The Middle Ages had some great points. Civilization could not have risen without the Feudal system. Also there were amazing thinkers. Aquinas, Anselm, Tosphot, Saadia Gaon, the authors of Musar.
But the drawbacks were real. They were not just made up by later generations.

One of the many great ideas of the Middle Ages was faith with reason. But at some point when people were seeing the limits of that they decided the middle of the road approach was not getting anywhere. They decided extremes was the only way. Some choice extremes in one direction and others in other directions.
I think the basic general approach is the middle of the road, but there does come a time and place when extreme action or thought is called for. The Renaissance was mostly about seeking the extreme. As x goes to infinity.
One example of the advantage of extremism is what I mentioned before about two kinds of learning. One going fast--saying the words and going on until you finish the book many times. The other is in depth learning. I think both are necessary.

There is some debate today about universities and some say they do not teach much. You can see this in Michael Huemer. But the problem was already seen by Allan Bloom in The Closing of the American Mind and he saw the issue in a wider context--an issue about the Enlightenment itself.
For there were people from the very beginning of the Enlightenment that were against the whole movement. [Jonathan Swift in Gulliver's Travels where he saw the rule of the intellectuals as them siting on some floating Island and ruling over us plebeians.]

I myself do not see much of an answer. However I can see that even in the Middle Ages before any of that started there already was this issue about Faith and Reason. But the Middle Ages had more or less come to the conclusion that you need both and some kind of synthesis between them.
I would point out that Hegel came closest to defending faith and reason in the most rigorous possible system--if not for the fact that he has been used ever since then for the exact opposite.
Faith with reason in the middle ages was the idea that both are compatible, but no one made the whole into a organic whole.

Leonard Nelson also has a clear defense of faith [That is the Kant Friesian School] but I can not tell if the difference between him and Hegel is all that significant. [The dinge an sich with Nelson is detected by a third faculty of the mind immediate non intuitive knowledge.  It does not seem all that different than Hegel'e getting to God through the dialectic.]
[I think that in terms of STEM universities are doing great. Allan Bloom was talking about the other insane departments.]

So you have in Rav Nahman [of Uman] [Sicha 76] a clear emphasis on learning as fast as possible. Not just say the words but say the words with "Great speed".  But you also see in his Sefer HaMidot an emphasis on review.
So one way to deal with this is like I was doing in Shar Yashuv--learn each paragraph twice and then go on. Even when I started to learn in depth I also tended to do this same thing.

But that was not really like the general way of learning at the Mir. In the Mir [New York] the morning was devoted to getting as deep as possible. [It was famous for that with Rav Shmuel Berenbaum's classes being considered the deepest in the world.] The afternoon was for fast learning. And that aspect of either part of the Mir I never got to. I was really not on the intellectual level to get as deep into the Sugia/subject as the classes of Rav Shmuel were. But nor was I on the level of doing the fast kind of learning that people were doing in the afternoon.
So I had my middle of the road approach. I would learn the Gemara with Tosphot and the Maharasha and maybe the Pnei Yehushua sometimes and then just go on. I never got into the deep aspects of learning that you can see for yourself in books like the Avi Ezri of Rav Shach and the chidushim of Rav Haim of Brisk.

So now it seems to me that if possible the way of having two different kinds of sessions is the best idea--like they were doing in the Mir. One in depth with lots of review and the other fast. And later I in began to apply both methods to learning Math and Physics. And I can see that both are necessary.
[It took me some time to find the rishonim that held that Physics is part of Torah. That was not well known at the Mir at the time.]

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To me it seems clear that trust in God is not just depending that whatever God wants, that is what will happen.  You can see this in verses. והבוטח בהשם חסד יסובבנו Psalms 16. he who trusts in God, kindness will surround him. So it is not just depending on the Divine Decree. Nor is it saying whatever God wants will happen. Rather the idea is that it is like a filter for polarized light. It lets in only kindness and keeps out the other stuff.
But it also is not trust in order to get things. It is rather indirect. One trusts in God and thus God helps. But it is not trust so that God will help.

Just to be clear. The basic issues about trust come originally from the Obligations of the Hearts by Ibn Pakuda.  חובות לבבות. Later the major sources are the books of Navardok, the Chazon Ish. Rav Nahman does not spend a lot of time on the issue,- but brings a lot of clarity to the issue.
Those four are the basic sources. For some reason the Gra says a remarkable statement about Bitachon. He says the entire purpose of giving the Torah is so that people will trust in God.
he also has that famous statement in his commentary on Proverbs 3 that one should trust in God with no effort. [This seems to be an argument between Ibn Pakuda and the Gra].

The Gra hold trust with no effort. Ibn Pakuda holds with effort. The way of the Gra seems to be that you do only what is required by the Torah and God will do the rest. [That was also how trust/bitachon was understand at the Mir in NY. There the idea was understood that you learn Torah and expect God to take care of your needs. This was in fact very practical. And it was never used as a reason not to do kindness. ]

There is an argument between the "Rishonim" [mediaeval authorities] about the usual law that money that someone has stays where it is unless another party brings a proof. המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה. The question is what happens if the other party grabs it after there is already raised a doubt.
See Bava Mezia page 6b and 7a.
There is a "teaching" that raises the question if a sheep or goat or cow has given birth before.  Then it gives birth. If it would be known that the calf was first born then it is given to a priest. And sacrificed.
But if there is a doubt then it stays with the owner but it can not be used for work or sheared for wool. So one one hand it is like a first born in that shearing and work are forbidden. But it is like a non first born in that the owners keep it.
The Gemara says the reason it stays with the owner is that money that someone has stays where it is unless another party brings a proof. המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה. So if a priest would grab it it would stay by the priest. Raba says we would take it away.
[Actually what Raba meant is the very issue at hand. Rav Shach says what he actually said was that even if we would say you take it away from the priest even so it would be forbidden in work and shearing.

I was in a store that sells "Felafel" (which is a kind of national food in Israel which was originally an Arabic dish) and the owner was asking me about my background. And in the conversation came up his observation that: "The Torah is holy and good but the religious people are f...ked  up."

The point he was making about someone else that works in that store. He said that the religious not only are messed up but that they mess up others.
There is a kind of mental force I think he was implying.

The idea is the more holy the Torah is, the easier it is to get off track. I mean that when you have a numinous area of value [holy and great], if not taken exactly right, it turns into the opposite.
That is why the authentic approach of the Gra, Rav Israel Salanter and Rav Shach is important. Authenticity is the issue.