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9.4.24

[The difference between Fries and Hegel

 Hegel is considered to be defending  law and order,  and that everyone has their place in society and  their obligation is to fulfill the duties and obligations that are naturally part of that place. Kant was quite opposite to this. Individual autonomy was the rule. So you might sum-up the argument thus: Hegel saw the disaster of the Reign of Terror of the French Revolution and sought a principle by which freedom can be preserved without disintegrating into chaos. Kant had developed his system before the French revolution, and had a portrait of Rousseau [the ideal of the French  revolutionaries] in his room.

In my view, both are a necessary advancement in philosophy, and reflect the ancient tension between individual and the group, and I do not think that anyone has come up with an answer to this tension. I am mainly on the side of the modified approach to Kant of the Kant-Friesian school  that Kelley Ross so ably defends in his web site, but I can not share the distain that most Kantians feel towards Hegel.[I admit I might be wrong. After all, see the book by Hobhouse, The Metaphysical State. And I do see that communism took a certain degree of Hegel, and yet I do not agree with communism. I hold with John Locke and the Two Treaties.  ]

[BUT I admit my regard for Hegel is probably because I read his Logic ( part of his Encyclopedia) rather than the Phenomenology that everyone else reads--or is assigned to read for their homework. Plus I think the best book on Hegel is McTaggart's.  I also like Cunningham ]   

At any rate, I would like here to recommend the founders of the second Friesian school, Leonard Nelson and Kelley Ross who provide a necessary amendment to Kant, since I do not think that the B deduction of Kant stands very well on its own, and anyway there is absolutely not the slightest bit of agreement about what Kant actually says there in the first place.  I can see how wonderful it is that Kant is being reintroduced in some universities, still  I  can't see why people do not adopt the modification of Leonard Nelson. [Even though Nelson was just a continuation of Fries in his own mind, I see a lot more rigorous logic in Nelson. But you do not have to take my word for it. Take a look yourself, and I think you will  see what I mean.  ]

[The difference between Fries and Hegel is that the connection between sensory perception and the intellectual categories or why, where, when and what are through non intuitive immediate knowledge in the Friesian approach because Kant did not explain any better way that concepts and senses can exist. To Hegel, even sense objects are manifestations of the Logos of Plato-so there is no place where the intellect can't penetrate. ]

Maybe there is disagreement between them, but I see both as modifications of Plotinus and his Neoplatonist approach



7.4.24

Bava Mezia 93b. There was a shepherd who was shepherding his sheep and one fell into the river. Raba said the shepherd is not liable for what could he have done? That is he considered this a case of a a unavoidable (big) accident that a paid guard does not pay for. Abayee asked on this from a braita a shepherd was watching his sheep and went into the city for a  short break and a lion came and took one of the sheep. If he could have saved the sheep if he had been there he is  liable. Abayee suggested that the break was a normal kind and yet he is still liable and so we see this is considered a case of an  avoidable accident [small accident]and so the shepherd is liable. Raba answered, no. rather it is a case of taking an unusual break and so it is considered an avoidable accident but for an unavoidable accident  he would not be liable. abaye asked if the case is he took an unusual break then it it is a case of the beginning  in transgression and the end in accident is liable. Tosphot learns from here that a minimal amount of guarding is not considered the beginning  in transgression and the end in accident.

The Ramban brings the gemara in Bava Kama 45a to show that this same principle is accepted universally, not just for Abayee. There the teaching is that four types of guards take the place of the owner. If they are guarding an dangerous ox (that had been seen to kill on three other occasions) that got loose and killed someone. The ox is killed, and the guards except the unpaid guard pay kofer a fine and pay for the loss of the ox to the owner. So we see by the fact that the unpaid guard is not liable that the minimal amount of guarding is not considered transgression (for all guards). My question here is that perhaps a minimal amount of guarding is not considered transgression for an unpaid guard, but perhaps it is considered transgression for a paid guard since he is obligated in a higher standard of guarding? [I noticed later that the Ramban, in fact, only meant his argument to apply to the unpaid guard.]


