between Hegel and Leonard Nelson.

 To me it seems the most important issue to straighten out is between Hegel and Leonard Nelson. That last is known as the Friesian school. It is completely ignored in the West, but was well known in the USSR.

The issues between these schools of thought are many about Kant's dinge an sich. Things in themselves isolated from all characteristics, [known by dialect, or by immediate non intuitive knowledge, or by straight reason according to the intuitionists like Huemer, G.E. Moore and Prichard.

It looks like the same sort of argument that existed between Plato and Aristotle until Plotinus made Neoplatonism philosophy based on Plato, but incorporated elements of Aristotle. 

[The issues between these two schools seem great to them, but the areas of agreement are much more that the strange areas where philosophy drifted into afterwards.  It seems that there is great value and insight in the Kant Friesian school but that should not be a reason to cancel Hegel or Prichard. What it looks like to me is  is the "soul" The deeper level where  intuitive [sense perception] and a priori knowledge originate. That is implied by Kelley Ross. I once wrote to him asking about this kind of question -that immediate non intuitive knowledge refers to a level of existence that is in the physical world and yet also refers to some level of reason--an end of the regress of reason. And his answer was that these two levels in their origin are one. That seems to refer to the soul. The "soul" seems  to be one area that philosophy has skipped in some sense except the Friesian school. 

But after one would come to this level, the questions still remain how to distinguish between area of good and evil- for every area of value seems to have  an opposite area of value that mimics the authentic area of value.

z13 music file

 z13 C Minor

a difficult Rambam [Laws of Idolatry 8:3]

 I have been thinking about a difficult Rambam. He writes: One who stands up a brick and an idolater comes along and bows down to it, it is forbidden because the act of making it stand up is considered an act." [Laws of Idolatry 8:3]. The very difficult thing to understand here is that the brick is man made. So there needs to be no act besides that fact in order that it should be forbidden. Rav Shach askes this question and answers it in a certain way. He says those last words about it being an act is a mistake and should have been places after the later law about the same scenario except it is referring to an egg. And there you can see that the setting the egg would have to be considered an act for it is not man made. However I am still wondering if there is some way to leave the law as it stands.  For the Gemara itself compares the case of the egg with the case of the brick. That is it asks if one sets up an egg and an idolater comes along and bows down to it is it forbidden like the brick of perhaps it is not an act that is able to be seen, so the fact that the person setting it up might have been in agreement that it should be worshipped but that intension is not clear since the egg looks the same whether it is set up or not. But what I noticed here is this question. What is the connection between the egg and the brick? If the brick is forbidden it is because it is man made and the owner acquiesces that it should be worshipped. The egg would be forbidden because the setting it is an act. So you see even so there is some reason the Gemara equates these two cases. [The Gemara is Avoda Zara 46 side A. Hezkia asked if one stands up an egg and bows down to it--is it forbidden? The Gemara says the meaning is the Israeli sets its it up and a idolater bows. The Gemara asked maybe it is just a brick where it is seen and visible that the Israeli intends it to be worshipped but perhaps an egg--not. The Rambam  [as opposed to Rashi] says that even for the brick we see is it enough not that it is manmade, but also you need  an act that shows his wanting the object to be worshipped. So this might be the reason the Rambam writes this reason on the brick not on the egg since in both cases you need an act. The only question of the Gemara is if you also need a visible act which the conclusion is that you do not. Otherwise the egg would be permitted.

In any case this would disagree with the sugia in avoda zara page 23 about why the asherot [trees that were worshipped by the Canaanites would have to have been burned]. They had been planted regularly [before the land was given to Avraham] and then worshiped [after it was given to Avraham] and then worshiped, but no act was done like here to set them up to be worshiped.

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 ֱחשבתי על רמב''ם קשה. הוא כותב: מי שמעמיד לבנה, ועובד אלילים בא ומשתחווה אליו, זו אסורה מכיוון שפעולת העמדה נחשבת כמעשה. [הלכות עבודה זרה פרק ח' הלכה ג']. הדבר הקשה להבין כאן הוא שהלבנה היא מעשה ידי אדם. לכן בהשקפה ראשונה לא צריך להיות שום פעולה מלבד עבודה זו כדי שזו תהיה אסורה. רב שך שואל את השאלה הזו ועונה עליה שאת המילים האחרונות האלה על " זה מעשה" זו טעות והיו צריכים להיות מקומן אחרי המשפט המאוחר יותר לגבי אותו תרחיש, אלא שהוא מתייחס לביצה. ושם אתה יכול לראות שההגדרה שהביצה תצטרך להיחשב כמעשה כי היא לא על ידי אדם עשוי. עם זאת אני עדיין תוהה אם יש איזושהי דרך להשאיר את החוק כפי שהוא. הגמרא עצמה משווה את המקרה של הביצה למקרה של הלבנה. כלומר היא שואלת אם מקימים ביצה ועובד אלילים בא ומתכופף אליו זו אסורה כמו הלבנה או אולי זה לא מעשה שמסוגל לראות, ולכן העובדה שהאדם שהקים אותה אולי היה מסכים שיש לסגוד לה, אך הכוונה הזו אינה ברורה מכיוון שהביצה נראית זהה בין אם היא עומדת בצד הזה או השני. אבל מה ששמתי לב כאן זו השאלה הזו. מה הקשר בין הביצה ללבנה? אם הלבנה אסורה, זה בגלל שנעשה על ידי האדם והבעלים מסכימים לסגוד לה. הביצה תהיה אסורה משום שההגדרה היא מעשה. אז אתה רואה למרות זאת יש סיבה כלשהי שהגמרא משווה את שני המקרים האלה. [גמרא עבודה זרה 46 צד א' "חזקיה שאל אם אחד העמיד ביצה ומשתחווה אליה, האם זו אסורה. הגמרא אומרת שהכוונה היא שהישראלי מכין את זו לשם עבודת אלילים. הגמרא שאלה אולי זו רק לבנה שבה נראה ונראה שהישראלי מתכוון לסגוד לה, אבל אולי ביצה - לא. הרמב''ם בניגוד לרש''י אומר שגם עבור הלבנים שאנו רואים זה לא מספיק שזה מעשה ידי אדם, אלא גם אתה זקוק למעשה שממנו נראה של רצונו לעבודה זרה. זו עשויה להיות הסיבה שהרמב"ם כותב את הסיבה הזו על הלבנה ולא על ביצה שכן בשני המקרים אתה זקוק למעשה. השאלה היחידה של הגמרא היא אם אתה צריך גם מעשה גלוי. המסקנה היא שאתה לא צריך. אחרת הביצה תהיה מותרת.

