I have not been writing about the beginning of Bava Metzia because I see there are a few different approaches to solve the conundrum of why in the begining you have two people holding onto a garment that you divide, while in a case in Bava Metzia 37a you have cases of a deposit and theft where there is one case where you say the object being argued over should be left in neither’s possession, and in another case you say nothing and the parties decide it between themselves. The main approaches to solve this mystery are Rav Shach, Rav Isar Meltzer, Rav Chaim of Brisk and Rav Shmuel Rozovski. Reb Chaim and Rav Shmuel Rozovski are very similar in approach. Rav Shach has radical new approach in which he explains the position of the Rambam as being based on the idea that the case in the beginning of Bava Metzia is they divide because you say that "What is in one's possession is assumed to belong to him," without needing any further proof. Rav Isar Meltzar has a new approach to the idea of "derara demomona" by which he solves these problems. Some of the major problems come from the Rambam, but there are two arguments between Rashi and Tosphot conerning "derara demomona" and the reason in the first mishna you say divide. [I hope that i might gain some clarity into this subject, but for now I am just trying to get some idea of what the problems are and possible solutions] I might mention that I am limited by the fact that is do not have my learning partner, David Bronson, to learn with any more. His razor-sharp computer mind made getting to the depths of any subject highly accessible for me. I have just these great thinkers of the Litvack world, David Bronson was invaluable in his way of electron micro scoping a subject. But since I do not have him with me, I look to the great sages of the Litvak world that have a more global perspective

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My feeling about philosophy is that it kind of got side tracked during the 20th century. In the words of John Searle, "The last 50 years of 20th century philosophy is obviously false." That includes existentialism which was proven false by a 13-year-old eight grader listening to Sarte about how meaning is different for every person. You construct your own meaning. The eight grader asked him, "Then why are you talking?" Robert Hanna has shown that so-called "Analytic Philosophy" is of historical interest only. The case is, however, even more severe. It is all about truth and meaning of words, but is totally innocent of awareness that meaning is 100 percent subjective without the slightest bit of objectivity in it. For example, the word "Dog" has meaning only to me and to whom I am talking to. In itself, it has zero relation to the dog except in the minds of people talking. [I mean to say that it has zero relevance to objective reality. And after all, what is the point of philosophy but to have an idea of what objective reality is all about. Well, here you have about 100 years of supposed rigorous philosophy which has no relevance at all to objective reality.] If you want my suggestion about philosophy, I think that Leonard Nelson is what people ought to spend time learning. That is after first getting through Kant's three critiques. You might also look at the web site of Kelley Ross who does an excellent job of getting across the main points of this Kant/Nelson approach. I might mention here the complaint of Michael Huemer about this Kant/Nelson School of thought--that is immediate non intuitive knowledge. The complaint is why would we think that implanted knowledge is true? But that is the very point of Kelley Ross in defense of this school --the very reason he resorted to Karl Popper' idea that knowledge can’t be proven. It can only be falsified. You can never prove without a shadow of doubt about any proposition, but you can disprove false propositions.And that position is not all that different from Huemer's idea of using a kind of probability theory to come to knowledge. He agrees that you can only come to truth by a long series maybe infinite series of step each one known by a kind of probability theory] The flaw in Kant is idealism along the line of Berkely and Hume. But Hegel has flaw also like the master slave dialectic. It seem to me like Plato and Aristotle in which each had important point but a 1ynthesis happened only later in Plotinus.

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argument between Tosphot and the Rambam. Kritot 28a כריתות כ''ח ע''א

