There is an argument to support the Raavad in his argument against the Rambam in laws of marriage 12 law 9.     The argument is that the way the Rambam himself understands the law of R. Yohanan ben Broka  Bava Batra pg 130 is that it refers only to someone close to death. Also one can argue that the law of R. Yohanan ben Broka has no application in dealing with the inheritance that a husband inherits from his wife.

Here is the Rambam, if a husband makes an agreement  with his wife that he will not inherit her property that condition is not valid. Even though the inheritance of a husband is from the words of the Sages still here they made this law that a husband inherits like the law of the Torah.  conditions about inheritance are not valid.

The Raavad writes there is no need for the Sages to make their law like the law of the Torah because in any case a person can not make a condition not to own or inherit something that has not yet come into the world. 

Rav Shach tries to bring support to the Rambam from the law of R Yohanan ben Broka that one can choose one of his inheritors alone to inherit him. he can say this son alone will inherit me. 

But the Rambam himself writes that that law only applies to a person close to death [laws of inheritance 6 law 2]. Also there can not  be any actual case in which a wife could say only someone will inherit her among several people that could inherit her since when she is married, only one person inherits her, and that is her husband.

[I am not saying that there is no defense for the Rambam. After all, you do see with R Yohanan ben Broka that there can be a condition that applies to inheritance. So the sages wanted to eliminate that possibility by making their decree like the law of the Torah, ]

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There is an argument to support the proof for the ראב''ד his argument against the רמב''ם in הלכות אישות  פרק י''ב הלכה ט.     The argument is that the way the רמב''ם himself understands the law of ר' יוחנן בן ברוקא  בבא בתרא דף ק''ל is that it refers only to someone close to death (שכיב מרע). Also one can argue that the law of ר' יוחנן בן ברוקא has no application in dealing with the inheritance that a husband inherits from his wife. Here is the רמב''ם, If a husband makes an agreement  with his wife that he will not inherit her property, that condition is not valid. Even though the inheritance of a husband is from the words of the חכמים still here they made this law that a husband inherits like the law of the תורה.  Conditions about inheritance are not valid. The ראב''ד writes there is no need for the חכמים to make their law like the law of the תורה because in any case a person can not make a condition not to own or inherit something that has not yet come into the world. רב שך tries to bring support to the רמב''ם from the law of ר' יוחנן בן ברוקא that one can choose one of his inheritors alone to inherit him. He can say, "This son alone will inherit me." But the רמב''ם himself writes that that law only applies to a person close to death [הלכות נחלות פרק ו' הלכה ב' ]. Also there can not  be any actual case in which a wife could say only someone will inherit her among several people that could inherit her, since when she is married, only one person inherits her and that is her husband.

[I am not saying that there is no defense for the רמב''ם. After all, you do see with ר' יוחנן בן ברוקא that there can be a תנאי that applies to inheritance. So the חכמים wanted to eliminate that possibility by making their decree like the law of the תורה, 

יש הוכחה לטענתו של הראב''ד נגד הרמב''ם בהלכות אישות פרק י''ב הלכה ט. הטענה היא שהדרך בה הרמב''ם עצמו מבין את דינו של ר' יוחנן בן ברוקא בבא בתרא דף ק''ל היא שהכוונה היא רק למישהו הקרוב למוות (שכיב מרע). כמו כן, ניתן לטעון שלדין ר' יוחנן בן ברוקא אין כל יישום במציאות עם הירושה שהבעל יורש מאשתו. הנה הרמב''ם, אם הבעל הסכים עם אשתו שלא יירש את רכושה, אין תוקף לתנאי זה. אף על פי שירושת בעל היא מדברי החכמים עדיין כאן עשו את הדין הזה שבעל יורש כחוק התורה. תנאים לגבי ירושה אינם תקפים. הראב''ד כותב שאין צורך שהחכמים יעשו את דינם כדין התורה כי ממילא אדם לא יכול להתנות לא להחזיק או לרשת משהו שעדיין לא בא לעולם. רב שך מנסה להביא תמיכה לרמב''ם מדין ר' יוחנן בן ברוקא שאפשר לבחור באחד מיורשיו לבדו לרשת אותו. הוא יכול לומר: "הבן הזה לבדו יירש אותי". אבל הרמב''ם עצמו כותב שדין זה חל רק על אדם הקרוב למוות [הלכות נחלות פרק ו' הלכה ב' ]. כמו כן, לא יכול להיות מקרה ממשי שבו אישה יכולה לומר שרק מישהו יירש אותה מבין כמה אנשים שיכולים לרשת אותה, שכן כשהיא נשואה, רק אדם אחד יורש אותה וזה בעלה.

