"I don't need no man" school of feminism. By Dr Kelley Ross. My mom told me: “To marry a nice Jewish girl." "Nice" and "Jewish" are two separate conditions.

American men get the drift that indoctrinated women are really all but hostile, with them finding it difficult to explain why they are open to dating at all. We also get a new ideology among men that women are not worth the trouble, to date or to marry, especially with family law weighted against men in divorce and custody disputes. "I don't need no man" school of feminism. So here, in response to the question, "No kids! What are you going to do when you're old?" we see an older woman relaxing with a drink in a chair by the pool, under an umbrella, with a stack of books to read and another person, perhaps a Black gentleman, in the adjacent chair. Of course, not everyone can afford this kind of retirement; the man is liable to die before her; and she is then left alone, perhaps without any family. That is the fate of many older women, who may die, as well as live, alone. Hopefully, days will not pass before her body is discovered. We are only missing the cats to complete the picture. We do get a kind of self-satisfied, smug smile, as though this is the best kind of life. All this reinforces the sort of feminist ideology of isolation and self-sufficiency that we often get now. In response, we also get a new ideology among men that women are not worth the trouble, to date or to marry, especially with family law weighted against men in divorce and custody disputes. Indeed, organizers have been discovering that "singles" events sometimes draw few, or no, men. This is a phenomenon, not just in the West, but in China, Korea, and Japan also, where marriage and even sex seem to be declining in popularity. American men get the drift that indoctrinated women are really all but hostile, with them finding it difficult to explain why they are open to dating at all. In March, 2025, a contestant on the Netflix show “Love Is Blind” broke off her engagement at the altar beause she suddenly decided that the groom was insufficiently political, with the "right" politics. He didn't even care about the fraudulent travesty, "Black Lives Matter." Truly, he is clearly better off. Next, at right, we get a purer version of "I don't need no man." What a man likes is irrelevant because a feminist is not in the business of pleasing anyone else. In fact, I don't know how often a man is liable to offer advice like this. It is more likely he will just check out if this woman represents something that "no man wants." Indeed, the "we don't care" may be a deal breaker all on its own. The "we" in this presumably means all women -- none of them are to care what a man thinks -- although it may just be the Royal We, which fits the attitude. The key thing, however, is that the woman here doesn't care what he likes or wants. She is not in the business of pleasing anyone but herself. I think this is called being "self-centered" or "narcissistic"; and I thought that it was only Ayn Rand who advocated the "virtue of selfishness." Isn't it only Capitalism that promotes the atomization of society? Would this feminist ever be able to buy this guy a Christmas or birthday present, if she never knows what he likes? Seems like she would just buy something that she likes, which will persuade the fellow that she really doesn't care about him. So we see the autism and isolation of this ideology. The accusation is always that the "patriarchy" wants women to live entirely for others, but here this is the polar opposite, to live with no concern for anyone else at all, headed towards the solitary old age and death as noted above. Or, after all, there are convents. Then, we might consider the cartoon at left. This at least concedes that a woman might be happy and fulfilled in a marriage with children. But, of course, it is balanced, at least, with the solitary and self-satisfied representative on the right. The terminology is also interesting, with each woman labelled as "complete." But we also might wonder if the implication here is that Black women marry because they are not capable of the self-sufficiency of the white woman. Sounds like a bit of racism, even as Molnar is trying to virtue-signal by showing an interracial marriage. Of