31.5.15
בבא מציעא יד: תוספות ד''ה תריץ
Introduction. You have the case of a מלווה lender and a לווה borrower with two fields. Then there is a loan. After the הלוואה loan, a person הלוקח buys one field. Then a second buyer buys the other. Then the לווה defaults on the loan. Then the מלווה lender goes after the second field. Shelomo Luria מהרש''ל says he has to go after the שדה השני second field because it was free משוחרר at a time when the first one had been sold. The מהרש''א disagrees. I claim this is like the case לווה ולווה וקנה a person borrows and then borrows again and then buys a field and defaults. Who gets the field? I say it is the same argument.
Well not exactly. If we say the first lender gets the field, it must be because once the שיעבוד obligation devolves on it it stays there.
According to the מהרש''ל
We see in תוספות that the general idea you see in the תלמוד that the לוקח can tell the מלווה "מקום "הנחתי לך לגבות means even if the second field was sold! The מהרש''א disagrees with this and I don't remember how. Maybe he thinks the מלווה can collect from which שדה he wants. I don't know. Look in Bava Batra 157.
But all I was doing in some little note was to say the argument between the מהרש''א and מהרש''ל
depends on the argument also in בבא בתרא קנז about לווה ולווה וקנה.
All I was saying was that the cases are not exactly similar, but in in our case on page 14 we are dealing with the order סדר של גביה . Not is there is שיעבוד at all but what the order that the מלווה has to take to collect. And that is exactly the argument about לווה ולווה וקנה.
This was the entire idea, and it is so simple I would be very surprised if I was the only one to think of it. And why I would have erased it I certainly don't know.
I think what caused my confusion was the fact that I had forgotten that תוספות says openly in בבא בתרא that the שדה השני was owned קמוי at the time of the הלוואה. It was not bought later. You also my reader must keep this in mind because it is essential in order to understand this תוספות בבא מציעא
________________________________________________________________________
I found the original essay. Here it is:
I wanted to mention something in Talmud Bava Metzia 14 and Bava Batra 157. The case is the well known case of המלווה (A) לווה (B) לוקח ראשון(C) . In Bava Batra we find that if לווה defaults on the loan that a collects the field from לוקח ראשון.
לוקח then goes to a later buyer לוקח השני to collect the price of the field [if לווה has no free field left.] Tosphot asks from where does לווה have free property and how could there be a person לוקח השני? The מהרש''א and the מהרש''ל have an argument from how could there be a לוקח השני here. The מהרש''א says he comes after the lender has collected from לוקח ראשון. --But he has not collected all the money owed to him yet. The לווה buys a new property and then sell it to לוקח השני. then לוקח ראשון collects from לוקח השני but not מלווה because he has already collected once. No double jeopardy. The מהרש''ל disagrees with this and say even if לוקח השני has property the the time the loan is being collected A still must go to the לוקח ראשון.
My suggestion here is that this argument come from a separate argument in the Talmud itself about one person that borrowed and borrowed from someone else and then bought and then sold a field.לווה ולווה וקנה The Gemara has one suggestion that the first one collects and another suggestion that the last one collects.
I think I can show how the מהרש''א and the מהרש''ל must have looked at this.
The first way is that the שיעבוד goes on לווה and does not get removed because of a later loan. This is the מהרש''ל just applying the same reasoning to a field that has a שיעבוד on it. The מהרש''א also is saying from the second way in the גמרא that just like the שיעבוד השני on the לווה nullifies the first שיעבוד so with a field.
That is my idea and now I would like to defend it by means of Reb Chaim Soloveitchik.
In short Reb Chaim has an idea like this. In the first case I mentioned here about המלווה לווה and לוקח ראשון the Rambam says לוקח loses only half his improvements but all improvements that grow by themselves.Why is that? Because he says the שיעבוד of המלווה and לווה are equal in so far as they go both through לווה. But the שיעבוד of מלווה is on the property directly while לוקח ראשון only bought the property which is less strong than the שיעבוד of המלווה. So we see that we can make a distinction between the שיעבוד on property and on a person but we do not do so unless there is a something stronger around .
Final note:
What makes this confusing is the fact that the מהרש''ל in Bava Metzia says the same thing as the מהרש''א in Bava Batra. This is because he is explaining a different answer in Tosafot. The argument between them is only in Bava Batra because it is there you have the statement of the maharshal that the מהרש''א is disagreeing with.
Introduction. You have the case of a מלווה lender and a לווה borrower with two fields. Then there is a loan. After the הלוואה loan, a person הלוקח buys one field. Then a second buyer buys the other. Then the לווה defaults on the loan. Then the מלווה lender goes after the second field. Shelomo Luria מהרש''ל says he has to go after the שדה השני second field because it was free משוחרר at a time when the first one had been sold. The מהרש''א disagrees. I claim this is like the case לווה ולווה וקנה a person borrows and then borrows again and then buys a field and defaults. Who gets the field? I say it is the same argument.