I might mention that Rav Shach and Rav Meltzer had an argument about this Ramban. Rav Meltzer claimed the argument of the Ramban only worked if the obligation of the guard is towards the owner of the animal, while Rav Shach showed that the Ramban's argument works even if the guard is obligated toone whom gets injured by an animal he was guarding.

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בבא מציעא צ''ג ע''ב. There was a shepherd who was shepherding his sheep, and one fell into the river. רבה said the shepherd is not liable for what could he have done? That is he considered this a case of a a unavoidable (big) accident that a paid guard does not pay for. אביי asked on this from a ברייתא a shepherd was watching his sheep and went into the city for a  short break and a lion came and took one of the sheep. If he could have saved the sheep if he had been there he is  liable. אביי suggested that the break was a normal kind, and yet he is still liable; and so we see this is considered a case of an  avoidable accident [small accident] and so the shepherd is liable. רבה answered, no. Rather it is a case of taking an unusual break and so it is considered an avoidable accident, but for an unavoidable accident  he would not be liable. אביי asked if the case is he took an unusual break, then it it is a case of "the beginning  in פשיעה and the end in אונס is liable." תוספות learns from here that a minimal amount of guarding is not considered "the beginning  in פשיעה and the end in accident."

The רמב''ן brings the גמרא in בבא קמא מ''ה ע''א to show that this same principle is accepted universally, not just for אביי. There the teaching is that four types of guards take the place of the owner. If they are guarding an dangerous ox (that had been seen to kill on three other occasions) that got loose and killed someone. The ox is killed, and the guards except the שומר חינם pay כופר a fine and pay for the loss of the ox to the owner. So we see by the fact that the שומר חינם is not liable that the minimal amount of guarding is not considered transgression. My question here is that perhaps a minimal amount of guarding is not considered transgression for an unpaid guard, but perhaps it is considered transgression for a paid guard since he is obligated in a higher standard of guarding?


בבא מציעא צ''ג ע''ב. היה רועה צאן ואחד נפל לנהר. רבה אמר שהרועה אינו אחראי. מה הוא היה יכול לעשות? כלומר הוא ראה בזה מקרה של תאונה בלתי נמנעת (גדולה) ששומר בתשלום לא משלם עליה. אביי שאל על כך מברייתא רועה צאן שומר כבשיו ונכנס לעיר להפסקה קצרה, ובא אריה ולקח את אחת הכבשים. אם הוא היה יכול להציל את הכבשה לו היה שם הוא אחראי. אביי הציע שההפסקה היא רגילה, ובכל זאת הוא עדיין אחראי; ולכן אנו רואים שזה נחשב למקרה של תאונה נמנעת [תאונה קטנה] ולכן הרועה אחראי. רבה ענה לא. אלא מדובר בהפסקה חריגה, ולכן היא נחשבת לתאונה שאפשר להיות נמנעת, אך בגין תאונה בלתי נמנעת הוא לא יהיה אחראי. אביי שאל אם במקרה הוא לקח הפסקה חריגה, אז זה מקרה של "ההתחלה בפשיעה והסוף באונס שהוא אחראי". תוספות לומדת מכאן שכמות מינימלית של שמירה אינה נחשבת "התחלה בפשיעה וסוף בתאונה.

הרמב''ן מביא את הגמרא בבבא קמא מ''ה ע''א להראות שאותו עיקרון מקובל בכל העולם, לא רק על אביי. שם ההוראה היא שארבעה סוגי שומרים תופסים את מקומו של הבעלים. אם הם שומרים על שור מסוכן (שראו אותו הורג בשלוש הזדמנויות אחרות) שהשתחרר והרג מישהו. השור נהרג, והשומרים חוץ מהשומר חינם משלמים כופר (קנס) ומשלמים על אובדן השור לבעלים. אז אנו רואים בעובדה שהשומר חינם אינו אחראי שכמות השמירה המינימלית אינה נחשבת לעבירה. שאלתי כאן היא שאולי כמות שמירה מינימלית אינה נחשבת עבירה לשומר ללא שכר, אבל אולי היא נחשבת עבירה לשומר בתשלום שכן הוא חייב ברמת שמירה גבוהה יותר?


