17.10.15
(1) There is an argument that David Hume presents on knowledge based on reason. It is that we can check our empirical knowledge. If we see an object we can get closer and check to see what it feels like and make other tests. But knowledge based on reason what can we check it against? What measuring stick do we have but to check it against other knowledge we also know by reason.
This does not seem to me to be a good argument. We check empirical knowledge against other empirical facts and we weigh degrees of certainty. We check a priori knowledge with other a priori knowledge and we weigh degrees of certainty.
(2) Spinoza thought to prove pantheism based on an axiom that is highly doubtful; that no substance can affect another substance. But he was doing this for a good reason. He wanted to answer the Mind Body problem raised by Descartes. He thought to do this by turning Descartes argument inside out.
(3) In any case both these thinkers had something right about them. It was Kant that was able to create his synthesis between these two schools of thought the rationalists and the empiricists.
(4) Dr. Michael Huemer makes some powerful arguments against Kant, but I think his arguments are answerable. One question he has is against the very beginning of Kant's argument. That is the question how is a priori synthetic knowledge possible. He follows the intuitionist school to answer this. He says that we can perceive a priori synthetic knowledge by reason. And that is true. But the axioms we start with have to be known in a different way than how we reason from axioms. We know the beginnings of reason or unconditioned reality by immediate non intuitive knowledge. (See Kelley Ross's web site. )
The truth of my assertion here is actually contained in Kant's initial question. How is synthetic a priori knowledge possible. What Kant has done here is he has already created a third category of knowledge. While Hume thought that all reason can do is to deduce things from definitions and see contradictions in those things, Kant has made a direct attack on this and claimed there is a kind of knowledge that sees things that are not contained in their definitions and not perceived by the senses.
But what Kant wanted was synthetic a priori after you know definitions and some basic ground of knowledge. What Kelley Ross and Michael Huemer what is synthetic a priori to tell us axioms and things before we start to reason about them.
(5) In order to defend Torah I depend on both reason and immediate non intuitive knowledge.
I say moral principles are the basis of Torah and moral principles are known by reason. This much is clear from the Rambam in The Guide for the Perplexed. But reason itself needs to be based on immediate non intuitive knowledge. [He says natural law which was known by Abraham and later on by the ancient Greeks could not have been known by reason but needed to be revealed.]
The idea here is that there are universals. Here is a proof that universals exist from Michael Huemer:
Paul Benacerraf originally raised it as a problem about mathematics: since we have no interaction with the number 2--we do not bump into it on the street, and so on--how can we have knowledge of it? I might plead that it is not the moral philosopher's job to answer this. Whether or not there is moral knowledge, there is a priori knowledge of other kinds, so there must be some solution to Benacerraf's problem. Whatever the explanation for a priori knowledge in general is, there is no reason to think it would not work equally well for moral knowledge.
'Universals' are abstract things (features, relationships, types) that two or more particular things or groups can have in common. For instance, yellow is a universal. It is something that lemons, the sun, and school buses, among other things, all have in common. Yellow is 'abstract' in the sense that it is not a particular object with a particular location; you will not bump into yellow, just sitting there by itself, on the street. Nevertheless, yellow certainly exists. Here is an argument for that:
And moral principles are a priori universals --that is not known by observation.
A proof of this from Michael Huemer:
How do we know moral principles? One can ask how can we know anything?
(6) The way to understand immediate non intuitive knowledge is this. The best place to start is with the Sidur (prayerbook) of the Gra (Elisha ben Shelomo the Gaon from Vilnius). In one comment on the hagadah on ברוך המקום ברוך הוא there the Gra explains everything has a hidden aspect and a revealed aspect. כל דבר יש לו נגלה ונסתר
That means when we see a sidur we see get information about that object. We we then feel it we get more information about it. The more senses we use we get more information. We might open it and read it and get even more information. But we are only getting information about the object. But what is the object we still know nothing. Lots of people knows lots of information about you. But no one knows who you really are inside.