course, some people are happy being alone; and there can be communities of people without children or even marriage. Which is why I mention convents. "Retirement" communities try to create little societies where people can be happy even while family and others are dying, or senile, around them. Perhaps the woman above is not by a pool at her own home but by the common pool of such a place. They play bingo or string beads for amusement. However, retirement communities are an "end of life" provision. The woman on the right, with her pizza and coffee, doesn't look ready for retirement. Instead, she is the ideal of solitary contentment. But, for most people, this is exceptional; yet it is the ideal promoted by this kind of feminism, and by Leiney Molnar. It is the sort of thing that is contrary, not only to most religious traditions, but to the principles of Darwinian Evolution. In other words, solitary self-satisfaction is not a good survival or reproductive strategy. Indeed, with some animals, like tigers, the females mate, conceive, and raise the young on their own. This is also a provision in feminist ideology, where "single motherhood" is just as "complete" as anything else. Unfortunately, human beings are not tigers; and we know that children raised by single mothers disproportionately suffer from a multitude of social and developmental problems, not the least of which is a greater incidence of criminal activity. Also, most single mothers are not professional white women but live at much lower income levels, say, from waitressing (where the IRS taxes tips, which are gifts, as income - which Trump has promised to stop), if not no income. Darwinian survival is no small consideration. Married women are the safest people in modern society, despite the Left wishing to portray marriage as hellscapes of domestic abuse. No, lowlife boyfriends are the threat of domestic violence, including against children, and Lesbian relationships can be just as violent as heterosexual ones. The former may be more common in low income circumstances, especiallly if the boyfriends are parasitic on the women, and not the natural fathers of the children. Male lions who take over a pride, as we know, kill the cubs of the lionesses. Next, at right, we've got a woman complaining about birth control pills, while the man complains, in what we are expected to take as in a trivial and dismissive way, about condoms. Actually, the problem with condoms is that they blanket all the sexually sensitive parts of the male anatomy. This reduces sensation, which otherwise is the point of engaging is sex beyond reproductive purposes, in which condoms would be counterproductive anyway. The problem with the woman's complaint, in turn, is that she doesn't need to use the Pill for birth control. Yet the Pill was presented, and has been celebrated for years, as the easiest way to make women as casual about sex as men can be. Nevertheless, as she complains, there can be side effects, which may be serious enough that they counterindicate the use of the drug. On the other hand, some women use the Pill therapeutically, for instance to regularize their menses. Thus, the complaint here about the Pill may be valid, but it will only apply to a subset of women, while the cartoon gives us the impression that it is the general experience of all women on the Pill. So this is a misrepresentation. My first wife was suspicious of what the Pill did to her sexual libido, but she otherwise seemed to have no complaints about it. At the same time, this woman doesn't need to use the Pill. I had a girlfriend who only used a diaphram, and she seemed pleased enough with its use. There also used to be contraceptive sponges, but in 1994 these were no longer available because when the maker (Whitehall-Robins Healthcare) wanted to change factories, the FDA required that the devices be re-certified, which the maker did not want to pay for. Now I've seen that there was some contamination in the factory, and the maker didn't want to upgrade the equipment. That is not what I heard at the time. Sponges have been reintroduced, but also withdrawn again, at least three times. The loss of this device was even the subject of an episode of Seinfeld (The Sponge, S7:E9, December 7, 1995). There seemed to be little protest about