28.3.24

Bava Kama page 6a

In the Rambam laws of damages 13:19 there is a law that if a tree or wall fall down and cause damage there is no liability unless they were not sturdy and  unsteady and the court told him to take them down. Then he is obligated. In Bava Kama page 6a  Abyee says we learn from the Mishna in the beginning of Bava Kama "the common denominator" comes to include his stone, knife or package that he left on a roof and they fell because of a common wind that even after they fall he is liable. The Rif and  Rambam leave out the law about a stone knife or burden. Rav Shach writes that that can be derived from the case of the wall.  a question is that Abyee derives the stone from a hole in a public domain (pit) and fire, while Ravina derives the tree and wall from a pit and an ox. Therefore we can not derive the stone and knife from the wall  because the knife might not be obligated since a different force is mixed with their fall.  I thought of the answer to this last question. The Rif and Rambam do bring other cases which we derive from hole (pit) and fire, and so we can derive the stone and knife from those cases.  another question is if the Rif and Rambam do not bring the law of the stone and knife on the roof, maybe they do not hold from it at all.  After all that law is from Abyee, and they might say that this whole subject is an argument between Abyee,  Rava, Rav Ada bar Ahava and Ravina,  and we do not go with Abyee against Rava except in 6 specified cases. [Yal Kegam]. But this last question does not seem very likely since the case of the stone and knife seem more severe that the tree since he put them on the roof where he was aware that a common wind could knock them down. 
Also I would like to mention that the Rosh learns from Tosphot that all these cases have the law of  a hole in a public domain, and we need to derive them from the common denominator only to show that they are liable, but their main law is that of a hole. It is likely that the Rif and Rambam hold the same way.   
I would like to add here for clarification the  Gemara on page 6a of Bava Kama. The Gemara asks what is the "common denominator" of the Mishna coming to add? Abyee says his stone knife or package that he left on a roof and they fell in a common wind and caused damage after they  were already at rest. This is derived from  hole and fire. Rava said a hole that is being pushed around in a public domain from hole a fire. Rav Ada Bar Ahava said opening the drain pipes and that drainage causes damage from pit and fire. Ravina said a wall and tree that fell from pit and ox.     

 Let me point out that the Gemara is clear that the Mishna is talking about when the wall and tree are already on the ground, and that the only obligation is if the owner still retains possession of them. Then the law is that he is liable only if the court had given him thirty days warning to take down the wall or tree because  they were shaky. Otherwise he is not obligated. But to Tosphot any damage they do at the time of falling is not liable because he is considered innocent of wrongdoing. But to Rav Isar Melzter damage they do at time of falling is obligated because they are  like fire that damages while moving. But the problem I see with that is fire and a knife that fall from a roof are liable because there was a transgression from the beginning when he put them there while there was no transgression in planting the tree and building the wall that fell.


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In the רמב''ם הלכות נזקי ממון  פרק י''ג הלכה י''ט there is a law that if a tree or wall fall down and cause damage there is no liability unless they were not sturdy and  unsteady and the court told him to take them down. Then he is obligated. In בבא קמא ו' ע''א says we learn from the משנה in the beginning of בבא קמא "the common denominator" צד השווה comes to include his stone, knife or package that he left on a roof and they fell because of a common wind that even after they fall he is liable. The רי''ף and  רמב''ם leave out the law about a stone knife or burden. רב שך writes that that can be derived from the case of the wall.  A question is that אביי derives the stone from a hole in a public domain (pit) and fire, while רבינא derives the tree and wall from a pit and an ox. Therefore we can not derive the stone and knife from the wall  because the knife might not be obligated since a different force is mixed with their fall.  I thought of the answer to this last question. The רי''ף and רמב''ם do bring other cases which we derive from hole (pit) and fire, and so we can derive the stone and knife from those cases.  Another question is if the רי''ף and רמב''ם do not bring the law of the stone and knife on the roof, maybe they do not hold from it at all.  After all that law is from Abyee, and they might say that this whole subject is an argument between אביי, רבא, רב אדא בר אהבה and רבינא,  and we do not go with אביי against רבא except in 6 specified cases. יע''ל כג''ם.. But this last question does not seem very likely since the case of the stone and knife seem more severe that the tree since he put them on the roof where he was aware that a common wind could knock them down. 
Also I would like to mention that the רא''ש learns from תוספות that all these cases have the law of  a hole in a public domain, and we need to derive them from the common denominator only to show that they are liable, but their main law is that of a hole. It is likely that the רי''ף and רמב''ם hold the same way.   
I would like to add here for clarification the  גמרא בבא קמא ד''ו ע''א  . The גמרא asks what is the "common denominator" of the משנה coming to add? אביי says his stone knife or package that he left on a roof and they fell in a common wind and caused damage after they  were already at rest. This is derived from  hole and fire. רבא said a hole that is being pushed around in a public domain from hole a fire. רב אדא בר אהבה said opening the drain pipes and that drainage causes damage from pit and fire. רבינא said a wall and tree that fell from pit and ox.     

