Allan Bloom in The Closing of the American Mind the the problem in USA universities [in the humanities and social studies] as being a basic problem that he traces back to the very core of the problems that were raised by Hobbes and the other Enlightenment philosophers. So the problem now is not just universities but it graduated into politics. But the issues have not gone away of been resolved. He was not advocating a return the the faith and reason approach of the Middle Ages and barely mentions Kant or Hegel. He simply says we have met a road block and how we deal with it will determine the future.

He certainly saw the reasons why the newer approach of the Renaissance had to begin. There were enough problems with kings and priests to warrant a new approach. But that new approach has approached a road block.

So what is "Bitachon" [trust in God]?

Navardok, the Chazon Ish and the very first Musar book the Obligations of the Heart and the Gra [the Gaon of Vilna] all deal with this question. But what is the conclusion?
At least we get some clarity when at least we define things as a מחלוקת ראשונים [an argument between the medieval authorities]. When at least you have come to that point where you can say "it is an argument among first authorities" you have reached a conclusion.[Because after that no matter how many argument you will bring to one side, teh fact remains that the other side is also valid and that you simply have not thought of the arguments on that side --yet.\
So the issue of trust with effort or without effort [בטחון עם השתדלות או ביטחון בלי השתדלות] is simple and clear. It is an argument among rishonim [first authorities].
But that still leaves the question what it actually is? Is it that you will get your needs? That does not seem to always be the case. but you can answer that most people that do not get their needs met simply do not have trust. Or enough trust.
However to me it seems that the basic idea is that one thinks and feels that God will make things work out in the way that is right in his eyes.

In particular that is the way it looks like the Chazon Ish explains the issue.

This all may sound all just in the air, but when I was at the Mir in NY, the basic approach of trust in God was very practical. People simply learned Torah and hoped and expected that God would take care of everything else. So they were not learning Torah for the sake making money. Rather they were learning for its own sake. And so if in fact at one point they needed to go out to find some "making a  living" activity, that was thought to not be a contradiction to teh idea of trust. It was simply trust with effort. However using Torah as a  means to make money was definitely looked down upon.  [It was almost thought of as a kind of defilement]. No one in that category had teh slightest respect from anyone.

But there is no obligation to give anything to a divorced woman

The obligation to feed one's wife is one kind of obligation. To  the Rif and most Rishonim it is from the sages, not the Torah. To the Rambam, it is from the Torah. There is also an obligation for a widow to be feed until she remarries. But there is no obligation to give anything to a divorced woman except the Ketubah itself. There is nothing called "Mezonot" "Food". This fact has always bothered me about courts that do not see the difference between divorced women and widows.

In any case, I wanted to introduce the subject of a case where you have a few widows. [I.e. the same husband married them all at different times.]

[Rambam laws of marriage 18 law 14] They all get the ketubah according to the time they were married but mezonot/food they all get at the same time.
The Ravvad says the reason is the obligation of the Ketubah is because they were married. The obligation of Mezonot is because he died. So it is like "borrowed and borrowed and then bought" [at the end of Bava Batra] where all get the same.
Rav Shach I see deals with this issue.

I would like to go into some of the problems of the Middle Ages in order to show that sometimes going to the extreme is the proper thing to do. What I mean is that the Middle Ages was basically exemplified by the focus on Reason and Faith which more or less meant authority belonged to kings and priests.

These lost a great deal of their authority when they seemed incapable of solving problems. The Black Plague would be the best example, but there were  more.  

So the Renaissance began-- which meant more or less, "Let's go to extremes, and then see maybe that will get us somewhere." [Take your pick of many examples of such thinking.]

To some degree you see this in Rav Nahman [Uman and Breslov] in his idea that Torah scholars tend to have a problem of "תלמידי חכמים שדיים והודאיים" (Torah scholars which are demons) which his brings directly from the Zohar [Pinhas]. [See Rav Nahman's LeM I:8, I:12, I:28, I:61, II:1, II:8.]
I have tried to soften the blow of Rav Nahman by explaining this in terms of Jung's archetypes. But it occurred to me that Rav Nahman did not want anyone to soften the blow. He wanted his point to be open and explicit.
That means he did not intend it to be a nice idea revolving in some "mind space". He meant his statement to cause  actions. Sp what kind of actions was he thinking?

w50 E Minor   [w50 in midi]

The Middle Ages had some great points. Civilization could not have risen without the Feudal system. Also there were amazing thinkers. Aquinas, Anselm, Tosphot, Saadia Gaon, the authors of Musar.
But the drawbacks were real. They were not just made up by later generations.

One of the many great ideas of the Middle Ages was faith with reason. But at some point when people were seeing the limits of that they decided the middle of the road approach was not getting anywhere. They decided extremes was the only way. Some choice extremes in one direction and others in other directions.
I think the basic general approach is the middle of the road, but there does come a time and place when extreme action or thought is called for. The Renaissance was mostly about seeking the extreme. As x goes to infinity.
One example of the advantage of extremism is what I mentioned before about two kinds of learning. One going fast--saying the words and going on until you finish the book many times. The other is in depth learning. I think both are necessary.

There is some debate today about universities and some say they do not teach much. You can see this in Michael Huemer. But the problem was already seen by Allan Bloom in The Closing of the American Mind and he saw the issue in a wider context--an issue about the Enlightenment itself.
For there were people from the very beginning of the Enlightenment that were against the whole movement. [Jonathan Swift in Gulliver's Travels where he saw the rule of the intellectuals as them siting on some floating Island and ruling over us plebeians.]

I myself do not see much of an answer. However I can see that even in the Middle Ages before any of that started there already was this issue about Faith and Reason. But the Middle Ages had more or less come to the conclusion that you need both and some kind of synthesis between them.
I would point out that Hegel came closest to defending faith and reason in the most rigorous possible system--if not for the fact that he has been used ever since then for the exact opposite.
Faith with reason in the middle ages was the idea that both are compatible, but no one made the whole into a organic whole.

Leonard Nelson also has a clear defense of faith [That is the Kant Friesian School] but I can not tell if the difference between him and Hegel is all that significant. [The dinge an sich with Nelson is detected by a third faculty of the mind immediate non intuitive knowledge.  It does not seem all that different than Hegel'e getting to God through the dialectic.]
[I think that in terms of STEM universities are doing great. Allan Bloom was talking about the other insane departments.]