The dinge an sich. The thing i itself. What is it that tells us there is some difference between what we sense about an apple and the apple in itself?
If you were to remove from the apple its redness and roundness, sweetness and hardness, coldness and smoothness, would there be any apple left? Yes. The thing in itself.
How we know unconditioned realities is different than how we process information based on senses or reasonable deductions.
(7) The Torah is holistic. It encompasses all of human life. Religious and political and interpersonal. But it considers all its laws to be from One Divine source. It makes no distinctions between laws that are between man and fellow and man and laws between man and God.
That is it avoids the common mistake that religious people make. They get all excited about serving God and therefore emphasis commandments that are between God and Man thinking that that is the source of meaning and value. The Torah could not be more explicit that this is a mistake. The holy and numinous aspect of the Torah, its unconditioned reality, is both for commandments that are between man and his fellow man and between man and God.
(8) The practical way to keep Torah is by learning Torah in an authentic Lithuanian Yeshiva and to avoid cults like the Black Plague. Since the religious world has become infested with cults that means in effect that one can't pray in a religious Synagogue. In fact, even some authentic yeshivas are borderline cults. But at least they are teaching authentic Torah--so they are OK to learn in and pray in. I would not go anywhere near an religious synagogue because I think they are dens of the Sitra Achra (Dark Side) and I fear for my life and soul.
This does not seem to me to be a good argument. We check empirical knowledge against other empirical facts and we weigh degrees of certainty. We check a priori knowledge with other a priori knowledge and we weigh degrees of certainty.
(2) Spinoza thought to prove pantheism based on an axiom that is highly doubtful; that no substance can affect another substance. But he was doing this for a good reason. He wanted to answer the Mind Body problem raised by Descartes. He thought to do this by turning Descartes argument inside out.
(3) In any case both these thinkers had something right about them. It was Kant that was able to create his synthesis between these two schools of thought the rationalists and the empiricists.
(4) Dr. Michael Huemer makes some powerful arguments against Kant, but I think his arguments are answerable. One question he has is against the very beginning of Kant's argument. That is the question how is a priori synthetic knowledge possible. He follows the intuitionist school to answer this. He says that we can perceive a priori synthetic knowledge by reason. And that is true. But the axioms we start with have to be known in a different way than how we reason from axioms. We know the beginnings of reason or unconditioned reality by immediate non intuitive knowledge. (See Kelley Ross's web site. )
The truth of my assertion here is actually contained in Kant's initial question. How is synthetic a priori knowledge possible. What Kant has done here is he has already created a third category of knowledge. While Hume thought that all reason can do is to deduce things from definitions and see contradictions in those things, Kant has made a direct attack on this and claimed there is a kind of knowledge that sees things that are not contained in their definitions and not perceived by the senses.
But what Kant wanted was synthetic a priori after you know definitions and some basic ground of knowledge. What Kelley Ross and Michael Huemer what is synthetic a priori to tell us axioms and things before we start to reason about them.
(5) In order to defend Torah I depend on both reason and immediate non intuitive knowledge.
I say moral principles are the basis of Torah and moral principles are known by reason. This much is clear from the Rambam in The Guide for the Perplexed. But reason itself needs to be based on immediate non intuitive knowledge. [He says natural law which was known by Abraham and later on by the ancient Greeks could not have been known by reason but needed to be revealed.]
The idea here is that there are universals. Here is a proof that universals exist from Michael Huemer:
Paul Benacerraf originally raised it as a problem about mathematics: since we have no interaction with the number 2--we do not bump into it on the street, and so on--how can we have knowledge of it? I might plead that it is not the moral philosopher's job to answer this. Whether or not there is moral knowledge, there is a priori knowledge of other kinds, so there must be some solution to Benacerraf's problem. Whatever the explanation for a priori knowledge in general is, there is no reason to think it would not work equally well for moral knowledge.
