Jesus was what is called in the Gemara Suka "messiah son of Joseph"

 Rav Avraham Abulafia held that Jesus was what is called in the Gemara Suka "messiah son of Joseph"

I asked Professor Moshe Idel about this since he brings it up in his first book which was actually his PhD thesis. But this does not imply what Christians are usually thinking about this issue.

But it is also not the same things as just a saint.

Rather if you look in the LeM of Rav Nahman of Breslov, vol I chapter 65 you can see what the idea of the "Baal Hasade" [lord of the meadow].

The idea there is that there is a meadow which has beautiful grasses and flowers and trees and fruit. And these trees and plants are all souls. And they need watering and taking care of. There can be weeds and diseases that try to attack these beautiful souls. So there has to be someone to do that work. That is a true tzadik. But even to get to that level to do the slightest smallest work  in meadow requires a very great saint.  

[There is a lot of animosity towards Jesus, but that is because people are not aware of Avraham Abulafia. Even among Christians people are ambivalent towards Abulafia, even if they hear about his insights. This seems sad to me. Now while he was not at all positive towards the catholic church that is clearly because of the problem of worshiping Jesus which  can not be correct. But that does not mean to go to the opposite extreme and start speaking slander about who was really a very great tzadik and even more. For most tzadikim do not have a soul from azilut/emanation. ] 

The sugia of messiah son of Joseph is brought at length in the Gra's Kol HaTor.

[It does seem that Rav Nahman himself was not careful about the signature  of the Gra. However he was not in that category himself.]

There are three cases that Rav Shach brings in the beginning of laws of שאלה ופיקדון in which you say, "Let it be". [Let it stay where it is until proof can be brought.] (1) The case of the third hundred, (2) signs and signs, [He found an object and two different people give signs that the object is theirs. So he does not know to who to return it.] (3) he found a document of  a loan among his documents. [The lender and borrower each claim that he alone was the one that gave it to him to guard.] 

These cases are like an unpaid guard who lost the object he was supposed to guard. But in a case of transgressing, he is somewhat similar to the borrower. The borrower pays for everything. But in the case of the third hundred he is not borrowing anything. Still the fact that he should have written down the names of each one, he is thought to have trespassed and so he pays both. That is like a borrower. 

In the cases above the fellow is somewhat like an unpaid guard since you just leave the found object where it is. He does not know to who to return it. But he does not take an oath because one never takes an oath of  "I do not know."

So  all three cases the lost object or monies are not considered lost at all since they are in fact not lost. They are simply still in the possession of the person that given to guard. But he does not know to who to return the objects.

 For if they were anything like lost objects, we would say שומר חינם נשבע על הכל. The un-paid guard swears on everything.

It occurred to me  today that that is nothing like the law of the third hundred. There a person is given three hundred dollars to keep safe for two people. One gave 100 and the other 200. When they come to get it each says the 200 is his. There we say the third person has to pay 200 to each since it was his fault. The thing here is that he seems to be simply a unpaid guard who takes an oath that he does not know where the object is and then pays nothing. So it seems this case is simply not thought to be anything like a guard of a lost object. The reason is the object last hundred was not lost. He simply does not know to who to give it. And for that he is thought to have transgressed. And so he pays like a borrower, שואל משלם את הכל

The basic steps to get to this conclusion are these: We have the third hundred. There two people give him three hundred dollars in one envelope and tell him to whom is the 200 and whom is the 100. But they gave it in one package. So he did not write it down. He forgot which one was whose. He gives 100 to each and the last hundred stays where it is. But if they were given in two envelopes then he gives each 200.

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There are three cases that רב שך brings in the הלכות פיקדון ואבדה in which you say, יהיה מונח. The case of the מנה שלישית, סימנים סימנים, ומצא שטר בין שטרותיו. It is clear that these cases are not considered to be like an שומר חינם who lost the object he was supposed to guard. But he is somewhat similar to the שואל. The borrower pays for everything. שואל משלם את הכל. But in the case of the מנה שלישית he is not borrowing anything. So it seems that in all three cases the lost object or monies are not considered lost at all since they are in fact not lost. They are in the possession of the person that given to guard. But he does not know to who to return the objects. For if they were anything like lost objects, we would say שומר חינם נשבע על הכל. The שומר חינם נשבע על הכל guard swears on everything.

