21.3.18
The Mir Yeshiva [of NY] approach
The Mir Yeshiva approach entails a large degree of humility. That is to say the awareness we really do not know how to teach or learn morality nor any of the big issues. The point is simple, "Learn Torah and act on what you have learned." There is no claim to supernatural powers or supernatural understanding of hidden things.
In fact most roshei yeshiva have a simple line they all say when asked about any subject what so ever that is not directly contained in the Gemara: "It is high things/ הויכע זכין." That is;- they plead ignorance
But besides the basic line "Learn Torah", Reb Shmuel Berenbaum did have a few other things that were important to him,-- and he would say when asked. He held strongly of being in seder [session]. He held strongly about not speaking bad about anyone. That is he was not particularly interested in something was actually lashon hara [slander] or not in terms of the legal definition. And he held strongly of doing kindness when anyone was in need.
[On the other hand the signature of the Gra on the letter of excommunication seems to indicate that sometimes a few words of warning are in order.]
But for politics, philosophy, or anything else - the general approach was "We do not know. So let's just sit and learn."
[I am not saying that this is my approach. I have opinions about everything under the sun. But I think the Mir approach is probably better. To me it seems the Rambam and Saadia Gaon thought the Neo Platonic approach was important enough and essential enough to Torah to write about it.]
Reb Shmuel did not hold highly however of university education. I asked him once about that and his answer was it is OK if it is to make a living.
The grandchildren of Rav David Abuzeira go to a yeshiva in Bnei Brak named after Avraham Kalmonoviz the founder of the Mir in NY --so I figure that is saying something.
In fact most roshei yeshiva have a simple line they all say when asked about any subject what so ever that is not directly contained in the Gemara: "It is high things/ הויכע זכין." That is;- they plead ignorance
But besides the basic line "Learn Torah", Reb Shmuel Berenbaum did have a few other things that were important to him,-- and he would say when asked. He held strongly of being in seder [session]. He held strongly about not speaking bad about anyone. That is he was not particularly interested in something was actually lashon hara [slander] or not in terms of the legal definition. And he held strongly of doing kindness when anyone was in need.
[On the other hand the signature of the Gra on the letter of excommunication seems to indicate that sometimes a few words of warning are in order.]
But for politics, philosophy, or anything else - the general approach was "We do not know. So let's just sit and learn."
[I am not saying that this is my approach. I have opinions about everything under the sun. But I think the Mir approach is probably better. To me it seems the Rambam and Saadia Gaon thought the Neo Platonic approach was important enough and essential enough to Torah to write about it.]
Reb Shmuel did not hold highly however of university education. I asked him once about that and his answer was it is OK if it is to make a living.
The grandchildren of Rav David Abuzeira go to a yeshiva in Bnei Brak named after Avraham Kalmonoviz the founder of the Mir in NY --so I figure that is saying something.
20.3.18
Bava Batra 34
The case of the נסכא של ר' אבא is that a person grabbed an object from another person and one witness saw it. The person that grabbed the object said, "Yes I grabbed it but it is mine." R, Aba holds the law since he can not take an oath he must pay. מתוך שאינו יכול לישבע משלם. He can not take an oath because he agrees with the witness that he grabbed it.
The Ri holds in the case of the נסכא של ר' אבא that there is no migo because if he would deny that he grabbed the object he would have to take an oath. [The Migo here is he could deny that he grabbed the object and we would believe him. So we should believe him when he admits that he grabbed it but he claims the object belongs to him. The reason the Ri says this is not a good migo is that if he would deny that he grabbed the object he would have to take an oath.]The Rivam holds there is a migo because otherwise why would Rav and Shmuel disagree with R. Aba? And the Rivam holds the reason R. Aba does not go with the migo is because of גזרת הכתוב. So then what could the Ri answer to this? I think the Ri would answer that the reason Rav and Shmuel disagree with R. Aba is not because of a migo but because of חזקת ממון.
The fact of the matter is that the Ri you can see holds that Rav and Shmuel do not think like סומכוס.
The Rashbam does hold the law is like סומכוס but you can see here that it is unlikely that the Ri would agree.