'Universals' are abstract things (features, relationships, types) that two or more particular things or groups can have in common. For instance, yellow is a universal. It is something that lemons, the sun, and school buses, among other things, all have in common. Yellow is 'abstract' in the sense that it is not a particular object with a particular location; you will not bump into yellow, just sitting there by itself, on the street. Nevertheless, yellow certainly exists. Here is an argument for that:
1.
|
The following statement is true:
(Y) Yellow is a color. |
2.
|
The truth of (Y) requires that yellow exist.
|
3.
|
Therefore, yellow exists.(53)
|
Comment: Suppose I say, 'The King of Colorado is fluffy'. Since there is no king of Colorado, some would say the sentence is false; others would say it is neither true nor false. But no one thinks it would be true. Sentence (Y) is of the same form, so it can be true only if 'yellow' refers to something--that is, only if yellow exists.
Some philosophers (the 'nominalists') say that the only thing multiple particulars have in common is that we apply the same word or idea to them.(54) Here is an argument against that:
4.
|
Yellow is a color, and lemons have it.
|
5.
|
No word or idea is a color, nor do lemons 'have' words or ideas.
|
6.
|
Therefore, yellow is not a word or an idea.
|
And moral principles are a priori universals --that is not known by observation.
A proof of this from Michael Huemer:
(1) Moral principles are not observations. The content of every observation is descriptive.
That is, you do not literally see, touch, hear, etc. moral value.
(2) Moral principles can not be inferred from descriptive premises. This principle is just an instance of the general fact that you cannot derive a conclusion within one subject matter from premises in a different subject matter. Just as you cannot expect to derive a geometrical conclusion from premises in economics, or derive a conclusion about birds from premises that don't say anything about birds, you should not expect to derive a conclusion about morality from non-moral premises.
Moral objectivism (like objectivism in general) seems to be entailed by the law of excluded middle and the correspondence theory of truth, along with a couple of what seem equally obvious observations about morality:
(1) There are moral propositions.
(2) So they are each either true or false. (by law of excluded middle) (3) And it's not that they're all false. Surely it is true, rather than false, that Josef Stalin's activities were bad. (Although some communists would disagree, we needn't take their view seriously, and moreover, even they would admit some moral judgement, such as, "Stalin was good.")
(4) So some moral judgements correspond to reality. (from 2,3, and the correspondence theory of truth)
(5) So moral values are part of reality. (which is objectivism)
(2) So they are each either true or false. (by law of excluded middle) (3) And it's not that they're all false. Surely it is true, rather than false, that Josef Stalin's activities were bad. (Although some communists would disagree, we needn't take their view seriously, and moreover, even they would admit some moral judgement, such as, "Stalin was good.")
(4) So some moral judgements correspond to reality. (from 2,3, and the correspondence theory of truth)
(5) So moral values are part of reality. (which is objectivism)
How do we know moral principles? One can ask how can we know anything?
For if we know some particular thing, then there are only three possibilities as regards its justification:
(a) it is infinitely regressive. That is, there is a reason for it, and a reason for the reason, and then a reason for that, and so on indefinitely.
(b) it is circular. That is, it is based on some chain of reasoning in which something ultimately is supposed to (directly or indirectly) justify itself.
(c) it is foundational. That is, the item of knowledge itself is, or is based upon, a fact that is known directly and without any argument or reason given.
Imagine an argument with person that thinks every piece of knowledge requires proof.
\
(b) it is circular. That is, it is based on some chain of reasoning in which something ultimately is supposed to (directly or indirectly) justify itself.
(c) it is foundational. That is, the item of knowledge itself is, or is based upon, a fact that is known directly and without any argument or reason given.
Imagine an argument with person that thinks every piece of knowledge requires proof.
\
Me: I know that it's wrong to torture people just for the fun of it.
Skeptic: What's your reason for thinking that?
Me: Isn't it self-evident? Why do I need a reason?
Skeptic: Because if you don't have one, then it's just an arbitrary claim.
Me: How do you know that?
Skeptic: Why, that's self-evident.
Skeptic: What's your reason for thinking that?
