bava kama page 17-18

The Rambam wrote that in a case of a chicken that chews a string with a bucket attached to it that if the string Is cut and the bucket broken that one pays full damage for the bucket. if there was dough on the string then he pays full damage for the string also. It sounds like the payment of full damage for the bucket is independent of whether there was dough on the string or not. If so, that is going like the Nemukei Yoseph and the Rosh and the Shiltei Giborim on the Rif that the damage for the bucket is because the law is like Raba that one goes by the beginning. However, there is a possibility of understanding that the Rambam means that the chicken was pushing the bucket because of a few extra words where he writes that the bucket was broken because of the chicken. Well, that seem obvious so why did the Rambam add that? Maybe because he is going like the Tur and Beit Yoseph [Choshen Mishpat 390 law 11] that held if there is no dough on the string it is a case of pebbles and liable only in half damage. This would be because in the Gemara Bava Kama 18 it say a that in a case where the chicken chewed on the string and the bucket fell and broke another vessel on which it fell, that is a case of force of his force. From that it seems clear that our first case with only the chicken string and bucket that that is a case of force, not direct physical contact and the Gemara has already said that a case of force is half damage. The case of the Gemara is this. Rava asked if one goes by the beginning or the breaking on a vessel? The case in question is this. An animal stepped on a vessel and it rolled away and was broken on a stone. If we go by the start, that is full damage. If we go by the end, that is half damage. We answered this by Raba who said if one throws a vessel off a roof and then someone else come and breaks it, the first Is liable. We therefore go by the beginning. Then the Gemara thought to answer the question of Rava by means of the case with the chicken and bucket where it looks that one goes by the beginning because of the requirement of full damage. Then we push that off and suggest that is Sumchos who holds pebbles are full damage. Then we push that off because the end of that braita (teaching) says if the bucket fell and broke another bucket, the second one is half damage and we are unaware that Sumchos ever said there Is such a thing a half damage. Then the gemara suggests that well perhaps in fact Sumchos holds force of his force is half damage. Then we push that off because then rav ashi would have had an easy answer to his question if force of force is half damage to Sumchos. So we return to our original question that ay the chicken I pushing the bucket until it breaks and therefore we have no answer to the question of rava. I might mention here my miniscule opinion that the Rambam seem to be more on the side of the Rosh and Nemukai Yoseph. (------------------------------------------- The רמב''ם פרק ב' הלכה י''ד wrote that in a case of a chicken that chews a string with a bucket attached to it that if the string Is cut and the bucket broken that one pays full damage for the bucket. if there was dough on the string then he pays full damage for the string also. It sounds like the payment of full damage for the bucket is independent of whether there was dough on the string or not. If so, that is going like the נימוקי יוסף and the רא''ש and the שילטי גיבוריםon the רי''ף that the damage for the bucket is because the law is like רבה that one goes by the beginning. However, there is a possibility of understanding that the רמב''ם means that the chicken was pushing the bucket because of a few extra words where he writes that the bucket was broken because of the chicken. Well, that seem obvious so why did the רמב''ם add that? Maybe because he is going like the טורand בית יוסף חושן משפט ש''צ הלכה י''א that held if there is no dough on the string it is a case of צרורות and liable only in half damage. This would be because in בבא קמא י''חit say a that in a case where the chicken chewed on the string and the bucket fell and broke another vessel on which it fell, that is a case of force of his force. From that it seems clear that our first case with only the chicken string and bucket that that is a case of force, not direct physical contact and the גמרא has already said that a case of force is half damage.

Apollo 11

I wanted to mention here that Buzz Aldrin eventually was able to redeem his reputation by means of one swift punch to a moon landing denier who was harassing him. [Aldrin was the second in command to Neil Armstrong, Apollo 11. Neil was the first to walk on the moon.] The reputation of Buzz had suffered, and that no one wanted to work with Buzz Aldrin. One Apollo commander (Borman) said openly to the Flight Director that if he was going to assign Buzz to his crew, he would reign. The flight director, at one point, took Neil Armstrong aide and asked him if he wanted to replace Buzz with Lovell (commander of Apollo 13). And Neil said, “Give me a day to think about it.” After a day, Neil said,” I can work with him. Lovell deserves his own command.” The truth be told, Buzz was a great astronaut, but people were put off by his self-promotion. In the end, Aldrin redeemed himself by one swift punch that I think not Armstrong, nor any other Apollo pilot would have done. But all the Apollo astronauts were great men. All were Navy test pilots who put their lives on the line daily. And Buzz had an advanced degree in engineering from MIT. [That punch was caught on film, and the D.A. of L.A. refused to prosecute because he said it was self-defense.] I think it is about time for Israel to get to Mars, and start a colony there, and start planting trees to make it inhabitable. I can see the need for self-defense, but getting to Mars is more important. It is about time for Israel, to devote some of its considerable brain power toward this goal of getting Mars ready for human expansion.