It occurred to me  today that that is nothing like the law of the מנה שלישית. There a person is given three שלש מאות שקלים to keep safe for two people. One gave מאה and the other מאתיים. When they come to get it each says the מאתיים is his. There we say the third person has to pay מאתיים to each since it was his fault. The thing here is that he seems to be simply a שומר חינם who takes an oath that he does not know where the object is and then pays nothing. So it seems this case is simply not thought to be anything like a guard of a lost object. The reason is the object last hundred was not lost. He simply does not know to who to give it. And for that he is thought to have transgressed. And so he pays like a borrower, שואל משלם את הכל. The basic steps to get to this conclusion are these: We have the מנה שלישית. There two people give him three hundred dollars in one envelope and tell him to whom is the מאתיים and whom is the מאה. But they gave it in one package. So he did not write it down. He forgot which one was whose. He gives מאה to each and the last hundred stays where it is. But if they were given in two envelopes then he gives each מאתיים בגלל שהוא פושע שלא כתב שם כל אחד על הכסף שלו

ישנם שלושה מקרים שרב שך מביא בהלכות פיקדון בהם אתה אומר, יהיה מונח. המקרה של מנה שלישית, סימנים סימנים, ומצא שטר בין שטרותיו. המקרים אלה כמו שומר חינם שאיבד את החפץ עליו היה אמור לשמור. אלא שאינו נשבע שלא לוקחים שבוע על איני יודע. אבל אם הוא פושע זה דומה לשואל. שואל משלם את הכל. כך בשלושת המקרים החפץ האבוד או הכספים אינם נחשבים לאבודים כלל מכיוון שהם למעשה לא אבודים. הם נמצאים ברשות האדם שנתן לשמור. אבל הוא לא יודע למי להחזיר את החפצים. כי אם הם היו משהו כמו חפצים אבודים, היינו אומרים שומר חינם נשבע על הכל. שומר חנם נשבע על הכל השומר נשבע על הכל. היום עלה בדעתי שזה לא דומה לחוק מנהלת השלישית. שם נותנים לאדם שלושה שלש מאות שקלים כדי לשמור על בטיחותם של שני אנשים. אחד נתן את מאה ולשני מאתיים. כשבאים לקחת את זה כל אחד אומר המאתיים הוא שלו. שם אנו אומרים שהאדם השלישי צריך לשלם מאתיים לכל אחד מכיוון שזו הייתה אשמתו. העניין כאן הוא גם נראה שזה קצת שונה ששומר חינם נשבע שהוא לא יודע איפה החפץ ואז לא משלם כלום. לכן נראה שמקרה זה פשוט לא נחשב לשומר של אובייקט אבוד. הסיבה היא שהאובייקט [המאה] לא אבד. הוא לא יודע למי לתת את זה. ולשם כך חושבים שהוא פושע. וכך הוא משלם כמו לווה, שואל משלם את הכל. [הצעדים הבסיסיים להגיע למסקנה זו הם אלה: יש לנו את מנה שלישית. שם שני אנשים נותנים לו שלוש מאות שקלים במעטפה אחת ואומרים לו למי הוא שתי מאות ומי המאה. אבל הם נתנו את זה בחבילה אחת, והוא לא כתב את זה. הוא שכח מי מהם. הוא נותן מאה לכל אחד, והמאה האחרונה נשאר במקום שהוא נמצא. אבל אם הכסף ניתן בשתי מעטפות, אז הוא נותן לכל אחד מאתיים בגלל שהוא פושע שלא כתב שם כל אחד על מעטפה שלו]

 In the subject of the third mana [the third hundred] (מנה השלישית). [ note 1] The law is to leave it as long as the middleman was not negligent. [If he was, then he has to pay.] The question that come up in the gemara in Bava Metzia is why is this not divided? They answer division happens only when it could be true. [note 2] Rav Akiva Eigger askes from page 28 what about the case of signs and signs that is left. That is, there is  a lost object. two people give signs to show that it belongs to them. It is left by the finder until some absolute proof can be brought. But it could be of both so why not divide? Answers Rav Shach: division only happens when there is derara demomona [דררא דממונא] a doubt about the money and both have some prior "hazaka" ( "חזקא" holding", that is a reason to say the object is theirs.) But here the finder is not holding the object for both but only for the true owner-even if we do not know who that is.  

