Bava Metzia page 35.Rambam Laws of Guards chapter 1 Halacha 6.

 At first glance, it looks like Rav Shach has a good argument for the Rambam.   The Rambam holds a guard that gives to another guard like R. Jose. And he holds that the reason is not like Rav Idi bar Abin but rather from the reasoning alone of "How can the first guard do business with the cow of another?" And that really Abyee would be right if not for that. But to me this looks weak. If Abyee is right that the first guard owns the cow right away at the time of the accident, then it makes no sense to as how can he do business with the cow of another when it already is his cow. If you are going to decide like R Yose against the sages as the Rambam does, then the only reason has to be because of  Idi bar Abin.

And as for the argument that he brings from Rav Aahron Kotler [later in laws of guards chap 2 law 3] that neglect is a good plea as opposed to "It is not  not in my possession"-that is a good argument for the Raavad and that does not mean that the case in chapter 1 law 6 is from the same reasoning. The case in chap 1 is that of the cow died in a normal way,  not from neglect, and that is a good plea.

Just to give some background as to what I mean here:

The Mishna states a case when  guard gives the  cow that he was hired to guard to another guard. The first is a paid guard. The second is borrowing from the first. The cow then dies naturally. The sages said the first guard takes an oath that it died naturally as is his normal requirement and the second guard who was borrowing from the first pays the first guard. R. Yose asks how can the first guard do business with the cow of another? 

Idi bar Abin says the owner of the cow should just tell the first guard "I do not need you nor your oath" and the go to the second guard, (the borrower) and get paid for the cow--as is the normal case of a borrower who pays in all cases.

The Rambam decides like R. Jose.

Later in chapter 2 law 3 the Rambam writes neglect is he same as causing damage and the Raavad disagrees. Rav Shach says that the reason for the Raavad is that he hold the plea of neglect is a good plea i and of itself even without an oath to back it up.

_______________________________________________________________________

 At first glance it looks like רב שך has a good argument for the רמב''ם,   The  רמב''ם holds a שומר that gives to another שומר like ר' יוסי. And he holds that the reason is not like רב אידי בר אבין but rather from the reasoning alone of "how can the first guard do business with the cow of another". And that really אביי would be right if not for that. But to me this looks weak. If אביי is right that the first guard owns the cow right away at the time of the accident then it makes no sense to ask how can he do business with the cow of another when it already is his cow. If you are going to decide like ר' יוסי against the חכמים as the רמב''ם does, then the only reason has to be because of   רב אידי בר אבין. And as for the argument that he brings later in laws of guards chap 2 law 3 that neglect is a good plea as opposed to "it is not  not in my possession"-that is a good argument for the ראב''ד and that does not mean that the case in chapter 1 law 6 is from the same reasoning. The case in chap 1 is that of the cow died in a normal way,  not from neglect and that is a good plea. Just to give some background as to what I mean here: The משנה states a case when  guard gives the  cow that he was hired to guard to another guard. The first is a paid guard. The second is borrowing from the first. The cow then dies naturally. The חכמים said the first guard takes an oath that it died naturally as is his normal requirement and the second guard who was borrowing from the first pays the first guard. ר' יוסי asks ''how can the first guard do business with the cow of another?'' רב אידי בר אבין says the owner of the cow should just tell the first guard ''I do not need you nor your oath'' and then goes to the second guard, [the borrower] and get paid for the cow, as is the normal case of a borrower who pays in all cases. The רמב''ם decides like ר' יוסי. Later in chapter 2 law 3 the רמב''ם writes neglect is he same as causing damage and the ראב''ד disagrees. רב שך says that the reason for the ראב''ד is that he hold the טענה of פשיעה is a good plea is and of itself even without an oath to back it up.

במבט ראשון נראה שלרב שך יש טיעון טוב לרמב''ם. הרמב''ם מחזיק שומר שנותן לשומר אחר כמו ר' יוסי. והוא גורס שהסיבה אינה כמו רב אידי בר אבין אלא מהנימוק בלבד של "איך יכול השומר הראשון לעשות עסקים עם פרה של אחר". ובאמת אביי היה צודק אלמלא זה. אבל לי זה נראה חלש. אם אביי צודק שהשומר הראשון מחזיק בפרה מיד בזמן התאונה, אז אין טעם לשאול איך הוא יכול לעשות עסקים עם פרה של אחר כשהיא כבר הפרה שלו. אם אתה מתכוון להחליט כמו ר' יוסי נגד החכמים כמו הרמב''ם, אז הסיבה היחידה צריכה להיות בגלל רב אידי בר אבין.

[רב שך מביא את תשובת אביי שהשומר זוכה בפרה בזמן התאונה, לא בזמן השבועה, וזו הוכחה לחכמים. אבל רב שך אומר שר' יוסי מסכים עם זה באופן עקרוני, אבל עדיין מחזיק אחרת בגלל השאלה "איך השומר יכול לעשות עסקים עם פרה של אחר?"]