za69 E Flat Major midi za69 nwc format

בבא קמא י''ז

עלה בדעתי להזכיר כאן משהו שהתלבטתי לגביו. יש שני מקומות בבבא קמא שבהם שואל רב אשי על גישת סומכוס אך נראה ששני המקומות הללו אינם מתאימים. גם ש ם עולה השאלה בגמרא אם אתה הולך בהתחלה או בסוף ויש קשר כלשהו לשאלה אחרת אם אתה מחשיב את כוחו של כוח זהה לכוח. אבל אולי יותר הגיוני להביא את הנושא עצמו כהקדמה כדי להסביר על מה אני תמה. במקרים מסוימים שבהם בעל חיים גורם נזקים משלם נזק מלא. אבל יש מקרה שהחכמים אומרים שמשלם רק חצי נזק. כלומר כשבהמה הולכת, ודורכת על חלוקי נחל והם מתעופפים ושוברים כלי. שחייבים בחצי נזק לפי החכמים, אבל סומכוס גורסת שמשלם נזק מלא. רבא שאל על מקרה של כוח. האם כוח הוא כמו גוף של חיה או לא. ברור שבסומכוס זה כמו הגוף. אבל מה עם החכמים? אם זה כמו הגוף, אז הוא צריך לשלם נזק מלא. אם לא, הוא לא צריך לשלם כלום. רבא ענה על השאלה שלו ואמר שכולם מסכימים שכוח הוא כמו גוף. אבל החכמים לומדים דין שנמסר מסיני על חצי נזק של אבן להפחית נזקי מלא לחצי נזק. אתה יכול לראות שרבא חושב שחוק חצי פיצויים בא להפחית תשלום, לא להגדיל מכלום לחצי. מאוחר יותר שאל רבא "האם אתה הולך לפי ההתחלה או הסוףדוגמה לשאלה זו תהיה אם מישהו יורה חץ לעבר כלי ואז לפני שהגיע ליעד מישהו שבר את הכלי בפטיש. אם החוק על פי ההתחלה, זה הופך את האדם הראשון לחייב. אם החוק על פי הסיום זה יהפוך את האדם השני לחייב. הגמרא ניסתה לענות על שאלה זו על ידי ברייתא שאמרו במקרה של כח כחו שהוא רק חצי נזק. הגמרא עונה על זה ואומרת הברייתא ההיא כסומכוס. הגמרא אומרת אז שזה לא יכול להיות שכן אז לרב אשי תהיה תשובה לשאלתו. [רב אשי לא היה שואל את זה אם התשובה הייתה מיידית ופשוטה.] שאלת רב אשי הייתה אם כוח של כוח כמו כוח לפי סומכוס או לא. המקום שבו רב אשי שואל את השאלה הזו, אולם הוא שונה במקצת. שם הוא שואל לפי סומכוס כוח של כוח כמו כוח של לא? האם הוא לומד את חוק חצאי הנזק ומחיל אותו בכוח כוח או לא? אם ילמד רב אשי כמו רבא שדין חצי נזק בא להפחית את הקנס, אז זה אומר שסומכוס מחזיק כח כח כמו כח, אזי נדרש תשלום מלא. אבל יכול להיות שרב אשי ילמד שדין חצי נזק בא לתשלום להיות חייב במקום שאם לא כן, לא היה חייב כלל. כמו כן, נראה ששתי השאלות של רב אשי קשורות. אחד אם כוח של כוח הוא כמו כוח או לא. השני אם סומכוס למד לדין חצי נזק בכלל. נראה סביר לומר שאם יחיל בכלל דין חצי נזק זה יכול להיות רק מכוח כח ושאם לא יחיל את הדין הזה אז כח כח יכול להיות לגמרי לא חייב בכלל או שמא יתחייב במלוא הנזק. אני רוצה להוסיף שהרא''ש גורס שאפשר ללמוד משאלת רב אשי על גישתם של החכמים. היו גורסים שכוח כח חייב בנזק מלא, אבל לפי התוספות ורמב''ם החכמים היו אומרים בכח כח שאין חייבים כלל/אולם ברייתא שהגמרא מביא להשיב לשאלת כח כח לחכמים אומרים אם עוף שרט את החוט המחזיק את הדלי והוא נשבר ונפל הדלי ושבר כלי אחר שהוא חצי נזק.וכן בדף כ''ב תוספות מביאה לכאורה הוכחה שכוח כחו אינו חייב כלל, ובכל זאת אפשר ללמוד את הגמרא להיות כמו הרא''ש שיהיה נזק מלא. ומכל מקום שקשה להבין ה את הגמרא. למה לשאול מלכתחילה "בשביל מה חייבת אש?" ר' יוחנן אומר בגלל "חיציו" וריש לקיש אומר בגלל כספו. למה לא לענות כי יש פסוק בתורה שאומר שאש חייבת? כמו כן, מדוע ריש לקיש צריך להפוך את המצב של הכלב שנושא כיכר שיש בה פחם בוער לזה שצריך להיות מקרה של הזה שהכלב זרק את הכיכר. אולי זה בגלל שהוא חושב שאם הכלב היה מוריד את זה, יהיה נזק מלא? אבל על כל פנים, תוספות אומר שלר' יוחנן