 Let me point out that the גמרא is clear that the משנה is talking about when the wall and tree are already on the ground, and that the only obligation is if the owner still retains possession of them. Then the law is that he is liable only if the court had given him thirty days warning to take down the wall or tree because  they were shaky. Otherwise he is not obligated. But to תוספות any damage they do at the time of falling is not liable because he is considered innocent of wrongdoing. But to רב איסר מלצר damage they do at time of falling is obligated because they are  like fire that damages while moving. But the problem I see with that is fire and a knife that fall from a roof are liable because there was a transgression from the beginning when he put them there while there was no transgression in planting the tree and building the wall that fell.


ברמב''ם הלכות נזקי ממון פרק י''ג הלכה י''ט יש דין שאם עץ או חומה נופלים וגורמים נזק אין אחריות אלא אם לא היו יציבים והזהירו הבית הדין להוריד אותם. ואז הוא מחויב. בבבא קמא ו' ע''א אומר למדים מהמשנה בתחילת בבא קמא "המכנה המשותף" צד השווה בא לכלול את אבן, סכינו או חבילה שהשאיר על גג ונפלו בגלל רוח מצויה שגם לאחר שנפלו הוא אחראי. הרי''ף ורמב''ם משאירים בחוץ את הדין על סכין אבן או משא. רב שך כותב שאפשר ללמוד את זה ממקרה הקיר. שאלה היא שאבי שואב את האבן מבור ברשות הרבים ואש, ואילו רבינא לומד את העץ והקיר מבור ושור. לכן לא נוכל ללמוד את האבן והסכין מהקיר כי ייתכן שהסכין לא חייבת כיון שכוח אחר מעורב בנפילתם. חשבתי על התשובה לשאלה האחרונה הזו. הרי''ף והרמב''ם אכן מביאים מקרים אחרים שאנו נובעים מבור ואש, וכך נוכל להפיק את האבן והסכין מאותם מקרים. שאלה נוספת היא אם הרי''ף והרמב''ם אינם מביאים דין האבן והסכין על הגג, אולי אינם מחזיקים ממנו כלל. הרי הדין הזה הוא מאבי, וייתכן שיגידו שכל הנושא הזה הוא ויכוח בין אביי, רבא, רב אדא בר אהבה ורבינא, ואין אנו הולכים עם אביי נגד רבא אלא בשש מקרים מוגדרים, יע''ל כג''ם.. אבל השאלה האחרונה הזו לא נראית סבירה מאוד שכן המקרה של האבן והסכין נראים חמורים יותר מהעץ מאז שהניח אותם על הגג שם היה מודע לכך שרוח רגילה עלולה לדפוק הם למטה

כמו כן אני רוצה להזכיר שהרא''ש לומד מתוספות שלכל המקרים האלה יש דין של בור ברשות הרבים, וצריך ללמוד אותם מהמכנה המשותף רק כדי להראות שהם חייבים, אבל החוק העיקרי הוא של בור. סביר להניח שהרי''ף והרמב''ם מחזיקים באותו אופן.