[I am being a bit short here because Rav Shach brings up a second question about the last mishna in the first chapter of Bava Metzia where also you leave the document even though the middleman is in fact holding the document for two people.

And I have not worked out how the argument between Sumchos and the sages fits in here--o if it is relevant at all.

[note 1] Two people give three hundred zuz  to a middleman to take care of. When they return each claims 200. If it was given together in one envelope, it stays with the middleman.

[note 2] Two people might pick up an object in the street at the same time. But the third mana belongs to one or the other, Not both. 

Rav Nahman of Breslov and Uman actually has two places in the LeM where he seems to contradict himself. In one place he says to learn "Poskim" [the medieval authorities that wrote on law. This is different than medieval authorities that wrote commentaries.] separates the good from evil--since that is the whole purpose of the poskim --to come to clarification of the law. [However I should add that in the terminology of Rav Nahman, the word "poskim" means basically the actual Shulchan Aruch of Rav Joseph Karo (who was not a Rishon). He was the beginning of the period of the Achronim. However, it is clear throughout his writings that "poskim" to Rav Nahman means especially the actual Shulchan Aruch with its commentaries , the Shach, Taz, Magen Avraham, etc. 

But in Le.M vol. I, chapter 54, he says the "כוח הדמיון שורה על שונה הלכות" ["Delusions rest upon those that learn halacha."] And there is no mistaking his intension there as he goes into great detail explaining this.

But I think that a simple answer is that he uses the word "shone halachot" שונה הלכות not "lomed halachot." לומד הלכות [To be "Shone" is  meant to to say the words and go on. The word "lomed" means to learn in depth.

So the best idea in terms of Halacha according to this would be not to be "shone halachot",  but rather to learn in depth starting from the Gemara and going through the Rosh, Rif, Tur, Shulchan Aruch with the basic commentaries on the Shuclan Aruch. [Later note, actually I think the best of all halacha books, the Tur with the Beit Yoseph is the best.] 

Incidentally, this is how I was taught in my second year in Shar Yashuv (the yeshiva of Rav Friefeld). Only in the third year there did they start with deep "lumdus" [learning] as you can see examples in Rav Shach and Rav Chaim of Brisk.

[There is a way of learning in depth which is to review the paragraph 10 times, and  that helps me to learn Physics and Math.] 

 "Social Justice Warrior"s advocate theft. They call it "redistribution" but changing the words that describe something still does not change the actual act.

This last so called "election" was not an election at all. There was was an astounding amount of open fraud. It was just a test of how much Democrats could get away with cheating. And if the voices that object would make any difference. It takes about two minutes to open any computer that count the votes and program it to count all the votes for Bidden or simply put in as many votes for Bidden as you want. This was already demonstrated in the Conference in Los Vegas at a computer conference.

The Gemara and Tosphot in the beginning of Bava Metzia

When there is a doubt about money the law is in some cases to divide, in other cases to let the money or object remain where it is until Elisha the prophet comes. The Gemara and Tosphot in the beginning of Bava Metzia deal with this.

One issue that come up is the מנה שלישית [the third hundred.] That is when two people come to a someone they trust and give him an envelope with three hundred dollars.  Then they return sometime later and each one says the 200 was mine and the hundred was of the other. Then he gives each 100 and the last hundred he keeps until some proof is brought, one way or the other. But if each comes in and separately give him their own envelope. Then he forgets who gave him the $200 and who gave the $100, then he has to give 200 to each and pay from his own pocket.

The question Rav Shach brings from the last Mishna in the first chapter of Bava Metzia מצא שטר בין שטרותיו ואינו יודע מה טיבו יניח a person finds a document of a loan among his documents and does not remember who gave it to him and the lender and borrower both ask for it. There he leaves it. Is this not the same as the above case where he has to pay from his own pocket since he forgot?