צריך להיות המצב שהכלב מניח את הכיכר, כי אם היה זורק אותה, זה יהיה כוח כוחו שלא יהיה חייב לגמרי. אני חושב שתוספות רוצה לומר שר' יוחנן רוצה להסביר את המשנה ([שאומרת אם כלב נושא לחם עם פחם בתוכו לערימת אלומות ואוכל אותו, והערימה נשרף, החיוב הוא שעל הכיכר נזק מלא וחצי נזק לערימת האלומות.]) ששריפת כל ערימת האלומות חייבת בחצי נזק, ולכן אם הכלב היה זורק את הכיכר, הוא לא היה אחראי כלל. אבל מצד שני, לר' יוחנן, אש היא כחיצים שלו, וחצים אתה זורק, אז אולי אם הכלב היה זורק את הכיכר, זה יהיה נזק מלא כמו שהרא''ש מבין את הדין לחכמים בכל אופן, דבר אחד אנחנו יכולים לראות הוא שהגמרא משווה את שאלת רבא אם אנחנו הולכים לפי ההתחלה או הסיום להיות זהה כאילו כוחו של כוחו הוא כמו כוחו או לא. לפיכך, הדברים הם סימטריים. רבא שאל לפי החכמים אם נלך לפי התחלה או סיום, כלומר אם כוח כוחו הוא כמו כוח ישיר או עקיף. ואותה שאלה שואל רב אשי לפי סומכוס. אם כן, אנו רואים מדוע רב אשי לא שאל את שאלתו גם לפי החכמים. ויתרה מכך, כיוון שאמרה רבה אנחנו הולכים לפי ההתחלה, עכשיו יש לנו תשובה לשאלת כוחו של כוח. תשובה: זה כמו הכוח. ולכן אם חיה דרכה על כלי והיא התגלגלה ואחר כך נשברה, אף על פי שמדובר בכוח של כח אנו פוסקים אותה ככוח הישיר לחכםים והוא חייב בחצי נזק. כך בהחלט לומד הרא''ש את הנושא הזה. אבל איך התוספות והרמב''ם לומדים את זה, זה לא מובן לי בשלב זה עם זאת, אני חושב שתוספות גורס שביבי בר אביי הסביר את התוספתא (ברייתא) משמע שהעוף דוחף את הכלי עד שהוא נשבר ולכן אין זה רומז שנלך לפי ההתחלה, ולכן יתכן שכוח הכוח אינו ככוח. אבל עד שזה לא אומר שאולי לחכמים זה לא יהיה חייב בכלל. אבל זה כנראה מה שתוספות ראו. שאי אפשר להתחייב לגמרי בנזק מלא, כי אז זה יחמיר עוד יותר מכוח ישיר שחייב רק בחצי נזק. אז תוספות מחזיקים שאנו למדים מביבי בר אביי (שהוא מסקנת הנושא) שכוח כוחו לחכמים אינו חייב כלל. זה לא יכול להיות חצי נזק כי אז זה יהיה כמו כוח ישיר שהגמרא מראה שזה לא יכול להיות שכן לרבא הייתה תשובה פשוטה לשאלתו עם זאת, יש שאלה על תשובה זו .וזאת היא. בשאלת רבא, אם תלך כפי ההתחלה או הסוף כשהכלי נשבר, הוא אומר בגלוי שאם תלך כפי הסוף, זה יהיה חייב בחצי נזק. אם אתה משווה את זה לכוח כוחו זה אינו יכול להיות כמו תוספות והרמב''ם שמחזיקים שכח כוחו אינו חייב כלל. מצד שני, אם היית הולך עם הרעיון של רבא שכח כחו ככחו, אז אין הבדל בין אם זה כמו כוח או כוח של כוח. אני יכול להזכיר כאן שהתוספתא עצמה אינה בעיה אם תלמד כמו רב ביבי בר אביי, כי הנזק הראשון הוא ישיר ולכן חייב בנזק מלא, ואז הכלי השני שנשבר הוא הכוח הראשון, לא כח כוחו עלה בדעתי שהסיבה שתוספות והרמב''ם גורסים שניהם שכוח כחו אינו חייב כלל היא בגלל הנושא בדפים כ''א וכ''ב. שם אומרת המשנה אם כלב נושא כיכר לחם עם פחם בוער בתוכה לערימת אלומות והיא נשרף, בעל הכלב משלם נזק מלא עבור הכיכר וחצי נזק עבור הערימה. שם ר' יוחנן אמר האש חייבת בגלל "חיציו" והמקרה של המשנה הוא כשהכלב הניח את הכיכר על הערימה. זה יהיה כוח מדרגה ראשונה. לכן, אם הכלב זרק את הכיכר או גרר אותה לאורך הערימה, זה יהיה כוח מדרגה שניה וזה לא יהיה חייב בכלל. אז לתוספות והרמב''ם אף על פי שהמצב ספק לרבא, הוא ברור לר' יוחנן. וכמו כן, יכול להיות שאפילו ריש לקיש מסכים כיון שלמעשה הוא אומר שאם הכלב זרק את הכיכר על הערימה, בעל הכלב אינו חייב כלל [אבל בעל הפחם יהיה חייב אם לא שם את הפחם הזה במקום שהיה שומור.

gemara bava kama pages 17, 18 and 19.

