Gemara Nida2. The Mishna says a person went into a mikve [pool] and it was found lacking the full volume, all the pure things which were handled [based on the  assumption that that mikve was okay] are impure. R Shimon says in a private domain they are in doubt. In a public domain they are pure. The Gemara asks from this braita: ''a barrel of wine was separated in order to use it for separating truma, and was found to be sour. For three days, the wine that was fixed is ok. After that it is a doubt.'' R Hanina from Sura says the teaching about barrel is R Shimon. And both learn from sota. What is the case with Sota? Even though she is in doubt, she is considered to be definitely not ok until she drinks. So all the pure things are impure. But then just like sota they should be considered pure in a public domain? No, because for in a public domain there is no privacy. That is why the sota is ok there. But for a mikve what difference is there in a public domain if it was found lacking? But even so since we learn from sota they should be pure in a public domain? No because here there are two status's  to make impure. R Shimon also learns from sota. Just like sota in a public domain is pure, so are the pure things. But then in a private domain they should be impure. No, because there  is valid suspicion on her in  private domain.

The question that Rav Shach asks here [in Laws of Truma 5:24 ] is that once you come on two status's, you do not need the answer of sota. Also, I ask that the Gemara asks on the first Tana that since we learn from sota, the law should be like sota  in all cases. I think they mean that if we learn by a Gezera shava. אין גזירה שווה לחצאים. So why do they not ask the same question on R Shimon? Since he learns from Sota. the law of the pure things should be like sota in all cases. And also, I would like to ask that if we are learning from a gezera shava or הקיש,  then what type of answer could it be that sotaa is different because of such and such a reason. Is that not the whole point of a gezera shava,- to put the law of one case into another case even though they are different?

Also I would like to ask that in any case, the teaching about the barrel is not like R Shimon. The braita says for three days it is ok, and after that a doubt. But if it would be R Shimon  it should be a doubt right away in a private domain and ok in a public domain.

[What I am getting at is that in fact Rav Shach is right that even though the gemara puts this together, it seems clear that these are two separate answers, ]

I know there i a lot here that might be unclear but I am really tired from being at the sea the whole day. But just tp help a little bit let me say:

A sota is a woman who was  warned by her husband not to be in a private place with a certain man, and she did so anyway. She is forbidden to her husband until she drinks the waters in the Temple--or she can refuse and admit her guilt, and is divorced.  

The "two status's" means the fellow that went into the mikva was impure, and the mikve is now not okay. That is two against one status that we know in the past it was ok That is sstatus of impure, plus status now against status of the past. You might have run into this subject in Ketuboth page 9

I might add that the  whole comparison of the barrel used for truma with sota or the mikve is difficult to understand. What we learn from sota is  a doubt about purity in a private domain is impure, and in a public domain it is pure. This does not seem to have any relation to separation of truma. Also the difference in  reasoning is hard to understand because  certainly R  Shimon agrees there is not privacy in a public domain. so why does he disagree with the firt tana [as the Gemara itself usually asks in similar type of arguments]. And certainly the first tana agrees that the  reason for suspicion in a private domain for the sota. And also, if that is the reason for suspicion in a private domain for the sota, perhaps any other case should be totally pure? Why does that reasoning only result in having the case of mikve just a doubt?   

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גמרא נידה ב ע''ב The משנה says a person went into a מקווה and it was found lacking the full volume all the טהרות which were handled based on the  assumption that that מקווה was okay are impure. ר' שמעון says in a רשות היחיד they are in doubt. In a רשות הרבים they are pure. The גמרא asks from this ברייתא a barrel of wine was separated in order to use it for תרומה and was found to be sour. For three days the תרומה is ok. After that it is a doubt. ר' חנינא from סורא says the teaching about barrel is ר' שמעון. And both learn from סוטה. What is the case with סוטה? Even though she is in doubt she is considered to be definitely not ok until she drinks. So all the טהרות are impure. But then just like סוטה they should be considered pure in a  רשות הרבים? No, because for in a רשות הרבים there is no privacy. That is why the סוטה is ok there. But for a מקווה what difference is there in a רשות הרבים if it was found lacking? But even so since we learn from סוטה they should be pure in a רשות הרבים? No because here there are two חזקות  to make impure. ר' שמעון also learn from סוטה. Just like סוטה in a רשות הרבים is pure So are the טהרות. But then in a  רשות היחיד they should be impure. No because there  is valid suspicion on her in  ברשות היחיד. The question that רב שך asks here is that once you come on two חזקות you do not need the answer of סוטה. Also I ask that the גמרא asks on the first תנא that since we learn from סוטה, The law should be like סוטה  in all cases. I think they mean that if we learn by a גזירה שווה ולכן אין גזירה שווה לחצאים. So why do they not ask the same question on ר' שמעון? Since he learns from סוטה. the law of the  טהרות should be like סוטה in all cases. And also I would like to ask that if we are learning from a גזירה שווה or הקיש  then what type of answer could it be that סוטה is different because of such and such a reason? Is that not the whole point of a גזירה שווה to put the law of one case into another case even though they are different?

