The letter of excommunication the Gra signed.

Is the letter of excommunication  the Gra signed valid? I think so. This is based on the Rambam in laws of oaths where there is some discussion of from where the laws of חרם נידוי (excommunication) come from. In the commentaries there it is explained they come from the Biblical category of איסר נדר [prohibited because of a vow]-that is anyone can forbid his object to another by saying "This object of mine is to you a  sacrifice קרבן."
So at least we see the status of an excommunication has validity. So you can not ignore it even if you think it is based on false premises.

All the more so after it has become obvious that it was not based on false premises.
Clearly the case is much more severe than that letter originally stated.
But the Gra was ignored because the Sitra Achra sometimes is given permission from above to create false structures and formations.
So at least one can be careful about his own self and what he keeps in his home even if he can not tell others about it.

[It is curious why the legal issues involved in this are ignored. I mean even people that seem to strive to uphold the Law still routinely  ignore the חרם (excommunication) and thus come under the חרם (excommunication) themselves.

[That is the general law about excommunication. If one ignores it then he himself comes under it. So I make it my practice not to enter into a place where the letter of the Gra is ignored. ]

Just for further information I ought to mention that I do not think that Rav Nahman from Breslov comes under that excommunication after I saw the actual words of the letter which I found in a book that brought a lot of the original documents.] In fact I think Rav Nahman has some amazing insights. Still the fact that the excommunication in ignored is upsetting.

The fact of ignoring the letter of excommunication means in effect all that ignore it are under the same list of prohibitions which means basically the entire religious world.

The most important point I learned in Shar Yashuv is the importance of learning Torah. But it was not just something that I read about but saw in practice. Later in the Mir was where I learned about trust in God without doing any work.

This came to me more or less in the sense that I became clear to me that learning Torah as a primary goal is, in fact, the world view of authentic Torah--not just made up out of thin air after the Litvak yeshivas made it a central point.
But I do not recall that trust was emphasized in Shar Yashuv. I would have to say that it was specifically at the Mir in NY that the idea of trust in God was emphasized or at least was an undercurrent.

[The idea that learning Torah is the prime goal definitively was not accepted by the secular world. But the idea that work was this great ennobling endeavor made little sense to me.]
[You can see how work became considered the highest goal in life during the revolutionary movements of the 1800's. The peak of that thought was Marxism. The rigorously worked out system. But even after reading Marx's Communist Manifesto and other leftist writings, I still could not see their point. It seemed oddly naive. However I can understand that the revolutionary movements were dealing with a whole different set of problems in which they saw the overthrow of the ruling class and establishing the rule of the proletariat as the highest goal. But growing up in the USA, I simply did not see the same kind of problems that the communists were facing. Maybe if I had grown up in Europe or Eastern Europe in the 1800's I would seen the point of Marx differently.]

It is possible for people to abuse this doctrine of the importance of learning Torah to try to get money from others because of their "supposed learning." But here I am just dealing with the actual doctrine of Torah, not whether it can be abused. Anything in Torah can easily be abused.

In any case the place that you see this idea of learning Torah most directly is in the Nefesh HaHaim. But the Mishna itself is the most obvious source. תלמוד תורה כנגד כולם Learning Torah is equal in itself to all the other commandments. And the Yerushalmi says "even one word"

The essentials of Torah

The essentials of Torah are
(1) Monotheism. God made the world from nothing. And He is one simple being, not a composite. Nor does He have any substance or form. The world is not God, nor is the world godliness.
God did not make the world out of Himself. He made it from nothing. Since this is an essential aspect and belief of Torah it is no wonder the Gra signed the letter of excommunication against people that denied these basic beliefs and yet made a whole show an dance about how Jewish they were.
(2) Midot Tovot =good traits.
(3) Belief that the Torah in divinely inspired.

[The middle point is this: that nothing matters until one has good traits. The good traits are what makes one a mensch [decent human being]. So without good traits, doing any commandments is not all that different from a dog keeping Shabat. This is explained in detail in the Guide of the Rambam and I have mentioned this before.
In short, the Rambam explains  the commandments of reason חוקים שכליים were revealed to Abraham the Patriarch was the for there to be the giving of the Torah to Moses, there first needed to be the level of commandments of reason. Otherwise the commandments of Torah would be indistinguishable from superstitions. The Reshash {Rav Shalom Sharabi} makes a similar point in his Nahar Shalom that the soul of a person is his character traits and the commandments are to food and clothing of the soul. So without good traits, one lacks the very soul which makes the commandments of Torah significant.