איני אומר שאין הגנה לרמב''ם. הרי אתה כן רואה אצל ר' יוחנן בן ברוקא שיכול להיות תנאי שיחול על ירושה. אז החכמים רצו לבטל את האפשרות הזאת על ידי שחיזקו את גזירתם כמו חוק התורה,

The approach of the Litvak Yeshiva World based on the Gra is this: to will sincerely believe in the Torah [the Tenach and the Two Talmuds and Midrash], to critically evaluate these teachings, and to attempt seriously to model their lives on its tenets. 

The approach of Rav Nahman of Breslov is: to adhere to the the Torah out of sincere conviction, but to disagree with important tenets; to attempt to recast the Torah in more personally palatable terms, and to work to redirect the Torah itself into more agreeable lines. The changes are real reforms, and sometimes redefinition into something more palatable.

This is honest and sincere but this still is not the same thing as straight unadulterated TORAH. And in spite of this the teachings of Rav Nahman are valuable and important --as long as one is aware that there can be slight or major deviations from straight Torah  

The problem I see in some Israeli cities is that there are no Litvak Yeshivot. Nor even kollels. Why specifically the Litvak brand? That is because [a a rule] that is where Torah is learned for its own sake, not for money,  nor for any agenda at all except to learn and keep Torah.

the problem with being too smart

 The Midrash says that the mother of Samuel the Prophet prayed that her son should not be too smart, nor dumb. You can see the problem with being too smart in a lot of intellectuals when their over extended minds mislead them. This is a point that Rav Nahman made in the Lekutai Moharan [The Le.M for short]. In particular you can see this in collage campuses where Harvard and Yale students and professors are cheering for Hamas. 

In philosophy however there was one philosopher who noticed the limits of reason and in fact that is the name of his book--The Critique of Pure Reason. The answer to the question "What is the limit of reason?" is the possibility of experience. i mean to say [from Kant] that outside of that realm of possible experience, reason collapses and starts to come up with self contradictions. --iI am not saying that is the end of the story. Rather there was the Friesian approach to Kant which to me makes the most sense. See the web site of Kelley Ross who shows some of the wider aspects of that approach in how it applies to faith. That aspect of the Kant Fries approach was first noticed by Otto.

There is a Rambam that does not seem to ''shtim'' [be in accord] with the Gemara in Ketuboth 76b.

There is a a law in the Rambam that does not seem to ''shtim'' [be in accord] with the Gemara in Ketuboth 76b. The Gemara brings a case where a cow was exchanged with an ass, and the cow was present, but the ass was still in the barn of its owner. When the owner of the cow went to pick up the ass, it was found dead.   Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shumel, the owner of the ass has to bring proof that it was alive at the time of the exchange. Mari bar Yechezkeil said ''Pay no attention to what Yehuda said. Rather in whose domain a doubt arose, upon him is to bring a proof.'' The Rambam writes in laws of sales 20 law  14 in whose domain a doubt arose, upon him is to bring proof. For example  a cow was exchanged with an ass. When the owner of the cow went to pick up the ass, it was found dead.  The owner of the ass has to bring proof that it was alive at the time of the exchange. Here the Rambam brings the statement of Mari who disagrees with Rav Yehuda and right away the statement of Rav Yehuda. To make my question clearer, let me make clear that the Rambam is saying even though the owner of the cow now owns the ass, still since the ass is in the barn of the [previous] owner of the ass, the previous owner must bring proof.  While Mari is saying that the owner of the cow has to bring proof. Besides this, the meaning of Mari is when he says ''domain''  means ownership, not in the property or on the land of. Otherwise he would be saying the exact same thing as Rav Yehuda with whom he is disagreeing. 

this is clearly very relevant to bava mezia page 100a but i do not recall that sugia. i recall writing about it in my little booklet on bava metzia chapters 8 and 9 but i have no recollection of what i wrote. while i am at it i might mention that this idea here i jut put into a different book on shas

