For Schopenhauer there is only one thing in itself.

For Schopenhauer there is only one thing in itself, not many. by this he intends to belay the problems on Kant raised by Schulze, Fichte and others. That is the WILL, but this will is not automatically good.  There is a non-rational aspect to God, as the verse we say in the morning states  יוצר אור ובורא רע ''forms light and creates evil.'' However that blessing changed to actual words of the verse to be ''...creates darkness.'' This you can see in Job where the suffering  in fact did not come from sin, but from a bet God had with the devil. The non rational aspect of God can be seen through-out the Torah. God gave Avraham a son and later told him to kill him to show how religious he is. He brings Moses to the edge of the Land of Israel but does not let him enter because Moses hit the rock similarly to what he was told 40 years prior to that right after they left Egypt. The events with David and Bat Sheva also shows this aspect  where he was never supposed to be married with her and yet that is the union from which all kings of the House of David come. in the Torah there is a command to appoint a king but when Israel wanted to fulfill that command the prophet Shmuel showed to them a miracle to show that they had sinned.

This irrational aspect is because reason is a creation of God. It does not control Him.

Bava Metzia Chapter Hamafkid pg. 35b. Rambam Laws of Renting chapter 1 halacha 6. see also the letter rav shach sent to reb isar meltzar

A guard that hands over an animal to another guard is an argument if the animal dies.   Does the responsibility go back to the owner or to the first guard. In what way does this relate to the case where a guard lends out the object, and thus borrower has an added degree of responsibility? (In case of accident a unpaid guard swears it was an accident but a borrower pays.) [Thus the first guard ought to take an oath that it was an accident, and thus not be obligated to pay. Then the second guard should pay the first guard. Only because of the reason that, "How can the guard be making business with the animal of the owner" that in fact the borrower has to pay the owner. ] In the second case, Idy bar Abin said the owner can say to the first guard, ''Do not take an oath, and I will deal with the borrower.'' Abyee said, ''Do you think the responsibility of the loss begins with the oath. No. It begins with the death of the animal.'' Rav Shach brings this statement as a proof that the plea of a big accident like the sudden death of the animal is a good plea, and so the money the borrower has to pay ought to go to the first guard. [This is unlike Reb Aaron Kotler who held this is not a strong plea.][I assume at this point that the guard was there when the animal died, so he can swear an oath about what happened, and also that he had permission to lend to animal to the borrower.  ]

But at the sea shore I was thinking that this point of Abyee must mean that  the added responsibility of the borrower is what causes the ownership of the animal to revert from the owners to the first guard. That is, if one holds a guard of a guard goes to the owner. But what about the reverse? What if a the responsibility of a guard of a guard goes to the first guard. Then the statement of Idy bar Abin is hard to understand. Just because of an oath, the ownership changes? [After all, in all oaths of the Torah, there is no change in ownership. they are oaths to retain possession, not to change possession. ]

It could be that Idy bar Abin holds that the responsibility of a  second guard or a borrower goes to the owner, not to the first guard. So even if the first guard takes an oath, the borrower would pay the owner.  And I guess that Abyee holds the main obligation of a second guard or a borrower from the first guard goes to the first guard. For to me it seems that just because there is a certain amount of added responsibility for the borrower, that should not change the status of ownership.

The main problem here comes from the fact that R. Yochanan  holds a guard that hands the animal over to another guard is obligated in paying if the animal was stolen. That is an argument between R. Yochanan and Rav and the halacha is like R. Yochanan as per the general rule.  So we see the obligation of the second guard is to the first guard. So why in our case the borrower  from the  first guard pays the owner, not the first guard? 

   

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A שומר that hands over an animal to another שומר is an argument if the animal dies.   Does the responsibility go back to the owner or to the first שומר. In what way does this relate to the case where a guard lends out the object, and thus השואל has an added degree of responsibility? [Thus the first שומר ought to take an oath that it was an accident, and thus not be obligated to pay. Then the שואל should pay the first שומר. Only because of the reason that, "How can the שומר be making business with the animal of the owner?" that in fact the שואל has to pay the owner. ] In the second case, אידי בר שבין said the owner can say to the first guard, ''Do not take an oath, and I will deal with the borrower.'' אביי said, ''Do you think the responsibility of the loss begins with the oath? No. It begins with the death of the animal.'' רב שך brings this statement as a proof that the plea of a אונס like the sudden death of the animal is a good plea, and so the money the borrower has to pay ought to go to the first שומר.