אני רוצה להוסיף כאן לבירור את הגמרא בבא קמא ד''ו ע''א . הגמרא שואלת מהו "המכנה המשותף" של המשנה שבא להוסיף? אביי אומר כי סכין האבן או החבילה שלו שהשאיר על גג והם נפלו ברוח מצויה וגרמו נזק לאחר שכבר היו על הקרקע. זה נגזר מבור ואש. אמר רבא בור שדוחפים אותו ברשות הרבים מבור ואש. רב אדא בר אהבה אמר פתיחת צינורות הניקוז וכי הניקוז גורם נזק מבור ואש. רבינא אמר חומה ועץ שנפלו מבור ושור

 

  אציין שהגמרא ברור שהמשנה מדבר על דין כשהקיר והעץ כבר נמצאים על הקרקע, והחובה היחידה היא אם הבעלים עדיין מחזיקים בהם. אז הדין הוא שהוא חייב רק אם בית הדין נתן לו אזהרה שלושים יום להוריד את החומה או העץ בגלל שהם רעועים. אחרת הוא לא חייב. אבל לתוספות כל נזק שיגרמו בשעת נפילה אינו אחראי כי הוא נחשב חף מפשע. אבל לרב איסר מלצר נזק שעושים בשעת נפילה חייב משום שהם כאש הפוגעת תוך כדי תנועה. אבל הבעיה שאני רואה בזה היא אש וסכין שנפלו מגג אחראים כי הייתה עבירה מלכתחילה כשהניח אותם שם אבל לא הייתה עבירה בנטיעת העץ ובבניית החומה שנפלו.


5.3.24

learning Torah is important.

 I would like to recommend learning the book Nefesh haChaim by Reb Chaim of Voloshin [a disciple of the Gra] in in particular the fourth volume.    This is a part of book that explains why learning Torah is important. A large part of my own approach to the world is to a large extent based on this idea, even though I got the idea originally by being in two great Litvak yeshivot, Shar Yashuv and the Mir in NY. The actually reading of the Nefesh HaChaim came after I had already been in the Mir for a few years. It just confirmed what I already felt intuitively.  Nowadays I think that it is hard for most people to get the idea of the importance of learning Torah without that book. [I might mention here that the best way to learn Torah is to hear classes from an authentic Litvak rosh yeshiva. Happily I had the opportunity to hear such classes myself from Reb Shmuel Berenbaum. However the important thing is that they should be in fact expert. That can be found mainly in people that have learned in Ponovitch, Brisk, Mir or the other great Litvak yeshivot.]

I would also like to mention I define "learning Torah" in a rather limited way. That is the Old Testament, the two Talmuds. the Midrashei Halacha  and Midrashei Agada. So anything written after the finishing of the Talmud does not count except as commentary. [I do think that here it is important to mention the opinion of some early authorities like ibn Pakuda and the Rambam who held learning Physics and Metaphysics is in the category of learning Talmud as you can see in Mishna Torah laws of Learning Torah in the law about dividing ones time into thirds: one third for Talmud, and in that category comes the subjects dealt with in the first four chapters of Mishna Torah. And if that is not clear enough, the Rambam makes sure that you get the point in the Guide.] Metaphysics in the early authorities means Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus.  Physics in the Rambam  includes Chemistry.

Torah is the Law of Moses.  The point of the Gemara is to understand how to apply it. Not to change it or to add or subtract. Thus I see that what the world needs is the Law of Moses.  


The problem in dealing with the Law of Moses is not to add and not to subtract and not to change it or change its meaning. And to accomplish this is very much an individual endeavor.   It is impossible to keep the Law of Moses except as an individual and ignore all groups.


Why Do Progressives Like Islam? MICHAEL HUEMER

 



1. Pro-Muslim Progressivism

Leftists have been trying to promote the cause of the oppressed for as long as I can remember. When I was in college, they mainly thought of the oppressed groups as women, blacks, and the poor. In the last 20 years, the ranks of oppressed groups have grown. Of particular interest, Muslims are now thought of as an important oppressed group, on whose side good progressives must fight. After warning about racism and patriarchy, the left is also eager to warn against “Islamophobia”. Left-wing protestors now seek to silence speakers who criticize Islam, as happened to Richard Dawkins when he was scheduled to speak in Berkeley. (Dawkins rejects all religion, but only his anti-Islam comments anger people on the left.)

It was also woke activists who got the film Jihad Rehab cancelled. This was a documentary containing interviews with ex-terrorists who were being rehabilitated at a Saudi detention center. It was initially critically acclaimed, before Muslim/woke filmmakers embarked on a campaign to label it “Islamophobic” (with no rational basis) and keep it from being publicly shown.

