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here is a link to Kelley Ross's PhD thesis on Kant, Fries, and Leonard Nelson. To me it looks like  masterpiece.

[Dr. Ross is building his system, and does not spend much time showing the problems with other Neo Kantian schools. Nor with other problems with "Analytic philosophy". [Robert Hanna does a great job in that area.] 

But I still have trouble with the arguments on Hegel that tend to be part and parcel of the Kant-Friesian approach.

I just can not see what the problem is. Non intuitive immediate knowledge was a part of Kant's approach as Dr Ross points in Kant's CPR pg 65. ["Immediate" means not through anything. Non intuitive means not through the senses.]

And though Hegel disagrees with this, this disagreement is not a major part of his points.

The problem that people have with Hegel is that the Marxists use his ideal state as a justification for their failed socialist experiments.  Might as well attack Plato for the same reasons. Or Leonard Nelson also! [But of all people, Hegel ought not to be used for justification for socialism. He was a capitalist.]

Because I have been influenced by Plotinus [the beginning of Neo Platonism],  I tend to see all mentions of pure reason in Kant as being the Logos in the heavens. [The order is the One, who emanates Logos which brings forth Being.] And I do the same when I read Hegel. So I just do not see much conflict between Kant and Hegel. Just that they are addressing different issues.  

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בבבא בתרא דף ס''ג ע''א Bava Batra 63 Rav Shach on the Rambam in Laws of Selling. 23:4

In the case of selling a tree and leaving the fruit for oneself [Laws of Selling. 23:4] Rav Shach suggests that even though the Rambam leaves out the question if the children inherit that right, it seems probable that they would. But to me it seems hard to imagine that a law that the Rambam does not mention one way or the other would be so different from the Gra, the Rashbam and the Ramban. I mean after all, how much can you derive from something that the Rambam does not even mention? I have seen that plenty of times--like in laws of  "tzarat" where in the case of clothes he leaves out plenty of details that are openly important in the Gemara itself!

My point here is that in Bava Batra [63] we have the case of the Levi that sells his field on condition that he gets the first tithe every year. He does get that, but that right does not go on to his inheritors. That we know from the Gemara itself. But what about the case of selling a house and keeping the the roof and extending a walkway from the roof to the walls of the courtyard? There the Ramban says that right does go on to his children, but that is only because it is a "definite thing"-- not like fruit that has not yet come into the world. So the Ramban right here is openly making a distinction between the  extensions and the fruit of  a tree. 

[I should mention that I am not thinking of this question as being final. Rather, it is just a question that I hope eventually to find some answer for. In our case, there might be some reason and a way to answer for Rav Shach. After all, the cases of the roof extensions and the fruit seem different that the first tithe that is not exactly some thing owned by the Levi. And that seem overly obvious. So that very well might be the reason for Rav Shach. After all, even when the Levi owned his field, he did not exactly "own" the first tithe. It still had to be taken and given to some Levi -- which could be himself. So he did not "own it".

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There is an argument of one can give or gain possession of something that has not come into the world. ר' מאיר said one can. However the sages said "no", and so throughout Shas, you see it is a given that one can not. There is a certain order among the  authors of the Mishna with whom is the law. R Jose, R Yehuda, etc. according to order. ר' מאיר is near that bottom unless it is a stam mishna" [no authorship is attributed] in which case the law is like ר' מאיר. [That is how R Yehuda the Prince arranged the Mishna]. In the case of a fruit tree, if one sells it to one person and sells its fruit to another, the other has acquired nothing except fruit which is on it right now. Not anything that will grow in the future. But in a case where he sells the tree to one person and he says, "I am selling to you the tree, but keeping the fruit for me," he keeps the fruit --for it is considered as if he kept the place where the fruit is growing for himself. Same with a sell of a house where he says "I am keeping the upper porch to be able to build upper extensions into the courtyard." But in both cases, there is an argument among ראשונים if he can pass that right along to the people that inherit him. The גר''א and רשב''ם say "no." The רמב''ן says yes. The issue is that the right to build an extension is thought to be a thing that has no substance. The גמרא there in בבא בתרא ס''ג ע''א says the case of the לוי who sells his land on condition that the first tithe he מקבל. That arrangement does not continue with his יורשיו that inherit him. The idea is he keeps in theory the actual ground that the tithe grows on. From there ריש לקיש learns from there about a person that sells his house on condition he keeps the roof space. But he keeps it anyway in the ancient usage of Iraq when if one sells a house the seller keeps top of the roof unless that is specified. To the רשב''ם  saying openly "I sell you the house on condition the גג space is mine" היינו דיוטא העליונה means he added a condition that was implicit anyway. So it comes to include הזכות to extend the גג to the other side of the courtyard and to make  a walkway there. זיזין, To the  רמב''ן that is not because of the language, but part of the actual arrangement in any case. The גר''א holds like the רשב''ם that the case of a לוי and roof are similar in that the children do not inherit the right, but the case of the roof is because of owning a thing that has no substance, not because of the language used in the deal.

