יש סתירה לכאורה בטור (סימן ש''צ וסימן תי''ב). במקרה של אדם שנשכר לשאת חבית, והיא נופלת ונשברת, שאם הדרך הייתה בשיפוע, הוא אינו חייב בפיצויים, אך אם היא ישרה הוא כן. אבל במקרה של אנשים רגילים ההולכים ונושאים צרור שנפל וגורם נזק לאדם שמאחור, שם הדין הוא כמו ר' יהודה שמעידה נחשבת לתאונה, כלומר, תאונה בלתי נמנעת, והוא אינו אחראי. אין הבדל אם הדרך הייתה בקו ישרה או בשיפוע. רב שך מציע שיש דרגה גבוהה יותר של אחריות אם אדם נשכר לשאת צרור בניגוד לנשיאת הצרור שלו בלבד.(הלכות שכירות פרק ג' הלכה ב') אבל הרמב"ן מביא שהחוק שאדם אחראי בכל דרך לגרום נזק נראה כאילו אינו תואם לכך. הוא אומר שהפעם היחידה שאנחנו לא אומרים שאדם אחראי תמיד היא כאשר מדובר באדם העוסק בעבודתו שלו. זהו אדם שנשכר לעבוד על חפץ כלשהו. בזה אנו אומרים שאם מתרחשת תאונה, הוא אינו אחראי. אבל בדרך חשיבה זו לא צריכה להיות אחריות אפילו במקרה של תאונה. וזה בגלוי לא דומה למה שאנו אומרים בבבא קמא דף כ''ט שמעידה היא תאונה, ואם יש גם נטישת החפץ, אז האדם אינו חייב כלל

There is an apparent contradiction in the Tur ch. 390 and ch. 412. In the case of one who is carrying a barrel and it falls and is broken that if the path was at an incline, he is not obligated in damages, but if it is level he is. But in a case of just regular people walking and carrying some bundle that is dropped and causes damage to the person in back, there the law is like R Judah that tripping is considered to be an accident i.e., an unavoidable accident, and he is not liable. there is no difference if it was path was at an incline or level. Rav Shach [law of renting ch. 3 law 2] suggests that there is a higher degree of responsibility if one is hired to carry some bundle as opposed to just carrying one’s own bundle. But the Ramban brings that the law man is always liable to cause damage seems to not correlate to this. He says that the only time we do not say "a man is liable always" is when it is a case of a person that is involved in his own work, (that is a person that is hired to work on some object). Then we say that if an accident occurs, he is not liable. But in this way of thinking there should be no liability even in a case of accident, and that is openly not like what we are saying in Bava Kama page 29 that tripping is an accident and if there is also abandoning the object then one is not obligated at all. ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ There is an apparent contradiction in the טור. In the case of one who is hired to carry a barrel, and it falls and is broken, that if the path was at an incline, he is not obligated in damages, but if it is level he is. But in a case of just regular people walking and carrying some bundle that is dropped and causes damage to the person in back, there the law is like ר' יהודה that tripping is considered to be an accident i.e., an unavoidable accident, and he is not liable. There is no difference if it was path was at an inline or level. רב שך suggests that there is a higher degree of responsibility if one is hired to carry some bundle as opposed to just carrying one’s own bundle. But the רמב''ן brings that the law man is all ways liable to cause damage seem to not correlate to this. he says that the only time we do not say a man is liable always is when it is a case of a person that is involved in his own work. That is a person that is hired to work on some object Then we say that if an accident occurs, he is not liable. But in this way of thinking there should be no liability even in a case of accident. and that is openly not like what we are saying in בבא קמא page כ''ט that tripping is an accident, and if there is also abandoning the object, then one is not obligated at all.

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יש וויכוח בין ר' מאיר לר' יהודה בב"א מציעא פ"ב ובבא קמא כ''ט ע''א. לפי אביי, הם חלוקים ביניהם על שני דברים. ראשית, האם מעידה היא תאונה או רשלנות. שנית, כאשר אדם נוטש את רכושו לאחר שנפל ארצה, האם זה עדיין נחשב שלו על מנת להיות אחראי לנזק שהוא עלול לגרום, או לא. הדרך שבה המהרש"א מבין את התוספות בכ"ט ע''א היא שר' יהודה שוקל לנטוש או אם הנפילה היא מקרה של תאונה, אז כל אחד מהם יכול לשחרר אותו מחובת הנזק. עבור ר' מאיר, מעידה ברשלנות או נטישת רכושו לאחר שנפל ברשלנות יכולות לגרום לו להיות אחראי. עבור התפארת שמואל, הגישה הנכונה לתוספת זו היא שבמהלך הנפילה, רק אם הנפילה נחשבת ברשלנות או לא משנה. לכן, לפי גישה זו, גם אם הוא נוטש את רכושו במהלך הנפילה, זה לא יפטור אותו. ועבור ר' מאיר, גם אם הנפילה הייתה בבירור מקרית, עדיין אם הוא לא נוטש את רכושו, הוא עדיין אחראי. להבהיר העניין: המקרה הרגיל של מעידה הוא כאשר אדם נושא חבית עבור מישהו, והוא מועד והחבית נשברת. עבור ר' מאיר זה נחשב ברשלנות; עבור ר' יהודה זה במקרה. אבל אפילו ר' יהודה מסכים שיכול להיות מקרה של נפילה ברשלנות, למשל אם אדם מניח אבן, סכין או צרור על גג, והם נופלים ברוח רגילה. כמו כן, עבור ר' מאיר, יכול להיות מקרה של נפילה מקרית, למשל כאשר אדם מניח קנקנים על הגג, והם נופלים ברוח רגילה.

