בבא בתרא י''ח שיטת רבינו יצחק

אם הולכים עם רבינו יצחק, אז צריך לומר שהדין לפי ר' יוסי הוא במקרה של מכירה, וזה יחול גם לגבי הדבורים והחרדל, וגם לגבי העץ והבור. הטעם הוא שכאן בדף י''ח כל השאלה על רבא מר' יוסי הייתה שרבא צריך להחזיק בדינו אם לפי החכמים ואם לר' יוסי. וכך, שאלתנו על רבא הייתה מר' יוסי כיון שכבר ענינו לו לפי החכמים. עתה אמר רב פפא התשובה היא שר' יוסי אמר דינו רק במקרה של מכירה. אבל אז אנחנו שואלים על זה. כי אם כן, מה יכולה להיות הסיבה של החכמים במקרה של המשרה או אפילו במקרה זה של החרדל? במילים אחרות, כאשר ר' יוסי חולק על החכמים, הם צריכים לדבר על אותו מקרה. אחרת, ר' יוסי היה אומר "אני לא מסכים איתם רק במקרה של מכירה". ועתה תשובתנו היא שאמר ר' יוסי דינו במקרה של מכירה, ואחרת היה אומר כרבא שכל דבר שיכול לגרום נזק יש להרחיק מגבול חברו שלשה טפחים, אפילו כשעדיין אין דבר מעברו השני של הגבול. ואז מגיעה הנקודה המרכזית של רבינו יצחק. כלומר, שרבינא הוא רק המשך של תשובת רב פפא. ואמר שהחכמים אמרו גורם נזק יש להרחיק מהגבול, ואמר ר' יוסי שיש להוציא מהגבול את הדבר שיכול להינזק. וכיון שזו המשך תשובת רב פפא, משמע שאמר זאת ר' יוסי רק במקרה של מכירה. אבל במקרה שבו יש רק שני שכנים, כל אחד חייב להרחיק את החפץ שלו שיכול לגרום נזק מהגבול. משמע שאם הדין יהיה כמו רבינו יצחק, אז למרות שהדין הוא כמו ר' יוסי, זה רק במקרה של מכירה, אבל אחרת יש להרחיק מהגבול כל דבר שיכול לגרום נזק. וכיון שכל ענין הדיון הזה הוא כדי שלא תהיה סתירה בין ר' יוסי לרבא, אותו נימוק חל בדף כ''ה עם העץ והבור. שם אמרו החכמים יש לכרות את העץ אם הוא תוך כ''ה אמות הבור אלא אם כן היה שם קודם. ואמר ר' יוסי אין צריך לקצץ כיון שכל אחד בתחומו. וגם כאן הדין הוא של מכירה שהיא המקרה היחיד שר' יוסי מחזיק בדינו, ואמרו החכמים דינם גם במקרה של מכירה. עתה לא ייתכן שמה שאמרו אם היה העץ קודם הוא יכול להישאר במצב בלי מכירה, כי זה יסתור את דין רבא שכל מה שיכול לגרום נזק יש להרחיק מהגבול גם כשבצד השני של הגבול אין דבר שיכול להינזק. כל העניין בדיון שלנו הוא שלא תהיה סתירה מין החכמים או מר' יוסי על דין רבא

Bava batra page 18b.The approach of Rabainu Izhak.