In the case of selling a tree and leaving the fruit for oneself Laws of Selling 23:4 רב שך suggests that even though the רמב''ם leaves out the question if the children inherit that right, it seems probable that they would. But to me it seems hard to imagine that a law that the רמב''ם does not mention one way or the other would be so different from the גר''א, the רשב''ם and the רמב''ן. 

My point here is that in בבא בתרא דף ס''ג ע''א we have the case of the לוי that sells his field on condition that he gets the first tithe every year. He does get that, but that right does not go on to his inheritors. That we know from the גמרא itself. But what about the case of selling a house and keeping the the roof and extending a walkway from the roof to the walls of the courtyard? There the רמב''ן says that right does go on to his children, but that is only because it is a definite thing, not like fruit that has not yet come into the world. So the רמב''ן right here is openly making a distinction between the  extensions and the fruit of  a tree.תירוץ: After all, the cases of the roof extensions and the fruit seem different that the first tithe that is not exactly some thing owned by the לוי.  So that might be the reason for רב שך. After all, even when the לוי owned his field, he did not own the first tithe. It still had to be taken and given to some לוי,  which could be himself. So he did not own it.

יש ויכוח על כך אם אפשר לתת או להשיג רכוש שלא הגיע לעולם. ר' מאיר אמר שאפשר. עם זאת, החכמים אמרו "לא", ולכן בכל הש"ס אתה רואה שזה נתון שאי אפשר לעשות זאת. יש סדר מסוים בקרב מחברי המשנה בשל מי החוק? ר' יוסי, ר' יהודה וכו' לפי הסדר. ר' מאיר נמצא קרוב לתחתית הסדר, אלא אם כן מדובר בסתם משנה "[לא מיוחסת לאיזה מחבר] ובמקרה של סתם משנה, החוק הוא כמו ר' מאיר. [כך ר 'יהודה הנסיך סידר את המשנה]. במקרה של פרי עץ, אם אחד מוכר אותו לאדם אחד ומוכר את פריו לאחר, האחר לא רכש דבר מלבד פירות שנמצאים עליו כרגע. לא שום דבר שיגדל בעתיד. אבל במקרה שהוא מוכר את העץ לאחד והוא אומר, "אני מוכר לך את העץ, אבל שומר לי את הפירות", הוא שומר את הפירות - שכן זה נחשב כאילו שמר לעצמו את המקום שבו הגידול גדל. בדין של בית בו הוא אומר "אני שומר על המרפסת העליונה כדי שאוכל לבנות הרחבות עליונות לחצר." אבל בשני המקרים, יש ויכוח בקרב ראשונים אם הוא יכול להעביר את זה לאנשים שירשו אותו. הגר"א ורשב"ם אומרים "לא." הרמב''ן אומר כן. העניין הוא שהזכות לבנות הרחבה נחשבת לדבר שבו אין חומר. הגמרא שם בבא בתרא ס''ג ע''א אומר המקרה של לוי שמוכר את אדמתו בתנאי שמעשר הראשון הוא יקבל. ההסדר הזה לא ממשיך עם יורשיו שלו שירש אותו. הרעיון הוא שהוא שומר בתיאוריה את הקרקע שעליה צומח המעשר. ריש לקיש לומד משם על אדם שמוכר את ביתו בתנאי שהוא שומר על שטח הגג. אבל הוא שומר את זה בכל מקרה בשימוש העתיק בעיראק, אם מוכרים בית, המוכר שומר על הגג אלא אם כן צוין. הרשב''ם אומר "אני מוכר לך את הבית בתנאי שמרחב הגג הוא שלי" היינו דיוטא העליונה פירושו שהוא הוסיף תנאי שהיה ממילא מרומז. אז זה מכווין לכלול הזכות להאריך את הגג לצד השני של החצר ולעשות שם שביל. זיזין, לרמב''ן זה לא בגלל השפה, אלא חלק מההסדר בפועל בכל מקרה. הגר"א גורס כמו הרשב"ם כי המקרה של לוי וגג דומים בכך שהיורשים אינם יורשים את הזכות, אך המקרה של הגג הוא בגלל בעלות על דבר שאין לו חומר, ולא בגלל השפה בה משתמשים בעסקה. 