I have been thinking about the argument between R. Meir and R Judah in Bava Mezia 82 and Bava Kama 29. According to Abaye, they disagree about two things. One, if tripping is an accident or negligence. Two, when one abandons his property after it has fallen to the ground, if that is still considered to be his in order to be liable for damage that it might cause, or not. The way the Maharccsha understands Tosphot on pg 29a is that R Judah considers either letting go (abandoning) or if the fall is a case of accident, then either one can release him from obligation for damage. To R. Meir, either tripping by negligence or abandoning one’s property after it has fallen by negligence can make him liable. To the Tiferet Shmuel (Rav Aaron Shmuel from Kaidan) the proper approach to this Tosphot is that at during the fall, only if the fall is considered by negligence or not matters. So, to this approach, even if he abandons his property during the fall, that would not excuse him. and to R Meir even if a fall was clearly by accident, still if he does not abandon his property, he is still liable. The normal case of tripping is when one is carrying a barrel for someone, and he trips and the barrel is broken. To R. Meir that is by negligence; to R. Judah that is by accident. But even R. Judah agrees at there can be a case of falling by negligence, for example if one places a stone, knife, or bundle on a roof, and they fall by a common wind. Also, to R Meir, there can be a case of a falling by accident, for example of one places jars on the roof, and they fall during an uncommon wind._________________________ I have been thinking about the argument between ר’ מאירand ר' יהודה in בבא מציעא 82 and בבא קמא 29. According to אביי, they disagree about two things. One, if tripping is an accident or negligence. Two, when one abandons his property after it has fallen to the ground, if that is still considered to be his in order to be liable for damage that it might cause, or not. The way the מהרש''א understands תוספות on 29a is that ר' יהודה considers either letting go (abandoning) or if the fall is a case of accident, then either one can release him from obligation for damage. To ר' מאיר, either tripping by negligence or abandoning one’s property after it has fallen by negligence can make him liable. To the תפארת שמואל the proper approach to this תוספות is that at during the fall, only if the fall is considered by negligence or not matters. So, to this approach, even if he abandons his property during the fall, that would not excuse him. And to ר' מאיר even if a fall was clearly by accident, still if he does not abandon his property, he is still liable. The normal case of tripping is when one is carrying a barrel for someone, and he trips and the barrel is broken. To ר’ מאיר that is by negligence; to ר' יהודה that is by accident. But even ר' יהודה agrees at there can be a case of falling by negligence, for example if one places a stone, knife, or bundle on a roof, and they fall by a common wind. Also, to R Meir, there can be a case of a falling by accident, for example of one places jars on the roof, and they fall during an uncommon wind.

The cure for all kinds of modern insanity

The cure for all kinds of modern insanity is faith and reason. I am a fan of faith and reason -the formula of the Middle Ages but with a modern twist. While in the Middle Ages, reason meant Aristotle and faith meant the catholic church. But I think that even starting at 1350 A.D. with the plague and later with wars against protestants that the approach to faith has to be rethought. And Reason I think is not really exactly reading Aristotle, but I would include Plato Plotinus and Kant, Hegel; also, John Locke and the founding papers of the USA, i.e. the Constitution, the Federalist Papers and the letters of the founding fathers. The line of division between philosophy and politics is blurred and so I think including John Locke and James Madison is important, Dr. Kelley Ross has some important improvements on the Friesian school started by Leonard Nelson, mainly the idea of Karl Popper about propositions that may not be able to be proven true, but can be proven false. At any rate, I think that philosophers tend to overextend themselves into politics. Though professors of philosophy tend to have high I.Q.s, but when they venture into politics, things seem to go haywire.Orientation matters you can not revere everything and expect the same result a we see in Discrete Differential Geometry. so, Mari x thinking he could revere Hegel mean that he came up with a system that does not work.