After the Hamas attack on October 7, left-wing students on American university campuses began passionate anti-Israel protests, among which you could find such slogans as “queers for Palestine” displayed unironically. Immediately after the attack, a group of 33 Harvard student organizations released a statement blaming Israel entirely for the attack.

2. The Strangeness of Pro-Islamic Progressivism

Let’s review what is odd about this.

a. Women

Progressives usually speak against what they view as the oppression of women in Western nations, e.g., the fact that women earn 20% less money than men on average (which is due to their choosing different kinds of work). Women in Muslim countries, however, are actually oppressed.

In Saudi Arabia, women have male guardians (typically their fathers or husbands). Until very recently, they needed the permission of their male guardian to get a passport, get married, get official documents, or get a job. Only in 2017 did the Saudi patriarchs decide that women could be allowed to drive.

In Islamic tradition, women are expected to cover their heads. In Iran and Afghanistan, women are legally required to wear the hijab. The most committed Muslims want women to cover their faces as well.

Some forms of Islam consider female genital mutilation mandatory, to prevent women from ever experiencing sexual pleasure.

b. Gays

For context, recall that gay marriage was legalized in the U.S. by the Supreme Court in 2015. Before that, this was a major issue for progressives, who viewed the lack of recognition for gay marriage as a form of intolerable oppression of gays. Even now, many still regard America as oppressive towards gays.

In many Muslim nations, however, the idea of gay marriage is completely beyond the pale; just being gay is illegal. In Saudi Arabia, Iran, Yemen, Mauritania, Nigeria, and Brunei (all majority Muslim countries), homosexuality is a death penalty offense.

Given how much progressives criticize America for its alleged mistreatment of women and gays, one would expect that they would be apoplectic about the horrific oppression of women and gays in many Muslim nations. Yet among those who are most vocal about the oppression of minorities in other contexts, it’s hard to find a critical word spoken about Islam.

3. Progressive Explanations

How could progressives explain this?

a. It’s only a few extremists

Perhaps progressives would say that these forms of oppression are only supported by the more extreme, fundamentalist Muslims and that we should avoid allowing our general view of Islam to be colored by a few extremists.

But we’re not just talking about a small, fringe element in the Islamic world. Again, multiple Muslim nations literally, legally prescribe death to homosexuals. After the October 7 attack, 72% of Palestinians surveyed supported the attack — an attack that massacred teenagers at a music festival, raped and mutilated women, and burned babies.

Progressives don’t seem particularly concerned about portraying Americans, white people, or men as oppressive. Yet the forces of intolerance within each of those groups are a minute fraction of what they are within the Islamic world.

b. US/Israel is worse

Perhaps progressives would say that Israel and the U.S. have caused more harm to Muslims than Muslims have caused to Israel and the U.S.; therefore, it’s more important to protest Israel and the U.S. Perhaps progressives just don’t want to dilute this most important message by adding criticisms of Islam.

Bear in mind, however, that hundreds of millions of people in the world live in Islamic theocracies. So this really doesn’t seem like a kind of oppression that someone whose political worldview revolved around oppression could afford to overlook.

Progressives are also not usually very sympathetic to the “someone else is worse” defense. For instance, during the Cold War, they didn’t see as a good reason suppress their criticisms of the United States that the Soviet Union was worse. They don’t hold off from attacking America’s history with slavery when informed that Arab slavery was worse; they regard that as quite irrelevant.

c. The obligation to fix one’s own society

Perhaps progressives would say that they tend to focus on problems with the West, America, Christianity, etc., because we have an obligation to fix the problems in our own society.

I’m not sure, though, why it wouldn’t also be important to address huge problems in other societies — at least important enough that you would frequently hear progressives talking about the oppression of women and gays in the Islamic world.

Progressives living in America also don’t seem to have any reticence about criticizing Israel, so it doesn’t seem as if the relevant distinction is between one’s own and other societies. It seems that the distinction is Muslims versus (Jews & Christians).

4. Hate

I have a suspicion about the answer. It is not a nice explanation, but it seems to me to fit the evidence.

