I missed learning by the Litvaks in the morning and had to go to the sea, on the way back I was thinking about Rav Shach’s explanation of the argument between the Ramban (Nachmanides) and R Nisim (the Ran) in Shavuot page 43. [This argument is brought in the Rif.] What I think now is this. I think R Nisim (the Ran) holds the law is like R Yochanan in terms of eiravon (guarantee of a sale) because that is on what R Yochanan said his law. But we also know that the Rambam (Maimonides) does not hold with the law of Shmuel that if one has borrowed money and given a guarantee and it is lost, the whole loan is nullified. (We know the Rambam does not hold like Shmuel from Laws of Loans chapter13, law 4.) So, R Nisim (the Ran) we can understand perfectly well. An eiravon is for a sale, and there the law is like R. Yochanan that the guarantee (eiravon) is for the whole sale. If the eiravon is lost, the whole sale is nullified. A mashkon is for a loan, and in that case, if the guarantee (mashkon) is lost, the amount of the loan that was more than the worth of value of the mashkon is still obligated. The Ramban (Nachmanides), however, holds that the law of R. Yochanan applies also to a mashkon. So, now we can understand the argument between the Ramban and R. Nisim (the Ran). The Ramban (Nachmanides) wrote that if one borrowed money, and received a guarantee [mashkon], and lost the mashkon, the borrower does not have to pay back anything. R. Nisim (HaRan) disagrees, and says that the amount of the loan that was worth more than the mashkon is still owed. Rav Shach says this depends on the argument between R Yochanan and Rav. However, I think R. Nisim (the Ran) holds that (in terms of a loan), the mashkon covers only its exact worth, not the whole loan. (note 1) (R Yochanan said the guarantee goes for the whole debt only in the case of a sale, not loan. The case in Bava Metzia where he is brought is talking about a sale.) I think he has a good reason for this because even the Rambam who holds like R Yochanan does not hold that the guarantee goes for the whole loan as we see that he does not decide the Shmuel. However, R Nisim (the Ran) would have to agree that the law is like R Yochanan in a case of a sale because it is a general rule that when there is a disagreement between Rav and R Yochanan, the law is like R Yochanan. Now even though the Gemara in Bava Metzia 48 holds the mashkon and eiravon are the same in terms of law, the Rambam (Maimonides) does not need to agree with that because, in any case, that Gemara is going like Shmuel who the Rambam holds is not according to the law. But I am saying all this only according to R Nisim. The Ramban (Nachmanides) however, holds the mashkon and eiravon are the same, and in terms of both, the law is like R Yochanan [which would be like Shmuel.]------------------------------------------------I missed learning by the Litvaks in the morning and had to go to the sea, on the way back I was thinking about רב שך’s explanation of the argument between the רמב’’ן and הר’’ן in שבועות page 43. [This argument is brought in the Rif.] What I think now is this. I think הר’’ן holds the law is like ר’ יוחנן in terms of עירבון (guarantee of a sale) because that is on what ר’ יוחנן said his law. But we also know that the רמב’’ם does not hold with the law of שמואל that if one has borrowed money and given a guarantee and it is lost, the whole loan is nullified. [(We know the רמב''ם does not hold like שמואל from הלכות מלווה ולווה פרק י''ג הלכה ד ] So, הר’’ן we can understand perfectly well. An עירבון is for a sale, and there the law is like ר’ יוחנן that the guarantee (עירבון) is for the whole sale. If the עירבון is lost, the whole sale is nullified. A משכון is for a loan, and in that case, if the guarantee (משכון) is lost, the amount of the loan that was more than the worth of value of the משכון is still obligated. The רמב’’ן however holds that the law of ר’ יוחנן applies also to a משכון. So now we can understand the argument between the רמב’’ן and הר’’ן (the Ran). The רמב’’ן wrote that if one borrowed money and received a guarantee and lost the משכון, the borrower does not have to pay back anything. הר’’ן disagrees and says that the amount of the loan that was worth more than the משכון is still owed. רב שך says this depends on the argument between ר’ יוחנן and רב. However, I think הר’’ן holds that (in terms of a loan), the משכון covers only its exact worth, not the whole loan. (ר’ יוחנן said the guarantee goes for the whole debt only in the case of a sale, not loan. The case in בבא מציעא where he is brought is talking about a sale.) I think he has a good reason for this because even the רמב’’ם who holds like ר’ יוחנן does not hold that the guarantee goes for the whole loan as we see that he does not decide the שמואל. However, הר’’ן would have to agree that the law is like ר’ יוחנן in a case of a sale because it is a general rule that when there is a disagreement between רב and ר’ יוחנן, the law is like ר’ יוחנן. Now even though the גמרא in בבא מציעא 48 holds the משכון and עירבון are the same in terms of law, the רמב’’ם (Maimonides) does not need to agree with that because, in any case, that גמרא is going like שמואל who the רמב’’ם holds is not according to the law. But I am saying all this only according to הר’’ן. However, the רמב’’ן however, holds the משכון and עירבון are the same, and in terms of both, the law is like ר’ יוחנן [which would be like Shmuel.] ---------------------------------------------- (Note 1) So the Ran seems to extrapolate from the law of Rav about eiravon to the law about mashokon. This is against Shmuel in Mashkon who held if one borrowed a thousand zuzim and as a guarantee got the handle of a shovel. If the handle is lost, the thousand zuz are lost. Rav apparently disagrees with this as seems apparent from the Mishna in Bava Metzia page 82. That Mishna says if a lender received a guarantee and lost it by neglect and says it was worth the half amount of the loan. [So, the borrower is liable to pay back half the loan]. The borrower says it was worth three fourths of the loan. The borrower takes an oath that it was worth 3/4 of the loan and pays back 1/4. That seems pretty clear to me that it is not like Shmuel.

