20.3.20
There is sometimes an intersection between a law that is from the words of the scribes and a law of the Torah. Usually this is rare and in theory almost impossible. Still it does happen sometimes.
An example is a woman gets married by the testimony of one witness [who says her husband died]. The two witnesses that are not accepted because of a decree of the scribes come, and say he is still alive. She can say married to her new husband. [See Rav Shach law of Divorce.. chapter 22.]
[What i mean is that one witness against two is always nothing. So here you have her getting married on the belief that he husband died in war or somewhere else. But there was only one witness to testify to that. So even if she can get remarried still it is not really valid testimony. Then come two witnesses that are OK from the law of the Torah [that is they are not women, nor relatives, nor have received money for their testimony]. Yet these last two are not accepted by a decree from the scribes--for example they gamble or play the lottery. So they are not good witnesses from the words of the scribes but are OK from the Torah. So from the law of the Torah she would have to leave her second "husband" since two witnesses say her real husband is still alive. Yet she is still allowed to remain married to the second one because the later testimony was from two that are not accepted from the words of the scribes.
[The idea is usually a decree from the scribes can forbid something that is permitted from the Torah because of making a "fence" a safeguard around the Law. But they can not permit something the Torah forbids. Yet here for some reason these two witnesses which are OK from the Torah are not accepted even to forbid. (I might add that even the ability to forbid what the Torah allows is subject to a debate. [See the Mishna "To make a fence" in Avot DeR. Natan. There you see the very concept in itself is subject to a debate. After all, why add to what the Torah says? Is it not enough?] Usually the Gemara is interested in what is forbidden or permitted from the Torah.
[When this comes up in money issues the answer is הפקר בית דין הפקר but here there is a different reason.]
[What i mean is that one witness against two is always nothing. So here you have her getting married on the belief that he husband died in war or somewhere else. But there was only one witness to testify to that. So even if she can get remarried still it is not really valid testimony. Then come two witnesses that are OK from the law of the Torah [that is they are not women, nor relatives, nor have received money for their testimony]. Yet these last two are not accepted by a decree from the scribes--for example they gamble or play the lottery. So they are not good witnesses from the words of the scribes but are OK from the Torah. So from the law of the Torah she would have to leave her second "husband" since two witnesses say her real husband is still alive. Yet she is still allowed to remain married to the second one because the later testimony was from two that are not accepted from the words of the scribes.
[The idea is usually a decree from the scribes can forbid something that is permitted from the Torah because of making a "fence" a safeguard around the Law. But they can not permit something the Torah forbids. Yet here for some reason these two witnesses which are OK from the Torah are not accepted even to forbid. (I might add that even the ability to forbid what the Torah allows is subject to a debate. [See the Mishna "To make a fence" in Avot DeR. Natan. There you see the very concept in itself is subject to a debate. After all, why add to what the Torah says? Is it not enough?] Usually the Gemara is interested in what is forbidden or permitted from the Torah.
[When this comes up in money issues the answer is הפקר בית דין הפקר but here there is a different reason.]
Torah scholars that are demons.
Rav Nahman was not the first one to point out the trouble with Torah scholars that are demons.
I only brought this from Rav Nahman's LeM because it was one of the most striking features of his teaching that I saw when I first started looking at his books. [LeM vol I: 8 I:12, I:28 I:61 II:1 II:8 and many other places I have forgotten off hand.]
The statements of the Gemara itself I forget the page numbers. One is from tractate Shabat.
"All the troubles that come into the world come only because of the religious leaders of Israel as it says in the verse in Isaiah, 'Your judges judge for the sake of getting bribes...'"
So already there was this connection from the start. It was not a new phenomenon in the time of Rav Nahman.
The question is why Rav Nahman would have picked out this particular point among thousands of possible great ideas from the sages he might have chosen to emphasize?
In any case, from the emphasis itself of Rav Nahman it seems these kinds of Torah scholars are not uncommon. Rather if anyone has trouble finding them they probably could not find a snowflake in a blizzard.
Clearly he saw this issue as sine qua non--[without which nothing good can even begin.]
I only brought this from Rav Nahman's LeM because it was one of the most striking features of his teaching that I saw when I first started looking at his books. [LeM vol I: 8 I:12, I:28 I:61 II:1 II:8 and many other places I have forgotten off hand.]
The statements of the Gemara itself I forget the page numbers. One is from tractate Shabat.
"All the troubles that come into the world come only because of the religious leaders of Israel as it says in the verse in Isaiah, 'Your judges judge for the sake of getting bribes...'"