the loss of the sponges from Establishment feminism. The FDA may have jerked women around, but, apparently, it is above accountability to the public. Typical for the Administrative State. The rest of the woman's complaint in the cartoon is about the horror of pregnancy. In that case, "I have to go through a traumatic abortion" (unlike Lena Dunham's infamous wish that she had had an abortion, since it sounded like a feminist sacrament), or she must tolerate destroying her life by actually having children, which, as we have seen, seems to be a fate worse than death. All this because the male is so selfish and insensitive that he doesn't want to inhibit his sexual response with a condom. Obviously, none of this will be beneficial for either of them. Finally, at left we see a celebration of divorce. But every divorce will be a failure of something, whether it is a failure of judgment, of maturity, or perhaps the moral failure of one of the partners. If the nature of the failure is not recognized, then the "new beginning" very likely will be the preparation for another failure. I know both men and women who've been through four marriages. The vibe we get from the cartoon, however, is more like that marriages are disposable and that now it is time to move on for some more fun. The moral failing in that case might well be of the woman pictured. The moral shallowness of all this is much like the advertisement we see here for a divorce lawyer: The implication is that the gentleman on the sign, unless he gets a divorce, is missing out on the busty woman standing in front of it. And perhaps she can tolerate using the Pill. This should be a clue that the problem here with feminism is part of a larger problem of which this kind of feminism is only one exemplar. The appeal about divorce is to hedonism. The dismissal of marriage and children is an expression of nihilism, whose only serious goal could be the extinction of life. None of that is possible without the rejection of the value of any religious tradition, which means that, in the West, it is fallout from atheism. The belief in ancient Greece, Rome, India, and China that reproduction is a duty to our ancestors is something that, naturally, no one believes now -- unless it is in India and China (where offerings to ancestors are still made at Ch'ing Ming). The rejection of hedonism and the diagnosis of nihilism following from atheism is, of course, characteristic of the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche. Nietzsche's solution was to substitute the pursuit of power for any of the old features of religious belief. This did not improve matters. Those pursuing power murdered many millions of people in the 20th Century, although their program was often dressed up with a rhetoric of Marxist "liberation." Yet somehow "liberation" always involved luxury for the rulers and tyranny, slavery, and poverty for everyone else. Establishment feminism is, naturally, like all the political Left, mad for power. This is incompatible with hedonism, as we indeed see in the feminist anaesthesia and anhedonia that poison cultural discourse and even popular entertainment. Nevertheless, as examined above, there is a parallel appeal that offers pleasure and irresponsibility to vulnerable and gullible women. Blow off men, family, and children and you will be happy, like the Davos Supervillains telling people they will own nothing and will be happy, sitting in their corporate cubicles, in an office where there is no social life because the men expect that any interaction with the women beyond business necessities will result in a sexual harassment lawsuit. Unfortunately, many women may buy into this until youth and fertility are gone (called "hitting the wall") and they are left with the isolation that has been sold to them. Hedonism and nihilism take a toll, morally and physically. That is the end of the essay by Dr Ross. My own input to this is to mention that my Mom told me “To marry a nice Jewish girl" and that these are separate conditions.