Also I would like to ask that in any case, the teaching about the barrel is not like ר' שמעון. The ברייתא says for three days it is ok and after that a doubt. But if it would be ר' שמעון  it should be a doubt right away in a רשות היחיד and ok in a רשות הרבים.

I might add that the  whole comparison of the barrel used for truma with sota or the mikve is difficult to understand. What we learn from סוטה is  a doubt about טהרה in a private domain is טמא and in a רשות הרבים it is טהור. This does not seem to have any relation to separation of תרומה. Also the difference in  reasoning is hard to understand because  certainly ר' שמעון agrees there is not יחוד in a רשות הרבים so why does he disagree with the תנא קמא  as the גמרא itself usually asks in similar type of arguments. And certainly the תנא קמא  agrees that the is reason for suspicion in a רשות היחיד for the סוטה. And also if the is reason for suspicion in a  רשות היחיד for the סוטה perhaps any other case should be totally pure? Why does that reasoning only result in having the case of מקוה just a doubt.   

תוצאות התרגום

גמרא נידה ב' ע''ב המשנה אומרת שאדם נכנס למקווה ונמצא חסר נפח, כל הטהרות שטופלו על סמך ההנחה שהמקווה היה בסדר טמאות. ר' שמעון אומר ברשות היחיד הם בספק. ברשות הרבים הם טהורים. שואלת הגמרא מברייתא שזו שונה מחבית יין כדי להשתמש בה לתרומה ונמצאה חמוצה. במשך שלושה ימים התרומה בסדר. אחרי זה יש ספק. ר' חנינא מסורא אומר שההוראה על חבית היא ר' שמעון. ושניהם לומדים מסוטה. מה המקרה עם סוטה? למרות שהיא בספק היא נחשבת בהחלט לא בסדר עד שהיא שותה. אז כל הטהרות טמאות. אבל אז בדיוק כמו סוטה הם צריכים להיחשב טהורים ברשות הרבים? לא, כי ברשות הרבים אין פרטיות. לכן הסוטה בסדר שם. אבל בשביל מקווה מה הבדל יש ברשות הרבים אם נמצא חסר? אבל למרות זאת כיוון שאנו למדים מסוטה הם צריכים להיות טהורים ברשות הרבים? לא כי כאן יש שתי חזקות לעשות הטהרות טמאות. גם ר' שמעון לומד מסוטה. בדיוק כמו שסוטה ברשות הרבים היא טהורה כך גם הטהרות. אבל אז ברשות היחיד הם צריכים להיות טמאים ודאי. לא כי יש עליה חשד תקף ברשות היחיד. השאלה שרב שך שואל כאן היא שברגע שאתה בא על שתי חזקות אתה לא צריך את התשובה של סוטה. וכן אני שואל שהגמרא ששואלת על תנא הראשון שכיוון שאנו למדים מסוטה, הדין צריך להיות כמו סוטה בכל המקרים. (אני חושב שהם מתכוונים שאם נלמד על ידי גזירה שווה אין גזירה שווה לחצאים.) אז למה הם לא שואלים את אותה שאלה על ר' שמעון? מאז הוא לומד מסוטה. חוק הטהרות צריך להיות כמו סוטה בכל המקרים. וגם אני רוצה לשאול שאם אנחנו לומדים מגזירה שווה או הקיש אז איזה סוג תשובה יכול להיות שסוטה שונה בגלל סיבה כזו ואחרת? האם זה לא כל העניין של גזירה שווה להכניס את הדין של מקרה אחד לתיק אחר למרות שהם שונים? כמו כן ברצוני לשאול שבכל מקרה, ההוראה על החבית אינה כמו ר' שמעון. הברייתא אומרת שלשה ימים זה בסדר ואחרי זה ספק. אבל אם זה יהיה ר' שמעון זה צריך להיות ספק מיד ברשות היחיד ובסדר ברשות הרבים.