( I am just mentioning this because you can see this relates to Bava Metzia pg 100. The Ri you can see holds the person that originally held the object is not called מרא קמא here because there is a doubt if it belonged to him. But in any case if the law would be like סומכוס that would מרא קמא would not help anything anyway and they would have to divide. So at least we can agree that the Ri is not holding like סומכוס]
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The case of the נסכא של ר' אבא is that a person grabbed an object from another person and one witness saw it. The person that grabbed the object said, "Yes I grabbed it, but it is mine." ר' אבא holds the law since he can not take an oath he must pay. מתוך שאינו יכול לישבע משלם. He can not take an oath because he is agrees with the witness. The ר''י holds in the case of the נסכא של ר' אבא that there is no מיגו because if he would deny that he grabbed the object, he would have to take an oath.
[The מיגו here is he could deny that he grabbed the object and we would believe him. So we should believe him when he admits that he grabbed it, but he claims the object belongs to him. The reason the ר''י says this is not a good מיגו is that if he would deny that he grabbed the object, he would have to take an oath.]
The ריב''ם holds there is a מיגו, because otherwise why would רב and שמואל disagree with ר' אבא? And the ריב''ם holds the reason ר' אבא does not go with the מיגו is because of גזירת הכתוב. So then what could the ר''י answer to this? I think the ר''י would answer that the reason רב and שמואל disagree with ר' אבא is not because of a מיגו, but because of חזקת ממון. However the ריב''ם would not hold that חזקת ממון would be a good answer because the object was originally in the possession of the other person.
The fact of the matter is that the ר''י you can see holds that רב and שמואל do not think like סומכוס.
The רשב''ם does hold the law is like סומכוס but you can see here that it is unlikely that the ר''י would agree.
המקרה של נסכא של ר' אבא הוא שאדם תפס חפץ מאדם אחר, ועד אחד ראה את זה. האדם שתפס את האובייקט אמר, "כן תפסתי אותו, אך הוא שלי." ר' אבא מחזיק את החוק הוא שהוא לא יכול להישבע, ולכן הוא חייב לשלם. "מתוך שאינו יכול לישבע משלם." הוא לא יכול להישבע כי הוא מסכים עם העד. הר''י מחזיק במקרה של נסכא של ר' אבא כי אין מיגו כי אם הוא יכחיש שהוא תפס את החפץ, הוא יצטרך לקחת שבועה. הריב''ם מחזיק ישנה מיגו, כי אחרת למה רב ושמואל לא מסכימים עם ר' אבא? וגם הריב''ם מחזיק שהסיבה שר' אבא לא הולך עם המיגו היא בגלל גזירת הכתוב. אז מה יכול הר''י לענות על זה? אני חושב הר''י היה עונה כי הסיבה שרב ושמואל לא מסכימים עם ר' אבא הוא לא בגלל מיגו, אלא בגלל חזקת ממון. אולם ריב''ם לא יחזיק כי חזקת ממון תהיה תשובה טובה כי האובייקט היה במקורו ברשותו של האדם האחר.
אתה יכול לראות שהר''י סובר כי רב ושמואל לא חושבים כמו סומכוס. הרשב''ם מחזיק בשיטה שהחוק הוא כמו סומכוס אבל אתה יכול לראות כאן כי אינו סביר שהר''י יסכים
The Ri holds in the case of the נסכא של ר' אבא that there is no migo because if he would deny that he grabbed the object he would have to take an oath. [The Migo here is he could deny that he grabbed the object and we would believe him. So we should believe him when he admits that he grabbed it but he claims the object belongs to him. The reason the Ri says this is not a good migo is that if he would deny that he grabbed the object he would have to take an oath.]The Rivam holds there is a migo because otherwise why would Rav and Shmuel disagree with R. Aba? And the Rivam holds the reason R. Aba does not go with the migo is because of גזרת הכתוב. So then what could the Ri answer to this? I think the Ri would answer that the reason Rav and Shmuel disagree with R. Aba is not because of a migo but because of חזקת ממון.
The fact of the matter is that the Ri you can see holds that Rav and Shmuel do not think like סומכוס.
The Rashbam does hold the law is like סומכוס but you can see here that it is unlikely that the Ri would agree.