It occurred to me to mention here something that I have been puzzled about. It is this. There are two places in the Gemara Bava Kama where Rav Ashi is asking about the approach of Sumchos, but these two places do not seem to correspond. Also, there comes up the question in the Gemara about whether you go by the beginning or end, and there seems to be some connection with another question about whether you consider force of a force to be the same as a force? But, perhaps it makes more sense to bring the subject itself as an introduction to explain what I am puzzled about. In some cases where an animal causes damages, one pays full damage. But, there is a case where the sages say one pays only half damages. That is, when an animal is walking, and steps on pebbles and they fly off and break a vessel. That is obligated in half damages according to the sages, but Sumchos holds that pays full damage. Rava asked about a case of force. Is force like the body of an animal, or not? Clearly, to Sumchos, it is like the body. But what about the sages? If it is like the body, then he should pay full damage. If not, he should not have to pay anything. Rava answered his own question, and said that everyone agrees force is like body. But the sages learn a law handed down from Sinai about half damages of pebbles to reduce full damages of force to half damages. You can see Rava thinks half damages comes to reduce payment, not increase from nothing to half. Later Rava asked do you go by the start or the finish. The case that Rava is asking on is this. An animal stepped on a vessel, and it rolled away and then broke on a stone. If you go by the beginning, it is full damage. If you go by the end, it is half damage according to the sages. [Another example of this question would be: if one shot an arrow at a vessel, and then before it reached its destination, someone broke the vessel by a hammer. If the law goes by the start, that makes the first person obligated. Going by the finish would make the second person obligated.] The Gemara tried to answer this question by a braita that says in a case of force of a force where only half damage is required. The gemara answers this and says that braita is like Sumchos. The gemara then says that this cannot be so, since then Rav Ashi would have an answer to his question. [Rav Ashi would not have asked it if the answer was immediate and simple.] The question of Rav Ashi was, "If force of a force is like a force according to Sumchos or not?" The place page 19 where Rav Ashi asks this question however is somewhat different. There, he asks according to Sumchos, "Is force of a force like a force of not?' Does he learn the law of half damages and applies it to force of a force, or do he not? s If Rav Ashi learns like Rava that the law of half damages come to reduce the fine, then this would mean that Sumchos holds if force of a force is like a force, then full payment would be required. But it might be that Rav Ashi learns that the law of half damages comes to increace required payment in a place that otherwise would not be obligated at all. Also, the two question of Rav Ashi seem to be related. One, If force of a force is like force or not? The other is if Sumchos learned to law of half damages at all? It seems reasonable to say that if he applies the law of half damages at all, it could only be by force of a force and that if he does not apply that law, then force of a force be might be completely not obligated at all, or that it might be obligated in full damages. I would like to add that the Rosh holds that one can learn from the question of Rav Ashi about the approach of the sages. They would hold that force of a force is obligated in full damage, but the Tosphot and Rambam hold the sages would say in the case of force of a force that one is not obligated at all. Yet, the braita that the gemara brings (to answer the question of force of a force to the sages) says if a chicken scratchs the string holding the bucket, and it breaks and the bucket falls and breaks another vessel, that is half damage. Also, on page 22 Tosphot is apparently bringing a proof that force of a force is not obligated at all, and yet it is possible to learn that Gemara to be like the Rosh that it would be full damage. At any rate, that Gemara is hard to understand. Why ask in the first place, "For what is fire obligated?" R Yochanan says because of “his arrows” and Reish Lakish says because of his money. Why not answer because there is a verse in the Torah which says that fire is obligated? Also, why does Reish Lakish have to turn the situation of the dog carrying a loaf that has a burning coal in it to a having to be a case of the dog throwing the loaf. Maybe it is because he thinks if the dog would put it down that would be full damages? But at any rate, Tosphot says that R. Yochanan has to have the situation to be that the dog put the loaf down because if he would have thrown it, it would be force of his force which would be completely not obligated. I think Tophot means to say that R. Yochanan wants to explain the Mishna [that says if a dog carries a loaf with a coal inside to a stack of sheaves, and eats it, and the stack burns up, the obligation is that on the loaf full damages and half damage for the stack of sheaves.] that the burning the whole stack of sheaves is obligated in half damage, and so if the dog would have thrown the loaf, he would not be liable at all. But on the other hand, to R Yochanan, fire is because if his arrows, and arrows you throw, so maybe if the dog would have thrown the loaf, it would be full damages like the Rosh understands the law to the sages. At any rate, one thing we can see is that the Gemara equates the question of Rava if we go by the start or finish to be the same as if force of his force is like his force or not. Thus, things are symmetric. Rava asked according to the sages if we go by the start or finish, that is if force of his force is like direct force or indirect. And the same question Rav Ashi asks according to sumchos. so, we see why Rav Ashi did not ask his question also according to the sages. And furthermore, since Raba said we go by the start, now we have an answer to the question of force of a force. Answer: It is