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 I am confused about a רמב''ם that does not seem to be in accord with the גמרא in כתובות ע''ו ע''ב. The גמרא brings a case where there a cow was exchanged with an חמור, and the cow was present, but the חמור was still in the barn of its owner. When the owner of the cow went to pick up the חמור, it was found dead.   רב יהודה said in the name of שמואל, the owner of the חמור has to bring proof that it was alive at the time of the exchange. מרי בר יחזקאל said ''Pay no attention to what יהודה אחי said. Rather in whose domain a doubt arose, upon him is to bring a proof.'' The רמב''ם writes in בהלכות מכירה כ' הלכה י''ד   in whose domain a doubt arose, upon him is to bring proof. For example  a cow was exchanged with an חמור. When the owner of the cow went to pick up the חמור, it was found dead.  The owner of the חמור has to bring proof that it was alive at the time of the exchange. Here the רמב''ם brings the statement of מרי who disagrees with רב יהודה and right away the statement of רב יהודה. To make my question clearer, let me make clear that the רמב''ם is saying even though the owner of the cow now owns the חמור, still since the חמור is in the barn of the [previous] owner of the חמור, the previous owner must bring proof.  While מרי is saying that the owner of the cow has to bring proof. Besides this, the meaning of מרי is when he says ''רשות''  means ownership, not in the property or on the land of. Otherwise he would be saying the exact same thing as רב יהודה with whom he is disagreeing. 

 הרמב''ם לא נראה כמתאים לגמרא בכתובות ע''ו ע''ב. הגמרא מביאה מקרה שבו הוחלפה פרה עם חמור, והפרה הייתה נוכחת, אבל החמור עדיין היה ברפת של בעליה. כשבעל הפרה הלך לקחת את החמור, היא נמצאה מתה. אמר רב יהודה בשם שמואל, בעל החמור צריך להביא הוכחה שהוא היה חי בזמן ההחלפה. מרי בר יחזקאל אמר ''אל תשים לב למה שאמר יהודה אחי. אלא שבתחומו התעורר ספק, עליו להביא הוכחה.'' הרמב''ם כותב בהלכות מכירה כ' הלכה י''ד של מי שבתחומו התעורר ספק, עליו להביא הוכחה. למשל פרה הוחלפה עם חמור. כשבעל הפרה הלך לקחת את החמור, היא נמצאה מתה. בעל החמור צריך להביא הוכחה שהוא היה בחיים בזמן ההחלפה. כאן מביא הרמב''ם את דברי מרי החולק על רב יהודה ומיד את דברי רב יהודה. כדי להבהיר את שאלתי, הרשו לי להבהיר שהרמב"ם אומר אף על פי שבעל הפרה הוא עכשיו בעל החמור, עדיין כיון שהחמור נמצא ברפת של הבעלים [הקודמים] של החמור, הבעלים [הקודמים] חייבים להביא הוכחה. ואילו מרי אומר שבעל הפרה צריך להביא הוכחה. חוץ מזה, הכוונה של מרי היא כשהוא אומר ''רשות'' פירושו בעלות, לא בקרקע של. אחרת הוא היה אומר בדיוק אותו דבר כמו רב יהודה שהוא לא מסכים איתו

I was at the sea shore and on the way back it occurred to me that the law in the Rambam laws of gifts 8 law 6 (if one says if my wife gives birth to a  son he will take 100 zuz and if he gives birth to a daughter she will get 200 zuz.) might refer to a kinyan sudar [handkerchief]. But that is not how the Magid Mishna explains it there [and he says it refers to a person dying] because of the gemara in Gitin page 40 side b that if a person writes in a document ''I will give such and such a thing to so and so'' that it is not valid, and there is no obligation incurred by means of that document.  And the Rambam brings that law in laws of gifts chapter 4. The Rashba however brings the Magid Mishna that there might be a difference between a kinyan sudar and a document. It occurred to me that the Rambam himself writes that the validity of documents is derabanan [from the sages, not from the Torah except where the Torah explicitly says one needs a document like with divorce.] while a kinyan sudar is from the Torah as a valid exchange [halifin]. Thus it makes sense to say that the Rambam is referring to a kinyan sudar which is clearly more powerful than a document.