( I am just mentioning this because you can see this relates to Bava Metzia pg 100. The Ri you can see holds the person that originally held the object is not called מרא קמא here because there is a doubt if it belonged to him. But in any case if the law would be like סומכוס that would מרא קמא would not help anything anyway and they would have to divide. So at least we can agree that the Ri is not holding like סומכוס]
_______________________________________________________________________________
The case of the נסכא של ר' אבא is that a person grabbed an object from another person and one witness saw it. The person that grabbed the object said, "Yes I grabbed it, but it is mine." ר' אבא holds the law since he can not take an oath he must pay. מתוך שאינו יכול לישבע משלם. He can not take an oath because he is agrees with the witness. The ר''י holds in the case of the נסכא של ר' אבא that there is no מיגו because if he would deny that he grabbed the object, he would have to take an oath.
[The מיגו here is he could deny that he grabbed the object and we would believe him. So we should believe him when he admits that he grabbed it, but he claims the object belongs to him. The reason the ר''י says this is not a good מיגו is that if he would deny that he grabbed the object, he would have to take an oath.]
The ריב''ם holds there is a מיגו, because otherwise why would רב and שמואל disagree with ר' אבא? And the ריב''ם holds the reason ר' אבא does not go with the מיגו is because of גזירת הכתוב. So then what could the ר''י answer to this? I think the ר''י would answer that the reason רב and שמואל disagree with ר' אבא is not because of a מיגו, but because of חזקת ממון. However the ריב''ם would not hold that חזקת ממון would be a good answer because the object was originally in the possession of the other person.
The fact of the matter is that the ר''י you can see holds that רב and שמואל do not think like סומכוס.
The רשב''ם does hold the law is like סומכוס but you can see here that it is unlikely that the ר''י would agree.
המקרה של נסכא של ר' אבא הוא שאדם תפס חפץ מאדם אחר, ועד אחד ראה את זה. האדם שתפס את האובייקט אמר, "כן תפסתי אותו, אך הוא שלי." ר' אבא מחזיק את החוק הוא שהוא לא יכול להישבע, ולכן הוא חייב לשלם. "מתוך שאינו יכול לישבע משלם." הוא לא יכול להישבע כי הוא מסכים עם העד. הר''י מחזיק במקרה של נסכא של ר' אבא כי אין מיגו כי אם הוא יכחיש שהוא תפס את החפץ, הוא יצטרך לקחת שבועה. הריב''ם מחזיק ישנה מיגו, כי אחרת למה רב ושמואל לא מסכימים עם ר' אבא? וגם הריב''ם מחזיק שהסיבה שר' אבא לא הולך עם המיגו היא בגלל גזירת הכתוב. אז מה יכול הר''י לענות על זה? אני חושב הר''י היה עונה כי הסיבה שרב ושמואל לא מסכימים עם ר' אבא הוא לא בגלל מיגו, אלא בגלל חזקת ממון. אולם ריב''ם לא יחזיק כי חזקת ממון תהיה תשובה טובה כי האובייקט היה במקורו ברשותו של האדם האחר.
אתה יכול לראות שהר''י סובר כי רב ושמואל לא חושבים כמו סומכוס. הרשב''ם מחזיק בשיטה שהחוק הוא כמו סומכוס אבל אתה יכול לראות כאן כי אינו סביר שהר''י יסכים
The King of Judah, Ahaz, invited the king of Assyria to fight against Israel [the Ten Tribes] and Syria. But the policy of Assyria did not change after that. Even though the original alliance was a success, the later king of Assyria just continued his war against Israel until he exiled Israel into the land of Medea [East of Assyria]. After that the kings of Assyria just continued their old policy and then invaded Judah, and then finally tried to conquer Jerusalem itself. The event the Assyria army being wiped out at that point is well known. But the fact that Assyria was first invited in by the King of Judah is less well known. [See Kings 16]
Be careful whom you ask for help from. Alliances are important but with whom to make an alliance is something not simple. [Since reading Thucydides I have been aware of how important alliances are. But the events surrounding the fall of the Ten Tribes shows how much care one needs in determining with whom to form an alliance. ]
Be careful whom you ask for help from. Alliances are important but with whom to make an alliance is something not simple. [Since reading Thucydides I have been aware of how important alliances are. But the events surrounding the fall of the Ten Tribes shows how much care one needs in determining with whom to form an alliance. ]
The all-women engineering team that designed the ill-fated pedestrian foot bridge at Miami’s Florida International University were highly touted for their advances in a field that is typically dominated by men.
