neighbor has put there, he has to take what can cause damage away. 

The Rishonim are depending on Ravina who is coming to answer either for Rava or Rav Papa and says על המזיק להרחיק את עצמו How this answers any of the above questions is unclear.     But it is the statement of Ravina that makes room for all the opinions that allow one to put something there. and in fact most rihonim hold that it can stay there even after the neighbor has put something there that could be damaged because at that point, the neighbor had to have put his thing farther away. 

Athens and Jerusalem

Athens and Jerusalem -faith and reason. in the middle ages that meant Plato and neo-platonic thought as we see in Duties of the Hearts. But at some point the emphasis got put on Aristotle. But I believe that the problems presented by the Mind- Body problem cannot be ignored, and thus you need some sort of answer. In my opinion, that is best found in Kant and the modified Kantian approach of Leonard Nelson. [And politics is downstream from philosophy, so this Kantian approach is really a much bigger deal than it seems to be on the surface. More over, this approach in itself needs clarification  for it starts with Beneke and Jacob Fries, but this was a sort of neo Kant approach that no one took seriously until nelson.  ]        

 The Obligations of the Hearts [Chovot Levavot] and all Rishonim take the view of faith with reason. in modern language that translates into the approach of a denial of absolute religious fundamentalisms and a denial of radical secularism. That means that  fundamentalism of Torah is in itself  a path of balance. You can see this in every chapter of the Chovot Levavot where for every good character trait he brings proof from the written Torah, the oral Torah and from reason [which to him means Aristotle, Plato, or Plotinus]

The marriage strike. MGTOW. Men going their own way.

 I think it is time to change secular laws about men. There is no reason why a wife can pick up a phone and send her husband to jail and prison, take away his children and money and reputation.  You can understand the MGTOW movement--men going their own way and refusing to get married or anything that can be considered marriage by the state. For once the state is involved, it is there forever.  

However, I can still see getting married as long as the wife learns the laws about lashon hara [slander] every day. [These laws are in the book Gates of.Repentance ] For people with values and that admit when they are wrong or have done wrong are still people that one can have a forever relationship with.

It is hard to know the laws of lashon hara without Gates of Repentance although they are in the gemara [Talmud]. Still to know them from the Talmud is hard, because they are spread out all over the place.  

[The main place in the Torah where the actual law  of lashon hara is stated is in Leviticus לא תלך רכיל בעמיך "Do not go as a tale bearer among your people." ] 

The best way to deal with a situation in which a wife is making her powerplay is to have values that you will not break under any circumstances.  Show her the door. 

Some of the basic problems with false allegations are the lashon hara problem;-- that is saying even what is true in order to cause damage.  There are, of course, many prohibitions that are involved in false allegations, but the lashon hara one is the most severe.

The general rules are that you need several conditions in order to say anything negative about someone: truth, rebuke, first hand evidence, not hearsay, intent to benefit someone, not cause harm that would not come according to din law of the Torah, not exaggerate. With issues between man and God the conditions seem to be less strict in that they do not seem to require all these conditions and there is some doubt about which ones apply--and it looks that a simple fact about someone' reputation is enough. that is that if it is common knowledge. 

Rav Ovadia Yoseph held along the lines of Reb Moshe and Reb Aaron concerning the State of Israel.

I believe that the people of Israel ought to return to Israel mainly because of the opinion of the Ramban [Nachmanidess] who holds it is a positive command. But also i think one ought to support the State of Israel because it was made in order to facilitate the possibility of fulfilling this command. I was not always aware of the importance of the State of Israel until I noticed the opinion of both Reb Moshe Feinstein and Reb Aaron Kotler that דינא דמלכותא דינא the law of the state is the law [Bava Batra 35].That statement of the Talmud is well known but Reb Moshe and Reb Aaron both said that that applies also to the State of Israel. What makes this especially relevant nowadays is that girls in the USA tend to be JAP's [Jewish American Princess's] and thus not marriageable material. They have an attitude problem.   And even if they did not, the laws are made in such  way to put a loaded gun into the hands of any wife. She can, with one phone call, put a man into prison, take away his children and money and reputation any time she feels like it. What kind of trusting relationship can anyone have with a partner that has a loaded gun pointed at their head?

The Ramban you can find in his commentary on Sefer Hamitzvot of the Rambam. Reb Aaron's approach I found in a book of musar that he wrote. Reb Moshe --I forget where I found his opinion, but I think it is well known in the circles that knew Reb Moshe. But those were not my circles. I was at the Mir in N.Y. and really had no idea of the opinion of these two great sages. I had heard of the Rav of Satmer, Reb Yoel who disagreed, but that just makes the issue an argument among the authorities. And even though I really am no where near the greatness of these sages, still I think the law is like Reb Moshe, and besides that, you see that Rav Ovadia Yoseph held along the lines of Reb Moshe and Reb Aaron.