אני רוצה להוסיף שכל ההשוואה של החבית המשמשת לתרומה עם סוטה או המקווה קשה להבנה. מה שאנו למדים מסוטה הוא שספק לגבי טהרה בתחום הפרטי הוא טמא וברשות הרבים זה טהור. נראה שאין לזה קשר להפרשת תרומה. גם את ההבדל בנימוק קשה להבין כי בהחלט ר' שמעון מסכים שאין יחוד ברשות הרבים אז למה הוא חולק על התנא קמא כמו שהגמרא עצמו שואל בדרך כלל בסוג דומה של טיעונים. ובהחלט תנא קמא מסכים שיש סיבה לחשד ברשות היחיד לסוטה. לכן אם יש סיבה לחשד ברשות היחיד לסוטה אולי כל מקרה אחר צריך להיות טהור לחלוטין? מדוע ההיגיון הזה רק גורם לכך שהמקרה של מקוה הוא רק ספק

Ukraine is filled with these Soviet built apartment buildings.

 Ukrainian cities having to deal with winter now is a frightful thought. I was in one unheated place for winter there, but I had electricity, so I could sit by a small fan heater, and then later I could turn it off and crawl under a ton of blankets. But that was a ground wooden structure which naturally preserves heat]. But Ukraine is filled with these Soviet built apartment buildings. [The minority are Stalin built buildings which are easy to see since they have less stories than the larger Krutchev and Breshnev built buildings which are the very tall buildings that you see all over the place there.] These without heating in winter would be like walking into a freezer of a refrigerator.

I think it is time for a negotiated peace. 

The Soviets had built a sort of central heating system for whole cities. They wrote whole textbooks on the Physics of super heated water that had a totally different sort of nature than regular heated water. [I actually used to learn one of these textbooks as part of my Physics studies.] And this system was used to heat all these apartment buildings throughout whole cities. But the down side of this is it is easy to "take out/" 

My dad was a captain in the United States Air Force

Dec 7 Pearl Harbor. My dad was a captain in the United States Air Force and I recall seeing his uniform had lots of medals but he never told what sorts of operations they were for except one. That was the onehe got for setting up a   US  air force base in France where damaged planes could come in and get repaired in short order. Other than that he never talked about what other missions the other medals were for.

 After a day at the beach I am tired. But I would like to mention a important point. The Gemara in Nida pg 2b says if one goes into a natural body of water [like a mikve] and it was found lacking the proper volume is not clean. [R Shimon said the pure things made after that are in doubt if in a private domain and pure in a public domain.] The Gemara asks from the teaching about a barrel.  One puts aside a barrel of wine to use for truma and later was found to have soured. For the first three days the truma is truma. After that is a doubt. Rav Hanina from Sura said the teaching on the barrel is R. .Shimon.

The Gemara then explains why. While at the sea it occurred to me that even before the explanation of the gemara the teaching of R Shimon in the Mishna and the braita do not seem to correspond. Another point that Rav Shach brings is the explanation of the Gemara is a bit disjointed

The gemara says both the sages and R Shimon learn from sota, and in the middle of this explanation they insert that the sages are learning from two status's opposed to one, The man was not clean and the mikve is now not okay, while one status is that originally the mikve was ok,

This explanation has no need to learn from sota. 

Rav Shach thus say that these are two separate explanations and it was  Rav Hanina that said one [תרתי לרעיותא] while and according to that one, the barrel teaching is R Shimon. But to the explanation from sota the barrel can be also the sages, This answers why the Rambam decides the law like the sages and also barrel.  

So reason can help understand Torah, but not override it.

 What is authoritative? Sola Scriptura. So reason can help understand Torah but not override it. It is the major theme of the Middle Ages to find the right balance between Reason and Revelation. But when it come down to a direct conflict, the actual words of God in the Five Books of Moses and the Prophets must take precedent over the faulty and fallible reason of man. And what are prophets is not open. The word of God has not become irrelevant as time ha gone on. Nor have we advanced beyond God.

We need the Gemara to derive and understand the words of Torah, but not override them.

  

 There is the thesis anti thesis synthesis of Hegel which is one way to get to the truth of things. He gets it from Socrates [as Dr Kelley Ross pointed out] who for some reason was always able to ask the right question to get to the opposite principle than the one that was suggested.   In some of the shorter dialogs this gets to just that--contradiction. In some however progress is made.