like the force. so if an animal stepped on a vessel and it rolled away and then broke, even though it is a case of force of a force, we judge it to be like the direct force to the sages, and it obligated in half damage. That is definitely how the Rosh learns this subject. But how the Tosphot and Rambam learn it is beyond me at this point However, I think that Tosphot holds that Bivi bar Abaye explained the Tosefta (Braita) to mean that the chicken is pushing the vessel until it broke, and so it does not imply that we go by the beginning, and therefore force of his force might be not like force. But still, that does not mean that to the sages it might be not obligated at all. But that is probably what Tosphot saw. That it cannot be completely obligated in full damages because then, it would be even more strict than direct force which is obligated only in half damages. so Tosphot holds that we learn from Bivi bar Abaye (who is the conclusion of the subject) that force of his force to the sages is not obligated at all. It could not be half damages because then it would be like direct force which the gemara shows that it cannot be since then Rava would have had a simple answer to his question. However, there is a question on this answer. It is this. In the question of Rava, if you go by the start or the end when the vessel is broken, he says openly that if you go by the end, that would be obligated in half damages. If you equate this with force of his force that cannot be like Tosphot and the Rambam who hold force of his force is completely not obligated at all. On the other hand, if you would go with the idea of Rava that it like force, then there is no difference between if it is like force or force of a force. I might mention here that the Tosephta itself is not a problem if you learn like Rav Bivi bar Abaye because the first damage is direct, and therefore obligated in full damage, Then the second vessel that is broken is the first force, not force of his force. It occurred to me that the reason Tosphot and the Rambam both hold that force of a force is not obligated at all is because of the subject on pages 21 and 22. There the Mishna says if a dog carries a loaf of bread with a burning coal inside it to a stack of sheaves and it is burned up, the owner of the dog pays full damage for the loaf and half damage for the hay stack. There R. Yochanan ay fire is obligated because of "his arrows” and the case of the Mishna is when the dog placed the loaf on the haystack. That would be first degree force. Therefore, o if the dog threw the loaf or dragged it along the haystack, that would be second degree force and that would be not obligated at all. so Tosphot and the Rambam both said to themselves, even though the situation of force of a force is doubtful to Rava, it is clear to R. Yochanan. and also it could be that even Reish Lakish agrees since he in fact say that if the dog threw the loaf on the haystack, the owner of the dog is not obligated at all [but the owner of the coal would be obligated if he did not put that coal in a place that was guarded.] ___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ It occurred to me to mention here something that I have been puzzled about. It I this. There are two places in the בבא קמא where רב אשיis asking about the approach of סומכוס but these two place do not seem to correspond. Alo there come up the question in the גמרא about whether you go by the beginning or end and there reem to be some connection with another question about whether you consider force of a force to be the same a force. But perhaps it makes more sense to bring the subject itself as an introduction to explain what I am puzzled about. In some case where an animal cause damages one pays full damage. But there is a case where the חכמים say one pays only half damages. That Is when an animal is walking, and steps on pebbles and they fly off and break a vessel. That is obligated in half damages according to the חכמים , but סומכוס holds that pays full damage. רבא asked about a case of force. Is force like the body of an animal or not. Clearly, to סומכוס it is like the body. But what about theחכמים ? If it is like the body, then he should pay full damages. If not, he should not have to pay anything. רבא answered his own question and אמר everyone agrees force is like body. But the חכמים learn a law handed down from Sinai about half damages of pebble to reduce full damages of force to half damages. You can see רבאthinks the law of half damages comes to reduce payment, not increase from nothing to half. Later רבא asked,” Do you go by the start or the finish.” An example of this question would be if one shot an arrow at a vessel and then before it reached it destination someone broke the vessel by a hammer. If the law goes by the start, that makes the first person obligated. Going by the finish would make the second person obligated. The גמרא tried to answer this question by a ברייתא that say in a case of force of a force where only half damage I required. The גמראanswers this and says that ברייתא is סומכוס. The גמרא then says that this cannot be so since then רב אשי would have an answer to his question. [רב אשי would not have asked it if the answer was immediate and simple] The question of רב אשי was If force of a force like a force according to סומכוס or not. The place where רב אשי asks this question however הוא somewhat different. There he asks according to סומכוס is force of a force like a force of not? Does he learn the law of half damages and apply it to force of a force or do he not? If רב אשי learns like רבא that the law of half damage come to reduce the fine, then this would mean that סומכוס hold if force of a force is like a force, then full payment required. But it might be that רב אשי learn that the law of half damage come to required payment in a place that otherwise would not be obligated at all. Also, the two question of רב אשי seem to be related. One If force of a force is like force or not. The other if סומכוס learned to law of half damage at all. It seems reasonable to say that if he applies the law of half damage at all it could only be by force of a force and that if he does not apply that law then force of a force be might be completely not