Me: Isn't it self-evident? Why do I need a reason?
Skeptic: Because if you don't have one, then it's just an arbitrary claim.
Me: How do you know that?
Skeptic: Why, that's self-evident.
(6) The way to understand immediate non intuitive knowledge is this. The best place to start is with the Sidur (prayerbook) of the Gra (Elisha ben Shelomo the Gaon from Vilnius). In one comment on the hagadah on ברוך המקום ברוך הוא there the Gra explains everything has a hidden aspect and a revealed aspect. כל דבר יש לו נגלה ונסתר
That means when we see a sidur we see get information about that object. We we then feel it we get more information about it. The more senses we use we get more information. We might open it and read it and get even more information. But we are only getting information about the object. But what is the object we still know nothing. Lots of people knows lots of information about you. But no one knows who you really are inside.
The dinge an sich. The thing i itself. What is it that tells us there is some difference between what we sense about an apple and the apple in itself?
If you were to remove from the apple its redness and roundness, sweetness and hardness, coldness and smoothness, would there be any apple left? Yes. The thing in itself.
How we know unconditioned realities is different than how we process information based on senses or reasonable deductions.
(7) The Torah is holistic. It encompasses all of human life. Religious and political and interpersonal. But it considers all its laws to be from One Divine source. It makes no distinctions between laws that are between man and fellow and man and laws between man and God.
That is it avoids the common mistake that religious people make. They get all excited about serving God and therefore emphasis commandments that are between God and Man thinking that that is the source of meaning and value. The Torah could not be more explicit that this is a mistake. The holy and numinous aspect of the Torah, its unconditioned reality, is both for commandments that are between man and his fellow man and between man and God.
(8) The practical way to keep Torah is by learning Torah in an authentic Lithuanian Yeshiva and to avoid cults like the Black Plague. Since the religious world has become infested with cults that means in effect that one can't pray in a religious Synagogue. In fact, even some authentic yeshivas are borderline cults. But at least they are teaching authentic Torah--so they are OK to learn in and pray in. I would not go anywhere near an religious synagogue because I think they are dens of the Sitra Achra (Dark Side) and I fear for my life and soul.
16.10.15
When people become religious they lose the ability to discern between right and wrong. One reason is they become infatuated with some miracle worker from the Dark Side. And they think because that charismatic person [demon] is religious with their kind of religion that therefore his powers must be from the Realm of Holiness.
But there are other reasons. And some of these reasons I know about. And some I don't. But the in any case is when someone becomes religious, you can forget about menschlichkeit [human decency.]
I think Israel Salanter tried to fix this with limited success. [That was his reason to start the Musar movement--to combine good character traits with Fear of God.]
My approach is that there are universals. Morals are one kind of universal. And they are recognizable by reason. But since human reason is corrupted to the desire to fit in with some social group so we need some kind of revelation that is not thought and not sensed. So we need Torah to make us aware of the difference from right and wrong in the first place. But since Torah is connected with numinous reality it can easily be subverted. And numinous value always conquers non numinous value. Right and wrong is mainly mundane. Pay your bills. Work for a living at an honest job, etc. That has nothing like the power and excitement of some religious high that one gets from a cult.
I should mention that being religious is very different from keeping Torah. These are in fact exact opposites. There is almost nothing that the religious do that is in accord with Torah.
But there are other reasons. And some of these reasons I know about. And some I don't. But the in any case is when someone becomes religious, you can forget about menschlichkeit [human decency.]
I think Israel Salanter tried to fix this with limited success. [That was his reason to start the Musar movement--to combine good character traits with Fear of God.]
My approach is that there are universals. Morals are one kind of universal. And they are recognizable by reason. But since human reason is corrupted to the desire to fit in with some social group so we need some kind of revelation that is not thought and not sensed. So we need Torah to make us aware of the difference from right and wrong in the first place. But since Torah is connected with numinous reality it can easily be subverted. And numinous value always conquers non numinous value. Right and wrong is mainly mundane. Pay your bills. Work for a living at an honest job, etc. That has nothing like the power and excitement of some religious high that one gets from a cult.