[This issue came up on Shabat when I was asked what my opinion about what are the essential aspects of Torah.]

בבא מציעא דף צ''ט ע''א

The question that came up in תוספות between my learning partner and me in בבא מציעא דף צ''ט ע''א is whether the גיזבר knows the vessel is הקדש? He said it is שוגג. It seemed to me  that it makes no difference. I thought if the גיזבר knows the כלי is הקדש and uses it, he still is not intending to take it out of  רשות of הקדש. So he would be obligated in מעילה במזיד, and in that case he gets מכות and pays the קרן of what he was נהנה. If he does not know that the קרדום is of הקדש, and he thinks it is one of his own vessels, then  he also is not intending to take it out of  רשות הקדש, and so pays קרן and חומש and brings a קרבן מעילה.  Why can not both say that it can be either one, שוגג or מזיד?
Answer:
The reason is the mishna in Kidushin 52b that only מזיד has מעילה אחר מעילה. The is the opinion of R. Yehuda that later on the Gemara 54 says is the law.
So in our case in Bava Metzia 99 in Tosphot the גיזבר does not know the ax is הקדש  as my learning partner said to me from the beginning. [That is why the second person can use it. In שוגג the object becomes חולין] The question I had on this was from Tosphot Kidushin page 55 where it does look the opposite. Then it occurred to me that what Tophot says in Kidushin does not disagree with what they say in Bava Metzia.[I mean they give there  a different answer, but still do not disagree with the basic idea that only מזיד has מעילה אחר מעילה for בדק הבית]



In short, Tosphot holds like R. Yehuda that only מזיד has מעילה אחר מעילה, but it has to be he intends to take the object from domain to domain. So the Tosephta where all the people that used the ax are מועל because they know it is הקדש.and שואל שלא מדעת הוא גזל so even if they do not intend to steal it but borrow it is still מעילה

המשנה בקידושין נ''ב: כותבת שרק במזיד יש מעילה אחר מעילה. זוהי דעתו של ר' יהודה. מאוחר יותר בגמרא דף נ''ד נפסק שכן הוא החוק. אז במקרה שלנו בבא מציעא צ''ט בתוספות בדעת הר''י הגיזבר אינו יודע שהגרזן הוא של הקדש. לכן האדם השני יכול להשתמש בו. שוגג במעילה האובייקט הופך לחולין. השאלה הייתה לי על זה הייתה מן תוספות קידושין דף נ''ה איפה שנראה ההפך. ואז עלה בדעתי כי מה תוספות אומר בקידושין אינו כנגד מה שאומרים בבא מציעא. תוספות מחזיקה כמו ר' יהודה שרק במזיד יש מעילה אחר מעילה [בבדק הבית], אבל זה חייב להיות כי בכוונתו לקחת את אובייקט מתחום לתחום. אז התוספתא שם שכל האנשים שהשתמשו בגרזן הם מועלים כי הם יודעים שזה הוא קדש .ושואל שלא מדעת הוא גזלן. כך שגם אם הם לא מתכוונים לגנוב אותו אבל ללוות אותו הוא עדיין מעילה.





The basic background here is the תוספתא and משנה and גמרא in בבא מציעא and תוספות in בבא מציעא דף צ''ט ע''א. The basic סוגיא is this. The תוספתא writes when one uses an קרדום of הקדש one after the other they are all מועל. But when one gives it to his friend, only the first is מועל. The משנה writes there is no מועל after מועל except animals and כלי שרת. Another משנה writes a person that puts a קרש of הקדש into his house is not מועל until he lives in it. But if he gives it to his friend, then he is מועל right away. רב אמי in בבא מציעא דף צ''ט ע''א says a המשאיל קרדום של הקדש לחבירו הוא מעל לפי טובת הנאה שבו וחבירו מותר להשתמש איתו מיד. One who משאיל a קרדום of הקדש to his friend, is מועל according to the amount of gratitude he receives from his friend, and his friend can use it right away. תוספות asks on this law of רב אמי from the תוספתא and the משנה. In תוספות are a few suggestions to answer this before תוספות gets to the answers that he thinks are correct. One  possible answer is this. There is a difference between כלי שרת and other vessels. I.e. the case of the תוספתא where there are multiple violations of מעילה on one קרדום is when the קרדום  is כלי שרת. And another rejected answer is the difference between intending to steal the קרדום, and just intending to use the קרדום. That is, the case of the תוספתא of multiple violations מועל אחר מועל is when there was no intention to steal the קרדום, but just to use it. But where there is intention to steal then only the first is מועל. But תוספות disagress with this because of the גמרא in בבא מציעא where רב אמי says one who משאיל the קרדום to another is מועל but not the one who receives it. Then תוספות come to the two answers of the ר''י that he likes. שינוי רשות and that רב אמי is talking about a גיזבר. That is  שינוי רשות of the קרדום means the קרדום goes out to חולין completely, and even so the גיזבר only pays according to טובת הנאה שיש בו . The other answer is also  that it is a גיזבר but the קרדום goes out to חולין only according to the time set for the loan. After that the קרדום returns automatically to the רשות of הקדש.