בדין של מכירת עץ והשארת פרי עבור במוכר הלכות מכירה פרק כ’’ג הלכה ד’ רב שך מציע שלמרות שהרמב''ם משאיר את השאלה אם היורשים יורשים זכות זו, נראה סביר שהם יורשים זאת. אבל קשה לדמיין שחוק שהרמב''ם אינו מזכיר כך או אחרת יהיה שונה כל כך מהגר''א, הרשב''ם והרמב''ן. הנקודה שלי כאן היא שבבבא בתרא דף ס''ג ע''א יש לנו את המקרה של לוי שמוכר את השדה שלו בתנאי שהוא יקבל את המעשר הראשון בכל שנה. הוא אכן משיג זאת, אך זכות זו אינה עוברת ליורשיו. זה אנחנו יודעים מהגמרא עצמה. אך מה לגבי המקרה של מכירת בית והשארת הגג למוכר והארכת שביל מהגג לקירות החצר? שם אומר הרמב''ן שהזכות אכן עוברת ליורשיו, אבל זה רק בגלל שזה דבר מסויים, לא כמו פרי שטרם הגיע לעולם. אז הרמב''ן כאן מבחן באופן גלוי בין הרחבות הגג לפרי עץ. תירוץ: אחרי הכל, המקרים של הארכת הגג והפרי נראים שונים מהמעשר הראשון שהוא לא בדיוק איזה דבר בבעלות מהלוי. אז זו עשויה להיות הסיבה לרב שך. הרי גם כאשר לוי היה בעל השדה שלו, הוא לא היה הבעלים של המעשר הראשון. עדיין היה צריך לקחת את זה ולתת לאיזה לוי שיכול להיות הוא עצמו. אז הוא לא היה הבעלים של זה  

The reason the religious world is so messed up

 The first time in the LeM of R. Nahman of Breslov that he brings the problem with religious teachers is the the LeM volume I, chapter 8. רברבי עשיו The princes of Esau. This Rav Nahman says refers to religious leaders of the Dark Side.

The basic idea in that chapter is that the spirit of life comes from Torah. So to be attached to Torah is the source of the spirit of life. But from where do evil people get their spirit of life? From the religious leaders of the Dark Side. The princes of Esau. רב דקליפה The Rav of the Dark Side.

Pretty scary. How do you tell who is who? I say listening to the Gra is the way to go about that. That is: the Gra made clear exactly who are the religious leaders of the Dark Side,--- and the fact that he is ignored is the reason the religious world is so messed up. 

One way you can see that the Gra was right is the who are the people that are in fact attached to Torah?--the obvious answer is: the Litvak yeshivas.

Eliyahu on Mount Carmel

 Eliyahu on Mount Carmel asked the People of Israel, "How long will you jump between two extremes? If the Lord is God then serve him, but if the Baal is God then serve him."

Why did they not just answer "Both?" After all that was the ancient Canaanite religion: that the Lord [Yod he vav he] is the ruler of the heavens and the Baal was the ruler of the Earth. I think that the point of Eliyahu was that there can be only one First Cause. [There can only be one first of any series.] This is the same point that the Chovot Levavot brings in answer to this same question. [That is the first book of Musar The Obligations of the Hearts by Ibn Pakuda

I was reading that whole incident and I had  a few observations. One is the Eliyahu was eating bread and meat in the morning and bread and meat at night. That was from what the ravens were bringing to him. That seems odd in itself in terms of tractate Hulin. [The sages said the meat was coming from the table of Ahav. So the only problem was בשר הנעלם מן העין. Meat that was hidden and then found. But there is an answer to that.]

Another thing is that even after the People of Israel had repented, still the later prophecy when Eliyahu was at Mount Horev said to anoint a king on Aram, then one of Israel and then Elisha who would kill all those who had bowed before the Baal. And you see later that in fact only 7000 people were left of all Israel. That is another thing that is hard to understand.

Another point is that the way the Canaanite religion was, was that the Lord is the God of the heavens which means he has final and absolute control over the heavens. The same with the Baal on the Earth. So the point of Eliyahu was that God has the final and absolute control of both heaven and earth. But we do find in the Torah that people did ask prophets to pray for them. Like Hezekiah asking Isaiah to pray for him. So the idea that there can be an intermediary between one and God is possible. But "asking" is not the same thing as "praying." "Praying" is when one knows there one he is praying to is the final court of appeals and has absolute power over the subject one is asking about. "Asking" is not the same thing. And one does not worship the intermediary. Only askes to pray for one.