When did Muslims gain favor with the American left? As far as I recall, it started after 9/11/2001. Before that, I can’t remember the left caring about the plight of Muslims or including them in their “diversity” goals. Before that, Islam wasn’t really on the radar screen of American politics.

Right after 9/11, most Americans were horrified and enraged. But not everyone. Some people on the far left gleefully seized the chance to blame America, just as those Harvard students took the chance to blame Israel for the October 7 attack. An Ethnic Studies professor at the University of Colorado posted an essay on “the justice of roosting chickens”, seemingly explaining the attack as the natural and just consequence of American evil. He compared America to the Nazis and justified killing people in the World Trade Center thus:

“As for those in the World Trade Center... Well, really, let's get a grip here, shall we? True enough, they were civilians of a sort. But innocent? Gimme a break. They formed a technocratic corps at the very heart of America’s global financial empire … If there was a better, more effective, or in fact any other way of visiting some penalty befitting their participation upon the little Eichmanns inhabiting the sterile sanctuary of the twin towers, I’d really be interested in hearing about it.”

Needless to say, the idea that Islamic terrorists are crusaders for socialism and progressive causes as Western leftists understand them is a narcissistic delusion. Al Qaeda, Hamas, and other Islamic extremist groups don’t give two craps about American leftist causes. They are crusaders for Islam. Osama bin Laden attacked America because he wanted to end U.S. support for the Saudi government, so that he could depose them and establish a different, more extreme fundamentalist theocracy in Saudi Arabia. Many people fail to understand this because they can’t imagine a society having completely different issues and different belief systems from ours.

Returning to the point: What do far leftists like about Islam? They like that Islamic extremists hate America. That’s what really matters to them. It’s more important to hate America than to recognize democracy, or free speech, or to treat women or gays like human beings.

The far left’s hatred of America is not explained by America’s mistreatment of this or that group, else they would hate the countries that treat those groups far worse. Rather, hatred of America is a fundamental ideological axiom. Their complaints about America’s alleged oppression of minorities are not driven by concern for those minorities; they are just a tool for attacking America. That is why woke activism doesn’t focus on practical steps to improve the lives of minorities (e.g., programs to reduce out-of-wedlock births, increase graduation rates, or reduce gang violence); it focuses almost entirely on convincing everyone that America is evil.

Granted, most people on the left side of the political spectrum are moderate leftists who don’t really hate America (just as most rightists are moderate rightists, not white supremacists). But people on the left stick together: they’re afraid to criticize anyone on the left side of the spectrum, however extreme. They’re afraid even to undermine the messaging that anyone on their side has undertaken. Hence, even moderate leftists won’t criticize Islam, since that would show disloyalty to their side, since the extremists have decided that the Islamic world is a leftist ally.

Why do the extreme leftists hate America? I still don’t know. This is very strange because most people throughout history, regardless of the society they lived in, had a very strong bias in favor of their own society. What trauma have left-wing extremists suffered that left them with such a deep-seated resentment toward their own society?


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© 2024 Michael Huemer

4.3.24

My approach to war is like General Sherman

 My approach to war is like General Sherman who burnt every town he walked into on his way through Georgia.  Not from cruelty, but from the sense that war is hell, and the most compassionate way about it is to end it as soon as possible. That is by making people not want to fight. He made no differences between soldiers or civilian. All the more so in Gaza where there is in fact no difference. 

 In the approach of Torah there have been three compromises. Faith with reason was the compromise of the Middle Ages. It is the approach of Saadia Gaon, the Chovot Levavot (Josef ibn Pakuda), and Rambam. [This I think is not that of the Ramban.] The separation of faith from reason, I think is a mistake. 


  There is another approach of Torah with pleasure. In this approach people follow Torah because it is the best way to "get laid" i.e., to get one's desires fulfilled. 

  There is a modern approach where the compromise is Torah with community. That is that Torah is a way to have a place in the religious community.

In these last two of these choices, boredom is the main motivation. People follow them because they are bored.

Mysticism also got mixed up with Torah because it tend to be tasty --much more than Talmudic arguments. But most of its influence has been baneful. However I have a lot of respect for Izhak Luria. The fact  that he is misused does not remove his value. Even Hegel quotes him. The Romans had a saying: "Misuse does not cancel use."