Rav Shach answers the case of the loan reverts to a verbal loan in which case the lender is believed to say "I paid". So we leave the document and give it to neither.

The question here is that most of the time in Bava Metzia when issues about money that we do not know to whom it belongs, the Mishnas goes like Sumchos [ממון המוטל בספק חולקים] , not the sages ( המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה) [like on page 100 side a]. But sometimes the mishna is a case where even the Sages agree. Sometimes the Gemara deals with this issue, and sometimes leaves it. So that last mishna might be like the sages that you leave the document where it is because it is המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה

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One issue that come up is the מנה שלישית . That is when two people come to a someone they trust and give him an envelope with three hundred שקלים.  Then they return sometime later and each one says the 200 was mine and the hundred was of the other. Then he gives each 100 and the last hundred he keeps until some proof is brought, one way or the other. But if each comes in and separately give him their own envelope. Then he forgets who gave him the 200 and who gave the 100, then he has to give 200 to each and משלם from his own pocket.

The question רב שך brings from the last משנה in the first chapter of בבא מציעא מצא שטר בין שטרותיו ואינו יודע מה טיבו יניח a person finds a document of a loan among his documents and does not remember who gave it to him and the lender and borrower both ask for it. There he leaves it. Is this not the same as the above case where he has to pay from his own pocket since he forgot?

רב שך answers the case of the loan reverts to a verbal loan in which case the lender is believed to say: "I paid". So we leave the document and give it to neither.

The question here is that most of the time in בבא מציעא when issues about money that we do not know to whom it belongs, the משנה goes like סומכוס ממון המוטל בספק חולקים, not the sages  המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה) like on page 100 side a. But sometimes the משנה is a case where even the Sages agree. Sometimes the גמרא deals with this issue, and sometimes leaves it. So that last משנה might be like the sages that you leave the document where it is because it is המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה

נושא אחד שעולה הוא מנה שלישית. זה כאשר שני אנשים מגיעים למישהו שהם סומכים עליו ונותנים לו מעטפה עם שלוש מאות שקלים. ואז הם חוזרים זמן מה אחר כך וכל אחד אומר שה -200 היו שלי והמאה היו של השני. ואז הוא נותן לכל אחד את 100 ואת המאה האחרונה שהוא שומר עד שמביאים הוכחה כלשהי, כך או אחרת. אבל אם כל אחד נכנס ונפרד נותנים לו מעטפה משלהם. ואז הוא שוכח מי נתן לו את ה200 ומי נתן את ה100, ואז הוא צריך לתת 200 לכל אחד ומשלם מכיסו.

השאלה שרב שך מביא מהמשנה האחרון בפרק הראשון בבא מציעא מצא שטר בין שטרותיו ואינו יודע מה טיבו יניח (אדם מוצא מסמך של הלוואה בין מסמכיו ואינו זוכר מי נתן לו המלווה או הלווה. שניהם מבקשים את המסמך. שם הוא משאיר את זה. האם זה אינו זהה למקרה דלעיל בו עליו לשלם מכיסו מאז ששכח?

רב שך עונה על המקרה של ההלוואה חוזר להלוואה מילולית ובמקרה זה מאמינים שהמלווה שאומר: "שילמתי". אז אנחנו עוזבים את המסמך ונותנים אותו לאף אחד מהם.

השאלה כאן היא שרוב הזמן בבבא מציעא כשנושאים על כסף שאיננו יודעים למי הוא שייך, המשנה הולכת כמו סומכוס (ממון המוטל בספק חולקים), ולא החכמים (המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה) כמו בעמוד 100 בצד א. אבל לפעמים זה מקרה שבו אפילו החכמים מסכימים. לפעמים הגמרא עוסקת בנושא זה ולעיתים עוזבת אותה. כך שבמקרה האחרון של שיכחת השטר יכול להיות כמו החכמים שאתה משאיר את המסמך במקום שהוא נמצא בגלל שהוא המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה

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