In the world of Litvak yeshivas it is commonly accepted that the morning hours are for in depth study, and the afternoon for fast study.

 I was in the Na Nach Breslov place yesterday, and they were learning the LeM vol I:74.

It must be obvious that there is a sort of tension between that Torah lesson and Conversation 76 in the Conversations: of Rav Nahman. [Plus in Sefer HaMidot מי שלומד ואינו חוזר הוא כמו מי שזורע ואינו קוצר

The emphasis in Conversation 76 is to say the words as fast as possible until one finishes the book, and then reviews it four times.

In the LeM I:74 the emphasis is on understanding. דיבור בדעה הוא בחינת יעקב.

 In the world of Litvak yeshivas it is commonly accepted that the morning hours are for in depth study and the afternoon for fast study. That sort of compromise makes the most sense to me  and it seems to work for me whether in Gemara study or Physics and Math. To divide one's time. Half in depth and half fast study. [My son IZHAK emphasized learning in depth, but also recognized the greatness and importance of the ideas of Rav Nachman -which includes learning fast.]

there does seem to be a tendency in Islam to encourage violence.

 There seems to be a certain amount of bombs falling outside. I guess the Muslims are upset. My feeling about this is this. What does a Jew do when he wants to serve God? [I mean he wants to do the highest service] He learns Torah. A Christian who wants to serve God decides to build a hospital or school,- or some other act of kindness. A Muslim who wants to serve God goes on a jihad mission. The reason is that the highest service he can do is holy war. [At least that is the simple sense of the verses. There are scholars who say jihad is not war in the normal sense but rather the eternal struggle to improve oneself.] [That might be true but still I think many Muslims take the meaning to be as it seems at first glance. 

So I would say that there does seem to be a tendency in Islam to encourage violence.

finding a spouse

The major work of  Rav Nahman of Breslov, the LeM I have heard is good for the particular issues that are raised in any one given chapter.  And in fact I found this idea helpful. I had seen that vol. I chapter 6 which deals with the intensions of Elul is good to learn in order to find one's proper mate. And in fact I was having a great deal of trouble in that area until one day I decided I was just going to say that Torah lesson every single day until I would find my true mate. And that in fact worked. [There is also another Torah lesson in the LeM vol. II chapter 87 that also deals with this issue. I said that also along with the paragraphs of the princes in Numbers and the Song on the Rea Sea.] [These last two are also mention by Rav Nahman in Sefer HaMidot as being good for this issue.]

If I had raised my expectations too high even that might not have helped. Sometimes when it comes to finding a spouse people are looking for something that has never been created. The Perfect Human Being.

Women often say Lashon Hara about their ex-husbands or fathers

 Most of the Lashon Hara [slander] that women say about their ex husbands or fathers does not have any of the usual kinds of permission one might have when saying something negative about someone else. I mean to say- that there is such a permission as you see in the Hafez Haim concerning lashon hara about issues between man and his fellow man. [There are seven conditions.] There also is a shorter list of conditions when the issue is between man and God.  The conditions: To speak to the person first to rebuke him. To see it oneself. Not hearsay.  To intend some benefit;-- for instance to warn others.  The benefit can not be gained in any other way.  Not to exaggerate. To be clear that what one is saying is in fact forbidden according to Torah law.  A result of the lashon hara can not be more than if the case was tried in an actual court that judges according to the law of the Torah. Most of what women say about men is intended to get revenge for some imaginary slight. They lack the conditions by which lashon hara is permitted.

[The conditions for saying lashon hara about issues between man and God are different, but similar. There is a note in the Hafez Chaim that goes into this. From what I recall the main difference is that one does not need to see it oneself, but if the sin is "מוחזק" well known and public. Other than that I think all the same conditions apply.

Maybe they just don't know how terrible a sin is slander [lashon hara]. In that case, at least I feel I have done my little bit here to let people know about this issue. Probably I should have written about this before, but I figured people have heard about the prohibition of Lashon Hara already so what could I possibly add? But then it occurred to me that women might think just saying negative things about others  especially with intent to cause harm is just not the same thing. Maybe they are mad and that gives them some permission? 

Nowadays women consider it a badge of merit if they accuse their fathers and or ex husbands of sexual abuse.  I can not understand  why they do not read the Hafez Chaim before slandering someone to see if what they are doing is really a badge of merit or the reverse.