And from what I saw in the Logic of the Encyclopedia this is the foundation of his whole system. But he also said there is not just one method of gaining ground in Philosophy. [That is why some have claimed he never had this method.]  

Mainly Hegel wants from this method to get to the conclusion that logic and reason permeates everything, There is no where beyond reason. --For in plain terms God made everything through his wisdom and reason. [That is not how Hegel would put it.] [Hegel also wants that reason can get to absolute truth by itself, not needing empirical evidence]

The reason I bring this up is that the only two areas I have done any study in science are math and physics and in fact progress is never made by the same method that the previous bit of progress was made.

Well obviously areas out from the possibility of experience [not possible experience]: areas that do not come under where when how why the categories. But the categories are not known by the categories- but they are known, Immediately after the Critique was published this was more or less along the lines of the original critics like Schultz.   So what Fries did was to postulate non immediate intuitive knowledge, Though Hegel and Fries were not saying the same thing, but I see this non intuitive knowledge as one more means of getting to the absolute truth in a different way than the dialectic. Just like Hegel had said: there is not just one way.

[fries disagreed  with kant on the transcendental deduction. fries felt that perception can not tell us anything about a priori principles.]  

I need to mention here that I totally agree with sola scriptura --only the word of God is the one true standard of truth and moral authority. I consider the validity of the Talmud to go only so far as to be an accurate understanding of how to fulfill the commandments of the Torah. And I think the Talmud hold the same view.

 I have noticed that when Christians defend their faith, they sometimes are unaware of the background that Jesus lived in. One instance is ''netilat yadaim'' [ washing before bread, or fruit that has been washed and is now wet, or before the three prayers]. It has nothing to do with coming from the market back home. The last two requirements are not generally observed except for before the morning  prayer. [There is however no good reason why these are not observed.] The first one has two reasons, one in Hulin chapter 8  מים ראשונים מצווה מים אמצעים רשות מים אחרונים חובה ("The first washing is a good deed, the middle washing is allowed, the last washing after the meal is an obligation."). Since it is clear the disciples were  not washing before bread, so it must be that Jesus held with this opinion: the first washing is a good deed,-not an obligation. 

Plus i should add here that just  because the religious fanatics (Pharisees) yelled at Jesus means nothing. Just as when religious fanatics yell at people nowadays it means nothing. They yell when they have no source in the Law  to defend their insane restrictions.  Have you ever been in Mea Shearim? Do you really think women have to walk on the opposite side of the street according to the Law? That is just the nature of religious fanatics- to make up their own restriction and yell at everyone else that is not following them. It has nothing to do with Torah.

סרך תרומה [[to cause priests to be used to washing for truma] is the other reason given for washing hands, That is the reason many consider it as an obligation. But if one holds the first reason from the Talmud in Hulin chapter 8, then it is only a good thing to do, not an obligation.  

Washing of cups however is different and that is in tractate Kelim. Some vessels [made from clay] can receive impurity from inside only. That is relevant to when the Temple was standing, but now with no temple, it make no difference.

See Mark 7 verse 1.

But Jesus also held with the authority of the scribes as in Mathew he said, "The Scribes and Pharisees sit in the seat of Moses, so all that they say to do that you must do.... " [but there are many hypocrites among them etc.]

I need to mention here that I totally agree with sola scriptura --only the word of God is the one true standard of truth and moral authority. I consider the validity of the Talmud to go only so far as to be an accurate understanding of how to fulfill the commandments of the Torah. And I think the Talmud holds the same view. I do not think the sages thought they could override the commandments except in time of emergency like Eliyahu on Mount Carmel where he brought sacrifices outside of the Temple. or in a case of, "Do not do" שב ואל תעשה for the sake of some other overriding reason. In any case, in Avot Derav Natan on Pirkei Avot we see this amora [Rav Natan] says on the Mishna openly that the decrees of the scribes can not override the Torah. This is however clear only in the correction of the Gra there on the girsa.[language.]

At any rate, see R Shimon ben Yochai in Bava Metzia 119 that we go by the reason for a verse, not the literal meaning. [so one can take a guarantee of a loan from a rich widow.]

As for ''it is a karban that which you derive benefit from me.'' can be said to anyone and is valid. If one say it to one' father, that is the complaint of Jesus. However it is Biblical. One can forbid one's property to another, That is from Parshat Nedarim [vows] in the Book of Numbers, and at any rate if you have to give money toyour parents, then the neder [vow] does not apply anyway. see. tractate nedarim