The all-women engineering team that designed the ill-fated pedestrian foot bridge at Miami’s Florida International University were highly touted for their advances in a field that is typically dominated by men.
But critics are pointing the finger of blame at the female engineers for design flaws that may have brought the bridge down.
Investigators are still on the scene of last week’s bridge collapse that killed 6 peopleple and injured 9 on the FIU campus in Southwest Miami.
My learning partner suggested this same reason for the cutting back of the Space Program after the Lunar Landings. I mean to say the later accidents were because of promoting incompetent people--so instead of changing the policy to have only white, male engineers,- they simply cut back the program.
[Promoting people that are competent is what ought to be the measuring stick. It should not matter if they are white or male or Martians. The problem is promoting people because they are female or some color other than white. ]
19.3.18
Even though the mystic writings are not supposed to be the basis of Torah, they have assumed a degree of confidence that questioning them is thought to be tantamount to a capital crime.
This was pointed out to me by my learning partner that the Ramban [Nahmanides] is the start of the most fanatic forms of Torah observance. The Rambam [Maimonides] forms the basis of a whole different kind of approach--which never really took off.--the more rational approach.
The mystic "thing" certainly is brought to the attention of anyone at the first step into the world of fanaticism.
One thing that is curious about the mystic thing is that most of the ideas come from the pre-Soctratics. That does not disqualify anything, but makes it less probable that it is Torah from Sinai.
There is nothing innocent about this. It is the pretense to secret knowledge that is used to further personal ambitions and those that suppose and project their own superiority.
Among the signs of idol worship is the ingenious variety of techniques devised to advance the human ambitions in the name of God.
The trouble is rewriting Oral and Written Torah which has been revealed and recorded once and for all time, and with the dangers of misleading others, seeming to claim spiritual merit for oneself, or indulging in simple self-aggrandizement.
[However I do have confidence in the insights of the Ari and other great tzadikim like the Gra and Rav Shach of Ponoviz.]
I have already written an essay a long time ago showing the ten sepherot to the 10 spheres around the earth in the Ptolemy Model, and the "Contraction" and drawing down of the light to the pre Socratics.
The empty space is one of the most remarkable ideas in the Ari and yet the original concept comes from Anaximader. Nevertheless it is a potent and important idea as note by Heidegger. In fact the original seems to have been forgotten by Metaphysics until Heidegger noticed it. The empty space--or negative transcendence was merely conceived as a background for existing things. It was forgotten to ask and understand what it is in itself. [What Heidegger and the Rav Isaac Luria were asking was what allows existing things to come into existence in the first place. Now what do existing things have in common.]
This was pointed out to me by my learning partner that the Ramban [Nahmanides] is the start of the most fanatic forms of Torah observance. The Rambam [Maimonides] forms the basis of a whole different kind of approach--which never really took off.--the more rational approach.
The mystic "thing" certainly is brought to the attention of anyone at the first step into the world of fanaticism.
One thing that is curious about the mystic thing is that most of the ideas come from the pre-Soctratics. That does not disqualify anything, but makes it less probable that it is Torah from Sinai.
There is nothing innocent about this. It is the pretense to secret knowledge that is used to further personal ambitions and those that suppose and project their own superiority.
Among the signs of idol worship is the ingenious variety of techniques devised to advance the human ambitions in the name of God.
The trouble is rewriting Oral and Written Torah which has been revealed and recorded once and for all time, and with the dangers of misleading others, seeming to claim spiritual merit for oneself, or indulging in simple self-aggrandizement.
[However I do have confidence in the insights of the Ari and other great tzadikim like the Gra and Rav Shach of Ponoviz.]
I have already written an essay a long time ago showing the ten sepherot to the 10 spheres around the earth in the Ptolemy Model, and the "Contraction" and drawing down of the light to the pre Socratics.
The empty space is one of the most remarkable ideas in the Ari and yet the original concept comes from Anaximader. Nevertheless it is a potent and important idea as note by Heidegger. In fact the original seems to have been forgotten by Metaphysics until Heidegger noticed it. The empty space--or negative transcendence was merely conceived as a background for existing things. It was forgotten to ask and understand what it is in itself. [What Heidegger and the Rav Isaac Luria were asking was what allows existing things to come into existence in the first place. Now what do existing things have in common.]
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