There is an argument between Tosphot and the Rambam about the law animals are not pushed off. [That means if one declares that "This animal will be a burnt offering" while that animal can't be a burnt offering. But the later it becomes fit.] To Tosphot, that is reflected in the statement R. Shimon and R. Elazar that if one sanctifies a female sheep to be a guilt offering or a burnt offering, and it gives birth to a male, that male can be sacrificed as a guilt offering or a burnt offering. The sages however disagree, and hold that the mother and male sheep have go to pasture, and stay there until they get a blemish, and then are redeemed (sold), and with that money they are sold for, one buys a male sheep to bring for a guilt offering or a burnt offering. However, the Rambam holds both with the principle “Animals are not pushed off” and with the sages that disagree with R Shimon and R Elazar. Rav Shach (sacrifies 15 law four) solves this puzzle with the idea that when the one sanctifies the female sheep to be a guilt offering that is holiness that is pushed off. And it is in such cases that even when the animal becomes fit for a sacrifice, it remains pushed off. However, in a case like when one partner sanctifies his portion in an animal and the other does not, then if that partner later buys the remaining part then the whole animal is fit for a sacrifice. The reason I bring this up is that it is unclear to me in what kind of case one says the holiness is pushed off. For two examples the case of the partners Rashi says there it is holiness that is pushed off. (However, that might be because Rashi there is explaining R. Yochanan. It might be that Rav hold the holiness is not pushed off]. Another example is in Kritot 28a where R Oshiya says if one is liable a sin offering as a rich man and puts aside two birds to sell and use that money to buy a sheep, and then becomes poor, he cannot bring the birds which are the sacrifice of a poor man. It is unclear to me why this case would be considered holiness that is pushed off while the case of partners is not. However, that might be because he holds like R Yochanan that even the case of partners is considered holiness that is pushed off. ( R.Yochanan holds animals can be pushed off.) And in fact, the Rambam wrote in that case that the pair of birds can be brought as his sin offering. So it might be that this is exactly the argument between Rav and R Yochanan, what kind of case is considered holiness that is pushed off. Much later after writing the above paragraph I noticed Rav Shach in the end of Laws of Temura brings two examples that might help to clarify the subject. One is the case of one sanctifies a female sheep for the Passover sacrifice. That animal and its temura and even the male offspring cannot be brought for a Passover sacrifice. But if one sanctifies a female animal to be a sacrifice and then it gets a blemish, and then gives birth, that offspring can be brought as a sacrifice. I have been pondering this for a while and this seem like a clear proof to this idea of Rav Shach that the difference is the sanctification of a female for a Passover sacrifice is holiness that is pushed off from the start. In general, the difference that Rav Shach is making is between regular "being pushed off " and between holiness that is pushed off. This might not work in all cases like the above example of the animal with a blemish, but in general the difference is normal being pushed off is like the case of partner where that being pushed off can be corrected. The partner can buy the second half. But the case of holiness that is pushed off is like the case where one sanctifies a female to be a guilt offering. that being pushed off can never be corrected. So, for regular pushing off we say animal are not pushed off. But for holiness that is pushed off we say it and its offspring go to pasture. This difference between what one can fix and cannot fix is how Tosphot explains the idea of animals that are devoted to be sacrifices that are in the Temple at a time when the altar becomes damaged. They can be sacrificed after the altar has been repaired. This is how Tosphot explains the opinion of R. Shimon. But Rav Shach uses this idea explain the opinion of the Sages in the approach of the Rambam. __________________________________________________________________________________________________________ There is an argument between תוספות and the Rambam about the law animals are not pushed off.(כלומר שאם מפריש איזו בהמה להיות קרבן אבל אותה בהמה לא יכולה להיות קרבן. אבל מאוחר יותר הבמה נעשה ראוי) To תוספות that is reflected in the statement ר' שמעון and ר' אלעזר that if one sanctifies a female sheep to be a אשם or a עולה, and it gives birth to a male, that male can be sacrificed as a אשם or a עולה. The חכמים however disagree, and hold that the mother and male sheep have go to pasture, and stay there until they get a מום, and then are redeemed (sold), and with that money they are sold for, one buys a male sheep to bring for a אשם or a עולה. However, the רמב''ם holds both with the principle, “Animals are not pushed off” and with the חכמים that disagree with ר' שמעון and ר' אלעזר. In order to solve this puzzle, Rav Shach suggests the idea that when the one sanctifies the female sheep to be a אשם that is holiness that is pushed off. And it is in such in such cases that even when the animal becomes fit for a sacrifice, it remains pushed off. However, in a case like when one partner sanctifies his portion in an animal and the other does not, then if that partner later buys the remaining part, then the whole animal is fit for a sacrifice. The reason I bring this up is that it is unclear to me in what kind of case one says the holiness is pushed off. For two examples the case of the partnersרש''י says there it is holiness