קשה על דעת הרמב''ם עם הכלב עם הלחם והפחם היא שקשה לראות איך זה מתאים לגמרא. הגמרא אמנם אומר שר' יוחנן סבור שאש חייבת בגלל חיצים שלו וממונו, אבל קשה לראות איך זה עוזר לרמב''ם. אם הרמב''ם היה מחזיק ישירות ורק כריש לקיש, אז הייתה לנו תשובה, אבל הוא לא. הוא מחזיק שאש חייבת בגלל חיציו. תן לי להסביר למה אם הוא יחזיק כריש לקיש זה יעזור לו. ריש לקיש אמר אש מחויבת כאשר היא רכושו של אדם. ואז גמרא שואלת עליו מהמשנה עם הכלב, הלחם והפחם. הפחם לא שייך לבעל הכלב, אז למה הוא חייב לשלם על הערימה? ריש לקיש עונה כי הכלב זרק את הכיכר עם הפחם על הערימה. זה אומר שהוא לא אחראי לאש בכלל, אלא בגלל קרן של שור תם או בגלל צרורות. זה בוודאי כמו הגמרא בעמוד י''ח שבו גמרא מחזיקה שהאחריות היא מצרורות או קרן התם. ולריש לקיש האחריות היא רק על מקום הפחם, לא כל הערימה כי האש לא הייתה של בעל הכלב, ובעל הפחם אינו אחראי כי שמר על הגחלים שלו. אבל הראשונים כולם החליטו שהדין הוא כמו ר' יוחנן ולכן ישנה אפשרות להיות אחראי או כאשר האש שייכת לו או שזה מקרה של חיציו. אז למה הרמב''ם סבור שאין אחריות על הערימה, אלא רק הדרך שהפחם עבר כשהכלב גרר אותו. בכל מקרה, למה זה משנה לריש לקיש אם הכלב זרק את הפחם? גם אם הוא הניח אותו בעדינות, זה עדיין קרן שור תם או צרורות. יתר על כן, איך מסביר ר' יוחנן את המשנה, שהכלב הניח את הפחם בעדינות כך שבעלי הכלב אחראי לחצי נזק לכל הערימה. אבל למה? זה עדיין לא "החצים שלו" אלא חיצים של הכלב שלו, והפחם לא שייך לו_________ כדי לענות על שאלה זו על הרמב''ם אני חושב שצריך להסתכל אחורה בדף י''ח שם עולה סוגיית כוחו של כח. נוכל לראות שהגמרא שם רואה בשאלת רבא אם תלך לפי תחילת או סוף עילות הנזק כשאלה כמו צרורות (חלוקי נחל). יש גם אם העוף שלעס את החוט שהחזיק כלי שנפל ושבר כלי אחר הוא כוח כוחו. אף שהגמרא שם לא מגיע לתשובה על כוח כוחו [מפני שהתרנגולת אולי דחפה את הכלי עד שנשבר על אבן], הרמב''ם והתוספות כאן בדף כ''ב אכן מגיעים לתשובה. העובדה שר' יוחנן דורש שהכלב יניח את הכיכר עם הפחם על הערימה כדי שיהיה חצי נזק, מלמדת שכוח כוחו אינו חייב כלל (או אולי נזק רביעי כפי ששואל הראב''ד על הרמב''ם). אני חושב שר' יוחנן מסכים עם ריש לקיש בנקודה זו. זה הטעם שריש לקיש אמר אין חיוב על הערימה עצמה כי הכלב הנושא את הלחם לערימה הוא בכוח, וזה יהיה חייב, אבל אז הכלב זרק את הכיכר עם הפחם, וזה כוח של כוחו, ולכן אין חיוב על הערימה. זה גרסה ארוכה יותר של אמירת מה שכתבו תוספות בדף כ''ב. עם זאת, כתבתי במקום אחר שאולי הרמב"ם מהחזיק כמו הרא"ש שכוח כוח הוא חייב, אבל על סמך השאלות שיש לי כאן על הרמב"ם, והעובדה שאני לא יכול לראות לו שום תשובה חוץ מלומר שהוא מחזיק כמו תוספות, אני חושב ששם יש למצוא תשובה אחרת

The Mishna brings a case that a dog carried a loaf with a burning coal in it to a stack and the stack is burnt up. The payment for the loaf is full damage, and the payment for the stack is half damage. so why does the Rambam hold that there is no liability for the whole stack, but only the path the coal took as the dog dragged it along? One problem with the opinion of the Rambam about the dog with the loaf and coal is that it is hard to see how it corresponds to the Gemara. The Gemara does say that R Yochanan holds that fire is also obligated because of arrows or money, but it is hard to see how that helps the Rambam. If the Rambam would hold directly and only like Reish Lakish, then we would have an answer, but he does not. He holds fire is obligated because of "his arrows". Let me explain why if he would hold by Reish Lakish that would help him. Reish Lakish said fire is obligated when it is one's property. Then the Gemara asks on him from the Mishna with the dog, loaf, and coal. The coal does not belong to the owner of the dog, so why is he liable to pay for the stack? Reish Lakish answers because the dog threw the loaf with the coal onto the stack. That means it is not liable for fire at all, but rather because of horn of a tame ox (that became wild) or because of pebbles. This is certainly like the Gemara on page 18 where Gemara holds the liability is from pebbles or horn of a tame ox. And to Reish Lakish, the liability is only on the place of the coal, not the whole stack because the fire did not belong to the owner of the dog, and the owner of the coal is not liable because he guarded his coal. But the Rishonim (medieval authorities) all decided the law is like R Yochanan, and therefore there is the possibility of being liable for either when the fire belongs to one or it is a case of "his arrows". so why does the Rambam hold that there is no liability for the stack, but only the path the coal took as the dog dragged it along. In any case, why does it make a difference to Reish Lakish if the dog threw the coal? Even if he put it down gently, it is still horn of an ox or pebbles. Furthermore, how does R Yochanan explain the Mishna, that the dog put the