Godel has a proof of the existence of God

Godel has a proof of the existence of God that I mentioned on one of my blogs. The idea was really from Anselm and Godel put it into logical form. It depends on God having all positive traits. I tried to reinforce that idea by means of the Compactness Theorem of Godel. This was all in some other blog entry somewhere. Today I just wanted to add that it seems to me that this completeness theorem itself is related to the fact that in differential manifolds we only talk about C^0 or C^ Infinity. The reason is that a manifold M that is C^r itself has a C^r diffeomorphism from M to a manifold that is C^infinity.
[Kelly Ross rightfully noted that existence is a predicate.]

a C^r manifold is a manifold that you can take a derivative r times over the complex field.  A C^r manifold has a C^r function to a C^infinity manifold.  



[(Compactness Theorem). A set of formulas Γ is satisfiable if and only if every finite subset of Γ is satisfiable.][From the finite to the infinite. Perhaps the simplest use of the Compactness Theorem is to show that if there exist arbitrarily large finite objects of some type, then there must also be an infinite object of this type.] [Mathematical Logic ch. 4 and ch. 9]



This idea is sound. However I prefer to go with the more direct and simpler approach of Saadia Gaon and the חובות לבבות (Obligations of the Heart) and  the  Rambam of the First Cause, and the fact that there has to be a First Cause because of the problem of the infinite regress, For me that is the simplest and strongest approach, though I think  Anselm's one is also good and complementary.


In any case this is related to Kelley Ross in a different way. Here is what he says in his PhD Thesis [Sec III]: "This continues the theory of purposive value by at last addressing the hitherto presupposed polarity of value, although the discussion belong to absolute transcendence because it may be taken to be a general characteristic of positive transcendence (and so characteristic of it as such) and because its meaning seems to be bound up with the meaning of our existence and non-existence."

That is to say in plain English he is considering God as "absolute transcendence" and considers Him to be the One who has positive transcendence. I.e. by means of intention. That is all you can say about this from the standpoint of Kelley Ross. But the connection with Godel and the idea positive traits is certainly tantalizing.

[from Purim]

Xerxes is as far as I know is אחשורוש [from Purim] because that is how the name is pronounced in Persian.
He had two dreams telling him to attack Athens and all of the Hellenes. That was after he had thought to do so anyway. His chief adviser told him not to do so. At night he saw a handsome man standing over him telling him if he does not attack Greece he would lose everything just as fast as he gained everything. Then he had a second dream along the same lines. And then his put his chief adviser in his royal robes, and sat him down on his throne at night to sleep. The same man came to his adviser and said "Are you the one who has been telling Xerxes not to attack Athens? You are jerk." Or something along those lines.
When he attacked his allies were numerous. Everyone thought he would win and joined him. No one joined the Hellenes. Even those that had agreed to ally themselves with Athens stayed away from the battle to see which side would prevail.
300 Spartans and about 4000 other men from other parts of Greece stopped about 1/2 a million men.
And the Spartans would have won if not for one betrayer who showed the Persians and alternative route to get behind the Greek lines.

Xerxes was the last great king of Persia and from then on its glory and might fell.

Ideas in Talmud Bava Metzia chapters 8 and 9.

I added a little idea which is so simple I embarrassed I did not think of it before. Mainly that there was a question on the opinion of the Riva in Tosphot page 98.
[The Riva was one of the Baali HaTosphot.]
I do not know who asked it. Maybe Tosphot themselves or maybe my learning partner. The question was the Riva has to treat a case of  "I do not know" as if it was a case of אונס that is armed robbery, and he also needs to treat it as if it was a case of denial.

For we know the opinion of the Riva is thus if the a guard of an animal or object loses it and says "there was no object" that does not require an oath at all unless there is with it another object that he admits he owes. That is it is a case of מודה מקצת. But if he says there  was an object but there was armed robbery, then he needs to take an oath.

[Unlike Rashi or Rabbainu Tam]

What if he says "I do not know." The Gemara says "I do not know" requires another animal of "I admit I owe it." So to the Riva I do not know is טענת כפירה. But then the Gemara also says to Rami Bar Chama that if you have I do not know you need also
 admission and denial. So there I do not know is a case of אונס

I  can't look it up to see if this fits into the Gemara. But it seems to me this minute that if he says, "I do not know if there was armed robbery or not" that is considered armed robbery--and thus is required an oath. But if he says, "I do not know if I borrowed another animal or not," that is considered denial.

Off hand it would seem that this probably would not work in our Gemara on page 98 since the Gemra is dealing with only one kind of ''I do not know.'' But without a Gemara, I can't tell.
If this would work, then probably my learning partner would have seen it.  Still it is a tantalizing possibility to think we might have  good answer for the Riva.

the essence of Torah

What is the essence of Torah? The way I see it, it is the Ten Commandments.