I should mention that being religious is very different from keeping Torah. These are in fact exact opposites. There is almost nothing that the religious do that is in accord with Torah.
Consciousness traps exist everywhere
Consciousness traps exist everywhere. I looked at different cults for a long time trying to understand a little bit about my own attraction to destructive cults. I have had the strange kind of tendency to abandon good groups or a good social situation to join weird groups. So I have gone through a long process of self introspection and also trying to understand the attraction of cults,
I was writing about this a few years back. Mainly I was studying Hindu cults in the USA and also in India and also Scientology. I did not have the stomach to look at Jewish religious cults. But I am familiar with Hasidim. I think Hasidic groups are very bad cults, It is just that many Hasidic groups are consciousness traps that lure people into their private cult.
It is characteristic of cults is they target people that are already on a good track and try to derail them. They will go into Lithuanian yeshiva where people are sitting and learning authentic Torah and try to lure them into something else. Often they will claim that these things do not contradict. They might also go to places where students are in fact on good life paths and try to lure them into their cult.
I was writing about this a few years back. Mainly I was studying Hindu cults in the USA and also in India and also Scientology. I did not have the stomach to look at Jewish religious cults. But I am familiar with Hasidim. I think Hasidic groups are very bad cults, It is just that many Hasidic groups are consciousness traps that lure people into their private cult.
It is characteristic of cults is they target people that are already on a good track and try to derail them. They will go into Lithuanian yeshiva where people are sitting and learning authentic Torah and try to lure them into something else. Often they will claim that these things do not contradict. They might also go to places where students are in fact on good life paths and try to lure them into their cult.
15.10.15
I wish I could learn Torah but I can't. Not only that but I also wish I could tell people about how great the Torah is and there also I find myself without words.
The reason is that when one is not worthy to learn Torah he is evicted. And the door to holiness is then shut behind him so he can't get back in. And then he is filled with illusions to run after that he thinks will give him happiness in this world or the next. The Satan then gives the power to do miracles to people that have their powers from the Dark Side. And he makes it seem that they are holy people. The glitter draws people that are not worthy of Torah.
This is the reason that when people become religious they lose the ability to discern between right and wrong. They become infatuated with some miracle worker from the Dark Side. And they think because that charismatic demon is religious with their kind of religion that therefore his powers must be from the Side of holiness.
The reason is that when one is not worthy to learn Torah he is evicted. And the door to holiness is then shut behind him so he can't get back in. And then he is filled with illusions to run after that he thinks will give him happiness in this world or the next. The Satan then gives the power to do miracles to people that have their powers from the Dark Side. And he makes it seem that they are holy people. The glitter draws people that are not worthy of Torah.
This is the reason that when people become religious they lose the ability to discern between right and wrong. They become infatuated with some miracle worker from the Dark Side. And they think because that charismatic demon is religious with their kind of religion that therefore his powers must be from the Side of holiness.
14.10.15
Peace or war.
Aut pax aut bellum.
If the Arabs in Israel had wanted peace I think that would have been clear. It seems to me that Israel needs someone like Joseph Stalin. Just imagine what he would do right now if he was head of the Israeli government. He would simply ship every last Arab off to Siberia or the Antarctic.
Now Arabs walking the street armed with nothing more than kitchen knifes go around killing Jews. Somehow I doubt if a similar kind of situation had or would exist in Russia today that Stalin would have had much patience or tolerance for this kind of behavior.
But you don't need to be a genius to know that the Israeli government will not take steps to stop this because they need that everyone should think they are nice. They don't understand that there are people that will never think they are nice no matter what they do.
If the Arabs in Israel had wanted peace I think that would have been clear. It seems to me that Israel needs someone like Joseph Stalin. Just imagine what he would do right now if he was head of the Israeli government. He would simply ship every last Arab off to Siberia or the Antarctic.