) בבא מציעא דף צ''ט ע''א. השאלה שעלתה בתוספות ביני ובין שותף הלמידה שלי בבא מציעא דף צ''ט ע''א היא
האם הגיזבר (בתירוצו של הר''י) יודע הכלי היא קדש? דוד אמר שלא. הגיזבר חושב שהכלי שלו. היה נראה לי
שזה זה לא משנה. ככל שהייתי יכול לראות אם גיזבר מכיר שהכלי (הקרדום) הוא קדש ומשתמש בו, הוא עדיין
לא מתכווין לקחת אתו מתוך רשות של קדש. אז הוא יהיה מחויב במעילה במזיד, ואם כך, הוא מקבל מכות
ומשלם את הקרן של מה שהוא נהנה. אם הוא לא יודע כי הקרדום הוא של קדש, והוא חושב שזה אחד מהכלים
משלו, אז הוא גם לא מתכוון לקחת את זה מתוך רשות קדש, ועל כך הוא משלם קרן וחומש ומביא קרבן מעילה.
חשבתי שאולי זה תלוי בויכוח בין תוספות ואת הרמב''ם אם המקרה של הגמרא של גיזבר במסכת מעילה (שנוטל
קרש של הקדש) הוא מזיד או שוגג. נראה לי שבוודאי דוד צדק שהגיזבר שגג. ובין לתוספות ובין לרמב''ם צריכים
לומר שזה שהשיאל את הקרדום הוא בשוגג ולא יודע שהוא של הקדש בגלל המשנה בהאיש מקדש [קידושין נ''ב
ע''ב] שבשוגג הכלי מתחלל ויוצא לחולין והאיש שמשתמש איתו אחר כך אינו מועל. במזיד הכלי של בדק הבית
אינו מתחלל בגלל שאינו חייב בקרבן ומי שהשתמש איתו אחר כך מעל.

[הרקע הבסיסי כאן הוא התוספתא ומשנה וגמרא בבא מציעא ותוספות שם. סוגיא הבסיסית היא זו. התוספתא
כותבת כשכמה אנשים משתמשים בקרדום של קדש אחד אחרי השני הם כולם מועלים. אבל כאשר אחד נותן אותו
לחברו, רק הראשון הוא מועל. המשנה כותבת שאין מועל לאחר מועל למעט בעלי חיים כלי שרת. עוד משנה
כותבת אדם זה מעמיד קרש של קדש לתוך הבית שלו הוא לא מועל עד שהוא מתגורר בבית. אבל אם הוא נותן
אותו לחברו, הרי שהוא מועל מיד. רב אמי בבבא מציעא דף צ''ט ע''א אומר המשאיל קרדום של הקדש לחבירו
הוא מעל לפי טובת הנאה שבו וחבירו מותר להשתמש איתו מיד. (מי שמשאיל קרדום של הקדש לחברו, הוא מועל
לפי כמות הכרת הטוב שהוא מקבל מידידו, וחברו יכול להשתמש בו מיד.) תוספות שואלים על החוק הזה של רב
אמי מן התוספתא ומן המשנה. תוספות מציע כמה הצעות כדי לענות על השאלה הזאת לפני שהתוספות מקבלים
לתשובות נכונות של הר''י. תשובה אפשרית אחת היא זו. יש הבדל בין כלי שרת וכלים אחרים. כלומר במקרה של
תוספתא שבהם יש הפרות מרובות של מעילה הוא כאשר הקרדום הוא כלי שרת. ועוד תשובה שדחו היא ההבדל
בין הכוונה לגנוב את הקרדום, ומצב שהוא מתכווין רק להשתמש בקרדום. כלומר, במקרה של תוספתא של
הפרות מרובות "מועל אחר המועל" הוא כאשר לא הייתה כל כוונה לגנוב את הקרדום, אלא רק כדי להשתמש בו.
אבל איפה שיש כוונה לגנוב, אז רק הראשון הוא מועל. אבל תוספות חולק על זה בגלל בגמרא בבא מציעא שרב
אמי אומר מי שמשאיל קרדום לחבירו הוא מועל, אבל לא חבירו. ואז תוספות מביא שתי תשובות של ר''י. שינוי
הרשות וגם שרב אמי מדבר על גיזבר. כלומר שינוי רשות של קרדום פירושו הקרדום יוצא חולין לגמרי, ולמרות
שהגיזבר משלם רק על פי טובת הנאה שיש בו. התשובה השנייה היא גם שמדובר בגיזבר, אך הקרדום יוצא חולין
רק במשך הזמן שנקבע להלוואה. אחרי זה הקרדום חוזר אוטומטית לרשות של קדש, והגיזבר משלם רק על פי
טובת הנאה שיש בו.]
) ב