that is pushed off. (However, that might be because רש''י there is explaining ר' יוחנן. It might be that רב hold the holiness is not pushed off] Another example is in כריתות כ''ח ע''אwhere ר' אושיה says if one is liable a sin offering as a rich man and puts aside two birds to sell and use that money to buy a sheep, and then becomes poor, he cannot bring the birds which are the sacrifice of a poor man. It is unclear to me why this case would be considered קדושה דחויהwhile the case of partners is not. However, that might be because he holds like ר' יוחנן that even the case of partners is considered holiness that is דחויה. And in fact, the רמב''ם wrote in that case that the pair of birds can be brought as his sin offering. So it might be that this is exactly the argument between רב and ר' יוחנן, what kind of case is considered holiness that is דחויה. רב שך in the end ofה' תמורה brings two examples that might help to clarify the subject. One is the case of one sanctifies a female sheep for the Passover sacrifice. That animal and its תמורה and even the male offspring cannot be brought for a Passover sacrifice. But if one sanctifies a female animal to be a sacrifice and then gets a blemish and then gives birth, that offspring can be brought as a sacrifice. I have been pondering this for a while and this seem like a clear proof to this idea of רב שך that the difference is the sanctification of a female for a Passover sacrifice is קדושה דחויה In general, the difference that רב שך is making is between regular דיחוי and between holiness that isדחויה . This might not work in all cases, like the above example of the animal with a blemish, but in general the difference is normalדיחוי is like the case of partner where that דיחוי can be corrected. The partner can buy the second half. But the case of holiness that is דחויה is like the case where one sanctifies a female to be a guilt offering. Thatדיחוי can never be corrected. So, for regular דיחוי we say בהמות are not נדחות. But for holiness that isדחויה we say it and its offspring go to pasture. This difference between what one can fix and cannot fix is how תוספות explains the idea of animals that are devoted to be sacrifices that are in the מקדש at a time when the altar becomes damaged. They can be sacrificed after the altar has been repaired. This is how תוספות explains the opinion of ר' שמעון. But רב שך uses this idea explain the opinion of the חכמים in the approach of the רמב''ם. _______________________ יש ויכוח בין תוספות לרמב"ם על חוק בעלי חיים אין נדחקים. (כלומר שאם מפריש איזו בהמה להיות קרבן אבל אותה בהמה לא יכולה להיות קרבן. אבל מאוחר יותר הבמה נעשה ראוי) לתוספות זה באה לידי ביטוי בהצהרה ר' שמעון ור' אלעזר שאם מקדשים כבשה נקבה להיות אשם או עולה, והיא מולידה זכר, אפשר להקריב את הזכר הזה כאשם או עולה. אולם החכמים חולקים, וגורסים שהאם והכבשה ילכו למרעה, ונשארים שם עד שיקבלו מום, ואחר כך נפדים (נמכרים), ובכסף הזה הם שהם נמכרים, קונים כבשה זכר להביא לאשם או עולה. ברם, הרמב''ם תופס הן עם העיקרון " אין בעלי חיים נדחקים " והן עם החכמים החולקים על ר' שמעון ור' אלעזר. על מנת לפתור את החידה הזו, רב שך (מעשה הקרבנות ט''ו ה''ד) מציע את הרעיון שכאשר מקדש את הכבשה הנקבה להיות אשם, זו קדושה דחויה. וזה במקרים כאלה שגם כשהבהמה מתאימה לקרבן, היא נשארת נדחה. אולם במקרה כמו שותף אחד מקדש את חלקו בבהמה והשני לא, אז אם אותו שותף יקנה אחר כך את החלק הנותר, הרי כל הבהמה ראויה לקרבן. הסיבה שאני מעלה את זה היא שלא ברור לי באיזה מקרה אומרים שהקדושה דחויה. לשתי דוגמאות המקרה של השותפים רש''י אומר שם הקדושה היא דחויה. (עם זאת, זה יכול להיות בגלל רש''י שם מסביר ר' יוחנן. יכול להיות שרב מחזיק את הקדושה לא דחויה.] דוגמא נוספת היא בכריתות כ''ח ע''א מקום ר' אושיה אומר אם חייב קרבן חטאת כעשיר ומניח שתי ציפורים למכור ולהשתמש בכסף הזה לקניית כבשה, ואז נעשה עני, הוא לא יכול להביא את הציפורים שהם קורבן של עני. לא ברור לי מדוע תיק זה ייחשב כקדושה דחויה בעוד המקרה של שותפים לא. אולם יכול להיות שזה בגלל שהוא סובר כמו ר' יוחנן שאפילו דין שותפים נחשב לקדושה שהיא דחויה. ולמעשה כתב הרמב''ם באותו מקרה שאפשר להביא את צמד העופות כקורבן חטאתו. אז יכול להיות שזה בדיוק הוויכוח בין רב לר' יוחנן, איזה מקרה נחשב לקדושה דחויה רב שך בסוף ה' תמורה מביא שתי דוגמאות שעשויות לעזור להבהיר את הנושא. האחד הוא מקרה שמקדישים כבשה נקבה לקרבן פסח. אי אפשר להביא את אותה בהמה ותמורה שלה ואפילו את ולדה הזכר לקרבן פסח. אבל אם מקדישים בהמה נקבה להיות קרבן ואחר כך היא מקבלת מום ואז יולדת, אפשר להביא את ולד הזה כקרבן. וזה נראה כהוכחה ברורה לרעיון הזה של רב שך שההבדל הוא קידוש נקבה לקרבן פסח הוא קדושה דחויה באופן כללי, ההבדל שרב שך עושה הוא בין דיחוי רגיל ובין קדושה שהיא דחויה. זה אולי לא יעבוד בכל המקרים, כמו הדוגמה לעיל של בעל החיים עם מום, אבל באופן כללי ההבדל הוא נורמלי דיחוי הוא כמו במקרה של שותפים שבו ניתן לתקן את הדיחוי הזה. השותף יכול לקנות את המחצית השנייה. אבל קדושה דחויה דומה למקרה שמקדישים נקבה להיות קרבן אשם. את הדיחוי הזה לעולם לא ניתן לתקן. אז, עבור דיחוי רגיל אנחנו אומרים בהמות אינן נדחות. אבל לקדושה דחויה אנו אומרים אותה ואת ולדה הולכים למרעה ההבדל הזה בין מה שאפשר לתקן ולא יכול לתקן הוא איך תוספות מסבירים את הרעיון של בעלי חיים המוקדשים לקרבנות שנמצאים במקדש בזמן שהמזבח ניזוק. ניתן להקריב אותם לאחר תיקון המזבח. כך מסבירים תוספות את דעת ר' שמעון. אבל רב שך משתמש ברעיון זה להסביר את דעת החכמים בגישת הרמב''ם