Now Arabs walking the street armed with nothing more than kitchen knifes go around killing Jews. Somehow I doubt if a similar kind of situation had or would exist in Russia today that Stalin would have had much patience or tolerance for this kind of behavior.
But you don't need to be a genius to know that the Israeli government will not take steps to stop this because they need that everyone should think they are nice. They don't understand that there are people that will never think they are nice no matter what they do.
The reason authentic yeshivas throw out people is because they found that Modus operandi is profitable--that is it makes the yeshiva successful. [Mode of operation]] The Rosh yeshiva does not consider every individual case separately. He just knows that by throwing out anyone that does not exactly fit in is the only way that he can have a beit midrash where people are sitting and learning Talmud.
Whether you this this is nice is not so much the issue as much as the rosh yeshiva knows that without this rule, he will not have a yeshiva.
The fact is the rule is probably applied in wrong cases. It may very well result in the downfall of the institutions it is meant to uphold.
I suggest a modified version of this rule. Fitting in ought to be defined as learning Talmud. It should not be defined by social group or marriage status of whether the fellow is a social outcast or not. That there should be only one condition--learning Torah.
The problem is the rule of throwing out people is always applied to the wrong people.
The deeper reason for this is in the LM circa Vol I chapter 157. There are people that are not fit for holiness. So they are thrown out. Then when they are thrown out the door closes so they should not come back in. But then after they wander off into the world of delusions the door opens again. But what happens if there are lots of people that need to be thrown out? There is fear that the door will stay closed after they are all thrown out. So at the door the place a person that fears God. When he is standing in the doorway the door can't close. And he throws out the people that are not fit to be inside.
So if the mashgiach throws you out, don't be discouraged. Be happy that at least you can still learn Torah somewhere else. If he would not be standing there to throw you out it might have happened that the door into holiness might get closed completely. That would mean that even somewhere else you would not be able to learn Torah.
For myself I consider that this happened to me in several situations. I mean to say that I was in situation that were very good but I had not reached those situations from my own merits or good heart. So the attraction of other glittery things attracted me. I was in my parents home which was a place of tremendous purity and wholesomeness. And I left that. Ditto with Israel and ditto with the Mir Yeshiva in NY. But as I mentioned sometimes it happens that when one is not worthy the door back into holiness closes. So you can't get back in even if you recognize your mistake.
Whether you this this is nice is not so much the issue as much as the rosh yeshiva knows that without this rule, he will not have a yeshiva.
The fact is the rule is probably applied in wrong cases. It may very well result in the downfall of the institutions it is meant to uphold.
I suggest a modified version of this rule. Fitting in ought to be defined as learning Talmud. It should not be defined by social group or marriage status of whether the fellow is a social outcast or not. That there should be only one condition--learning Torah.
The problem is the rule of throwing out people is always applied to the wrong people.
The deeper reason for this is in the LM circa Vol I chapter 157. There are people that are not fit for holiness. So they are thrown out. Then when they are thrown out the door closes so they should not come back in. But then after they wander off into the world of delusions the door opens again. But what happens if there are lots of people that need to be thrown out? There is fear that the door will stay closed after they are all thrown out. So at the door the place a person that fears God. When he is standing in the doorway the door can't close. And he throws out the people that are not fit to be inside.
So if the mashgiach throws you out, don't be discouraged. Be happy that at least you can still learn Torah somewhere else. If he would not be standing there to throw you out it might have happened that the door into holiness might get closed completely. That would mean that even somewhere else you would not be able to learn Torah.
For myself I consider that this happened to me in several situations. I mean to say that I was in situation that were very good but I had not reached those situations from my own merits or good heart. So the attraction of other glittery things attracted me. I was in my parents home which was a place of tremendous purity and wholesomeness. And I left that. Ditto with Israel and ditto with the Mir Yeshiva in NY. But as I mentioned sometimes it happens that when one is not worthy the door back into holiness closes. So you can't get back in even if you recognize your mistake.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)