if you go with Rabainu Izhak, then you have to say that the only allowance according to r Jose is in a case of a sale and this would apply both in the case of the bees and mustard and in the case of the tree and pit. the reason is that here on page 18 the whole question on Rava from R. Jose was that Rava has to hold with his law whether according to the sages or to r Jose. and so, our question on Rava was from r Jose since we already answered him according to the sages. now Rav Papa said the answer is that R. Jose said his law only in a case of a sale. But then we ask on that. For then, what could be the reason of the sages in the case of the tub of linen or even this case of the mustard? In other words, when R. Jose disagrees with the sages, they have to be talking about the same case. Otherwise, R. Jose would have said "I disagree with you only in a case of a sale." And now our answer is that R. Jose said his law in the case of a sale, and otherwise he would say like Rava that anything that can cause damage must be removed away from the border of one's neighbor three handbreadths even when there is nothing yet on the other side of the border. Then comes the major point of Rabbainu Izhak. That is that Ravina is just a continuance of the answer of Rav Papa. And he said that the sages said one that causes damage must be removed from the border, and that R. Jose said that the thing that can be damaged must be removed from the border. And since this is a continuance of the answer of Rava Papa, this means that R. Jose said this only in the case of sale. But in a case where there are just two neighbors, each one must keep his object that can cause damage away from the border. This means that if the law would be like Rabbainu Izhak, then even though the law is like R. Jose, that is only in a case of a sale, but otherwise anything that can cause damage must be kept away from the border. And since the whole point of this discussion is so that there should be no disagreement between R. Jose and Rava, this same reasoning applies on page 25 with the tree and pit. There the sages said the tree must be cut down if it is with 25 cubits of the pit unless it was there first. And R. Jose said it does not need to be cut down since each is in his own domain. And here also the case is that of a sale which is the only case that R Jose holds his law, and the sages said their law in the case of a sale also. Now it is not possible that what they said if the tree was there first it can stay, because that would contradict the law of Rava that whatever can cause damage has to be kept way from the border even when there is nothing on the other side of the border that could be damaged. _____________________________________________________________________________ if you go with רבינו יצחק, then you have to say that the only allowance according to ר' יוסי is in a case of a sale and this would apply both in the case of the bees and mustard and in the case of the tree and pit. The reason is that here on page י''ח the whole question on רבא from ר' יוסי was that רבא has to hold with his law whether according to the חכמים or to ר' יוסי. and so, our question on רבא was from ר' יוסי since we already answered him according to the חכמים. Now רב פפא said the answer is that ר' יוסי said his law only in a case of a sale. But then we ask on that. For then, what could be the reason of the חכמים in the case of theמישרה or even this case of the mustard? In other words, when ר' יוסי disagrees with the חכמים, they have to be talking about the same case. Otherwise, ר' יוסי would have said "I disagree with you only in a case of a sale." And now our answer is that ר' יוסי said his law in the case of a sale, and otherwise he would say like רבא that anything that can cause damage must be removed away from the border of one's neighbor three handbreadths, even when there is nothing yet on the other side of the border. Then comes the major point of רבינו יצחק. That is, that רבינא is just a continuance of the answer of רב פפא. And he said that the חכמים said one that causes damage must be removed from the border, and that ר' יוסי said that the thing that can be damaged must be removed from the border. And since this is a continuance of the answer of רב פפא, this means that ר' יוסי said this only in the case of sale. But in a case where there are just two neighbors, each one must keep his object that can cause damage away from the border. This means that if the law would be like רבינו יצחק, then even though the law is like ר' יוסי, that is only in a case of a sale, but otherwise anything that can cause damage must be kept away from the border. And since the whole point of this discussion is so that there should be no disagreement between ר' יוסי and רבא, this same reasoning applies on page כ''ה with the tree and pit. There the חכמיםsaid the tree must be cut down if it is with כ''ה cubits of the pit unless it was there first. And ר' יוסי said it does not need to be cut down since each is in his own domain. And here also the case is that of a sale which is the only case that ר' יוסי holds his law, and the חכמים said their law in the case of a sale also. Now it is not possible that what they said if the tree was there first, it can stay, because that would contradict the law of רבא that whatever can cause damage has to be kept away from the border even when there is nothing on the other side of the border that could be damaged. The whole point of our discussion is that there should be no contradiction from the חכמים or from ר' יוסי on the law of רבא