coal down gently, so the owner of the dog is liable half damage for the whole stack. But why? It still is not “his arrows” but arrows of his dog and the coal does not belong to him. In order to answer this question on the Rambam I think it is necessary to look aback on page 18 where the issue of force of a force comes up. We can see that the gemara there considers the question of Rava about if you go by the beginning or the end of the causes of damage to be the same question as pebbles. There also is the case if the chicken that chewed on the string which held a vessel that fell and broke another vessel is force of force. Though the gemara there does not arrive at an answer about force of a force [because the chicken might have pushed the vessel until it broke on a stone], the Rambam and the Tosphot here on page 22 do arrive at an answer. The fact that R. Yochanan require that the dog place the loaf with the coal on the stack in order for there to be half damage, show that force of a force is not obligated at all (or perhaps fourth damage as the Raavad asks on the Rambam). I think R yochanan agrees with Reih Lakish on this point. It is the reason that Reish Lakish said there is no obligation on the stack itself because the dog carrying on the loaf to the stack is force, and that would be liable, but then the dog threw the loaf with the coal, and that is force of a force, and that is why there is no obligation on the stack. This is a longer version of saying what Tosphot wrote on page 22. However, I wrote elsewhere that the Rambam might hold like the Rosh that force of a force is obligated but based on the questions I have here on the Rambam, and the fact that I can not see any answer for him except to say that he holds like Tosphot, I think that that other place has to be answered in a different way ______________________________________________________________________________________ ________________ The problem with the opinion of the רמב’’ם about the dog with the loaf and coal is hard to see how it corresponds to the גמרא. The גמרא does say that ר’ יוחנן holds that fire is also obligated because of money, but it is hard to see how that helps the רמב’’ם. If the רמב’’ם would hold directly and only like ריש לקיש, then we would have an answer, but he does not. He holds fire is obligated because of his arrows. Let me explain why if he would hold by ריש לקיש that would help him. ריש לקיש said fire is obligated when it is one's property. Then גמרא asks on him from the משנה with the dog, loaf, and coal. The coal does not belong to the owner of the dog, so why is he liable to pay for the stack? ריש לקיש answers because the dog threw the loaf with the coal onto the stack. That means it is not liable for fire at all, but rather because of horn of a tame ox or because of צרורות. This certainly like the גמרא on page י''ח where גמרא holds the liability is from צרורות or קרן התם. and to ריש לקיש the liability is only on the place of the coal, not the whole stack because the fire did not belong to the owner of the dog and the owner of the coal is not liable because he guarded his coal. But the ראשונים all decided the law is like ר’ יוחנן and therefore there is the possibility of being liable for either when the fire belongs to one or it is a case of his arrows. so why does the רמב’’ם hold that there is no liability for the stack, but only the path the coal took as the dog dragged it along. In any case, why does it make a difference to ריש לקיש if the dog threw the coal? Even if he put it down gently, it is still horn of an ox or צרורותs. Furthermore, how does ר’ יוחנן explain THE משנה, that the dog put the coal down gently so the owner of the dog is liable half damage for the whole stack. But why? It still is not “his arrows” but arrows of his dog and the coal does not belong to him. In order to answer this question on the רמב’’ם I think it is necessary to look back on page י''ח where the issue of force of a force comes up. We can see that the גמרא there considers the question of רבא about if you go by the beginning or the end of the causes of damage to be the same question as pebbles. There also is the case if the chicken that chewed on the string which held a vessel that fell and broke another vessel is force of force. Though the גמרא there does