בדף מ''ח ע''ב בבא מציעא יש מקרה שבו לר' חייא בר יוסף היה מלח למכור. מישהו נתן לו תשלום חלקי (ערבון). ואז מחיר המלח עלה. רב חייא ניגש לר' יוחנן ושאל אם יוכל לחזור בו מהעסקה. ר' יוחנן אמר שהוא חייב לקיים את העסקה, כי ר' יוחנן קבע שתשלום חלקי רוכש את כל הרכישה [יש לספק את הסחורה ואת יתרת התשלום יש לשלם]. אבל, רב אמר שהוא רוכש רק עד לסכום שלו. השאלה שלי כאן היא איפה המשיכה? כי למרות שכסף רוכש מדין התורה, אולם חכמים גזרו שאין עסקה סופית עד שהחפץ הנקנה נמשך או נגבה. אז, במקרה שלנו, איפה המשיכה? המלח לא נמשך ובכל זאת המכירה נחשבת סופית

Bava Metzia page 48b.rav chia bar joseph had salt to sell. someone gave him partial [payment. then the price of salt went up. Rav Chiya came to R Yochanan and asked if he could retrack on the deal. R. Yochanan said he has to keep the deal, because R Yochanan held a partial payment acquires the whole purchase [the goods need to be delivered and the remaing payment needs to be paid.]. Rav said it acquires only up to its amount. my question here is where is the picking up? for even though money acquires from the law of the Torah, however the sages decreed no deal is final until the bought object is picked up. so in our case let me ask. where is the picking up?--------------------IN בבא מציעא page מ''ח ע''ב there is a case where ר' חייא בר יוסף had salt to sell. Someone gave him partial payment ערבון . Then the price of salt went up. רב חייא came to ר' יוחנן and asked if he could retrack on the deal. ר' יוחנן said he has to keep the deal, because ר' יוחנן held a partial payment acquires the whole purchase [the goods need to be delivered and the remainder of payment needs to be paid.]. But, רב said it acquires only up to its amount. My question here is where is the picking up? for even though money acquires from the law of the תורה, however the sages decreed no deal is final until the bought object is picked up. So, in our case let me ask. where is the picking up? The salt was not picked up and yet the sale is considered to be final.

בבא מציעא דף מ''ח ע''א. רמו'ב''ם מעילה פרק ו' הלכה י'