I assume at this point that the guard was there when the animal died, so he can swear an oath about what happened, and also that he had permission to lend to animal to the borrower.  ] 

 I was thinking that this point of אביי must mean that  the added responsibility of the borrower is what causes the ownership of the animal to revert from the owners to the first guard. That is, if one holds a guard of a guard האחריות goes to the owner. But what about the reverse? What if a guard of a guard האחריות goes to the first guard? The the statement of אידי בר אבין is hard to understand. Just because of an oath the ownership changes?

It could be that  אידי בר אבין holds that the responsibility of a  second guard or a borrower goes to the owner, not to the first guard. So even if the first guard takes an oath, the borrower would pay the owner.  And I guess that אביי holds the main obligation of a second guard or a borrower from the first guard goes to the first guard

The main problem here comes from the fact that ר' יוחנן  holds a guard that hands the animal over to another guard is obligated in paying if the animal was stolen. That is an argument between ר' יוחנן and רב and the הלכה is like ר' יוחנן as per the general rule.  So we see the obligation of the second guard is to the first guard. So why in our case the borrower  from the  first guard pays the owner, not the first guard? 

   

 

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שומר שמוסר בעל חיים לשומר אחר הוא ויכוח אם החיה מתה. האם האחריות חוזרת לבעלים או לשומר הראשון. באיזה אופן זה קשור למקרה שבו שומר משאיל את בהמה, ובכך לשואל יש מידה נוספת של אחריות? [לכן השומר הראשון צריך להישבע שמדובר בתאונה, ולפיכך לא חייב בתשלום. אז השואל צריך לשלם את השומר הראשון. רק בגלל הסיבה ש"איך יכול השומר לעשות עסקים עם החיה של הבעלים?" שבעצם השואל צריך לשלם לבעלים. ] במקרה השני, אידי בר שבין אמר שהבעלים יכולים לומר לשומר הראשון ''אל תישבע, ואני אתמודד עם הלווה'' אביי אמר, ''האם אתה חושב שאחריות ההפסד מתחיל בשבועה? לא. זה מתחיל במות החיה.'' רב שך מביא קביעה זו כהוכחה לכך שהטענה של אונס כמו מותו הפתאומי של החיה היא טענה טובה, ולכן הכסף שעל שואל לשלם צריך לשלם הולך לשומר הראשון. 

אני מניח בשלב זה שהשומר היה שם כשהחיה מתה, אז הוא יכול להישבע על מה שקרה, וגם שהיה לו רשות להלוות את החיה ללווהחשבתי שנקודה זו של אביי חייבת לומר שהאחריות הנוספת של השואל שגורמת לבעלות על החיה לחזור מהבעלים לשומר הראשון. כלומר, אם מחזיקים שאחריות של שומר של שומר הולכת לבעלים. אבל מה עם ההפך? מה אם אחריות של שומר של שומר אחר תלך לשומר הראשון? קשה להבין את האמירה של אידי בר אבין. רק בגלל שבועה הבעלות משתנה?

שהרי בכל שבועות התורה אין שינוי בבעלות. הן שבועות לשמור על בעלות, לא לשנות בעלות

יכול להיות שאידי בר אבין סבור שהאחריות של שומר שני או לווה עוברת  לבעלים, לא לשומר הראשון. אז גם אם השומר הראשון נשבע, הלווה ישלם לבעלים

ואני מניח שאבי מחזיק שחובה העיקרית של שומר שני או של הלווה מהשומר הראשון הולך לשומר הראשון

כי לי נראה שרק בגלל שיש מידה מסוימת של אחריות נוספת על הלווה, זה לא אמור לשנות את מצב הבעלות

עיקר הבעיה כאן נובעת מכך שר' יוחנן מחזיק בשומר המוסר את הבהמה לשומר אחר חייב בתשלום אם הבהמה נגזלה. זה ויכוח בין ר' יוחנן לרב, וההלכה היא כמו ר' יוחנן לפי הכלל. אז אנחנו רואים שחובת השומר השני היא לשומר הראשון. אז למה במקרה שלנו הלווה מהשומר הראשון משלם לבעלים, לא לשומר הראשון?

Litvak Yeshiva World follows the Gra to some degree

 My recommendation in terms of the Gra are to follow his approach in several areas 1. Learning bekiut (saying the words in order ) of all the books of the Written and Oral Torah (the two Talmuds and all the Midrashim) and iyun of the Achronim from Reb Chaim of Brisk until Rav Shach.  2. The famous herem (excommunication) 3. The study of the seven wisdoms. 4. Trust in God for all things spiritual and physical.  Trust without effort for parnasa [money]. 5.Coming to the Land of Israel. 6. Make sure before you get married that you will learn TORAH at all cost lishma (i.e., for no money), and will never compromise on this for any reason what-so-ever. If she wants to leave because of that, then good riddance.