not arrive at an answer about force of a force [because the chicken might have pushed the vessel until it broke on a stone], the רמב’’ם and the תוספות here on page כ''ב do arrive at an answer. The fact that ר' יוחנןrequire that the dog place the loaf with the coal on the stack in order for there to be half damage, show that force of a force is not obligated at all (or perhaps fourth damage as the ראב'' ד asks on the רמב’’ם). I think ר' יוחנן agrees with ריש לקיש on this point. It is the reason that ריש לקישsaid there is no obligation on the stack itself because the dog carrying on the loaf to the stack is force, and that would be liable, but then the dog threw the loaf with the coal, and that is force of a force, and that is why there is no obligation on the stack. This is a longer version of saying what תוספות wrote on page 22. However, I wrote elsewhere that the רמב’’ם might hold like the רא''ש that force of a force is obligated but based on the questions I have here on the רמב’’ם, and the fact that I can not see any answer for him except to say that he holds like תוספות, I think that that other place has to be answered in a different way ______________________________________________________________________________________

קושי על הרמב''ם מהגמרא בבא קמא כ''ג ע''א

הגמרא שואלת על המשנה . המשנה מביאה מקרה שכלב נשא כיכר עם פחם בוער לערימה והערימה נשרפה. התשלום עבור הכיכר הוא נזק מלא, והתשלום עבור הערימה הוא חצי נזק. הגמרא אומרת שהסיבה היא שלא מדובר בחצים של עצמו, אלא בחצים של הכלב, אז זה חצי נזק. הגמרא שואלת אז מי משלם? תשובה: הבעלים של הכלב. הוא שואל, "למה לא הבעלים של הפחם?" תשובה: הוא שמר על הפחם שלו. לכן, הגמרא קובעת שהדין הוא שהתשלום עבור הערימה הוא חצי נזק, וזה משולם על ידי בעל הכלב. אולי גם בעל הפחם ישלם אם לא ישמור על הפחם. [וכן שתוספות אומר.] אבל אנחנו לא יודעים זאת ישירות מהגמרא. כל מה שאנחנו יודעים בוודאות מהגמרא הוא שהבעלים של הכלב משלם חצי נזק עבור הערימה. אז למה הרמב''ם כותב שאין תשלום על הערימה בכלל? לאן נעלם הבעלים של הכלב? אם הרמב''ם רצה לומר שגם בעל האש משלם הוא היה יכול לכתוב את זה

A difficulty on the Rambam from the Gemara Bava kama pg 23

Furthermore, the Gemara asks on the Mishna . The Mishna brings a case that a dog carried a loaf with a burning coal in it to a stack and the stack is burnt up. The payment for the loaf is full damage, and the payment for the stack is half damage. The Gemara says the reason is that it is not one's own arrows, but the arrows of the dog, so it is half damage. The Gemara then asks, “Who pays?” Answer: the owner of the dog. It asks “Why not the owner of the coal?” Answer: he guarded his coal. So, the Gemara holds that the law is that the payment for the stack is half damage, and that is paid by the owner of the dog. Maybe the owner of the coal would also pay if he did not guard the coal. [And that if fact what Tosphot says.] But we do not know that directly from the Gemara. All we know for sure from the Gemara is the owner of the dog pays half damage for the stack. So why does the Rambam write there is not payment for the stack at all? Where did the owner of the dog go? If the Rambam wanted to say the owner of the fire also pays well, he could have written that. _____________________________________________________________________________________________________The גמרא asks on the משנה . The משנה brings a case that a dog carried a loaf with a burning coal in it to a stack and the stack is burnt up. The payment for the loaf is full damage, and the payment for the stack is half damage. The גמרא says the reason is that it is not one's own arrows, but the arrows of the dog, so it is half damage. The גמרא then asks, “Who pays?” Answer: the owner of the dog. It asks “Why not the owner of the coal?” Answer: he guarded his coal. So, the גמרא holds that the law is that the payment for the stack is half damage, and that is paid by the owner of the dog. Maybe the owner of the coal would also pay if he did not guard the coal. [And that if fact what תוספות says.] But we do not know that directly from the גמרא. All we know for sure from the גמרא is the owner of the dog pays half damage for the stack. So why does the רמב''ם write there is not payment for the stack at all? Where did the owner of the dog go? If the רמב''ם wanted to say the owner of the fire also pays well, he could have written that.

