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Rav Haim of Voloshin who was a disciple of the Gra a

 Litvak yeshivas were mainly based on the model of Rav Haim of Voloshin who was a disciple of the Gra and my experience in these kinds of places was amazingly positive. So even if I have fallen from that sublime wonderous path, I still feel a twinge of regret that I was not able to stay within that context. It is like they say you never know what you have until you lose it.

However I do have a suggestion for those that are willing to listen. To me it seem the problem for me and for many others is the fact that the Herem that the Gra signed is ignored. [That is somewhat related to the idea of excommunication but within the context of halacha it is much more serious.] 

So it might seem ironic that I quote Rav Nahman of Breslov often and yet also hold that the herem of the Gra is valid. However there is an easy answer for that. It goes back to a famous book that contained the actual language of the herem and there I saw that it did not apply to Rav Nahman.

But now that I come to objective morality, I have a hierarchy of values. Natural Law takes precedence. That is the Torah is beyond natural law, however it does not override it. It is based on coming to it.

 I learn Torah to come to understand objective morality. And I think many other do so also. But that does not mean I give  a blank approval of the religious world. The best is of course the Litvaks that go by the Gra and Sefardim that keep the Torah plainly and simply. But no one group is ever OK all and in itself. Especially  we know from Rav Nahman that many  religious leaders are demons, and I have experienced much of this.  That probably means I guess that their human souls have been exchanged for demonic souls. But who knows? Maybe Rav Nahman meant it literally?

[It seems that at least one major [problem in the religious world is that they can not feel good about themselves except by pitting down others. No from any accomplishment. They are not astronauts, even though they try to convince fry yidden [secular Jews] that they are.

So what is objective morality? I would have to go with the intuitionists as far as that goes that reason recognizes objective morality [Prichard, G.E. Moore, Huemer.] But the idea that reason recognizes objective morality goes back to Fichte and Hegel. That is not all that far from Kelley Ross and Leonard Nelson except that these being faithful Kantians, hold that while morality is objective, not structures in the mind, but they can only be known by immediate non intuitive knowledge and that seems a bit too much for me to swallow. I see no reason that implanted knowledge ought to be knowledge at all.

But now that I come to objective morality, I have a hierarchy of values. Natural Law takes precedence. That is the Torah is beyond natural law, however it does not override it. It is based on coming to it.

 In order to learn Torah, what I think is the best idea is to concentrate on the basic achronim [authorities after the middle ages] that show how to get into the depths of Torah, i.e. R. Haim of Brisk and those from that school up until Rav Shach.

The reason is that maybe in first generations it was clear to them, but nowadays it is hard to get into the depths of Torah without those that showed the way. 

Now if one is in a Litvak yeshiva like Brisk or Ponovitch, one could simply learn the Gemara with Tosphot and the rishonim, and then go to the class of the rosh yeshiva. But if you are like me in so far that Ponovitch and the other great Litvak yeshivas are not within walking distance, then the best idea is to have your own copy of the Hidushei Rav Chaim and the Avi Ezri of Rav Shach.

[In my own time at the Mir in NY I learned a lot of the early achronim R Akiva Eiger, the Pnei Yehoshua etc, They were more understandable to me  I was not really ready for the depths of Rav Shach.] 

I have had a great deal of trouble trying to figure out the argument between Hegel and Jacob Fries. One one hand I can see valid points in each. If the whole issue is immediate knowledge,-- well that question seems to have been taken care of by Michael Huemer when he writes about reason having direct awareness of things. It might need to understand what is a line in the first place, but after that it can see immediately that two lines can not make  a closed figure but three lines can.   

I think that the major problem is when philosophy slides into politics.  So I can see that a visceral reaction against totalitarian regimes  would give people a pause about Hegel's concept of the State. [Maybe more than a pause.]]

[And the odd thing is that nothing of the Constitution of the USA had anything to do with  almost any philosophy at all. Even though Thomas Jefferson was a great admirer of John Locke, but he had little of nothing to do with the Constitution which was more of less the product of James Madison.]

My basic impression is that the train of thought of Fries , Leonard Nelson and Kelley Ross [called the Kant Fries school] is about the best thing. Still I can see a lot of valid points in Hegel. So the extent of the disagreement seems to be over done. 

 The Gemara in Bava Batra page 106 brings this idea that brothers that inherited property, since if they cast lots, then the lot determines who receives what. It is hard to know what kind of "kinyan" [method of acquiring] a "goral" [drawing lots is].

In fact, the Tur brings [from his father the Rosh] openly [Hoshen Mishpat 177] that drawing lots in fact causes not acquisition to occur. It only verifies which part of a property goes to whom.

Yet at the same time he also bring down that Gemara from Bava Batra.

Rav Shach explains  that there is a debate here between the Rosh and the Rambam. With the Rambam there is a difference between a courtyard that is 4*8 amot [yards] where there is a law that either of two partners can force the other to divide; and one that is smaller in which case the goral [lot. i.e. dividing by lots] does not cause a acquisition. In the large courtyard since it is large and one can force the other to divide, then it is as if he already owns his part and the goral can verify which part.

To the Rosh there is a difference between inheritance where the inheritors never made a partnership in the first place, and in that case the goral can verify what part goes to whom, and in a sense causes the acquisition. [That is the acquisition is already there, but the goral verifies to whom is what.] 

But, in the case of partners, since they made an act of joining together and a goral can not cause a acquisition, there it only verifies.