What this means in a practical sense is it is a denial of other things that claim to represent the basic sense of Torah.
So believing in some tzadik or other righteous person would not be the essence of Torah.
This would also mean simply learning Torah or Musar would not be the essence either.
Rather it is a strict Ethical Monotheism that says God is one and he is not the world. And what one would call menschlichkeit. being a decent human being. Thou shalt not steal, thou shalt not murder, thou shalt not bear false witness.
The essence of Torah is not to follow other groups that make their main thing some other kind of essence.

Religious teachers expect to be treated as if they represented the Torah. But they don't. They represent false Torah. Pseudo Torah. The Torah of Rituals. Not the real authentic Torah.

Of course to keep  the Ten Commandments requires knowledge of  the Oral and Written Law. For example "Thou shalt not steal" requires knowing the laws of Bava Metzia Bava Kama and all seder Nezikim and Nashim.

For more information on Religious teachers look up: "Home Wreckers".

however damaging to family life liberal society is, it can not possibly come close to the damage that religious teachers cause.

There is a kind of paradox in social norms. True that liberal society tends to weaken family bonds.
But you would expect in the religious world, things would be different. At first the religious teachers encourage one to disobey his parents because they are not religious enough. Then they urge ones wife to divorce him because he is not religious enough or religious in the right way that they think is right. Then they urge his children to disparage and ignore him and make false accusations. Somehow however damaging to family life liberal society is, it can not possibly come close to the damage that religious teachers cause.

They must think there is no judge and no judgment.
If you ask your children just one thing. Your whole life you never asked them a thing but there is something important to you, do you have any authority? Would you not think that the Ten Commandments would make a difference? Forget it. Your worth to your children is how much money they can keep on skimming off of you.
Certainly one should never believe them about the time of day, much less about what the Torah says.

False friends are much worse than open enemies. 

The Major Lies of Feminism

Talmud Tractate Bava Metzia page 98

Introduction. Rabbainu Tam says the only case when a guard swears the object was lost by accident is when there is another object that he admits and he gives back. That is there were two objects or two animals that he was guarding.

Tosphot asks on this in two places. One is in Bava Metzia page 98. The question is based on the Gemara in Shavuot. Over there the Mishna says a employee that says he was not paid takes an oath and gets paid. Rav and Shmuel say that is where there are witnesses that he is in fact an employee. For if there are not witnesses then the employer is believed that he paid because he could have said a stronger plea and certainly be believed. That is the employer could have said "Who are you? I never saw you before in my life."
Rami Bar Chama said what a nice statement that is. Rava asked, "What is nice about it? If it is true then we would never have  a case of a guard taking an oath."
That is the entire Gemara that is relevant for us right now. It is from that Gemara that Tosphot sees a contradiction to Rabbainu Tam.
The question of Tosphot is this. If Rabbainu Tam is right, then the case of a guard is not that where there is a possibility of denying the whole thing because it is always a case when there is one object he is agreeing that he owes.
Crystal Clear. But then Tosphot adds two words  אהייא קאי which to my learning partner [David Bronson] made no sense.
"Which animal does he deny?" To David these words are problematic.

It is in order to answer the question of David that I wrote the next paragraph.
It occurred to me a possible way to answer the question of my learning partner on Talmud Tractate Bava Metzia page 98. The original question was on the Tosphot on that page that asks אהייא קאי on which animal does the guard deny?  The answer I think is this. lets say the guard denied both animals? Then that is a straight case on לא היו דבאים מעולם. That is if he denies the animal that he denies then there is an oath because that is the regular case of הודאה וכפירה. If he denies the other animal then that is the case of כפירה  וכפירה. And in fact there would be no oath in that case--but we do not say he could have said that because that is then העזה and we always say that מודה מקצת is נשבע even though he could have denied everything and be believed. But there is no migo because of העזה
In other words this explains the question of Tosphot on Rabbanu Tam.

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 עלה בדעתי דרך אפשרית כדי לענות על השאלה של השותף הלמידה שלי על בבא מציעא צ''ח ע''א. השאלה המקורית היתה על תוספות בדף זה ששואל אהייא קאי על איזו חיה השומר מכחיש? התשובה לדעתי היא זו. נניח השומר הכחיש שתי החיות? אז זה הוא מקרה ישר "לא היו דברים מעולם". כלומר, אם הוא מכחיש את החיה שהוא מכחיש, אז יש שבועה כי זה המקרה הרגיל של הודאה וכפירה. אם הוא מכחיש את חיה האחרת, אז זה המקרה של כפירה וכפירה. ולמעשה לא יהיה שום שבועה במקרה זה, אבל אנחנו לא אומרים שהוא יכול לומר את זה כי הוא אז זה העזה ואנחנו תמיד אומרים מודה מקצת הוא נשבע למרות שהוא יכול היה להתכחש הכל ושיאמין. אבל אין מיגו בגלל העזה. במילים אחרות זה מסביר את השאלה של תוספות על רבינו תם