Even though the Litvak (Lithuanian) Yeshiva World follows the Gra to some degree, but not to depend on that for any kind of example. After all, if Torah is the standard, then volunteering for IDF on the first day of the war ought to have happened without any prompting, [not to fight the draft at all cost]. 

Also I should mention that I think some of the Seven Wisdoms that the Gra mentioned have made advances since the time of the Ancient Greeks.   Thus one  should not be restricted to Aristotle in these subjects.

Why Kant is important is that the approach of the Torah is Faith with Reason; and the sort of synthesis of the Rambam is based on Aristotle, and that approach has some major flaws

 There is a kind of problem in Kant which I think is best answered by Jacob Fries. THIS problem is really many aspects of the same problem. how do we know the dinge an sich exists? How can the a priori categories tell us anything about reality since they are all in mind? Is not is or is not a a priori category? With Fries the role of reason or knowledge is expanded into immediate non intuitive knowledge. Normally we would think that there is a kind of immediate knowledge that comes along with perception. That is the second half of the B deduction. But  Fries postulates that there is a kind of immediate knowledge that precedes the senses that knows the categories but also the level of knowledge of the One or the Good in Plato and Plotinus..

That should not be taken to dismiss Hegel who I think deals with a lower level of Logos [of Plotinus]. To me that seems clearly what Hegel meant by the Geist.

The next level is the foundationalists, Huemer, Prichard, G. E. Moore. There you are dealing with a level of cognition after we already can perceive universals.

the best approach to fries is leonard nelson and kelley ross--and even there the best i kelley ross because there are things that fries gets wrong and nelson corrects. and other areas the opposite. to get a full and consistent picture the best is kelley ross.

Why Kant is important is that the approach of the Torah is Faith with Reason; and the sort of synthesis of the Rambam is based on Aristotle, and that approach has some major flaws--as pointed out by Berkley and Thomas Reid. 

The trouble with Communism

 The trouble with Communism is the short memory of people. Every day  about 15,000 people from East Berlin used to escape into West Berlin until the wall was put up in 1961. They were not escaping from the worker's paradise promised by Communism but from worker's hell. After the wall was up, the escape attempts were almost every day, and many of these attempts were reported in the USA where I was aware of this phenomenon. The East German guards had orders to shot to kill, and succeeded in doing so many times. So when in  English Literature Departments in universities  advocate for communism, why don't they mention this? 

global warming

 I might mention that plants need CO2 for it is their way of surviving, and they produce O2 which we need. But we can not breathe CO2. But the real reason for the global warming scare is the newspapers can not be sold unless they are predicting some dire catastrophe.

The amount of CO2 in the atmosphere during the Jurassic era was 1800 parts per million; and at the start was 2100. The amount of CO2 in the atmosphere now 419.39 ppm. That is the amount now is about a fourth of what it was when the dinosaurs were around. 

Ii would like to add here that papers about the subject tend to rely on computer modeling. But there are plenty of equations that go to infinity, but a computer will miss completely unless you enter the exact amount. See the lectures of Dr Strang at MIT where he mentions this. Besides the computer depends on input data. so it all depends on what you put in.  

combining faith with reason that was universal with Muslims, Christians and Jews.

 My son, Izhak, was aware of the importance of the teachings of Rav Nahman of Breslov, But at the same time was aware of the pitfalls of Breslov.  The tendency in Breslov is to go off on tangents that have nothing to do with Torah. One gets excited about Rav Nahman, and then learning Gemara goes out the window. +in the middle ages there was a general approach of combining faith with reason that was universal with Muslims, Christians and Jews. But how this worked was not unanimous. The Rambam wrote the Guide For The Perplexed in order to answer this question, and he has some good points. However I think Rav Nahman does a much better job. That is not to say that this was his only intension, However in the way that Rav Nahman answers this question, I think he does a better job. Of course, he had the help of Rav Izhak Luria in order to do so. Without the insights of the Ari, clearly Rav Nahman would not have been able on his own to show the reasons and reasonableness of the commandments.

Even though I am not really sure why the Guide seems not very great, still Rav Avraham Abulafia, the great mediaeval mystic, saw in the first 40 chapters the redemption of Israel. [my suspicion is that the translation might not present an accurate picture of what the Rambam was saying. The original was in Arabic.   ]