הצעתי כיצד רב שך יכול להסביר את הרמב"ם במעילה. עם זאת, בדרכי חזרה מהים עלה בדעתי לשאול על כך. במילים אחרות, תשובתי יכולה להיות שונה מזו של רב שך. הסיבה שאני אומר זאת היא שהוא מביא את בעל המאור מסיבה שונה משלי. הוא מביא אותו משום שבעל המאור דורש שגם הכסף וגם החפץ הקנוי יהיו קיימים בזמן ביטול המכירה. אבל גישה זו אינה עוזרת בהתחלה מהסיבה שאנו מחפשים סיבה שאם יהודי קונה חפץ מיהודי אחר מבלי למשוך אותו, הוא אינו עובר על מעילה בגלל הגזירה ש"משיכה קונה" אלא אם כן שני החפצים נמצאים קיימים. אם גם הכסף וגם החפץ נמצאים בסביבה, אז כסף קונה לפי בעל המאור, ולכן יש לראות את הקונה כעובר על העבירה של מעילה. [עם זאת, ברור שרב שך מתכוון לומר שמכיוון שהמכירה אינה סופית, אז אין מעילה.] רב שך חושב שזה לא מספיק שהמכירה תקפה כעת מהתורה משום שכסף רוכש (מעות קונות), אלא שאנחנו צריכים גם שהקונה ירוויח מהמכירה. זה נראה לי רעוע. אם הוא רוכש את החפץ, זה כנראה אומר שהוא הרוויח גם אם הוא יכול לבטל את המכירה עד שהוא מושך את החפץ.] בכל מקרה, יש עוד שאלות שעולו בדעתי בדרכי חזרה מהים ואני בספק אם אני יכול לזכור את כולן. שאלה נוספת היא תשלום "אתנן זונה" עבור כבשה לאישה עבור יחסי מין. אם היא נכרית, היא רוכשת. אם היא יהודייה, היא לא רוכשת עד שהיא מכניסה את הכבשה לחצרה. נראה שרב שך כאן תלוי באחרונים שאומרים שרק תועלת מהקדש היא מעילה לדעת הרמב''ם, לא שינוי תחום. שאלתי היא שאם הכבשה היא התשלום עבור המין, אז הוא הרוויח תועלת ולכן הכבשה צריכה להיות אתנן, שכן דאורייתא, כסף רוכש. אבל רב שך נוקט בגישה שפעולת המין היא מה שנחשב תשלום עבור הכבשה, וכי ניתן להפוך אותה על ידי תשלום עבור המין בכסף. אבל אם המין הוא התשלום, אז הוא הרוויח הנאה. עם זאת, כאן אני מודה שרב שק צודק שהשאלה אינה אם הוא עבר על מעילה, אלא אם הכבשה הפכה לאתנן

I suggest in my previous blog entry how Rav Shach might be explaining the Rambam in meila . However, it occurred to me on my way back from the sea to ask on this. In other words, my answer might be differentp that that of Rav Shach. The reason I say this is that he brings the Baal Hameor for a different reason than I do. He brings him because the Baal Hameor requires that both the money and bought object be in existence at the time of nullification of the sale. But that approach does not help at first for the reason that we are looking for a reason that if a Jew buys an object from another Jew without picking it up, he does not transgress meila because of the decree that” picking up acquires” unless both objects are around. If both the money and object are around, then money acquires according to the Baal Hameor, and therefore the buyer should be considered to transgress. [However, it is clear that Rav Shach intends to say that since the sale is not final, then there is no meila.] Rav Shach is thinking that it is not enough that the sale is now valid from the Torah because money acquires, but that we also need the buyer to benefit from the sale. This seems shaky to me. If he acquires the object, that would seem to mean that he gained benefit even if he can nullify the sale until he picks up the object.] At any rate, there are more questions that came shooting at me on my way back from the sea and i doubt if I can remember them all. Another question is the ''etnan zona'' payment of a sheep to a woman for sex. If she is a gentile, she acquires the sheep. If she is Jewish, she does not acquire until she picks up the sheep. Rav Shach here seems to depend on the achronim that say only benefit of hekdesh transgress, not change of domain. My question is that if the sheep is the payment for the sex, then he gained benefit and so the sheep should be an etnan[payment] since from the Torah, money acquires. But Rav Shach takes the approach that the act of sex is what is considered payment for the sheep, and that it can be reversed by paying for the sex with money. But if the sex is the payment, then he gained pleasure. However here I admit that Rav Shach is right that the question is not if he transgressed meila, but if the sheep became an etnan. Here she does not acquire unless she picks it up or brings it into her domain. At any rate, I see that Reb Aaron Kotler has a significantly different approach to this, that I see is very important,-----------------------I suggest in my previous blog entry how רב שך might be explaining the רמב''ם in מעילה . However, it occurred to me on my way back from the sea to ask on this. In other words, my answer might be different that that of רב שך. The reason I say this is that he brings the Baal Hameor for a different reason than I do. He brings him because the Baal Hameor requires that both the money and bought object be in existence at the time of nullification of the sale. But that approach does not help at first for the reason that we are looking for a reason that if a Jew buys an object from another Jew without picking it up, he does not transgress מעילה because of the decree that” picking up acquires” unless both objects are around. If both the money and object are around, then money acquires according to the בעל המאור, and therefore the buyer should be considered to transgress. [However, it is clear that רב שך intends to say that since the sale is not final, then there is no מעילה.] רב שך is thinking that it is not enough that the sale is now valid from the תורה because money acquires(מעות קונות) but that we also need to buyer to benefit from the sale. This seems shaky to me. If he acquires the object that would seem to means that he gained benefit even if he can nullify the sale until he picks up the object.] At any rate, there are more questions that came shooting at me on MY WAY back from the sea and I doubt if I can remember them all. Another question is the ''אתנן זונה'' payment of a sheep to a for sex. If she is a gentile, she acquires. if she is Jewish, she does not acquire until she picks up the sheep. רב שך here seems to depend on the אחרונים that say only benefit of הקדש transgress, not change of domain. my question is that if the sheep is the payment for the sex, then he gained benefit and so the sheep should be an אתנן[payment] since דאורייתא, money acquires. But רב שך takes the approach that the act of sex is what is considered payment for the sheep, and that it can be reversed by paying for the sex with money. But if the sex is the payment, then he gained pleasure. However here I admit that רב שך is right that the question is not if he transgressed מעילה, but if the sheep became an אתנן.