obligated at all or that it might be obligated in full damage. I would like to add that the רא''ש holds that one can learn from the question of רב אשי about the approach of the חכמים. They would hold that force of a force is obligated in full damage, but the תוספות and רמב''םhold the חכמים would say in the case of force of a force that one is not obligated at all. Also, on page כ''ב תוספות is apparently brining a proof that force of a force is not obligated at all, and yet it is possible to learn that גמרא to be like the רא''ש that it would be full damage. And at any rate that גמרא is hard to understand. Why ask in the first place "For what is fire obligated?" ר' יוחנן says because of “his arrows” and ריש לקיש says because of his money. Why not answer because there is a verse in the תורה which says that fire is obligated? Also, why does ריש לקישhave to turn the situation of the dog carrying a loaf that has a burning coal in it to a having to be a case of the dog throwing the loaf. Maybe it is because he thinks if the dog would put it down that would be full damages? But at any rate, תוספות says that ר' יוחנן has to have the situation to be that the dog put the loaf down because if he would have thrown it, it would be force of his force which would be completely not obligated. I think תוספות means to say that ר' יוחנן want to explain the משנה that the burning the whole stack of sheaves is obligated in half damage, and so if the dog would have thrown the loaf, he would not be liable at all. But on the other hand, toר' יוחנן , fire is because if his arrows, and arrows you throw, so maybe if the dog would have thrown the loaf, it would be full damages like the רא''ש understands the law to the חכמים. At any rate, one thing we can see is that the גמרא equates the question of רבא if we go by the start or finish to be the same as if force of his force is like his force or not. Thus, things are symmetric. רבא asked according to the חכמיםif we go by the start or finish, that is if force of his force is like direct force or indirect. And the same question רב אשי asks according to סומכוס. so, we see why רב אשי did not ask his question also according to the חכמים. And furthermore, since רבה said we go by the start, now we have an answer to the question of force of a force. Answer: It is like the force. so if an animal stepped on a vessel and it rolled away and then broke, even though it is a case of force of a force we judge it to be like the direct force to the sages and it obligated in half damage. That is definitely how the רא''ש learns this subject. But how the תוספות and רמב''ם learn it is beyond me at this point However, I think that תוספות holds that ביבי בר אביי explained the תוספתא.(ברייתא) to mean that the chicken is pushing the vessel until it broke and so it does not imply that we go by the beginning, and therefore force of force might be not like force. But till that does not mean that to the חכמיםit might be not obligated at all. But that is probably what תוספות saw. That it cannot be completely obligated in full damage because then it would be even more strict than direct force which is obligated only in half damages. so תוספותholds that we learn from ביבי בר אביי (who is the conclusion of the subject) that force of his force to the חכמים is not obligated at all. It could not be half damages because then it would be like direct force which the גמרא shows that it cannot be since then רבא would have had a simple answer to his question However, there is a question on this answer. It is this. In the question of רבא , if you go by the start or the end when the vessel is broken, he says openly that if you go by the end, that would be obligated in half damages. If you equate this with force of his force that cannot be like תוספותand the רמב''ם who hold force of his force is completely not obligated at all. On the other hand, if you would go with the idea of רבא that it like force, then there is no difference between if it is like force or force of a force. I might mention here that the תוספתא itself is not a problem if you learn like רב ביבי בר אביי because the first damage is direct and therefore obligated in full damage, Then the second vessel that is broken is the first force, not force of his force. It occurred to me that the reason תוספותand the רמב''םboth hold that force of a force is not obligated at all is because of the subject on pages ב''א and כ''ב. There the משנה says if a dog carries a loaf of bread with a burning coal inside it to a stack of sheaves and it is burned up, the owner of the dog pays full damage for the loaf and half damage for the hay stack. There ר' יוחנן אמר fire is obligated because of "his arrows” and the case of the משנה is when the dog placed the loaf on the haystack. That would be first degree force. Therefore, o if the dog threw the loaf or dragged it along the haystack, that would be second degree force and that would be not obligated at all. so תוספותand the רמב''ם both said to themselves, even though the situation of force of a force is doubtful to רבא, it is clear toר' יוחנן . and also, it could be that even ריש לקיש agrees since he in fact say that if the dog threw the loaf on the haystack, the owner of the dog is not obligated at all [but the owner of the coal would be obligated if he did not put that coal in a place that was guarded.