Bava Metzia page 99a

The question that came up in Tosphot between David and me in Bava Metzia page 99a is whether the Gizbar knows the vessel is Hekdesh? It seems to me at this point that it makes no difference. As far as I can see if the Gizbar knows the Kli is Hekdesh and uses it he still is not intending to take it out of  reshut of hekdesh. So he would be obligated in Meila bemezid in which case he gets makot and pays the keren of what he was "nehene." If he does not know and he thinks it is one of his own vessels then there he also in not intending to take it out of his domain and so pays Keren and 1/5 and brings a sacrifice.

This would I think depend on the argument between Tosphot and the Rambam whether the regular case that the Gemara says is of  a Gizbar in tractate Meila is Mezid or Shogeg.

But then why in that law of the Gizbar why would there be an argment between the Rambam and Tosphot? Why can not both says that it can be either one, shogeg of Mezid?

Perhaps to the Rambam it has to be Mezid because he does not hold of Shinuy Reshut in Meila? I mean is it possible that his opinion about Meila in general that it refers only to either getting benefit out of the Hekdesh object or damaging it might be the only reason he says the Gizbar has to be knowing it is Hekdesh? I can not see why this minute but maybe?

In any case the basic background here is the Tosephta and Mishna and Gemara in Bava Metzia and Tosphot in Bava Metzia page 99a
The basic Sugia is this. The Tosephta writes when one uses an ax of hekdesh one after the other they are all Moel. But when one gives it to his friend, only the first in Moel.
The Mishna writes there is no Moel after Moel except animals and kli sharet.
Another mishna writes a person that puts a wooden beam of hekdesh into his house is not Moel until he lives in it, but if he gives it to his friend he is moel right away.
Rav Ami in Bava Metzia page 99a says a המשאיל קרדום של הקדש לחבירו הוא מעל לפי טובת הנאה שבו וחבירו מותר להשתמש איתו מיד. One who loans an ax of hekdesh to his friend, is moel according to the amount of gratitude he recieves from his friend and his freind can use it right away.
Tosphot asks on this law of Rav Ami from the Tosephta and the Mishna.
In Tosphot are a few suggestions to answer this before Tosphot gets to the answers that he thinks are correct. One is this. There is a difference between כלי שרת and other vessels. I.e. the case of the תוספתא where there are multiple violations of meila on one קרדום is when the קרדום  is כלי שרת. And another rejected answer is the difference between intending to steal the קרדום and just intending to use the קרדום. That is, the case of the Tosephta of multiple violations is when there was no intention to steal the קרדום but just to use it. But where there is intention to steal then only the first is Moel. Tosphot disagress with this because of the Gemara in Bava Metzia where Rav Ami says one who loans the ax to another is moel but not the one who recieves it.
Then Tosphot come to the two answers of the Ri that he likes. שינוי רשות.and that Rav Ami is talking about a Gizbar. That is  שינוי רשות of th ax means the ax goes out to Hulin completely and even so the Gizbar only pays accoring to טובת הנאה שיש בו . The other answer is it is a Gizbar but the ax goes out to Hulin only according to the time set for the loan. After that the ax returns automatically to the reshut of Hekdesh.
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The question that came up in תוספות between David and me in בבא מציעא דף צ''ט ע''א is whether the גיזבר knows the vessel is הקדש? It seems to me at this point that it makes no difference. As far as I can see if the גיזבר knows the כלי is הקדש and uses it he still is not intending to take it out of  רשות of הקדש. So he would be obligated in מעילה במזיד and in that case he gets מכות and pays the קרן of what he was .