So already there was this connection from the start. It was not a new phenomenon in the time of Rav Nahman.
The question is why Rav Nahman would have picked out this particular point among thousands of possible great ideas from the sages he might have chosen to emphasize?
In any case, from the emphasis itself of Rav Nahman it seems these kinds of Torah scholars are not uncommon. Rather if anyone has trouble finding them they probably could not find a snowflake in a blizzard.
Clearly he saw this issue as sine qua non--[without which nothing good can even begin.]
19.3.20
Leonard Nelson: A Theory of Philosophical Fallacies
I guess I am surprised that Leonard Nelson was actually published a few years ago and I simply did not take notice.
A Theory of Philosophical Fallacies published by Springer Verlag [the most prestigious publishing house in the world.
[I can not get over the fact that I missed this. It must be that people finally started noticing Leonard Nelson!! How do you like that?] [Dr. Kelley Ross had noticed Nelson all the way in the 1960's, but he was alone. He devotes his whole web site to expand on the ideas of Nelson.]
[I again want to mention I not want to take a side between his more Kantian approach, and John McTaggart's approach to Hegel]. I have learned, and gained a lot by both. I am not trying to be a philosopher. I simply wanted to gain some insight into the world and I found both to be of great benefit.
What I found amazing in Nelson was the idea of non-intuitive immediate knowledge [faith].
[The issue is can you have faith that is justified? It seems it can not be from empirical evidence. But also a priori seems limited as John Locke pointed out. To see what the problem is you might take a look at Descartes and Berkeley. Kant and Hegel come to answer the problems, but Kant's answers have seemed unsatisfying ever since he proposed them. [Fries came up with non-intuitive immediate knowledge, but his approach had problems also --that I forgot about off hand. If I can recall, I will try to put it up on this blog. But I know at least that Nelson was a great improvement on Kant and Fries both.] Nelson seems to have the best modification of Kant that does answer problems.
[Michael Huemer has an approach different from Nelson. He goes with the idea that Reason tells you more than just how to detect contradictions (as Hume thought). Starting with that he goes further with prima facie the way things seem unless proven otherwise. So what Nelson calls immediate Huemer would also say reason sees things not exactly as immediate, but rather that after you understand the concept then it has prima facie credibility. So to Nelson can a priori knowledge be mistaken? I guess that is the issue. Kelly Ross answered this in connection with non Euclidean Geometry. I forget the whole issue right now.]
[The way I see this is thus: That knowledge and opinion --the question of Plato-is not a difference in kind but a difference of degree. And the whole difference between empirical and a priori is not the issue. As Dr Huemer pointed out there is no such thing as pure empirical knowledge.]
[The odd thing is that Hegel was the exact opposite of Socialism and yet used for that very purpose constantly. The strange thing about that is this. The goal of socialism is to make sure you have nothing more than your neighbor. That is the literal meaning of "equality." That does not mean making more goods. It means taking what there is and making sure that no one has anything more than anyone else. Do you really think that is right?]
[I again want to mention I not want to take a side between his more Kantian approach, and John McTaggart's approach to Hegel]. I have learned, and gained a lot by both. I am not trying to be a philosopher. I simply wanted to gain some insight into the world and I found both to be of great benefit.
What I found amazing in Nelson was the idea of non-intuitive immediate knowledge [faith].
[The issue is can you have faith that is justified? It seems it can not be from empirical evidence. But also a priori seems limited as John Locke pointed out. To see what the problem is you might take a look at Descartes and Berkeley. Kant and Hegel come to answer the problems, but Kant's answers have seemed unsatisfying ever since he proposed them. [Fries came up with non-intuitive immediate knowledge, but his approach had problems also --that I forgot about off hand. If I can recall, I will try to put it up on this blog. But I know at least that Nelson was a great improvement on Kant and Fries both.] Nelson seems to have the best modification of Kant that does answer problems.
[Michael Huemer has an approach different from Nelson. He goes with the idea that Reason tells you more than just how to detect contradictions (as Hume thought). Starting with that he goes further with prima facie the way things seem unless proven otherwise. So what Nelson calls immediate Huemer would also say reason sees things not exactly as immediate, but rather that after you understand the concept then it has prima facie credibility. So to Nelson can a priori knowledge be mistaken? I guess that is the issue. Kelly Ross answered this in connection with non Euclidean Geometry. I forget the whole issue right now.]
[The way I see this is thus: That knowledge and opinion --the question of Plato-is not a difference in kind but a difference of degree. And the whole difference between empirical and a priori is not the issue. As Dr Huemer pointed out there is no such thing as pure empirical knowledge.]