הרמב''ן אומר שיש הוכחה קלה שתחילתו בפשיעה וסופו באונס חייב אינו חל על מקרה שבו ההתחלה היא בשמירה פחותה, ואחר כך בא אונס. ההוכחה שהוא מביא בדף צ''ג בבא מציעא היא הברייתא בדף מ''ה בבא קמא ארבע באים במקום הבעלים: שואל, שוכר, שומר בתשלום ושומר ללא תשלום. אם הוזהר שור שלוש פעמים, והולך והורג מישהו, נהרג השור, ושלושת מיני השומרים משלמים כופר ומחזירים ערך השור לבעלים חוץ מהשומר ללא תשלום (שלא מחזיר כלום לבעלים של השור). הגמרא החליטה שהברייתא מתייחסת למקרה שבו כל הארבעה שמרו על השור עם שמירה מינימלית. וכן, הגמרא אומר שלפי ר' אלעזר יש לשחוט בהמה שכבר הוכחה כמסוכנת והמשנה שלנו מתייחסת למקרה כזה. מצד אחד, אני יכול להבין את הרמב''ן כי השומר שכר עשה כמות מינימלית של שמירה אבל כל השומרים היו צריכים לעשות את השמירה הראויה. כך שרק השומר ללא תשלום אינו מחויב לשלם. עם זאת, נראה שקשה להבין. הסיבה שאני אומר את זה היא שחוק ההתחלה בפשיעה וסופו באונס חייב הכוונה לשומר בתשלום (שומר שכר). זה לא יכול להיות השומר חינם כי בכל מקרה הוא לא חייב במקום שעשה שמירה מינימלית. אז זה חייב להתייחס לשומר בתשלום. אבל הוא חייב בברייתא אף על פי שעשה שמירה מינימלית. אז איך אתה יכול להחליט ממקרה שהוא חייב בתשלום, למרות שעשה שמירה מינימלית, למקרה שגם עשה שמירה מינימלית ובכל זאת להחליט שהוא לא חייב

The Ramban says that there is a light proof that the beginning with neglect and the end by force which is obligated in damage does not apply to a case in which the beginning is with minimal guarding, and then later cames force. The proof he brings on page 93 of Bava Metzia is the teaching on page 45 in Bava Kama, "Four come in place of the owner: a borrower, renter, paid guard and an unpaid guard. If an ox has been warned three times, and goes and kills someone, the ox is killed and 3 kinds of guard pay the fixed penalty and pay back to value of the ox to the owner except for the unpaid guard who does not pay back. The Gemara decided the braita is taking about a case where all four guarded the animal with minimal guarding. Also, the gemara says that according to R. Elazar, that an animal that has already proven dangerous must be slaughtered, and our mishna is referring to such a case. On one hand, I can see the point of the Ramban because the paid guard did a minimal amount of guarding, but all should have done the proper amount of guarding. so only the unpaid guard is not obligated to pay. However, it seems hard to understand. The reason I say this is the entire law of the "beginning by by neglect and the end with force is obligated to pay" is referring to the paid guard. It cannot be the unpaid one because in any case he is not obligated where he did minimal guarding. so, it must refer to the paid guard. But he is obligated in the braita even though he did minimal guarding. so how can you decide from a case where he is obligated to pay even though he did minimal guarding to a case where he also did minimal guarding and yet say he is not obligated.______________________________________________ The רמב''ן says that there is a slight proof that תחילתו בפשיעה וסופו באונס חייב does not apply to a case in which the beginning is with שמירה פחותה, and then later came force. The proof he brings on page צ''ג of בבא מציעא is the ברייתא on page מ''ה in בבא קמא four come in place of the owner: a borrower, renter, paid guard and an unpaid guard. If an ox has been warned three times, and goes and kills someone, the ox is killed, and the four kinds of guard pay the כופר and pay back to value of the ox to the owner. That is all three except for the unpaid guard who does not pay back. Theגמרא decided הברייתא is taking about a case where all four guarded the animal with minimal guarding שמירה פחותה . Also, theגמרא says that according to ר' אלעזר that an animal that has already proven dangerous must be slaughtered and our משנה is referring to such a case. On one hand, I can see the point of the רמב''ן because the שומר שכר did a minimal amount of guarding but all שומריםshould have done the proper amount of guarding. so only the unpaid guard is not obligated to pay. however, it seems hard to understand. The reason I say this is the law of the תחילתו בפשיעה וסופו באונס חייב is referring to the paid guard שומר שכר. It cannot be the שומר חינם because in any case he is not obligated where he did minimal guarding. so, it must refer to the paid guard. But he is obligated in the ברייתא even though he did minimal guarding. so how can you decide from a case where he is obligated to pay, even though he did minimal guarding, to a case where he also did minimal guarding and yet say he is not obligated.