ולגבי הטענה שהוא מביא בהמשך הלכות שומרים פרק ב' דין ג' שהזנחה היא טענה טובה בניגוד ל"אין זה ברשותי" - זה טענה טובה לראב''ד, וזה לא אומר שהמקרה בפרק א' חוק ו' הוא מאותו נימוק. המקרה בפרק א' הוא שהפרה מתה בדרך רגילה, לא מהזנחה וזו טענה טובה. רק כדי לתת קצת רקע למה אני מתכוון כאן: המשנה מציינת מקרה שבו השומר נותן פרה שהוא נשכר לשמור לשומר אחר. הראשון הוא שומר בתשלום. השני הוא לווה מהראשון. לאחר מכן הפרה מתה באופן טבעי. החכמים אמרו שהשומר הראשון נשבע שהוא מת באופן טבעי כדרישה הרגילה והשומר השני שלווה מהראשון משלם לשומר הראשון. ר' יוסי שואל ''איך השומר הראשון יכול לעשות עסקים עם פרה של אחר?'' רב אידי בר אבין אומר שהבעלים של הפרה צריך פשוט לומר לשומר הראשון ''אני לא צריך אותך ולא את השבועה שלך'' ואז הולך לשומר השני, [הלווה] ומקבל תשלום עבור הפרה, כמו במקרה הרגיל של הלווה שמשלם בכל המקרים. הרמב''ם מחליט כמו ר' יוסי. בהמשך פרק ב' חוק ג' כותב הרמב''ם שהזנחה היא זהה לגרימת נזק, והרב''ד חולק. רב שך אומר שהסיבה לראב''ד היא שהוא מחזיק בטענה של פשיעה היא טענה טובה אפילו בלי שבועה לגבות אותה.

 I have been thinking about the problems in the world and i recall the advice that i heard while in Litvak yeshivot-- learning Torah brings peace to the world.  Instead of complaining about it or offering solutions that will not work, I  recommend to people to learn Torah. But "Torah" is specific. It is not a word that can be applied to anything. As the Rambam wrote in a letter: "Just like one can not add or subtract from the Written Law, so one can not add or subtract from the Oral Law." That is: the only things which get to be called the Oral Law are the actual books handed down by the sages of the Mishna and Talmud. Later on books are not "Torah" except in a secondhand sort of way in that some of them might be explanations of the Talmud.    

The sad thing is I wanted to learn Torah , but circumstances and my own personal failings led to me not being able to do so, so I had to depend on the opinion of some Rishonim like the Rambam that include Physics and Metaphysics in the category of Learning Torah. [Not that he is saying they are Torah, but rather in the category of ''learning Torah'' that is to clarify the deeper meaning of Torah.]  

 i think one should divide the time half for iyun [deep learning] and half for bekiut./fast learning. even though in the conversation of rav nachman 76 we find the emphasis on jut saying the words as fast a possible and going on, in the LeM vol I ch 78 we see that the main thig is iyun. so clearly there need to be both. but how much of each. i can see the need for both -especially in early ages because when people do not get ''how to learn'' [how to really get into the depths of the subject] they never get it.

when i was young i also did not understand this as i think most people do not. i thought what is the point of spending a few weeks on one page of gemara when i have not even finished the whole tractate at least a few times to get the big picture? but now i see that we people do not get iyun when they are young they never get it. o clearly the great litvak yeshivot that immerse people in iyun right away have the right idea. 

Rav Nahman made a very big deal about sexual purity, and I can see that he was right on one hand. But there is also the danger of adding and or subtracting from what the Torah commands, -as its says in Devarim Deuteronomy,  not to add or subtract from the law. after all in Torah there are things that are emphasizing and things which are less emphasized-- and it is not up to every individual to decide on his or her own what is really important and what is not.

For a simple and well know example: lashon hara [slander]. וויתר הקדוש ברוך הוא על עבודה זרה  גילוי עריות שפיכות דמים ולא וויתר על לשון הרע  God let go and forgave sexual sin, murder and idolatry in the time of the first temple but did not forgive them for lashon hara.

Even though there are specific conditions in which one can speak negatively about others as a rule anything one says about others that is negative comes under the category of lason hara.

So we see that there is a hierarchy of values in Torah and it is not just up to everyone to decide for themselves what is more important and what is less. 

For this reason it is worthwhile to learn the Gates of Repentance which gives a basic overview of the commandments and their degrees of being more or less important 

 I was interested in the issue of idolatry and thus learned Sanhedrin 64 and onwards until the next chapter, and also that Tosphot on shituf שיתוף. Shituf שיתוף is combing the name of God with another. This comes up in the Gemara and right there on the page Tosphot deals with Christianity. To Tosphot it is not idolatry since they worship God, but they join God with a representative. So it is shituf שיתוף.

at least that is one opinion in tosphot. but when i learned that tosphot with david bronson, he noticed that there seemed to be a few other approaches in that very same tosphot.

At any rate, the problems with Christianity are (bitul hamitzvot) nullification of the commandments -which comes from Paul, not Jesus. The other is worship of a person who is not the first cause. that is wrong even given that he was the Messiah son of Josef as held by Rav Avraham Abulafia. a person being considered ''divine'' is not against the torah as stated by the Ari Rav Izhak Luria about Avraham, Izhak yaakov and others who were souls of Emanation which is totally Godliness.  

 My impression in Ukraine was most people were more happy with living in the USSR rather than after the fall of the Soviet state. I base this on the fact that after Rosh Hashanah in Uman , i stayed there for long periods and whenever i went to the local markets i asked people if they were happy that the USSR was gone. And the answer was always the same except for two people. Everyone said ''Things were better under the USSR.'' The two people that disagreed with this were  a good friend of mine. The other was the home owner of the place I was staying at for seven years. He was of Tartar decent so I can see why his feelings would have been different.

 There is a good reason to support someone learning Torah. But there also a  problem about the mentality involved. Far too often people in kollel get the idea that they are the Patrician class while the rest of us plebeians only exist to give them money. But in authentic Torah thought, there is no class distinction. Anyone who wants to sit and learn Torah even on a beginners level  is equal to someone learning at the Mir or Brisk..