בבא בתרא דף י''ח רבינו תם ורבינו חננאל

עלה בדעתי שדעתם של רבינו תם ורבינו חננאל הגיונית מאוד, כי הם שמים לב לכך שר' יוסי מסכים שבמקרה של "חיציו" (שהגורם הנזק חייב להרחיק כמו שאומר הגמרא בבא בתרא דף כ'ב ע''א); וכי הדין כר' יוסי, ושהדין תמיד כרבא כנגד אביי חוץ ביע''ל כג''ם. בהתחשב בכל זה, יש טעם להסביר את הגמרא בבא בתרא דף י''ח באופן שהם עושים. אנחנו שואלים על רבא, אם צריך להסיר את ההיזק שלו מהגבול, אז איך מוצאים מקרה שבו ר' יוסי אומר "למה תגיד לי להזיז את החרדל שלי? ראשית, עליך להסיר את הדבורים שלך." מה הדבורים עושות שם מלכתחילה? תשובה, זה מקרה של מכירה. אבל אם כן, מדוע אין ר' יוסי חולק על המשרה ואומר שגם היא מותרת, ומדוע אומרים החכמים שיש להסירה? אלא אמר רבינא אמרו החכמים להסיר כל דבר שיכול לגרום נזק. משמע, שרבא מסכים עם ר' יוסי ורק אמר דינו במקרה של הוצאת בור אחד מהגבול ששם יכול להיות בור אחר, או אפילו אם אין בור אחר, כי זה מחליש את הקרקע. ור' יוסי מסכים בכל המקרים של חיציו כמו המשרה, אבל אומר על הדבורים שהן מקרה של חיציו, והחכמים אומרים דווקא החרדל הוא הגורם העיקרי לנזק לדבורים, ולא להיפך

Rabbainu Tam and Rabbainu Chananel in Bava Batra page 18

It occurred to me that the opinion of Rabbainu Tam and Rabbainu Chananel makes a lot of sense, because they are taking notice of the fact that R. Jose agrees that in a case of "his arrows" (that the one who causes damage must keep away as the gemara says in Bava Batra page 22a); and that the law is like R. Jose, and that the law is always like Rava against Abyee except in yal kegam. Taking all this into account, it makes sense to explain the gemara in Bava Batra page 18 in the way that they do. We ask from R. Jose on Rava. "If one has to remove his thing that causes damage away from the border, then how do we find a case were R. Jose is saying 'Why tell me to move my mustard? First, you should remove your bees'" What are the bees doing there in the first place? Answer: it is a case of a sale. But then, if so, why does R. Jose not disagree about the tub of linen and say it also is permitted, and why do the sages say it should be removed? Rather Ravina said the sages said to remove anything that can cause damage. This means, that Rava agrees with R. Jose, and only said his law in a case of removing one pit away from the border where there can be another pit, or even if there is no other pit, because it weakens the ground. And R. Jose agrees in all cases of "his arrows" like the tub of linen, but is saying about the bees that they are a case of "his arrows" and the sages say the mustard is the main cause of damage to the bees, not vice versa __________________________________________________________________________ It occurred to me that the opinion of רבינו תם and רבינו חננאל makes a lot of sense, because they are taking notice of the fact that ר'יוסי agrees that in a case of with "his arrows" (that the one who causes damage must keep away as the גמרא says in בבא בתרא page כ''ב ע''א); and that the law is like ר' יוסי, and that the law is always like רבא against אביי except in יע''ל כג''ם. Taking all this into account, it makes sense to explain the גמרא in בבא בתרא page י''ח in the way that they do. We ask from ר' יוסי a question on .רבא If one has to remove his היזק away from the border, then how do we find a case were ר' יוסי is saying "why tell me to move my mustard? First, you should remove your bees." What are the bees doing there in the first place? Answer, it is a case of a sale. But then, if so, why does ר' יוסי not disagree about the מישרה and say it also is permitted, and why do the חכמים say it should be removed? Rather רבינאsaid the חכמים said to remove anything that can cause damage. This means, that רבא agrees with ר' יוסי and only said his law in a case of removing one pit away from the border where there can be another pit, or even if there is no other pit, because it weakens the ground. And ר' יוסי agree in all cases of his arrows like the משרה, but is saying about the bees that they are a case of his arrows and the חכמים say rather the mustard is the main cause of damage to the bees, not vice versa