[The odd thing is that Hegel was the exact opposite of Socialism and yet used for that very purpose constantly. The strange thing about that is this. The goal of socialism is to make sure you have nothing more than your neighbor. That is the literal meaning of "equality." That does not mean making more goods. It means taking what there is and making sure that no one has anything more than anyone else. Do you really think that is right?]
Saadia Gaon on some problems in Christianity and some possible answers.
Saadia Gaon dealt with the two basic issues of Christianity of cancellation of the commandments and the Trinity.
But for some reason his book אמונות ודעות [Faiths and World Views] is rarely learned. The reason is that is is not on Gemara nor Musar. Still it sets the stage for all later Musar. [See the Introduction to the Obligations of the Hearts.]
In any case I wanted to mention that certainly he was correct that cancellation of the commandments is wrong. The trouble with this is it is not from Jesus himself but rather from Paul. And Paul was referring to gentiles. So while Saadia Gaon was right to criticize the doctrine, the point is that the doctrine is itself not even in the NT. note 1 [see http://www.anthonyflood.com/bahnsentheonomicposition.htm]
However, I ought to add that there is the point of R Shimon Ben Yochai-- that the commandments have a purpose. And when the purpose does not apply to a situation, the commandment itself is not applicable. For instance: it is not allowed to take a pledge from a rich widow. R. Shimon Ben Yochai said one can take a pledge from a rich widow. [BM 119] [See Rav Shach where he brings up this argument between R Shimon and the Sages.]
The Trinity is also apparently a difficulty except if one takes into account that all mystics generally held the souls of the patriarchs from from Emanation. [I mean all mystics. See Sefer Yezira, Sefer HaBahir, Rav Avraham Abulafia etc.]
[note 1] "Do not begin to think that I came to abrogate the Law or the Prophets; I came not to abrogate but to fulfill. For truly I say to you, until heaven and earth pass away, until all things have happened, not one jot or tittle shall by any means pass away from the law. Therefore, whoever shall break one of these least commandments and teach men so shall be called least in the kingdom of heaven" (Matt. 5:17-19).
But for some reason his book אמונות ודעות [Faiths and World Views] is rarely learned. The reason is that is is not on Gemara nor Musar. Still it sets the stage for all later Musar. [See the Introduction to the Obligations of the Hearts.]
In any case I wanted to mention that certainly he was correct that cancellation of the commandments is wrong. The trouble with this is it is not from Jesus himself but rather from Paul. And Paul was referring to gentiles. So while Saadia Gaon was right to criticize the doctrine, the point is that the doctrine is itself not even in the NT. note 1 [see http://www.anthonyflood.com/bahnsentheonomicposition.htm]
However, I ought to add that there is the point of R Shimon Ben Yochai-- that the commandments have a purpose. And when the purpose does not apply to a situation, the commandment itself is not applicable. For instance: it is not allowed to take a pledge from a rich widow. R. Shimon Ben Yochai said one can take a pledge from a rich widow. [BM 119] [See Rav Shach where he brings up this argument between R Shimon and the Sages.]
The Trinity is also apparently a difficulty except if one takes into account that all mystics generally held the souls of the patriarchs from from Emanation. [I mean all mystics. See Sefer Yezira, Sefer HaBahir, Rav Avraham Abulafia etc.]
[note 1] "Do not begin to think that I came to abrogate the Law or the Prophets; I came not to abrogate but to fulfill. For truly I say to you, until heaven and earth pass away, until all things have happened, not one jot or tittle shall by any means pass away from the law. Therefore, whoever shall break one of these least commandments and teach men so shall be called least in the kingdom of heaven" (Matt. 5:17-19).
Several points about the interpretation of this passage should be rather clear. (1) Christ twice denied that His advent had the purpose of abrogating the Old Testament commandments. (2) Until the expiration of the physical universe, not even a letter or stroke of the law will pass away. And (3) therefore God’s disapprobation rests upon anyone who teaches that even the least of the Old Testament laws may be broken.
Attempts are sometimes made to evade the thrust of this text by editing out its reference to the moral demands of the Old Testament—contrary to what is obvious from its context (5:16, 20, 21-48; 6:1, 10, 33; 7:12, 20-21, 26) and semantics (“the law” in v. 18, “commandment” in v. 19). Other attempts are made to extract an abrogating of the law’s moral demands from the word “fulfill” (v. 17) or the phrase “until all things have happened” (v. 18). This, however, renders the verses self-contradictory in what they assert.
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