בדרך חזרה מהים עלה בדעתי לשאול מה לדעתי צריך להיות פשוט לענות, אבל אני באמת לא יודע מה יכולה להיות התשובה. בבא בתרא י''ז, אביי אומר שהמשנה צריך להיקרא: "צריך לשמור את בורו שלושת טפחים מכותל הבור של חברו", ולא "מבור חברו". זה נראה כמו הוכחה ישירה לרבא שצריך להחזיק חפץ שיכול לגרום נזק לשלושה טפחים מקו הגבול, גם כשאין עדיין כלום בצד השני. איך אביי יכול להבין את דבריו שלו לפי פסיקתו שאפשר לשים את הגורם לנזק ליד גבול שכנו עד שהשכן ישים שם משהו שיכול להינזק?(רבא אמר שצריך להרחיק את החפץ שלו שלושה טפחים מהגבול, והצהרה זו של אביי עוזרת לו ישירות.) אולם בהמשך הגמרא רבא מסביר את המשנה לפי ר' יוסי שהחפירה עצמה גורמת נזק. אני לא מבין איך זה עוזר לאביי. אם הוא מתכוון שהקיר עצמו נחשב לחלק מהבור שגורם נזק, אז הוא צריך לומר שהוא יכול לשים אותו ליד הגבול, והשכן השני צריך אז לשמור את הבור שלו ששה טפחים מהגבול. אם מצד שני, הוא מתכוון שרק חלול הבור הוא שגורם לנזק, אז הדרך שבה הוא קורא את המשנה היא ההפרכה הישירה שלו. הוא אמר שהוא יכול לשים משהו שגורם נזק ליד הגבול. לא שלושה טפחים מהגבול. יתרה מזאת, איך כל זה יכול להתייחס לגמרא בהמשך גישתו של רבינו יצחק שאומרת שאם אחד עשה משהו מעט לא בסדר על ידי הצבת החפץ שלו ליד הגבול, אז השני יכול לעשות את אותו הדבר. האם זה אומר שהקיר עושה את הנזק? אז זה כמו מה שהוא אמר. אבל אם הוא מתכוון לשקע הבור, אז שני הבורות יתחברו לבור אחד. אבל על זה כבר ענה רבא שהחפירה היא שגורמת לנזק. אבל עדיין, אני לא רואה איך זה עוזר לאביי---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------הערה מאוחרת יותר. לאחר כתיבת האמור לעיל ראיתי שתוספות שואלים את השאלה הזו ועונים עליה. אבל הרשו לי לציין את המשנה והגמרא בפועל בשלב זה כדי להיות ברור. המשנה אומרת, "אסור לחפור בור ליד הקיר של שכנו ולא סוג אחר של דבר הגורם נזק אלא אם כן הוא מרחיק שלושה טפחים" הגמרא שואלת "למה המשנה משתנה מ'בור' ל'קיר'?" אביי ענה, "זה אומר 'כותל של הבור'". לאחר מכן שואלת הגמרא, "אם כן, יאמר: אסור לחפור בור ליד בור חברו אלא אם כן הרחיק שלוש טפחים". הגמרא ענה: "זה בא לומר לנו שקיר בור הוא שלושה טפחים." תוספות אומר "אם היה כתוב 'כותל הבור' זו תהיה הוכחה לרבא, וזה מה שהגמרא מתכוון לשאול. ואז הוא עונה לאביי, "זה אומר שהקיר הרגיל של בור הוא שלושה טפחים." זה עונה על השאלה במידה מסוימת. זה אומר שכל שאר החפצים שגורמים נזק צריכים להיות שלושה טפחים מהחפץ שיכול להינזק. אבל כאן שני הבורות גורמים נזק. לפיכך, לא ניתן לומר "אי אפשר לחפור בור שלושה טפחים מהבור השני", כי כל בור נדרש להזיז שלושה טפחים, בסך הכל שישה. לכן הוא אומר, "אי אפשר לחפור בור, החלל החלול של הבור, בתוך שלושה טפחים מהקיר של הבור השני". לפיכך ההפרדה תהיה שישה טפחים. הבעיה שעדיין יש לי בעניין זה היא הנקודה בדיון שגמרא שואלת אז, "אם כן, צריך לומר 'אסור לחפור בור ליד הבור של שכנו אלא אם כן הרחיק שלושה טפחים'. "זה אומר שאם אביי צודק צריך לומר, "יש להזיז בור שלושה טפחים מהבור השני". כלומר, חלול אחד של בור יכול להיות בגבול, ואת הבור השני יש להרחיק שלושה טפחים. אבל הבעיה שיש לי כאן היא שאם אביי צודק, אז צריך להרחיק את הבור השני שישה טפחים, לא שלושה טפחים. הסיבה היא שלכל סוג של חפץ שיכול לגרום נזק יש להעביר שלושה טפחים מחפץ שעלול להינזק. יש לקרוא את המשנה כך, "יש להזיז את הבור שלו שישה טפחים מהבור של שכנו" אם אביי צודק------------------------------------- אני רוצה לענות על שאלה זו, אך בהסתייגות מסוימת. ראשית אגיד שבגישת ר' יוסי יש כל הקודם זוכה (הרשאה של מי שקודם) ואם אביי הולך לפי ר' יוסי, אז קל לראות שאם המשנה תגיד אי אפשר לחפור בור ליד הבור של שכנו אלא אם כן התרחק שלוש טפחים, אז זה אומר שיש רשות מי בא ראשון. הבור הראשון אינו חייב לזוז, ובבור השני יש רק חובה להרחיק שלושה טפחים. אם הוא לא רוצה להיפגע מהבור הראשון, אז זכותו להתרחק יותר. עם זאת, תשובה זו תעבוד רק אם אביי ור' יוסי יסכימו. עם זאת, אצל אביי עצמו, איננו רואים כל סוג של אישור של כל הקודם זוכה. רק אנחנו רואים שאם אין שום דבר אחר לא ליד הגבול, אז הוא יכול לשים את הדבר שלו שם. אבל אחרי שמשהו יגיע, אנחנו לא יודעים מה אביי היה אומר

On the way back from the sea it occurred to me to ask what I think should be simple to answer but I really do not know what could be the answer. in Bava Batra page 17 Abaye says the Mishna should read: “One must keep his pit three handbreadths from the wall of the pit of his neighbor,” not "from the pit of his neighbor." This seems like a direct proof of Rava that one should keep an object that can cause damage three handbreadths from the border line, even when there is nothing yet on the other side. How could Abaye understand his own statement according to his ruling that one can put that which causes damage next to the border of his neighbor until the neighbor put there something that can be damaged? (Rava said that one must keep one's object three handbreadths from the border, and this statement of Abayee help him directly.) However, later in the gemara, Rava explains the Mishna according to R. Jose to mean that the digging itself causes damage. I do not how that helps Abayee. If he means the wall itself is considered part of the pit that causes damage then he should say he can put it next to the border, and the other neighbor then has to keep his pit 6 handbreadths from the border. If on the other hand, he means only the hollow of the pit is what causes damage, then the way he reads the Mishna is his direct refutation. He said he can put something that causes damage next to the border. Not three handbreadths from the border. Furthermore, how can any of this relate to the Gemara later in the approach of Rabainu Ihzhak that holds if one did something slightly wrong by putting his object next to the border, then the other can do the same. Does that mean the wall does the damage? Then that is like what he said. But if he means the hollow of the pit, then the two pits would be joined into one pit. But this was already answered by Rava that it is the digging that causes the damage. But still, I do not see how that helps Abayee. Later note. After writing the above I saw that Tosphot asks this question and answers it. But let me state the actual Mishna and Gemara at this point to be clear. The Mishna says, “One must not dig a pit near the wall of his neighbor nor other type of thing that causes damage unless he moves away three handbreadths.” The Gemara asks “Why does the Mishna change from ‘pit’ to ‘wall’?” Abaye answered, “It means ‘the wall of the pit’”. The Gemara then asks, “If so, it should say, ‘One must not dig a pit near the pit of his neighbor unless he moved away three handbreadths’”. The Gemara answered, “It comes to tell us the wall of a pit is three handbreadths.” Tosphot says,” If it would say ‘the wall of the pit’ that would be proof to Rava and that is what the Gemara intends to ask. And then it answers for Abaye, “It means the normal wall of a pit is three handbreadths.” This answers the question to some degree. It means that all the other kind of objects that cause damage have to be three handbreadths from the object that can be damaged. But here both pits cause damage. Thus, it cannot say, “You cannot dig a pit three handbreadths from the other pit” because each pit is required to be moved three handbreadths totaling six in all. So, it says, “You cannot dig a pit (that is the hollow space of the pit) within three handbreadths of the wall of the other pit”, and thus the separation will be six handbreadths. The problem I still have on this is the point in the discussion “The Gemara then asks, “If so, it should say, ‘One must not dig a pit