נהנה If he does not know  that the קרדום is of הקדש and he thinks it is one of his own vessels, then there he also is not intending to take it out of his רשות and so pays קרן and חומש and brings a קרבן מעילה. This would I think depends on the argument between תוספות and the רמב''ם whether the regular case that the גמרא says is of  a גיזבר in מסכת מעילהis מזיד or שוגג. But then why in that law of the גיזבר why would there be an argument between the רמב''ם and תוספות? Why can not both says that it can be either one, שוגג or מזיד? Perhaps to the רמב''ם, it has to be מזיד because he does not hold of שינוי רשות in מעילה? I mean to ask, is it possible that his opinion about מעילה in general that it refers only to either getting benefit out of the הקדש object or damaging it might be the only reason he says the גיזבר has to be knowing it is הקדש? I can not see why this minute, but maybe? In any case, the basic background here is the תוספתא and משנה and גמרא in בבא מציעא and תוספות in בבא מציעא דף צ''ט ע''א. The basic סוגיא is this. The תוספתא writes when one uses an קרדום of הקדש one after the other they are all מועל. But when one gives it to his friend, only the first is מועל. The משנה writes there is no מועל after מועל except animals and כלי שרת. Another משנה writes a person that puts a קרש of הקדש into his house is not מועל until he lives in it. But if he gives it to his friend, then he is מועל right away. רב אמי in בבא מציעא דף צ''ט ע''א says a המשאיל קרדום של הקדש לחבירו הוא מעל לפי טובת הנאה שבו וחבירו מותר להשתמש איתו מיד. One who משאיל a קרדום of הקדש to his friend, is מועל according to the amount of gratitude he receives from his friend, and his friend can use it right away. תוספות asks on this law of רב אמי from the תוספתא and the משנה. In תוספות are a few suggestions to answer this before תוספות gets to the answers that he thinks are correct. One  possible answer is this. There is a difference between כלי שרת and other vessels. I.e. the case of the תוספתא where there are multiple violations of מעילה on one קרדום is when the קרדום  is כלי שרת. And another rejected answer is the difference between intending to steal the קרדום, and just intending to use the קרדום. That is, the case of the תוספתא of multiple violations מועל אחר מועל is when there was no intention to steal the קרדום, but just to use it. But where there is intention to steal then only the first is מועל. But תוספות disagrees with this because of the גמרא in בבא מציעא where רב אמי says one who משאיל the קרדום to another is מועל but not the one who receives it. Then תוספות come to the two answers of the ר''י that he likes. שינוי רשות and that רב אמי is talking about a גיזבר. That is  שינוי רשות of the קרדום means the קרדום goes out to חולין completely, and even so the גיזבר only pays according to טובת הנאה שיש בו . The other answer is also  that it is a גיזבר but the קרדום goes out to חולין only according to the time set for the loan. After that the קרדום returns automatically to the רשות of הקדש.


I do recall that there were some people that commented on this argument between Tosphot and the Rambam. It seems to me if perhaps I can find out what they were suggesting, maybe I can see how that might apply to the ax also?

objective morality

I must have mentioned this before but now it occurs to me to mention again that the basic approach of Saadia Gaon and and the rishonim is that the basic idea of Torah is to come to objective morality which is recognizable by reason. But there is a level above that also which the Torah tries to bring one to. But the first level--the minimum is natural law--or what Rav Saadia Gaon calls חוקי השכל

Reason has a limit.

I have been bothered by the phenomenon of the 1800's that people accepted what now looks like a sort of silly world view--that just by getting rid of kings and priests and putting workers in control, everything would become like a utopia.  The thing to try to figure out is how this applies to us nowadays? What kinds of silly world views are we accepting that on closes examination will prove to be silly and ridiculous.
How can you tell where the current in leading you when you yourself are immersed in the stream itself?

[I am more or less thinking of Marx and an over confidence in reason that Kant warned about. Now even though I believe that reason recognizes moral principles as Michael Humer pointed out why he is not an objectivist,  still I think there are limits to reason as Kant said and this was certainly the opinion of the Talmud and the geonim and rishonim.
See the beginning of Nahar Shalom of Rav Shalom Sharabi where he explains that the Condensation was in all the midot. That means including wisdom. That is to say Reason has a limit. [A similar explanation is offered by Rav Nahman of Breslov.]