za67 C Minor midiza67 nwc music files go from "a..." until "z..." with a hundred files (or more) with each letter. [Then you can see they start again with "za.." ]i.e. ,there is an "z1" file and a "z2" until "z100"; and the same for each letter. But most were never put on the internet, and tons were lost, and I think the x series were just rough drafts. There were also pieces with names [e.g., "Orchestra" or "Mathematics" etc.] before it made sense to just give letters, intead of trying to figure out new names for every piece. {I write mainly for the sake of keeping sane, but I also have hoped that others will benefit. My own thinking about music that Bach is the most fun to play, while Mozart is the greatest of all (to listen to and to play in an orchestra). Beethoven, I think is one step down from Mozart. I think also there were greats in the Renaissance and Middle Ages. In more modern times, I think Sebelius and Brahms were great.} {I ought not forget Vivaldi and Handel. I used to play Vivaldi and Mozart scores on the violin. I mean that I would try to track the important line, and play it on the violin on the street. I had hoped to get through all Mozart in that way, but never managed that. I think I might have noticed that some of Mozart could not be condensed in a single music line.} I must add here that my father had a profound feeling in music, even though he went into inventing things for satellite communication at TRW and other aerospace inventions for the Usa. And I had a great music teacher, Mr. smart, and a great violin teacher, Mr. Chassman.} I think my dad might have gone into playing the violin as a profession, but instead went into science at Caltech.

בעיה בהבנת ההלכה היא שהגמרא לא עוסקת בזה הרבה. לפעמים הוא אומר לך את החלטת הפסק הסופי. אבל זה לא האינטרס העיקרי שלה (שזה להבין את המשנה). בכל הנוגע למשפטים, הגמרא נותנת עקרונות שונים במקומות שונים. והמקומות האלה הם שמספקים לרשויות המאוחרות (אחרונים) חומר מקור שיכול לתת רמז מדוע ספרי ההלכה של ראשונים החליטו בצורה מסוימת. עם זאת, אין היררכיה בעקרונות הידועים. אם אתה מביא הוכחה לרמב''ם שהדין הוא כמו החכמים נגד סומכוס, אתה יכול באותה מידה להביא הוכחה שהדין הוא כמו סומכוס כי ההלכה היא כמו סתם משנה. כשאתה מביא הוכחה למוקצה ממקום אחד, אתה יכול באותה מידה להביא הוכחה שהחוק הוא כמו ר' שמעון שאין דבר כזה מוקצה אלא במקרה נדיר שמשהו מופרש כדי לא להשתמש בו. העיקרון של סדר התנאים יכול לשמש כדי לבטל את העיקרון של האמורא האחרונה, וזה יכול לשמש כדי להחליט נגד סתם פשט של הסוגייה [משמעות פשוטה של הנושא]

A problem with understanding halacha is that the gemara does not deal with it much. sometimes it actually tells you the final pesak decision. But this is not its main interest (which is to figure out the mishna). When it comes to law, the Gemara gives different principles in different places. And it is these places that provide the later (achronim) authorities source material that can give a hint as to why the halacha books of the Rishonim decided in a certain way. However, there is no hierarchy in the principles that is known. If you bring a proof to the Rambam that the law is like the sages against sumchos, you could just as easily bring a proof that the law is like sumchos because halacha is like a plain mishna. When you bring a proof to muktze from one place, you could just as easily bring a proof that the law is like R. shimon that there is no such thing a mutkze except in a rare case that something Is set aside not to be used. The principle of the order of tenaim could be used to overturn the principle of the latest amora, and that can be used to decide against the stama desugia [plain meaning of the subject] _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ A problem with understanding הלכה is that the gemara does not deal with it much. sometimes it actually tells you the final pesak decision . But this is not its main interest (which is to figure out the משנה). When it comes to law, the גמרא gives different principles in different places. And it is these places that provide the later (אחרונים) authorities source material that can give a hint as to why theהלכה books of the ראשונים decided in a certain way. However, there is no hierarchy in the principles that is known. If you bring a proof to the רמב''ם that the law is like the חכמים against סומכוס you could just as easily bring a proof that the law is like סומכוס because הלכה is like a plain משנה. When you bring a proof to מוקצה from one place you could just as easily bring a proof that the law is like ר' שמעון that there Is no such thing a מוקצה except in a rare case that something Is set aside not to be used. The principle of the order of תנאים could be used to overturn the principle of the latest אמורא , and that can be used to decide against the סתם פשט של הסוגיה [plain meaning of the subject]