Well not exactly. If we say the first lender gets the field, it must be because once the שיעבוד obligation devolves on it it stays there.
According to the מהרש''ל
We see in תוספות that the general idea you see in the תלמוד that the לוקח can tell the מלווה "מקום "הנחתי לך לגבות means even if the second field was sold! The מהרש''א disagrees with this and I don't remember how. Maybe he thinks the מלווה can collect from which שדה he wants. I don't know. Look in Bava Batra 157.
But all I was doing in some little note was to say the argument between the מהרש''א and מהרש''ל
depends on the argument also in בבא בתרא קנז about לווה ולווה וקנה.
All I was saying was that the cases are not exactly similar, but in in our case on page 14 we are dealing with the order סדר של גביה . Not is there is שיעבוד at all but what the order that the מלווה has to take to collect. And that is exactly the argument about לווה ולווה וקנה.
This was the entire idea, and it is so simple I would be very surprised if I was the only one to think of it. And why I would have erased it I certainly don't know.
I think what caused my confusion was the fact that I had forgotten that תוספות says openly in בבא בתרא that the שדה השני was owned קמוי at the time of the הלוואה. It was not bought later. You also my reader must keep this in mind because it is essential in order to understand this תוספות בבא מציעא
________________________________________________________________________
I found the original essay. Here it is:
I wanted to mention something in Talmud Bava Metzia 14 and Bava Batra 157. The case is the well known case of המלווה (A) לווה (B) לוקח ראשון(C) . In Bava Batra we find that if לווה defaults on the loan that a collects the field from לוקח ראשון.
לוקח then goes to a later buyer לוקח השני to collect the price of the field [if לווה has no free field left.] Tosphot asks from where does לווה have free property and how could there be a person לוקח השני? The מהרש''א and the מהרש''ל have an argument from how could there be a לוקח השני here. The מהרש''א says he comes after the lender has collected from לוקח ראשון. --But he has not collected all the money owed to him yet. The לווה buys a new property and then sell it to לוקח השני. then לוקח ראשון collects from לוקח השני but not מלווה because he has already collected once. No double jeopardy. The מהרש''ל disagrees with this and say even if לוקח השני has property the the time the loan is being collected A still must go to the לוקח ראשון.
My suggestion here is that this argument come from a separate argument in the Talmud itself about one person that borrowed and borrowed from someone else and then bought and then sold a field.לווה ולווה וקנה The Gemara has one suggestion that the first one collects and another suggestion that the last one collects.
I think I can show how the מהרש''א and the מהרש''ל must have looked at this.
The first way is that the שיעבוד goes on לווה and does not get removed because of a later loan. This is the מהרש''ל just applying the same reasoning to a field that has a שיעבוד on it. The מהרש''א also is saying from the second way in the גמרא that just like the שיעבוד השני on the לווה nullifies the first שיעבוד so with a field.
That is my idea and now I would like to defend it by means of Reb Chaim Soloveitchik.
In short Reb Chaim has an idea like this. In the first case I mentioned here about המלווה לווה and לוקח ראשון the Rambam says לוקח loses only half his improvements but all improvements that grow by themselves.Why is that? Because he says the שיעבוד of המלווה and לווה are equal in so far as they go both through לווה. But the שיעבוד of מלווה is on the property directly while לוקח ראשון only bought the property which is less strong than the שיעבוד of המלווה. So we see that we can make a distinction between the שיעבוד on property and on a person but we do not do so unless there is a something stronger around .
Final note:
What makes this confusing is the fact that the מהרש''ל in Bava Metzia says the same thing as the מהרש''א in Bava Batra. This is because he is explaining a different answer in Tosafot. The argument between them is only in Bava Batra because it is there you have the statement of the maharshal that the מהרש''א is disagreeing with.
[1] The centrality of the tzadik [saint].
Now there are pitfalls to this approach. One can for example take someone who is not a tzadik as a teacher thinking that they are a tzadik. This happens frequently. And people justify their following some very evil person thinking that they are a tzadik. This happens, in fact, most of the time. I know no person today that is called a "tzadik" that is in fact such. Most of the time they are clever actors that are highly wicked.
And it is this phenomenon of people following some wicked person thinking that they are a tzadik that causes what we see that many people give up on the whole idea and come to the grave of
Clarification: the tzadik is not divine. He is not someone to pray to. [Though you do see baalei teshuva doing this.] But a connection with the tzadik is an indirect way of being connected with the Torah. Because the tzadik is connected with the Torah and by means of that he is connected with God.
Without a tzadik people tend to create all kinds of modern idols, Psychology, Yoga, Meditation,worship of homosexuals, worship of Negroes, and worship of a tzadik also. It takes a lot of conviction to remain loyal to Torah and to in fact believe that Torah has all the answers for human life. To obstacles to Torah are infinite. But the Sitra Achra creates Trojan Horses--people that it plants into the world of Torah that are in fact agents of the Sitra Achra.