חשבתי על מה שכתבתי מקודם על בבא מציעא דף מ''ח ע''א, והבנתי שיש לי באמת רק תשובה אחת לרמב''ם. זהו הרעיון של בעל המאור והרמב''ן התקנה שמשיכה רוכשת היא רק למוכר ולקונה. חכמים לא היו קובעים גזירה לגוי. לכן, כאשר יהודי משלם בכסף הקדש לגוי (מבלי לקחת את הקנוי) הוא עובר על מעילה משום שהגוי רכש את הכסף בין אם היהודי רכש את הקנוי ובין אם לאו. אינך צריך את הרעיון של המהר''ם מלובלין שגזירת חכמים הייתה רק שהקונה לא רוכש עד שהוא לוקח את הקנוי, לא שהמוכר לא רוכש את הכסף. אני חושב שהרעיון הזה לא פותר את הרמב"ם בכל מקרה, כי אם זה יהיה כך, אז מה לגבי המקרה שבו יהודי קונה מיהודי אחר? שם הדין הוא שהוא לא עובר על מעילה אלא אם כן הוא לוקח את החפץ. אבל אם המוכר רוכש את הכסף, אז הקונה בוודאי עובר על מעילה גם אם לא קנה

I was thinking about what I wrote in my previous blog about Bava Metzia page 48, and I realized that I really have only one answer there for the Rambam. That is the idea of the Baal Hameeor and the Ramban that the decree that pulling acquires is only for the seller and buyer. The Sages would not have made a decree for a gentile. Therefore, when the Jew pays with money of hekdesh (the Temple) to a gentile (without picking up the bought object) he transgresses meila because the gentile has acquired the money regardless if the Jew has acquired the bought object or not. You do not need the idea of the Maharam of Lublin that the decree of the sages was only that the buyer does not acquire until he picked up the bought object, but that that the seller does not acquire the money. I think that idea does not solve the Rambam in any case, because if it would be so, then what about the case when the Jew buys from another Jew? There the law is that he does not transgress meila unless he picks up the object. But if the seller acquires the money, then the buyer should transgress meila even if he has not acquired.--------------------------------------I was thinking about what I wrote in my previous blog about בבא מציעא דף מ'', and I realized that I really have only one answer there for the רמב''ם. That is the idea of the בעל המאור and the רמב''ן that the decree that משיכה acquires is only for the seller and buyer. The Sages would not have made a decree for a gentile. Therefore, when the Jew pays with money of הקדש (the Temple) to a gentile (without picking up the bought object) he transgresses מעילה because the gentile has acquired the money regardless if the Jew has acquired the bought object or not. You do not need the idea of the מהר''ם מלובלין that the decree of the sages was only that the buyer does not acquire until he picked up the bought object, but that that the seller does not acquire the money. I think that idea does not solve the רמב''ם in any case, because if it would be so, then what about the case when the Jew buys from another Jew? There the law is that he does not transgress מעילה unless he picks up the object. But if the seller acquires the money, then the buyer should transgress מעילה even if he has not acquired.