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 The Rambam  writes הלכות זכיה ומתנה פרק ח' הלכה ו: If one says, "If my wife gives birth to a  son, he will take מנה.  If she gives birth to a daughter, she will get מאתיים. This might refer to a קניין סודר [handkerchief]. But that is not how the מגיד משנה explains it there. [He says it refers to a person dying שכיב מרע]. The reason the מגיד משנה explains this differently is because of the גמרא in גיטין מ' ע''ב that if a person writes in a document ''I will give such and such a thing to so and so'' that it is not valid, and there is no obligation incurred by means of that document.  And the רמב''ם brings that law in laws of giftsהלכות זכיה ומתנה פרק ד. The רשב''א however brings the מגיד משנה that there might be a difference between a קניין סודר and a document. It occurred to me that the Rambam himself writes that the validity of documents is מן הרבנן [from the sages, not from the Torah except where the תורה explicitly says one needs a document like with divorce.] while a קניין סודר is from the תורה as a valid exchange [חליפין]. Thus it makes sense to say that the רמב''ם is referring to a קניין סודר which is clearly more powerful than a document.

הרמב"ם כותב הלכות זכיה ומתנה פרק ח' הלכה ו: אם יאמר "אם אשתי תלד בן, ייקח מנה. אם היא תלד בת, היא תקבל מאתיים. זה יכול להתייחס לקניין סודר [מטפחת]. אבל לא כך מסביר זאת המגיד משנה שם. [הוא אומר שזה מתייחס לשכיב מרע]. הסיבה שהמגיד משנה מסביר זאת אחרת היא בגלל הגמרא בגיטין מ' ע''ב שאם יכתוב אדם במסמך ''אתן כזה וכזה'' שאינו תקף, ואין התחייבות שנגרמה על ידי אותו מסמך. והרמב''ם מביא את הדין הזה בהלכות זכיה ומתנה פרק ד. הרשב"א לעומת זאת מביא את המגיד משנה שאולי יש הבדל בין קניין סודר למסמך. עלה בדעתי שהרמב"ם בעצמו כותב שתוקף המסמכים הוא מן הרבנן [מהחכמים, לא מהתורה אלא במקום שבו התורה אומרת במפורש שצריך מסמך כמו בגירושין.] ואילו קניין סודר הוא מהתורה כחילופין. לפיכך הגיוני לומר שהרמב''ם מתייחס לקניין סודר שהוא בבירור חזק יותר ממסמך

 In the ketubah there is a clause ''I will work.'' But in any document, if one writes ''I will do such and such a thing'' it is קניין דברים acquisition of words which has no validity.  So why is it in the ketubah-- because of the obligation that exists anyway. Even though the obligation to provide for a wife is an argument if it is from the Torah or the words of the scribes, still there is no doubt that there is such an obligation which amounts to about two kilograms of flour every week. 

there is a lot to go into about all this which i might get to someday. 

 When Christians talk about Bible Studies for Wednesday night [or some other time they get together during the week], they do not ever learn the Old Testament in depth, and most of the time not even the New Testament except for the letters of Paul.  But that just goes to show that Christianity is really based on Paul. But that requires a belief that Paul understood the approach of Jesus better that any of the actual people that heard and saw him, and wrote down his teachings directly from first hand knowledge.  But if they want to learn Paul as an authority on Jesus, well so be it. But then, why is it that the ''Bible Studies''never include the Old Testament.

[One place where you can see the problem of not learning the Old Testament is when Christians try to take a verse from the Old Testament to show something is morally wrong, but ignore other verses. When they take the words of the Old Testament to be authoritative, they are depending on Jesus. When they ignore the Law of Moses, they depend on Paul. But this weakens their position . You can not have it both ways. Either the Law of Moses means what it  says, or it does not. I ask them to make up their minds.]

I might add here that the way I see morality of the Old Testament is that it is based on a synthesis of faith and reason. This is as we see in the Talmud where there is a great deal of discussion about how to understand the verses of the Law of Moses based on reason. Very few times is any discussion based on the idea that someone's opinion is halacha le'Moshe miSinai [a law to Moses from Sinai]. [There are a few places where it is considered that a law is halacha to Moses from Sinai. More often it is just clear that some things are in fact ''from the Torah''; e.g., things like the 39 types of work on the sabbath, or the many laws about the temple or marriage]. Rather all discussions are based on the idea of how can we reconcile seemingly contrary verses or later teachings that themselves were based on verses.

I hope that Christians start to learn the Old Testament in depth, not superficially. In fact, I recall that there was once a long time ago a father who read to his family a few chapters of the Bible at the dinner table every night until the family had finished the Bible several times over.