Now there are pitfalls to this approach. One can for example take someone who is not a tzadik as a teacher thinking that they are a tzadik. This happens frequently. And people justify their following some very evil person thinking that they are a tzadik. This happens, in fact, most of the time. I know no person today that is called a "tzadik" that is in fact such. Most of the time they are clever actors that are highly wicked.
And it is this phenomenon of people following some wicked person thinking that they are a tzadik that causes what we see that many people give up on the whole idea and come to the grave of
Clarification: the tzadik is not divine. He is not someone to pray to. [Though you do see baalei teshuva doing this.] But a connection with the tzadik is an indirect way of being connected with the Torah. Because the tzadik is connected with the Torah and by means of that he is connected with God.
Note: I put this here again though it is an essay from a few days ago because it is important.
Without a tzadik people tend to create all kinds of modern idols, Psychology, Yoga, Meditation,worship of homosexuals, worship of Negroes, and worship of a tzadik also. It takes a lot of conviction to remain loyal to Torah and to in fact believe that Torah has all the answers for human life. To obstacles to Torah are infinite. But the Sitra Achra creates Trojan Horses--people that it plants into the world of Torah that are in fact agents of the Sitra Achra.
30.5.15
(1)I spent a lot of time on the subject of idolatry and in fact it looks to me that for a person to "tie himself to a tzadik" is not idolatry. At least based on the Talmud in Sanhedrin from pages 60 to 63.
(note 1)
(2) We have four types of idolatry not like the way of an idol. And we have serving it according to its way. But being attached to a tzadik does not seem like a way of serving the tzadik any more than doing any mitzvah to bring oneself closer to God. Conceptually it seems different. But that is not news to anyone.
(3) What is news is that after going through the subject matter as thoroughly as I could it seem to me that the whole approach to idolatry in those pages of Sanhedrin does not seem to have anything to do with being attached to a tzadik.
(4) But certainly some people do worship a tzadik. That is bad. But attachment is not worship. And the general attitude is that the tzadik should pray for one and by that one is helped. It seems very far away from praying to the tzadik. So I would have to say that the Nefesh HaChaim was exaggerating when he said attachment to a tzadik is idolatry. (note 2)
(5) Of course what chasidim do is idolatry, but not because of attaching themselves to a tzadik. Rather because of worship of a person they think is a tzadik. And not to confuse the issue the case is usually the object of worship is most often a "rasha" highly wicked and highly clever at using his position for nefarious purposes.
Notes
(note 1) In Avoda Zara 41 it says, when an idol falls and breaks it is nullified. Rav Shach derives from that that the major thing that causes something to be an idol is the thought, "This can help" in an invisible sense. But there too just because one thinks, "This can help" that alone doe not make it an idol.
(note 2) This is not the only place in which the Nefesh HaChaim exaggerated. Also in where he says if the world would be empty of words of Torah for a second, it would be destroyed. Reb Chaim Kanievsky [Bnei Brak] pointed out that the Talmud says in one place that the world was in fact empty of words of Torah for a second.
In any case, if we understand Torah in the sense that Torah is hidden inside of everything. Torah is the interface between God and his creation.
(note 1)
(2) We have four types of idolatry not like the way of an idol. And we have serving it according to its way. But being attached to a tzadik does not seem like a way of serving the tzadik any more than doing any mitzvah to bring oneself closer to God. Conceptually it seems different. But that is not news to anyone.
(3) What is news is that after going through the subject matter as thoroughly as I could it seem to me that the whole approach to idolatry in those pages of Sanhedrin does not seem to have anything to do with being attached to a tzadik.
(4) But certainly some people do worship a tzadik. That is bad. But attachment is not worship. And the general attitude is that the tzadik should pray for one and by that one is helped. It seems very far away from praying to the tzadik. So I would have to say that the Nefesh HaChaim was exaggerating when he said attachment to a tzadik is idolatry. (note 2)
(5) Of course what chasidim do is idolatry, but not because of attaching themselves to a tzadik. Rather because of worship of a person they think is a tzadik. And not to confuse the issue the case is usually the object of worship is most often a "rasha" highly wicked and highly clever at using his position for nefarious purposes.
Notes
(note 1) In Avoda Zara 41 it says, when an idol falls and breaks it is nullified. Rav Shach derives from that that the major thing that causes something to be an idol is the thought, "This can help" in an invisible sense. But there too just because one thinks, "This can help" that alone doe not make it an idol.
(note 2) This is not the only place in which the Nefesh HaChaim exaggerated. Also in where he says if the world would be empty of words of Torah for a second, it would be destroyed. Reb Chaim Kanievsky [Bnei Brak] pointed out that the Talmud says in one place that the world was in fact empty of words of Torah for a second.
In any case, if we understand Torah in the sense that Torah is hidden inside of everything. Torah is the interface between God and his creation.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)