near the pit of his neighbor unless he moved away three handbreadths’ “That means if abaye right it should say a pit three handbreadths from the other pit. That is, one hollow of a pit is at the boundary and the other must be away three. But if Abayee is right, the other would have to be six away, not three, since each kind of damage must be three from that which can be damaged. The Mishna would have to be read, "One must move his pit six handbreadths from the pit of his neigbor" if Abyee would be right.I would like to answer this question but with some reservation. First let me say that in the approach of R. Jose there is first come first served (permission of who comes first) and if Abaye is going according to R. Jose then it is easy to see that if the Mishna would say one cannot dig a pit next to the pit of hi neighbor unless he moved away three handbreadths then that would mean there is permission of who came first. The first pit does not have to move and the second pit only has an obligation of moving three handbreadths away. If he de not want to be damaged by the first pit then it is his prerogative to move away further. However, this answer would only work if Abaye and r Jose agree. However, in Abaye himself, we do not see any kind of permission of first come first served. Only we ee if nothing else is next to the border, then he can put his thing there. But after something comes, we do not know what Abaye would say ______________________________________________________________________________________ On the way back from the sea it occurred to me to ask what I think should be simple to answer but I really do not know what could be the answer. In בבא בתרא י''ז אביי says the משנה should read: “One must keep his pit three טפחים from the wall of the pit of his neighbor,” not "from the pit of his neighbor." This seems like a direct proof of רבא that one should keep an object that can cause damage three טפחים from the border line, even when there is nothing yet on the other side. How could אביי understand his own statement according to his ruling that one can put that which causes damage next to the border of his neighbor until the neighbor put there something that can be damaged? However, later in the ,גמרא רבא explains the משנה according to ר' יוסי to mean that the digging itself causes damage. I do not how that helps אביי. If he means the wall itself is considered part of the pit that causes damage then he should say he can put it next to the border, and the other neighbor then has to keep his pit 6 handbreadths from the border. If on the other hand, he means only the hollow of the pit is what causes damage, then the way he reads the משנה is his direct refutation. He said he can put something that causes damage next to the border. Not three handbreadths from the border. Furthermore, how can any of this relate to the גמרא later in the approach of רבינו יצחקthat holds if one did something slightly wrong by putting his object next to the border, then the other can do the same. Does that mean the wall does the damage? Then that is like what he said. But if he means the hollow of the pit, then the two pits would be joined into one pit. But this was already answered by רבא that it is the digging that causes the damage. But still, I do not see how that helps אביי. Later note. After writing the above I saw that תוספות asks this question and answers it. But let me state the actual משנהand גמרא at this point to be clear. The משנהsays, “One must not dig a pit near the wall of his neighbor nor other type of thing that causes damage unless he moves away three handbreadths.” The גמרא asks “Why does the משנה change from ‘pit’ to ‘wall’?” אביי answered, “It means ‘the wall of the pit’”. The גמרא then asks, “If so, it should say, ‘One must not dig a pit near the pit of his neighbor unless he moved away three handbreadths’”. The גמראanswered, “It comes to tell us the wall of a pit is three handbreadths.” תוספות says,” If it would say ‘the wall of the pit’ that would be proof to רבא and that is what the גמרא intends to ask. And then it answers for אביי, “It means the normal wall of a pit is three handbreadths.” This answers the question to some degree. It means that all the other kind of objects that cause damage have to be three handbreadths from the object that can be damaged. But here both pits cause damage. Thus, it cannot say, “You cannot dig a pit three handbreadths from the other pit” because each pit is required to be moved three handbreadths totaling six in all. So, it says, “You cannot dig a pit (that is the hollow space of the pit) within three handbreadths of the wall of the other pit”, and thus the separation will be six handbreadths. The problem I still have on this is the point in the discussion גמרא then asks, “If so, it should say, ‘One must not dig a pit near the pit of his neighbor unless he moved away three handbreadths’ “That mean if אביי right it should say a pit three handbreadths from the other pit. That is, one hollow of a pit is at the boundary and the other mut be away three. But if אביי is right the other would have to be six away not three since each kind of damage must be three from that which can be damaged. The משנהwould have to be read one must move his pit six handbreadths from the pit of his neigbor if אביי would be right I would like to answer this question but with some reservation. First let me say that in the approach of ר' יוסי there is first come first served (permission of who comes first) and if אביי is going according to ר' יוסי then it is easy to see that if the משנה would say one cannot dig a pit next to the pit of his neighbor unless he moved away three handbreadths, then that would mean there is permission of who came first. The first pit does not have to move, and the second pit only has an obligation of moving three handbreadths away. If he does not want to be damaged by the first pit, then it is his prerogative to move away further. However, this answer would only work if אבייand ר' יוסי agree. However, in אביי himself, we do not see any kind of permission of first come first served. Only we ee if nothing else is next to the border, then he can put his thing there. But after something comes, we do not know what אביי would say